LLB criminal exam notes
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67 terms
Terms | Definitions |
|---|---|
 Misra (2004) | must also have been a reasonably foreseeable risk of death The question for the jury is whether his behaviour was grossly negligent and consequently criminal |
| R v Wenton (Luke) [2010] appellant threw a brick through the victim's window, breaking it. The appellant subsequently threw a petrol canister and a lit piece of paper through the broken window. does not ignite | threat to life in s.1(2) had to result from the damage to the property and not from the act of the defendant property by fire should always be charged as arson contrary to s.1(3). |
| R v Smith, Plummer and Haines [2011 as whether a person can be guilty of stealing something which it is unlawful for anyone to possess | Court of Appeal held that nothing in the provisions of the Theft Act 1968 suggests that what would be regarded as property for the purposes of theft ceases to be so because its possession or control is, for whatever reason, unlawful or illegal or prohibited. |
| Parties to crime Gnango [2010] A bullet from X's gun killed a passer-by. By virtue of the doctrine of transferred malice, X was found guilty of murder and, by way of joint enterprise, the appellant was also found guilty of murder, | existence of a joint enterprise was essential to liability. Mere participation in the affray with foresight but without joint enterprise was not enough to give rise to liability. There had to be foresight of the further offence as a possible incident of the common enterprise and participation, with that foresight, in the common enterprise. |
| Parties to crime Hui Chi-Ming v The Queen (1992) | parties in this case were not in a joint enterprise as, even though they were both guilty of affray, it had not been demonstrated that they had agreed to that offence and shared a common purpose in committing it. |
| Parties: R v Willett (Tommy) [2010] accomplice had remained in a vehicle being driven by his brother, Y, while Y ran over a man who was trying to stop them from getting away after their attempt to steal from his van. | murder in relation to the accomplice was unsafe as the trial judge had failed to emphasise to the jury that it had to be sure that the accomplice had joined in the threat to the victim and, in doing so, had encouraged Y to run over him. essence of imposition of liability on a secondary party in such circumstances was the secondary party's continued participation in a joint criminal enterprise despite his foresight or contemplation of the commission of another crime which was not the purpose of the enterprise. See R v Rahman (Islamur) |
| A, B, C & D (joint enterprise) v The Queen The appellants appealed against their convictions for murder. There had been an attack on the victim in his home by three of them but the attack had actually been organised by the fourth. The attack consisted of a beating, no weapons were involved and it was not possible to identify individual acts of violence or to say who had done precisely what. | An accessory could be guilty of murder only if he participated in the common enterprise of a crime and foresaw that in the course of it the principal, whether identified or not, might (not would) commit murder, i.e. act with the intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm. follow Chan Wing Siu v R [1985] Therefore, the judge had also erred by failing to state in terms that a defendant could only be guilty if someone (identified or not) had inflicted grievous bodily harm on the deceased with the intention of doing so - in other words if someone was guilty of murder. |
| R v Rahman (Islamur) | foresight of D1's act would almost inevitably carry with it foresight of an intention to kill or at least to cause really serious injury. If, as in many of the reported cases, D1 was carrying a knife, a gun or a broken bottle, and used it, the real question would normally be whether D2 knew that he was carrying it and foresaw that he might (not would) use it. |
| Powell | f B intends or foresees that A may act with intent to kill, it seems immaterial that he does it by one means rather than another. Unlike GBH, there are no degrees of death. |
| Rahman | If D1 and D2 agree to kill V by beating him to death with baseball bats, but, in the course of the attack, D1 pulls out a gun and shoots V, B2 must still be guilty of murder. |
| Stringer R. v Stringer | While it was central to liability as an aider and abettor that defendants should perform acts of assistance or encouragement it was not necessary for such acts to accompany the principal's commission of the offence, nor that it should cause the principal to commit the offence although it should be of a nature to be capable of assisting or encouraging the offence. Whether D's conduct amounted to assistance or encouragement was a question of fact. |
| R v Carpenter [2011] | that the unavailability of manslaughter as a possible verdict in the R v Mendez case had to be seen in the context of that case where use of a knife was not foreseen, rather than to a case where use of a knife was foreseen but the secondary party did not share or foresee the intention with which it was used. The court was simply not addressing a situation where, as here, use of a knife was foreseen but it was not intended or foreseen that the knife would be used with the intention to kill or cause really serious harm. |
| Hatton (2005) cf Ogrady | held that a defendant who raised the issue of self-defence was not entitled to rely on a mistaken belief induced by voluntary intoxication, regardless of whether the defence was raised against a charge of murder or one of manslaughter. |
| words can amount to assault (Ireland and Burstow (1998)), although there is the issue here of whether Simon apprehended 'immediate' violence. What is 'immediacy' in this context. In addition some of you referred to the offence assault occasioning actual bodily harm without noting that the psychological harm, Chan Fook??? | in order to amount to bodily harm had to be an identifiable clinical condition Chan-Fook (1994) |
| Chase-Manhattan Bank 1981 theft | That a person who paid money to another under a factual mistake retained ownership of it (in equity). C had a right to the money it did not belong to the defendant. |
| Walkington, R v (1979) | it is for the jury to decide whether the area physically marked out by a counter was sufficiently segregated to amount to a "part of a building" from which the general public are excluded. It was clear that the public was impliedly prohibited from entering the counter area and D knew this. |
| Dhaliwal (2006) | where it was stated per curiam that unlawful violence on an individual with a fragile and vulnerable personality which is proved to be a material cause of death, even where it was death by suicide was, arguably, capable of amounting to manslaughter. |
| Chan Fook | 'Actual bodily harm '; includes psychiatric injury but does not include emotions, such as fear or panic. ABH does not include states of mind that are not themselves evidence of some identifiable clinical condition. Only expert evidence to this effect should be made to the jury regarding psychiatric injury. |
| Dear (1996) | he real question was whether the injuries inflicted by the defendant were an operating and significant cause of the death. |
| consent: cases FRAUD DURESS CAPACITY PUBLIC POLICY | Wilson v Pringle: for assault touching must be hostile in crowd. Reality of consent |
| consent cases Fraud | R v Williams [1923]: guilty of rape sex fake breathing exercise R v Clarence (1888) : fraud must go to root and identity (here not guilty even though venereal disease) R v Tabassum [2000]: breast exam , consent to the nature of the act there was no consent in relation to its quality. Konzani [2005]: GBH s20 OAPA HIV infections Fraud: identity of the person Richardson [1998]: qualifications of dentist, cannot claim against fraud!! |
| CONSENT DURESS and Capacity | Nichol (1807) : implied duress schoolboy Gillick v West Norfolk Health Authority [1986] : under 16 could consent to advice and treatment without the need for any parental consent provided the child had the ability to appreciate the situation. A person of full age may lack the capacity to consent. In T v T [1988] the parent of a 19-year-old woman was granted a declaration in relation to the termination of a pregnancy. also Re F [1989] |
| Consent Fraud, DUress, Capacity PUBLIC POLICY BH ok for social purpose: medical,sports tatoos, piercing. BUT look at social utility of D... | Donovan [1934]: caned a 17-year-old girl for pleasure, guilty of indecent assault, consent immaterial when intent to cause BH, but quashed on appeal jury not directed. AG 6 1980:when ABH or intended ABH consent will only be a defence where the harm caused or intended was in the public interest. Street fighting was not such an activity. Brown [1993]. Sado-masochism Where A wounds or assaults B occasioning him actual bodily harm in the course of a sadomasochistic encounter, does the prosecution have to prove lack of consent on the part of B before they can establish A's guilt under s.20 or s.47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861? HL : NO ,concern at the possible corruption of young men who might be lured into these activities at a young age and then become entrenched in them for life+ spread of AIDS (although Dica allows consent for this). complained to ECHR article 8, but rights are not garanteed Sports: Barnes [2005] : no proceedings unless serious to be properly categorised as criminal Children Act 2004: assault or battery would still amount to lawful chastisement. But if any injury is caused or where there was cruelty there would be no defence. |
| Appeal in Owino [1996] confirmed in Palmer | 2 stage test to be proved before the self-defence could be successfully used as a defence. The defendant must honestly believe that force is necessary to defend himself, another or property and he must use reasonable force. This test was confirmed by Lord Morris in the Privy Council case R v Palmer [1971] |
| Majewski | voluntary intoxication is no defence to crimes requiring only basic intent, the mens rea requirement for these being satisfied by the reckless behaviour of intoxicating oneself |
| Dietschmann Di Duca: transient effects of intoxicants do not constitute abnormality of the mind for DR | To benefit from the finding of diminished responsibility, D does not have to show he would have killed had he been sober. drunkenness not relevant can change behaviour but abnormality must be evaluated outside of this. |
| DR BOP | Dunbar:raised by D BOP Grantif D insanity , P DR=> BRD Cox: guilty plea accepted if medical evidence uncontested. |
| DR Byrne | Byrne Diminished responsibility covers all the activities of the mind. Abnormality of the mind does no have to be connected with madness. |
| Woollin Test | unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant's actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case. |
| maliciously | s requiring proof that the defendant was aware that his conduct carried a risk of causing some harm, albeit not serious harm (Savage and Parmenter approving Mowatt [1967] |
| Sheehan and Moore [1975] | drunken intent is intent |
| Savage and Parmenter [1991] | Maliciously'. It must be proved that D was aware that his conduct carried a risk of causing some harm, albeit not serious harm |
| offences : omissions | Children and Young Persons Act 1933: willing neglect Pittwood : contract Stone and Dobinson Hood : duty to spouse |
| Under what circumstances may a person be criminally liable for a failure to act? | no general criminal liability for omissions to act, there are circumstances where a duty to act might be imposed either by statute (eg where it specifically states that a particular offence may be committed by omission) or by the courts. |
| Williams and Davis jumps out of car and dies claiming attemptedrobbery | The nature of the threat is of importance in considering both the foreseeability of harm to the victim from the threat and the question whether the deceased's conduct was proportionate to the threat, that is to say that it was within the ambit of reasonableness and not so daft as to make it his own voluntary act which amounted to a novus actus interveniens and consequently broke the chain of causation. It should of course be borne in mind that a victim may in the agony of the moment do the wrong thing." not guilty |
| Roberts (1971) | The proper test for "occasioning" is not whether D actually foresaw the conduct of the victim which resulted in the actual bodily harm, but whether that conduct could have reasonably been foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying or doing. i.e. provided it was not 'so " . daft" . ... or so unexpected ... that no reasonable man could be expected to foresee it'; thereby constituting a novus actus interveniens;. Guilty of ABH |
| Anna stabbed Iqbal. Iqbal was seriously injured. He was taken to hospital and placed on a life-support machine. One night, an intensive-care nurse, who hated money being wasted on expensive life-support machinery and without being authorised to do so, switched off the life support machine. Iqbal died. Consider Anna's possible criminal liability for murder key cases Cheshire, Pagett Malcharek, Woollin | Anna might have committed the actus reus of the offence. You should have cited the Woollin direction on intention when discussing the mens rea and pointed out that if it is proved that she intended serious harm that is sufficient mens rea for murder. You should then briefly have considered the liability of the nurse for murder. It is clear from the question that, even if her primary purpose was not to kill Iqbal but to save money, she would have foreseen death or serious harm as being a virtually certain consequence of her conduct (barring some unforeseen intervention). Anna's conduct is the sine qua non of Iqbal's death. But for her stabbing him he would still be alive. However, this factor alone will not make her criminally responsible. The question now to be determined is whether her conduct was also the legal cause. You will remember that in Malcherek where the doctors switched off the victim's life support, this did not break the chain of causation. The victim had, by a series of tests, been found to be brain stem dead before the ventilator was turned off. The defendant was liable as the injuries he inflicted were an operative and substantial cause of death. Anna's case is different, however, in that the nurse, without authorisation, took it upon herself to switch off the machine. This was not medical treatment so the case of Cheshire would not be directly relevant. In Pagett it was said that a free, deliberate and informed intervention by a third party could have the effect of relieving a defendant of criminal responsibility. The nurse's intervention was free, deliberate and informed and is likely to break the chain of causation between Anna's conduct and Iqbal's death. |
| Tatooing of minors Act | consent of minor is not valid can be used as analogy for consent cases |
| Morrison 1989 maliciousness test | whether D foresaw risk of some harm |
| D assaulted by beating a child by punching the child's mother causing the child to fall and hit his head. He argued that battery required the direct application of force which involved direct physical contact with the victim either with the body or with a medium such as a weapon | D assaulted by beating a child by punching the child's mother causing the child to fall and hit his head. He argued that battery required the direct application of force which involved direct physical contact with the victim either with the body or with a medium such as a weapon |
| actus reus murder | unlawfully killeth unlawful: not self D, ReA killeth: must be operative and legal cause |
| intervening event/Act of God | novus actus interveniens |
| Instan [1893] D lived with her aunt, who was suddenly taken ill with gangrene in her leg and became unable either to feed herself or to call for help. D did not give her any food, nor did she call for medical help, | A duty was imposed upon D to supply the deceased with sufficient food to maintain life, and that, the death of the deceased having been accelerated by the neglect of such duty. |
| self-induced intoxication contexts | evidence of lack of mens rea or as evidence supporting a mistaken belief in the need to use a defence |
| Self-induced intoxication is never accepted by the courts as an excuse for committing an offence. | distinction made between specific and basic intent offences and also its impact on other defences. For example, the 'objective' elements of duress, provocation and also 'reasonable force' in selfdefence. |
| self D and self induced intoxicaion | not for Mistake: O'Grady limited application courts do not want to encourage. Balance between peace and public safety and D's rights level of intoxication: Sheehan and Morore drunken intent=intent Gallagher: Dutch courage NO DPP v Beard rules for specific/basic retaken in Majewski NOTE: involuntary OK if no MR Hardie: OK also for Soporific drugs like Valium |
| Owino self D | must be reasonable and proportionate (not excessive) |
| NECESSITY: R v Burns (Paul) [2010 Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] Hichens [2011] | cannot forcibly remove a person from vehicle if they were let in voluntarily (self help. Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] : homeless enter empty houses. Hichens: upheld conviction of assault since there were other reasonable alternatives (calling the police) available |
| Duress: R v Ness [2011] Beever[2010]: threat from prisoner R v Z [2005]: he threat relied on must be to cause death or serious injury | Beever[2010]: threat was not sufficiently serious to amount to duress, required BoP. |
| Carey Watson : burglary, scares old V dies, info gained during crime is relevant. Dawson: objective test should be applied in the context of the circumstances known to the accused. And so if the accused is unaware of a peculiar vulnerability of the victim, then the 'sober and reasonable man' is also taken to lack this knowledge in assessing whether the conduct was objectively dangerous. applied in Carey | carey: The physical assault on Aimee was not the cause of death. The cause of death was Aimee running away in fear, but reasonable person would not bconsder this to be subjecting Aimee to some harm. |
| Ms B v An NHS Hospital | court agreed with Ms B that the doctors' refusal to disconnect a life-support machine to which she was connected and from which she wished to be disconnected and allowed to die was an unlawful trespass. |
| duty: | Stone and Dobinson: allow people into th their care implies a duty miller: if one creates a situation a duty of care arises Lewin v CPS: friend in car in hot weather, duty to friends |
| scope of a person's duty | The issue is whether a defendant who was under a duty to act has discharged that duty to a reasonable standard. If Luke was under a duty to act, what he did or did not do in discharging that duty will be judged according to how the court considers a reasonable person would have acted under the particular circumstances. It is an objective test. Even if Luke thought he was doing his best, if that was an 'incompetent best' it will not be sufficient to discharge his duty |
| Hill 2008 | childhood experience of sexual abuse would, following Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23, be relevant to the question in provocation whether the reasonable man would have done as the defendant did. |
| DR | burden of proof is on the defendant on balance of probabilities. Note that medical evidence is required to support this defence. |
| Gomez (1993) | Provided K was dishonest consent to the appropriation is (s.3) irrelevant. |
| When is an act 'sexual' for the purposes of the Sexual Offences Act 2003? | ... |
| R v Chrastny [1991] | The defendant had been convicted of conspiracy to supply a Class A drug, and sought to challenge her conviction on the ground that the trial judge had erred in law in directing the jury that, although the defendant had only agreed with her husband that the offence should be committed, s2(2)(a) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 provided no protection where she had nevertheless known of the existence of the other conspirators. In dismissing the appeal, Glidewell LJ pointed out that the provision does not enable a wife to escape liability simply by taking care only to agree with her spouse, even though she knows of the existence of other parties to the conspiracy. Only where she remained genuinely ignorant of other parties to such a conspiracy would s2(2)(a) protect her. |
| Case law on consent to offences against the person, even after the decision in Brown, is unjustifiably inconsistent. The irreconcilability of Emmett and Aitken demonstrates this amply.' | Very few candidates attempted this question, which called for a general discussion of the post-Brown (1993) HL case law on the defence of consent. A good answer would have dealt with the inconsistencies in this area, particularly on how the courts have assessed which activities are 'lawful' for these purposes. A good answer would also have considered in some detail the approach of the majority and minority in the House of Lords in Brown (1993) to assessing which activities should be lawful or not. Surprisingly many candidates ignored, in the course of their discussion, the two cases referred to in the question. Both of these involved D setting fire to V but with different outcomes because the activities in question were sado-masochism and horseplay respectively. See 9.4 of the subject guide where this topic is considered. |
| Hector is furious that his girlfriend has left him for Vince. Hector's friends, Phillippe and Xavier, tell him that they should play a practical joke on Vince by way of revenge. They plan to call at Vince's house, pretending to be bailiffs coming to evict him for non-payment of rent. Hector agrees and they go to Vince's house and knock on the door. As Vince opens the door, they tell him that, if he does not pay this month's rent to them immediately, they will forcibly remove him and his possessions from the house. Vince is scared by this threat and tries to shut the door, but traps Xavier's foot as he does so, breaking several small bones. Hector, who had drunk half a bottle of vodka, cannot contain his anger and punches Vince hard in the stomach. They all run off, leaving Vince lying on the ground and struggling to breathe as the incident has brought on an asthma attack. As they run off, Phillippe grabs Vince's wallet. Discuss the criminal liability, if any, of the parties involved. NOTE - you are not required to discuss any inchoate offences which may arise in this question. | First of all - please see the note above which instructs you not to discuss any inchoate offences which may arise in the question. I cannot emphasise strongly enough that it is extremely important to read the question carefully. Many candidates did not do this and discussed a range of inchoate offences. In doing so, they wasted valuable examination time as, not only did they not get any marks for it, but the time they used thinking and writing about these inchoate offences could have been used to good effect by discussing what was relevant. They would obviously have then gained marks for doing so. Note also that the question does not state that anybody died. You will gain no marks, when answering a question like this, if you state '...if X had died then...' and then go on to discuss one or more of the forms of unlawful homicide. In answering this question, you were expected to consider a range of non-fatal offences against the person, property offences and, in relation to some of these offences, accomplice liability. Remember, when a question requires you to consider accomplice liability, always deal with the possible liability of the principal before you go on to examine any liability on the part of an accomplice. There was also the issue of intoxication on the part of Hector. What impact might that have had on his liability? Might Vince be able to take advantage of the defence of self-defence in respect of any offence(s) you should have considered in relation to him? |
| Davina applies for a job as a resident au pair for a family. She writes in her CV that she has been trained at the Montefiore school for nannies. She did indeed attend that school but failed her exams. The family hire her because at her interview she demonstrates an affinity with the children. While working for the family, she empties the piggy banks belonging to the children and uses the money to invest in some shares in her boyfriend's company, hoping to double the money so that she can replace their savings. She also becomes very friendly with the children's elderly grandmother who lives with them. The grandmother becomes so besotted with her that she changes her will, leaving Davina £10,000 to thank her for looking after her grandchildren. When the grandmother dies three months later, Davina inherits the £10,000. Her employers then ask the police to take legal action against her. Advise the police as to whether Davina has committed any criminal offences. | This question, like question 7 on the Zone A paper required consideration of a number of fraud and theft offences. Therefore, as with the Zone A question, note that it is easier to produce a good, concise and precise answer by breaking it down into a number of smaller parts (or questions) and dealing with each part/question fully before going on to the next one. The completed answer will read as though it is the answer to a single problem question but there is less chance that you will conflate and confuse issues. See the Examiner's comments on question 7 in the report for the Zone A paper. Candidates should have considered Davina's liability for fraud and theft offences. First her false or misleading statement in her CV, that she was 'trained' at the Montefiore school. She may well have been trained there but the fact that she failed her exams may make this statement misleading. There may also have been a fraud by failure to 265 0010 Criminal law Zone B 8 disclose. Was this done with a view to gain or cause loss? Note that the reasons why she was hired are irrelevant to liability as the fraud does not need to be operative. Using the money in the piggy banks - could she be liable for theft and/or fraud? Which type of fraud would you discuss here? So far as Davina's inheritance was concerned, there was no false representation. Could she be guilty of theft? See Chapter 16 of the subject guide for a discussion of fraud and theft |
| 'English common law rules in respect of insanity and automatism are as insane as those who try to rely on them.' | his was a very broad question which required candidates to comment critically on the application of these defences rather than just a narrative description of these defences which, unfortunately, was all that some candidates did. There should have been some critical comment on the distinction between sane and insane automatism and how decisions are made in respect of these different types. How does the distinction affect the burden of proof and ultimate disposal of the defendant? What purpose does this distinction serve? |
| Ivan and Katarina had been married for several years. Katarina had suffered many years of violence and abuse from Ivan and as a consequence suffered from severe depression. She was also diagnosed in her teenage years as suffering from a personality disorder which results in obsessive jealousy. One evening whilst on his way out of the house, Ivan insulted Katarina, calling her hideous and revealed that he was having an affair with her sister. This left Katarina feeling very depressed and she proceeded to drink half a bottle of whisky. A few hours later Ivan returned and, with a sneer, told her that he had had a wonderful evening. Katarina picked up the bottle of whisky and intending to cause him serious harm, hit Ivan on the head with it. He died from the injuries sustained. Discuss Katarina's liability for the homicide of Ivan. | This was a reasonably straightforward and very standard problem concerning murder and the old defences of provocation and diminished responsibility. Some candidates may have recognised it from the sample examination question in Chapter 8 of the 2007 edition of the subject guide. Since then, the law has changed and the 2010 edition of the subject guide takes account of these changes. In 8.1 of the 2010 subject guide, you will see that the partial defence of provocation was abolished by section 56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and replaced by the defence of loss of control - see sections 55 and 56. The partial defence of diminished responsibility was retained by the 2009 Act but modified by section 52. These provisions come into effect in October 2010 - just in time for your 2010/11 Criminal law course! A general point which relates to this question is that the offence of murder should be discussed before the consideration of any defence(s). Note that the question states that Katarina intended to cause Ivan 'serious harm'. As an intention to cause grievous bodily harm (serious harm) is sufficient mens rea for murder there was no need to spend time (as many candidates did) discussing oblique intent. Always read the question very carefully. You would need to consider, by reference to the provisions in the statute, whether Katarina suffered a loss of self-control (s.54(1)(a)) as the result of a qualifying trigger (s.54 (1)(b)) and which caused her to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged (s.54 1(c)). See 8.1 of the subject guide. Note that Katarina would bear an evidential burden in respect of this defence (s.54(6)) So far as the alternative defence of diminished responsibility is concerned, the burden of proof on balance of probabilities remains on the defendant where s/he raises the defence. This defence is defined in section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 as substituted by section 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. For the ingredients of the defence which you would need to consider in relation to Katarina see 8.2.1 of the subject guide. The question states that Katarina had been drinking quite heavily. You would need to consider the impact of intoxication on this defence. See 8.2.2 of the subject guide. |
| If is it right to offer the defence of duress at all in criminal law, then it should be a defence to any crime, not just some.' | This question required a critical discussion of both the rationale for, and the operation of, the defence of duress. A competentand critical review of the discussion and arguments in Howe (1987) HL against the 265 0010 Criminal law Zone B 6 application of the defence to murder, and the Law Commission's recent proposals on this issue, was required. To see the Law Commission's proposals go to http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp177_web.pdf at page 13. See also activity 13.1 in the subject guide. Not many candidates answered this question but, had you completed this activity (which was also in the 2007 edition of the guide) you should not have found it difficult to answer. |
| Armand calls at Vera's house, pretending to be a gas fitter offering to service her boiler at a highly discounted rate, when in fact he wishes to steal anything of value in her house. Vera, delighted at the bargain, agrees. Vera lets him into her house and watches as he takes the front cover off her boiler and starts doing something with a screwdriver inside the workings of the boiler. Vera gets bored watching Armand at work and goes off to watch TV and promptly falls asleep. Once Armand sees that Vera is asleep, he creeps off around the house looking for valuables. He eventually finds some cash hidden in an envelope in a drawer in the hall, and then leaves the house. Armand, does not realise that, in pretending to service the boiler, he has loosened a gas pipe and gas is leaking into the house. Vera, whilst asleep, inhales a quantity of gas and is found dead from the effects of poisoning the next morning. Discuss Armand's criminal liability, if any | Many answers to this question demonstrated a common problem for candidates. This is a difficulty with extrapolating a number of possible offences from the facts of the question and then dealing with those offences in a precise and concise manner. Some answers were literally all over the place, with a couple of lines on fraud, then a couple of lines on homicide, a few on burglary and then back to homicide, then fraud, then homicide, then burglary and so on and so forth. With a problem that contains a number of issues, treat each issue as a little problem in itself and ensure that you have fully dealt with each individual issue before you go on to the next one. It is much easier to answer problem questions this way. Your answer will be much better and so likely to get you more marks The question requires you to consider Armand's liability for manslaughter. There is no indication that he intended to kill or cause Vera serious harm - note that he did not even realise that gas was leaking into the house so there was no need to consider murder. It is involuntary manslaughter which should have been considered: i.e. constructive manslaughter (manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act) and gross negligence manslaughter. See 7.5 of the subject guide for a discussion of these offences. If you do the activities in the guide, you should be able to answer this part of the question. Was there fraud contrary to section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006 when Armand falsely represented that he was a gas fitter? See 16.2 of the subject guide. Was he guilty of burglary contrary to sections 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968. Note that he had Vera's permission to enter the house. How would you deal with this? See 17.2 of the subject guide for a discussion of burglary |
| Jake, an artist, is a member of a cult which has persuaded him that women always want sex and that when they say "no" they really mean "yes". The cult's mission is to encourage its members to "give sexual pleasure to women". Jake decides that to be faithful to the cult's mission he should have sex with his long-standing friend. Anna has always made it clear that they will never be more than good friends, but Jake now believes that she does not mean this. He goes to her bedroom where she is asleep and climbs into bed with her. She only vaguely recalls this incident the next morning. The following week Jake meets Fiona in a bar. While they are chatting she tells him that she suffers from migraine headaches. Jake tells her that he is a faith healer with mystical powers and can cure such headaches through the medium of sexual contact. Fiona is doubtful but thinks it is worth a try and they go to her house where they have sexual intercourse. Jake is then invited to the cult leader's house for dinner, where he meets, Debbie, the leader's 16 year old daughter. He and Debbie go out into the garden for a walk together and, when out of view of the house, Jake asks Debbie to practise oral sex on him. Debbie does not want to, but has been taught by her father never to deny a man of sexual pleasure so she agrees to Jakes request. Assess the criminal liability, if any, of Jake. | his question is very similar to the sample examination question that appears - with feedback - in Chapter 11 of the subject guide. Candidates who worked through the subject guide should, therefore, have been able to answer it easily. Feedback to the first two events in this question is given in the subject guide. For some reason, when looking at the scenario involving Fiona, a considerable number of candidates discussed the offence of fraud contrary to section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006. Fraud is an entirely different offence which had absolutely no bearing on this question as Jake did not intend to make a gain for himself or cause loss to another in a monetary sense. If having sex involves a 'gain' for one of the parties, it is not a pecuniary gain so the Fraud Act cannot apply. When dealing with the third event, you should have considered the possibility of rape or assault by penetration of Debbie. Sections 75 and 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 would not apply, but you should have considered section 74 and the extent to which Debbie had the freedom to choose whether to consent or not. Note that Debbie is 16. It is not, in itself, unlawful to have sexual intercourse with a person over the age of 16 - given her age it is doubtful as to whether issues of capacity arose here. You should not, as many candidates did, consider the offences contrary to sections 3 and 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 as they are no longer on the syllabus. |
| Harry's mother was dying from a cancerous brain tumour. Caring for her and watching her dying in this way caused Harry to suffer from severe stress and depression. Unable to watch her suffering any longer, he decides to put her out of her misery by poisoning the cup of cocoa that she drinks before going to sleep. Harry slips some surgical spirit into her cocoa, believing that this is poisonous, although it is, in fact, harmless. His mother drinks the cocoa, but dies during that night of a brain haemorrhage caused by her malignant tumour. Discuss Harry's liability, if any, for his mother's death. (b) When, if at all, can a defendant successfully claim that a novus actus interveniens breaks the chain of causation, thus negating his liability? | Note that this question consists of 2 parts. Many candidates did not read the rubric on the examination paper and only answered one part - usually part (a). Bear in mind that if you do this you would need to get 80% for the part you answer in order to scrape a bare pass for the question overall. Please ensure that you always read the rubric carefully. So far as part (a) was concerned, most candidates who answered it recognised the White causation point but most, having decided that Harry could not be guilty of murder, failed to consider any other criminal liability. Some considered manslaughter as an alternative offence, quite forgetting that, as the actus reus of murder and manslaughter are the same, it follows that if there is no causal link for the purposes of the offence of murder there is equally no causal link in respect of manslaughter. Given that there was no offence of murder Harry could not raise the defence of diminished responsibility, contrary to what some candidates seemed to think. Some candidates correctly considered the offence of attempted murder but only a few of those discussed attempting the impossible. Very few candidates obtained good marks for this, relatively easy, problem simply because they did not give it sufficient thought. Part (b) was a relatively straightforward question on causation and you should have concentrated specifically on case law involving different types of novus actus interveniens. Some criticism of the courts' approach 265 0010 Criminal law Zone B 4 in respect of causation generally and the inconsistencies and conflicts between some of the decisions was required. It is a shame that some candidates who had attempted this question did not do this part as it was not difficult and they could have gained some marks. |
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