5 Written questions
5 Matching questions
- How does Solingen make a case for her thesis from the seemingly unlikely example of Japan?
- What is asymmetric information and how does it affect relations between states?
- How does the case study Hyman make of Australia illustrate his thesis?
- Why does Mearsheimer believe international institutions are essentially irrelevant?
- What is the NPT? What is its place in arms control?
- a Both the degree of interest in nuclear weapons and the decision to renounce a nuclear option, Hymans postulates, were largely unrelated to changes in the perceived external security environment
or the state of the international non-proliferation regime. Rather, he argues, Australia's nuclear posture must be understood in terms of the NICs of different prime ministers. Consistent with this thesis, he finds that the only time Australia actively sought to acquire an independent nuclear capability was when it was led by John Gorton (1968-71), the one Australian prime minister between 1949 and 1975 to fit the oppositional nationalist NIC profile. According to Hymans, Gorton believed that Australia was both entitled to and capable of developing a nuclear deterrent. He therefore insisted that Australia remain outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) while seeking to
develop indigenous uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities (pp. 126-129).
Significantly, Gorton's nuclear orientation was not based on the perception of a more hostile international security environment than those of his predecessors. Indeed, if anything, Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1949-66) viewed the world in more threatening terms, especially following the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. Unlike Gorton, however, Menzies' NIC profile was that of an
oppositional subaltern who was far more inclined to seek protection through assurances from "great and powerful friends" in the West than through an in-dependent nuclear deterrent (pp. 115-117).
According to Hymans, Gorton's efforts to launch nuclear weapons pro-gram ultimately were stymied by his shaky hold on power and bureaucratic opposition from the Atomic Energy Commission (pp. 130-133). When Gorton's government fell and Gough Whitlam—a sports-manlike subaltern, replaced him—Australia predictably (from Hymans's perspective) soon adopted a new nuclear posture, renounced nuclear weapons, and ratified the NPT.
- b It is a treaty—or rather a grand bargain—between the nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). NNWS, in return for not pursuing a nuclear weapons program, are rewarded with aid from developed countries towards the acquisition of civilian nuclear power programs and related support. The NPT also adds that in return for such a pledge from NNWSs, the NWSs will "one day" get rid of their own nuclear weapons and themselves become NNWSs too.
b. It is the largest agreement so far ratified, with all but three countries (Pakistan, India, and Israel) taking part in it, and only one country so far having reneged it.
c. In being so universally ratified, the NPT can be seen as the heart of arms control. The health and status of the NPT therefore can represent the health and status of arms control as a whole: Where and when the NPT is weak, so too is arms control in general; when and where it is strong, so too is arms control in general.
- c -- Information is asymmetric or incomplete when different actors know or believe different things about a situation.
-- The problem of asymmetric information manifests itself in two general areas - (1) difficulties in assessing the relative power of various states, and (2) difficulties in discerning the preferences of states.
-- These asymmetries typically take the form of uncertainty about states' goals or capabilities.
- d What was decisive in determining Japan's nonnuclear status, she argues, was the adoption of the "Yoshida model" of development that required "a strong economic infrastructure, manufacturing capabilities...and swimming with (not against) the great tide of market forces" (p. 70). From this perspective, Japan's Liberal Democratic Party's hold on power was contingent on securing Japan's place in the global economy, an objective incompatible with the pursuit of nuclear weapons. As such, the decision to renounce nuclear weapons preceded the negotiation of the NPT
- e -- International institutions are essentially irrelevant because they merely reflect state interests and policies and do not exert any independent effects on the struggle for power.
5 Multiple choice questions
- They created trigger lists to help monitor, control, and restrict the trade of nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies. Trigger lists were lists of items related to nuclear development. If such an item were in the process of being traded internationally, the trigger would go off and the NPT would intervene in the trade.
- -- U.S strategy toward a rising China seems based on the premise that China can, and wants to, play a constructive role in the emerging new world order.
- Constructivists consider that political order arise from mutual understanding and dialogue across cultures, however, the essential task they preconize is to "shame rights abusers", "cajole powerful actors" if they promote proper values, and "holding perpetrators accountable to int'l standards
- "International change results from the work of intellectual entrepreneurs". On the one hand, intellectual entrepreneurs attempt to convert people to new ideas. On the other hand, they condemn actors whose behaviour is different from standards. (Importance of transnational activist networks)
- -- Buck-passing is most attractive in a balanced multipolar system because, with roughly equal capabilities, each great power individually can hold off an aggressor, and is therefore capable of accepting the buck.
-- In an unbalanced system, when one state is markedly more powerful than its neighbours, those neighbours are too weak to accept the buck, so everyone will have a strong common interest in balancing against the powerful state.
5 True/False questions
How is the hierarchic system different than Realism, particularly offensive realism? → The requisite NIC profile for a weapons proliferator, according to Hymans, is an "oppositional nationalist" who combines intense enmity to-ward an external rival and intense pride in his/her own state's ability to challenge the external foe. Oppositional nationalism, he argues, thrives on the explosive mixture of fear and pride, emotions that link national identities with foreign policy choices.
Why does the East Asia Region appear to be a dangerous breeding ground for the security dilemma according to the Realist perspective? → There is an unequal distribution of capabilities amongst state actors and this distribution could change suddenly (China's deployment of a stealth fighter, for instance). The importance of nearby sea-lanes for energy supplies also means that vital interests are at stake. The importance of power projection forces in the region (such as China's new carrier) will also help feed a security dilemma.
How does Buzan view the effectiveness of ARF? → Karl argues, that exactly this fact will lead to small and well manageable nuclear arsenals. It will also make counterforce capabilities risky because it might not be sufficient to deliver a decisive blow to the enemies nuclear facilities.
According to the new pessimism, why will new nuclear states fail to achieve the level of deterrence required to recreate the peace that occurred during the Cold War? → Possibility of first strike might be reasonable sometimes.
No secure retaliatory arsenals, which are essential for retaliation.
Accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, which might occur due to structural deficiencies.
What is the deterrence method of "non-weaponization"? → • doubts about the Asian model and the future
• strong securitization against globalization and a strong demand for a regional response
• revealed a contradiction between domestic political legitimacy, and global economic rules and norms that undermined distinctive national development projects