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5 Written questions

5 Matching questions

  1. Band wagoning, the allying of weaker states with―or under―a stronger state, is dismissed by Mearsheimer. Why?
  2. How has the US discouraged Asia from achieving its own independent security measures?
  3. What were ways in which the new arms control would assess success?
  4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of passing the buck?
  5. What contradiction is posed in the constructivist view towards progress in the international community?
  1. a -- The reasons buck-passing is preferred are threefold. (1) it is cheap - the cost of fighting is born by the ally and oneself takes a 'free-ride' (2) the aggressor and the buck-catcher may get involved in a long and debilitating war that leaves the buck-passer stronger than both (3) if a state faces several adversaries, it may employ buck-passing to tackle them sequentially
    -- The chief drawback to passing the buck is, of course, that the designated buck-catcher might fail to resist the aggressor, or resist unsuccessfully, leaving the buck-passer in the field alone with the aggressor. Thus the Soviet Union found itself all alone with Germany in 1940, after France and Britain failed to catch the buck that the Soviet Union passed them in 1939.
  2. b • balancing power falls to China alone thus little desire for security regimes such as ASEAN to play a more central role
    • projects nuclear non-proliferation in a strong way
    • cultivates Japan as a military dependant
    • traditionally opposed Asian multilateral security initiatives.
  3. c Constructivists consider that political order arise from mutual understanding and dialogue across cultures, however, the essential task they preconize is to "shame rights abusers", "cajole powerful actors" if they promote proper values, and "holding perpetrators accountable to int'l standards
  4. d a. By deterring and responding to treaty withdrawal by states in violation of the NPT's obligations;
    b. By seeking to achieve universal adherence to the IAEA Model Additional Protocol, giving international inspectors the authority they need to detect undeclared nuclear activity and making protocol part of the safeguard standard;
    c. By attempting to ensure compliance with the non-proliferation obligations that form the core of the NPT
    d. By seeking to foster recognition of the need for all states to live up to the strictest standards of safety and security in their peaceful nuclear activities;
    e. By continued support of NNWS with their civilian nuclear applications.
  5. e -- Great powers rarely bandwagon. Mearsheimer gives a peculiar reason for this rarity: Band wagoning, he says, entails shifting the distribution of power in the stronger ally's favour, which 'violates the basic canon of offensive realism - that state maximize relative power.' Band wagoning means 'conceding that the formidable new partner will gain a disproportionate share of the spoils they conquer together'

5 Multiple choice questions

  1. --a) They became aggressive again in the South China Sea (the first time was in 94, I believe).
    b) They insisted that instead of ASEAN+3, ASEAN form an ASEAN+1 group.
    c) They demanded that Obama admit that the US does not belong in Asia, and so leave. This was the main obsession in Chinese political writing in 2009-11
  2. --a) It started attacking the US as a force interfering with regionalism.
    b) It started chastising Japan for its non-regionalist attitude (perhaps its encouragements of US presence in Asia)
    c) It started combining the concepts of culture and security, particularly in contrast to globalization. The formula of Chinese thinking could be drawn up as regionalism vs. globalization (see the listed points on p.146) with the purpose of expelling globalization from the Asian model.
  3. a. The Accidental Measures Agreement
    i. To improve technical safeguards against accidental and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
    ii. To notify each other should the risk of nuclear war arise;
    iii. To provide advance notification of missile launches into international airspace or waters
    b. The Incident at Sea Agreement
    i. For both superpowers' navies to follow safe practices when their warships operated in close proximity
    c. The Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
    i. To avoid confrontations likely to lead to nuclear war;
    ii. If such a crises arose anyway, to consult with each other on ways to solve the differences peacefully.
    d. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation talks (SALT)
    i. To limit strategic offensive arms
  4. -- Tokyo worries that a unified Korea might see Japan as its 'natural enemy.'
    -- Beijing worries that a unified Korea, under Seoul's rule and with the US-ROK alliance still intact, would remove its current bugger and could place a US ally closer to its borders.
    -- Seoul's rule is seen as a far more attractive choice, something that should give Beijing cause for pause.
  5. Both the degree of interest in nuclear weapons and the decision to renounce a nuclear option, Hymans postulates, were largely unrelated to changes in the perceived external security environment
    or the state of the international non-proliferation regime. Rather, he argues, Australia's nuclear posture must be understood in terms of the NICs of different prime ministers. Consistent with this thesis, he finds that the only time Australia actively sought to acquire an independent nuclear capability was when it was led by John Gorton (1968-71), the one Australian prime minister between 1949 and 1975 to fit the oppositional nationalist NIC profile. According to Hymans, Gorton believed that Australia was both entitled to and capable of developing a nuclear deterrent. He therefore insisted that Australia remain outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) while seeking to
    develop indigenous uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities (pp. 126-129).
    Significantly, Gorton's nuclear orientation was not based on the perception of a more hostile international security environment than those of his predecessors. Indeed, if anything, Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1949-66) viewed the world in more threatening terms, especially following the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. Unlike Gorton, however, Menzies' NIC profile was that of an
    oppositional subaltern who was far more inclined to seek protection through assurances from "great and powerful friends" in the West than through an in-dependent nuclear deterrent (pp. 115-117).
    According to Hymans, Gorton's efforts to launch nuclear weapons pro-gram ultimately were stymied by his shaky hold on power and bureaucratic opposition from the Atomic Energy Commission (pp. 130-133). When Gorton's government fell and Gough Whitlam—a sports-manlike subaltern, replaced him—Australia predictably (from Hymans's perspective) soon adopted a new nuclear posture, renounced nuclear weapons, and ratified the NPT.

5 True/False questions

  1. Buzan claims there are striking similarities between India and China. What are they? Why is the value in making such connections?• Both hold strongly realist perspectives towards their regions and the wider world
    • both locate themselves in a historical self-perspective as great and ancient civilizational centres to which other peoples traditionally came for trade and enlightenment, but which themselves were not usually militarily expansive outside their region
    • both have been sensitized by colonial experiences which leads to stronger nationalism
    • both give high value to the autonomy of the economy, foreign policy, military capability
    • both are moving towards a more liberalized economy despite strong anti-capitalist traditions
    • both see US as a key threat but pragmatic enough to align with it on some matters
    • both favour multipolar international systems
    • IMPORTANCE: These deeply rooted and shared features make both India and China likely to be essentially Westphalian great power players in Asian security.


  2. How does China encourage Japan to build its defence, thus further escalating the security dilemma?By basing themselves in Japan, and defending Japan from potential enemies, the Americans take away any justification for a re-armament of Japan. This prevents a security dilemma between Japan and China from spiralling out of control. However, by asking for a more active Japanese role in the Alliance, the Americans may actually cause instability.


  3. What is the essence of regionalism and what are its three components?--The essence of regionalism, regardless of how extensive its economic interdependence is, is its sense of shared community. The three aspects of this shared community are 1) the social networks that bridge national boundaries; 2) strategic thinking that recognizes common security interests; and 3) a regional identity capable of overriding national identities on matters of shared significance.


  4. When looking at the behaviour of China and the "lesser" states in Asia, what should we keep in mind when deciding if states' behaviours in the region tend towards hierarchy or a more Westphalian model?-- Discerning what actions China takes towards its neighbours.
    -- Focus on the strategies that other nations take to adjust to China's rise.
    -- A hierarchic theoretical approach will focus empirical scrutiny on the domestic aspects of China's rise.


  5. How can Libya be seen as the confirmation of the new arms control and the nail in the coffin of the old?a. Combating the proliferation of WMDs;
    b. Closing gaps in the international non-proliferation regime by creating coalitions of states to intercept and interdict air, ground, and sea transportation of WMDs;
    c. Addressing new threats from non-state actors;
    d. Depending on bilateral and multilateral initiatives for results


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