5 Written questions
5 Matching questions
- What are the three objectives of Arms control?
- What are some challenges to the CWC?
- What is the main goal of states for offensive realists, such as Mearsheimer?
- How is arms control different from disarmament?
- Why is it unlikely that China will become the hegemon of the East Asian region?
- a Disarmament contains merely the reduction of armaments.
Arms control is a broader concept. It first priority is to increase security. This can at times be counterintuitive, because in certain circumstances it might actually lead to an increase in armament to improve security. It also addresses number, character, development and use of armaments.
- b - Reduce likelihood of war
- Reduce political and economic costs
- Minimize scope of war
- c • no state, external (US) or internal has the power to overlay the region
• China lacks the coercive ability and the civilization attractiveness it once possessed
• China has negative soft-power
• Asia has too many substantial powers within it to allow one power to dominate
- d -- Offensive realists believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. Power is a means and an end in itself.
- e a. Implementation of its provisions;
b. Verification that all parties are in compliance with its terms.
5 Multiple choice questions
- a. For verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards agreements states have made by signing the NPT treaty. In other words, they make sure that nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful, civilian programs to nuclear weapons programs.
b. In particular, it has been tasked with monitoring the nuclear programs of Iraq and N. Korea.
c. It also serves as a resource to developing countries for assistance with peaceful nuclear applications, and, since 1986, for training in the safe operation of nuclear reactors.
- -- Global hegemony is virtually impossible, except for a state that has acquired "clear cut nuclear superiority," defined as "a capability to devastate its rivals without fear of retaliation"
-- Regional hegemony - A hegemon is the only great power in its system. Thus, if a region contains more than one great power, there is no hegemon. The United State is the only regional hegemon in modern history, through its domination of the western hemisphere.
-- Potential hegemon is the most powerful state in a regional system, but it is more than that. It is so powerful that it stands a good chance of dominating its region by overcoming its great power neighbours, if not all together, at least in sequence. There is a "marked gap" between the size of its economy and army, and that of the second most powerful state in the system. They always aspire to be hegemons, and they will not stop increasing their power until they succeed.
- Deductive logic: History is used for illustration rather than theory building.
Ethnocentric bias: 3rd World country leaders are seen as less responsible and more prone to use nuclear weapons.
- Cold War logic is applicable to new proliferant countries, i.e. 3rd World leaders are rational actors who fear 2nd strike retaliation.
Deliberate wars are less likely to occur. However, accidental wars are more likely to occur. (The latter is not part of optimistic proliferation.)
- Asia carries its own distinctive baggage: with the exception of Japan, China and Thailand, all states were post-colonial constructions (and even these were all heavily penetrated by the super powers)
• unlike in other areas of the world, the process of decolonization left behind a system that by and large reflected the patters on pre-colonial political history; this carried pre-colonial history forward into post-colonial international relations
5 True/False questions
What new partnerships emerged from the new arms control? → a. By breaking the old arms control arrangements; it is reneging on security assurances made to Russia. Trust between the nations is therefore compromised.
b. Mistrust may turn into apprehension in light of certain moves, like the US deploying antiballistic missiles in Central Europe despite Russian protestations.
c. Dismissal of Russian security interests during periods of national distress.
i. Compare China's dismissal of Japan's concern over its 'defensive' actions.
What is the backlash towards the China's purported Sinocentric model? In other words, what have been the results of China's Sinocentric interpretations of and actions in the region? → a. Disarmament was a tool of the victors over their conquered enemy to prevent them from undoing their subjugation. A clear example is of the Philistines banning the Jews from ironworking to prevent them from forging weapons in 1100BCE, or the Romans proscribing the use of elephants in war after defeating Carthage in 201BCE. A recent example would be the disarmament required of the Germans by the Versailles Treaty of WWI.
b. By the 17th century—particularly with the signing of the Strasbourg agreement of 1675, signed between France and the Holy Roman Empire to ban the use of poisoned bullets—, the notion of (in)humanity started appearing as a factor. This changed the role of disarmament as an imposition of the victor on the vanquished into a mutual cooperative effort.
c. Aside from total disarmament, as the above is concerned with, there were also agreements between rivals to de-militarize certain areas in dispute or where conflict might arise, such as the demilitarization by the Persia and Athens in 448 BCE. A later example still with relevance today would be the Rush-Bagot Agreement that demilitarized the Great Lakes, leading to the largest unfortified border in the world.
i. In this regard, though, instead of the parties involved being directly affected, a geographical area was affected.
d. Another focus of disarmament had to do with putting reins on the nature of war, exemplified by concept of a just war. This aspect of disarmament attempted to limit the damage in future warfare, particularly damage against non-combatants. This trend can be said to have begun in 989CE at the Synod of Charoux. Where the 17th century introduced (in)humanity or morality as a factor, here was introduced a sort of pragmatic humanity. Leaders realized that total disarmament was naïve and so instead thought on how to wage war with less destruction.
e. It is interesting to note that these developments through history are quite similar to the formulation of the three key elements of Arms Control in the 20th century.
What are some sign posts that this fear of Japan may be artificially induced―at least in China, but very probably in other East Asian countries too, particularly Korea? → The Japanese do not have the "trappings" of a Great Power. Likewise, there are constitutional and non-constitutional limits on its power projections. Also, the Japanese have seemed content to let the Americans defend them.
How about the Australia Group? → a. It was established in 1984 in response to the production of chemical weapons (CW) during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran and Iraq had been able to run CW programs through foreign trade.
b. The Australia Group therefore makes sure that countries do not intentionally or inadvertently assist trading partners develop a CW program. Like the Zangger Committee, it uses a "trigger list" of 54 precursor chemicals related to CW, and which also would apply to biological weapons (BW).
c. It also serves as a forum for countries to discuss experiences in implementing and enforcing CBW export controls.
d. After 9/11, the Australia Group also added "catchall controls," which cover items not listed in the trigger lists. These "catchall controls" attempt to control intangible transfers of technology directed towards countries already in possession of a CW or BW program.
How, therefore, could the region protect itself from getting caught up in a security dilemma? Why would security dilemma theory fail in East Asia in regards to TMDs? → By basing themselves in Japan, and defending Japan from potential enemies, the Americans take away any justification for a re-armament of Japan. This prevents a security dilemma between Japan and China from spiralling out of control. However, by asking for a more active Japanese role in the Alliance, the Americans may actually cause instability.