Constitutional Law I Cases (Trucios Haynes Fall 2012)

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Cases with brief facts and holdings Federal Judicial Power Federal Legislative Power Federal Executive Power Due Process and Fundamental Right

Marbury v. Madison

Topic: JUDICIAL REVIEW

Facts: President Jefferson's Secretary of State, Madison, refused to deliver a commission granted to Marbury by former President Adams.

Holding: The Supreme Court has the power, implied from Article VI, 2, of the Constitution, to review acts of Congress and if they are found repugnant to the Constitution, to declare them valid.

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816):

Topic: JUDICIAL REVIEW

Facts: Land dispute. The state of Virginia enacted legislation during the Revolutionary War that gave the State the power to confiscate the property of British Loyalists. Hunter was given a grant of land by the State. Denny Martin held the land under devise from Lord Thomas Fairfax

Holding:The U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions involving federal law.

The federal power was given directly by the people and not by the States. Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution states that "in all other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction". This demonstrates a textual commitment to allow Supreme Court review of state decisions. If the Supreme Court could not review decisions from the highest State courts, the state courts necessarily would be excluded from hearing cases involving questions of federal law. It had already been established that state courts have the power to rule on issues of federal law, and therefore the Supreme Court must be able to review those decisions. The Court also held that the Supremacy Clause states that the federal interpretation trumps the states' interpretation. The Court rejected concerns regarding state judicial sovereignty. The Supreme Court could already review state executive and legislative decisions and this case was no different. Story then confronted the arguments that state judges were bound to uphold the Constitution just as federal judges were, and so denying state interpretations presumed that the state judges would less than faithfully interpret the Constitution. The Court stated that the issue did not concern bias; rather, it concerned the need for uniformity in federal law. The Supreme Court concluded that the decision by the Virginia court of appeals was in error.

Cohens v. Virginia (1821

Topic: Judicial Review

Facts:An act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final arbiters of disputes between the states and the national government.


Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review state criminal proceedings. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Court was bound to hear all cases that involved constitutional questions, and that this jurisdiction was not dependent on the identity of the parties in the cases. Marshall argued that state laws and constitutions, when repugnant to the Constitution and federal laws, were "absolutely void." After establishing the Court's jurisdiction, Marshall declared the lottery ordinance a local matter and concluded that the Virginia court was correct to fine the Cohens brothers for violating Virginia law.

District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)

Topic: 2nd Amendment

Facts: DC appealed to the Supreme Court after a federal appeals court ruled that the DC gun control laws were unconstitutional.

Holding: The DC Code's 1) general bar against the registration of handguns, 2) prohibition against carrying a pistol without a license, and 3) requirement that all lawful firearms to kept unloaded and either disassembled or trigger locked violate rights of individuals under the US Constituion's Second Amendment, which permits individuals to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes, even though they are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia.

Ex Parte McCardle (1869

Topic: Congressional Limits on Judicial Reveiw

Facts: McCardle appealed for a denial of habeas corpus to the SC, but Congress passed an act forbidding the Court jurisdiction.

Holding: Although the Supreme Court derives its appellate jurisdiction from the Constitution, the Constitution also gives Congress the express power to make exceptions to that appellate jurisdiction.

United States v. Klein (1871):

Topic: Separation of Powers & Judicial Review

Facts: Klein was awarded compensation for property destroyed by the Union army because a presidential pardon he received presumptively showed that he had been loyal, loyalty being a condition of receiving such an award. On appeal, he challenged a congressional enactment that directed federal courts to find that pardon was proof of disloyalty and that denied the court jurisdiction over the claim.

Holding: A statute violates the separation of powers by commanding a court to draw a certain conclusion from evidence before it and by directing the court to dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction when it encounters such evidence.

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)

Topic: Necessary and Proper Clause

Facts: Determining whether the National Bank was a Constitutional use of Congress's powers.

Holding:The act chartering the national bank was valid because it bore a reasonable relationship to various constitutionally enumerated powers of the government (the power to collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate commerce, etc.). Congress may choose any means not prohibited by the Constitution that carries out its authority.

United States v. Comstock (2012)

Topic: Judicial Review (affirmation of Marbury)

Facts: A group of convicted sex offenders sought to dismiss petitions that attempted to indefinitely "commit" them under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. At trial, the federal district court dismissed the petitions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Protection and Safety Act exceeded the scope of Congressional authority by enacting a law that imprisons/confines a person solely because of "sexual dangerousness," where the prosecution does never even need to allege that the "dangerousness" violates a federal law.

Holding: The necessary and proper clause is broad in its scope. Citing McCullough v. Maryland, the Court argued that Congress may enact laws that are "convenient, or useful" or "conducive" to the enumerated power's "beneficial exercise." There must be a "means/ends rationality." The court must determine if the means used are rationally and actually calculated to achieve the Constitutionally desired end. Congress has long passed longs affecting mental health prisoners and crimes involving mental health deficiencies, despite there being no expressly authorized power to do so. Many of the prisoners were already committed under a similar statute. The additions proposed by the new statute at issue are modest and affect only a few prisoners. "The Federal Government, as custodian of its prisoners, has the constitutional power to act in order to protect nearby (and other) communities from the danger such prisoners may pose."

"Thus, far from a 'general police power,' §4248 is a reasonably adapted and narrowly tailored means of pursuing the Government's legitimate interest as a federal custodian in the responsible administration of its prison system."

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp

Topic: Commerce Clause

Facts: Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., a manufacturing company with subsidiaries in several states and nationwise sales, was charged with an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. In defense, Jones & Laughlin claimed that the Act was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate intrastate production.

Holding: The manufacturing portions of a large, integrated multistate corporation all within the constitutional meaning of the term "activities affecting commerce" so as to allow federal regulation thereof. "The fundamental principal is that the power to regulate commerce is the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for 'its protection and advancement,' 'to adopt measures' to 'promote its growth and insure its safety,' 'to foster, protect, control, and restrain.'"

United States v. Darby (1941)

Topic: Commerce Clause

Facts: Darby was a lumber manufacturer, some of whose goods were later shipped in interstate commerce. He was indicted for violation of the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labors Standards Act and defended on the ground that as an intrastate produce he was not subject to federal regulation.

Holding: "While manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such commerce" and Congress may regulate. Said the Tenth Amendment "is but a truism."

Wickard v. Filburn (1942)

Topic: Commerce Clause

Facts: Congress passed a law that limited the amount of wheat the farmer may grow for his own consumption.

Holding: The distinctions b/w commerce and production and b/w indirect and direct effects on commerce, no longer were followed. Even though Filburn's wheat only had a negligible impact on interstate commerce, Congress could regulate his production b/c cumulatively home-grown wheat had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States [

Topic: Commerce Clause --> Civil Rights

Facts: Applicability of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to a business local in scope was challenged as constitutional

Holding: Under the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate businesses local in scope if their business activities in some way have an impact on interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate commerce among the several states. That a particular business is local in character does not impact on Congress's ability to regulate in provided that the business in some manner impacts interstate commerce. The 1964 Civil Rights Act may be applied to a business local in scope.

Katzenbach v. McClung, Sr. & McClung Jr. (1964)

Topic:Commerce Clause --> Civil Rights

Facts: Ollie's BBQ refused sit-down service to Negroes. The lower court found that a substantial portion of the food served in the restaurant had moved in interstate commerce.

Holding: Pursuant to its commerce power, Congress may prohibit racial discrimination in a restaurant that serves food that was transported in interstate commerce. Although an activity is local and may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. Further, although an individual defendant or plaintiff's own effect on commerce may be slight, if their contribution taken together with that of many others similarly situated is substantial, then the individual's actiivty may be regulated.

Hodel v. Indiana (1981)

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Perez v. United States (1971)

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National Leagues of Cities v. Usery (1976

Topic: Commerce Clause & Tenth Amendment

Facts: Congress, in 1974, extended the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA to cover all state and municipal employees.

Holding: Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congree may not regulate the labor market insofar as it concerns state and municipal government employees. The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting any legislation designed to "operate to directly displace the states' freedom to structure integral operations in... traditional governmental functions," and, as such, Congress may not employ the Commerce Power to interfere with any state activity, the performance of which can be characterized as an "attribute of sovereignty." Though the Commerce Power is correctly characterized as plenary, it is not without other constitutional limitations. .

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority [Overruled National League of Cities]

Topic: Commerce Clause

Facts: Garcia appealed from a decision for San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority holding that municipal ownership and operation of a mass transit system is a traditional governmental function and thus, according to National League, its system was immune from the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Holding: The test for determining state immunity from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause is not whether the state activity sought to be regulated is a traditional governmental function, but rather whether the regulation as applied to the state activity is destructive of state sovereignty or violation of any constitutional provision.

United States v. Lopez

Topic: Commerce Clause

Facts: Determining gun-free zone statute was constitutional

Holding: Congress may regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as well as any activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Morrison

Topic: Commerce Clause

Facts: Determining whether the Violence Against Women Act was constitutional

Holding: Congress cannot regulate non-economic activity by finding that the cumulative impact creates the substantial effect. Argument rejected that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregated effect on interstate commerce.

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

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Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen

Topic: Commerce Clause

Facts: Law required background checks for police using firearms.

Holding: Congress's commerce power authorized legislation aimed to improve the safety of the channels of interstate commerce. The states were reluctant to provide the necessary safety information about the condition of their highways because of liability issues. The federal government is within its rights and authority to provide protections that would encourage the production of that information. Congress may regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Power, and that regulation includes control over the channels of interstate commerce, such as highways. The privacy provision will result in greater safety on the nations highways.

Gonzales v. Raich (2005)

Topic: Commerce Clause

Facts:In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court

Holding: In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the commerce clause gave Congress authority to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary. Stevens argued that the Court's precedent "firmly established" Congress' commerce clause power to regulate purely local activities that are part of a "class of activities" with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority argued that Congress could ban local marijuana use because it was part of such a "class of activities": the national marijuana market. Local use affected supply and demand in the national marijuana market, making the regulation of intrastate use "essential" to regulating the drug's national market. The majority distinguished the case from Lopez and Morrison. In those cases, statutes regulated non-economic activity and fell entirely outside Congress' commerce power; in this case, the Court was asked to strike down a particular application of a valid statutory scheme.

New York v. United States (1992)

Topic: Commerce Clause

Facts: Federal law required all states clean up their nuclear waste by 1996 and any state who didn't were liable for any harm caused

Holding: The law was unconstitutional because it commandeered state legislative and regulatory activity, in violation of the Tenth Amendment

Printz v. United States (1997)

Topic: Commerce Clause & Tenth Amendment

Facts: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose.

Holding: The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them.

Reno v. Condon (2000)

Topic: Commerce Clause & Tenth Amendment

Facts: Federal law prohibiting state and local governments from releasing social security numbers from the DMV.

Holding: Congress was not imposing affirmative duties, but were prohibiting harmful commercial activity by state governments. This did NOT violate the Tenth Amendment.

United States v. Butler (1936)

Topic: Commerce Clause & Tenth Amendment

Facts: As part of the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under.

Holding:The Court found the Act unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate and control agricultural production, an arena reserved to the states. Even though Congress does have the power to tax and appropriate funds, argued Justice Roberts, in this case those activities were "but means to an unconstitutional end," and violated the Tenth Amendment.

Chas C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis (1937)

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Sabri v. United States (2004)

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South Dakota v. Dole (1987)

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Katzenbach v. Morgan & Morgan (1966)

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City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)

Topic: Commerce Clause, Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment

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Holding: Congress cannot create new rights or expand new rights, they can only prevent or remedy violations of rights already recognized by the courts, and such laws must be narrowly tailored

H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, Commisioner of Agriculture & Markets of New York

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Facts: Hood, a Boston milk distributor, obtained milk from New York. He was denied a license to establish a receiving depot in New York on the basis of a New York law that makes a condition of the issuance of a license that such issuance will not tend to be destructive of competition in a market already "adequately served."

Holding: Restrictions imposed for the avowed purpose and with the practical effect of curtailing the volume of interstate commerce to aid local economic interests will not be sustained. There is a distinction between the power of the state to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety, even when those dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack of power to retard, burden or constrict the flow of such commerce for their economic advantage.

Aaron B. Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia

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Facts: Cooley violated a Pennsylvania law requiring all ships using the port of Philadelphia to engage a local pilot.

Holding: The states may regulate those areas of interstate commerce that are local in nature and do not demand a uniform national system of regulation by Congress. j

The local interest versus the national interest test is still used by the court today. In applying this test, the Court balances the national interest against the local interest and also determines if the local regulation does not discriminate against interstate commerce, the states are allowed to regulate that subject of commerce. If the local interest outweighs the national interest and the regulation does not discriminate against interstate commerce, the states are allowed to regulate that subject of commerce. If it appears that the state regulation has placed a burden on interstate commerce, the Court has drawn the line and refused to hold the state regulations valid even though a local subject may be involved

South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc.

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Facts: A SC law prohibited trucks exceeding a certain width and weight from using the state's highways. Interstate truckers challenged the law as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.

Holding: Congress has not decided to regulate the width and weight of motor vehicles in interstate motor traffic and has left intact the states' authority to regulate in this area. The Commerce Clause itself prohibits discrimination by states against interstate commerce, as where state laws are nominally of local concert, but in reality are aimed at gaining a local advantage. Here, however, the object of state regulation is of great local concern. Unlike state concern of the railroads, which is subject to the Commerce Clause, the safe and economical use of highways is a prime concern of the states, which own and maintain their own highways, and nondiscriminatory regulations of interstate commerce that ensure such use are permitted. Where Congress has not acted, it is not for the courts to decides what are suitable motor vehicle size regulations- that is a legislative choice and not a judicial one.

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, Attorney General

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Facts: The Arizona Train Limit Law prohibited the operation within the state of passenger trains more than 14 cars long and freight trains more than 70 cars long.

Holding: Wide scope has been left to the states for regulating matters of local concern, but such regulation must not materially restrict the free flow of interstate commerce or interfere with it in matters requiring national uniformity. The courts must determine the nature and extent of the burden that a state regulation would impose on interstate commerce, and then balance that burden against the benefits and merits to be derived from the regulations.

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey

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Facts: The NJ Supreme Court upheld a NJ law prohibiting the importation of waste originating in another state into NJ on the basis that it protected a legitimate health interest of the state of NJ.

Holding: State laws that are basically protectionist in nature unduly burden interstate commerce and are unconstitutional. Even in New Jersey's ultimate purpose was to protect the health and safety of its citizens, it may not accomplish this by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the state. Discrimination must be based on some property of the goods other than geographic origin. This law treats inherently similar products differently based solely on place of origin. As a result, it improperly discriminates against out-of-state production and unduly burdens interstate commerce.

C &A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York

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Facts: The town of Clarkstown mandated that all solid waste leaving the city be processed through a particular transfer station.

Holding: Discrimination against interstate commerce is per se invalid. Any ordinance that deprives nonlocal businesses from access to local markets discriminates against interstate commerce and is invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause. With respect to waste, the commodity at issue is not the waste itself but rather the services of processing it and/or transportin it. When a city designates a particular commercial entity as the sole provider of such services, nonlocal providers of the service are effectively shut out. Local governments may not use their regulatory power to favor local businesses by prohibiting patronage of out-of-state competitors.

United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority (2007)

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Facts: A county's "flow control" ordinance required haulers of trash to deliver the trash to facilities owned and operated by a state-created public benefit corporation.

Holding: An ordinance requiring that trash be delivered to a state-created public benefit corporation does not violate the dormant commerce clause. The distinction between private and public facilities is constitutionally significant because laws benefitting local government may serve several legitimate purposes instead of economic protectionism. To hold otherwise, to treat public and private facilities equally under the dormant commerce clause, would lead to much interference by federal courts in state and local affairs. Also worth noting is that the injury alleged by United Haulers, more expensive waste disposal, will be borne by local citizens, not by citizens of other states. Typically, the dormant Commerce Clause is enforced to prohibit shifting expenses out of state instead of keeping at home. United Hauler's proper remedy is therefore through the local political process, not through the federal courts.

Hughes v. Oklahoma (1979)

Topic: Dormant Commerce Clause

Facts: Hughes was convicted under an OK statute forbidding the transportation for sale outside the state of minnows seined or procured from OK waters.

Holding:The Commerce Clause of the Constitution is violated by a state statute barring the transportation or shipment for sale elsewhere of fish or wildlife procured within that state. The once-embraced rule that a state owns all the wildlife within it and has the right to qualify ownership of it is now discarded. State regulations of wild animals should be considered according to the same general rule applied to state regulations of other natural resources. This rule necessitates inquiries as to 1) whether the statute regulates evenhandedly or discriminates against interstate commerce; 2) whether it serves a legitimate local purpose; and 3) whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against interstate commerce. The legitimate interest in conservation is not, in this case, advanced by the least discriminatory means available. There is no attempt to limit in-state capturing and sales of minnows, only restraint on interstate transport. Thus, this statute fails to pass constitutional muster.

Hunt, Governor of the State of North Carolina v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commn. (1977)

Topic: Dormant Commerce Clause

Facts: NC law required specific grading for all closed apple containers sold or shipped into the state. Washington state had a more stringent system for grading apples.

Holding: The regulation, although facially neutral (applying equally to apples from outside and inside the state) has the practical effect of not only burdening interstate sales of Washington apples, but it also discriminates against them. First, the regulation raises the cost of doing business for the Washington apply industry in the North Carolina market, while leaving North Carolina counterparts unaffected. Second, it strips away from the Washington apple industry the market advantages it had earned for itself through its expensive and superior grading system. Third, by prohibiting the Washington apply industry from using its grade, the regulation had a leveling effect that operated to the advantage of local apple producers. When discrimination is found, the state has the burden of justifying its regulation both in terms of the local benefit and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives that can effect such benefit.

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland (1978)

Topic: Dormant Commerce Clause

Facts: Maryland prohibited producers or refiners of petroleum products from operating retail service (gas) stations within the state. Virtually all petroleum producers and refiners were located outside of Maryland, and therefore these companies had to divest themselves of their Maryland gas stations and could not otherwise directly sell their product in Maryland. The oil companies claimed the law had a discriminatory effect on the out-of-state oil companies and impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. At trial, the oil companies prevailed on due process grounds, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, upholding the law against the oil companies attacks. The Supreme Court granted review.

Holding: The law does impose some burdens on the oil companies, but the fact that the burden of the law falls solely on interstate companies does not, but itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce. That is because the statute creates no barrier against interstate independent dealers, nor does it prohibit the flow of interstate goods, place added costs upon them, or distinguish between in-state and out-of-state companies in the retail market. The absence of these factors distinguishes this case from those in which a state law was found to be discriminatory. Moreover, the statute does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce, even if some of the oil companies were to stop selling oil products in the state. Interstate commerce is not subjected to an impermissible burden simply because an otherwise valid regulation causes some business to shift from one interstate supplier to another. The Commerce Clause protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.

West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, Commissioner of Massachusetts Dept. of Food & Agriculture (1994)

Topic: Dormant Commerce Clause

Facts: Massachusetts's legislature, perceiving a need to protect dairy producers, enacted an assessment system wherein a certain levy was placed on all dairy products sold in Massachusetts, the proceeds of which were disbursed to Massachusetts's producers only. The system was challenged by West Lynn Creamery, a milk dealer who purchased out-of-state milk, as unconstitutional. The state courts rejected the challenge, and the Supreme Court granted review.

Holding: An assessment scheme that levies a tax on all distribution of a good but disbursed its assets to local producers of the distributed goods only is unconstitutional. A state may not enact a tariff on out-of-state goods; to do so is a clear violation of the Commerce Clause. The system at issue here, although taking two steps to achieve its goal, is a de facto tariff. While all producers pay equally into the fund, the assets go only to local producers. This is, in effect, a tariff. The fact that Massachusetts could validly enact either a local subsidy or a nondiscriminatory tax is irrelevant; coupled, the two measures constitute a tariff and cannot stand, as the assessment is clear discrimination against interstate commerce.

State of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.(1981)

Topic: Dormant Commerce Clause

Facts: Minnesota enacted a statute prohibiting the sale of dairy products in disposable plastic containers but permitting such sales in disposable paperboard containers and Clover, a dairy using plastic containers, challenged the statute as violation of the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses.

Holding: A state statute prohibiting sales within the state of products packed in certain kinds of disposable containers for environmental reasons does not unduly burden interstate commerce nor violate the Equal Protection Clause. The statute does not discriminate between intrastate and interstate sellers; both are prohibited from selling products in disposable plastic containers. Neither is it a protectionist measure. Thus, our inquiry is whether the incidental burden imposed upon interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits. The change of containers is not an excessive burden upon out-of-state producers. Paperboard containers are readily obtainable. The benefits include a reduction in the amount of solid waste for disposal and an increase in the Minnesota pulpwood industry. This state statute prohibiting sales within the state of products packed in certain kinds of disposable containers, here plastic ones for environmental reasons, does not unduly burden intrastate commerce nor violate the Equal Protection Clause.

Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin (1951)

Topic: Dormant Commerce Clause

Facts: A Madison ordinance made it unlawful to sell any milk as pasteurized unless it had been processed and bottled at an approved pasteurization plant located within five miles of the city.

Holding: A locality may not discriminate against interstate commerce, even to protect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable alternatives exist which do not discriminate and are adequate to conserve legitimate local interests. The Madison ordinance erects an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the state. Hence, it plainly discriminates against interstate commerce. It must be decided whether the ordinance can be justified in view of the local interest and the available methods for protecting those interests. Reasonable and adequate alternatives do exists. Madison could send its inspectors to the distant plants, or it could exclude from its city all milk not produced in conformity with standards as high as those enforced by Madison. It could use the local ratings checked by the US Public Health Service to enforce such a provision. The Madison ordinance must yield to the principle that "one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation."

Maine v. Taylor & United States (1986)

Topic: Dormant Commerce Clause

Facts: Taylor imported live baitfish into Maine despite a Maine statute prohibiting such importation. He was indicted under a federal statute that made it a federal crime to transport fish in intrastate commerce in violation of state law. Taylor challenged the Maine statute as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.

Holding: States may regulate matters of legitimate local concern even though interstate commerce may be affected. Where a law is discriminatory on its fact, the state has the burden of showing that the law both serves a legitimate local purpose and that this purpose cannot be achieved by available nondiscriminatory means. Based on the evidence presented by Maine, there is no less discriminatory way to prevent significant threats to Maine's unique and fragile fisheries from parasites prevalent in out-of-state fish, but no common in Maine. Also, nonnative species inadvertently included with baitfish could pose a threat by competing with native species for food, by preying on native species, or disturbing the environment in other ways. Inspecting for commingled nonnative species, because of the small size of the fish, and for parasites is a way to promote a legitimate state interest- guarding against perfectly understood environmental risks- the law is constitutional.

Loren J. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (1970) [Most frequently cited as establishing the test used in analyzing laws that are not discriminatory.

Topic: Dormant Clause --> Non-Discriminatory

Facts:Arizona required that all cantaloupes grown in Arizona be packed there. Bruce Church, a farming corporation with extensive operations in California and Arizona, sent the cantaloupes it grew in Arizona uncrated and in bulk to its packing facilities in California, about 30 miles away from its Arizona operations. Pike, an Arizona official charged with enforcing the Arizona law, issued an order prohibiting such transportation. Bruce Church filed suit to enjoin the law as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, arguing that it would cost $200K to build and operate a plant in Arizona, the sole purpose of which would be to comply with the law. A district court granted the requested injunction, and the Supreme Court granted review

Holding:Where a nondiscriminatory law effectuates a legitimate local interest, and it effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Thus, where there is a legitimate local interest, it must be balanced against the burden it imposes.

Bibb, Director, Dept. of Public Safety of Illinois v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.(1959)

Topic: Dormant Commerce Clause

Facts: Illinois required all trucks passing through the state to use a contoured mudguard. Arkansas required trucks to have straight mudguards, and all the other states required wither type. Navajo Freight lines challenged the Illinois law on the ground that it unduly burdened interstate commerce. A district court agreed that the Illinois law violated the Commerce Clause, and the court enjoined Bibb and other Illinois officials from enforcing the law.

Holding: States have a legitimate safety interest in regulating their highways and safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity. Here the law would add to a carrier's costs of doing business, since every truck entering interstate commerce would have to have the contoured mudguards, given the impossibility of determining at what point a particular truck would enter Illinois; trucks going to both Arkansas and Illinois would either have to avoid Illinois or stop at the border to change their mudguards; and compliance with the Illinois law would seriously interfere with "interline" trucking operations- the interchanging of trailers beteween carriers. Moreover, the trial court found that the contoured mudguards had no safety benefits over strait ones and actuall created previously unknown hazards. These burdens on interstate commerce are "heavy" and "pass the permissible limits even for safety regulations."

Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Raymond Kassel (1981)

Topic: Dormant Commerce Clause

Facts: The state of Iowa passed a statute restricting the length of vehicles that may use its highways. The state law set a general length limit of 55 feet for most vehicles, and 60 feet for trucks pulling two trailers. Iowa was the only state in the western or Midwestern US to outlaw the use of 65-foot doubles. Consolidated Freightways, one of the largest common carriers in the country, alleged that the Iowa statute unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. The district court and the court of appeals found the statute unconstitutional and Kasel, on behalf of the state, appealed.

Holding: While bona fide safety regulations are entitled to a strong presumption of validity, the asserted safety purpose must be weighed against the degree of interference with interstate commerce. Here, the State of Iowa failed to present any persuasive evidence that the 65 foot doubles are less safe than 55-foot single trailers. Consolidated Freightways demonstrated that Iowa's law substantially burdens interstate commerce by compelling trucking companies either to route 65-foot doubles around Iowa or use the small trucks allowed by state statute. Thus the Iowa statute is in violation of the commerce clause.

YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE V. SAWYER (1952):

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US v. Nixon

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Cheney v. US District Court (2004):

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William J. Clinton, President of the United States v. City of New York

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Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982)

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United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp (1936)

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Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of Treasury

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Hamdi v. Rumsfield

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Facts:
Holding

Boumediene v. Bush

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Loving v. Virginia

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Zablock v. Redhail

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Boddie v. Connecticut

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Santosky v. Kramer

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Stanley v. Illinois

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Michael H. v. Gerald D

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Moore v. City East Cleveland, Ohio (1977):

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Meyer v. Nebraska (1923

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Troxel v. Granville (2000)

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Buck v. Bell

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Skinner v. Oklahoma

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Griswold v. Connecticut

Topic:

Facts: Doctor and Planned Parenthood Director were prosecuted for advising married persons on the means of preventing contraception.

Holding: The various guarantees which create penumbras, or zones of privacy include the First Amendment's right of association, the Third Amendment's prohibition against the peacetime quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, and the Ninth Amendment's reservation to the people of unenumerated rights. The Connecticut law, by forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manner or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon a relationship that lies within a zone of privacy.

Eisenstadt v. Baird

Topic:

Facts: Massachusetts made it a crime to give contraceptives to an unmarried person. Baird gave a contraceptive to a single person and was convicted under the Massachusetts law. Baird challenged his conviction under the Equal Protection Clause.

Holding: There is no rational basis for treating married personas and unmarried persons differently. Even if the state's goal is to limit fornication, the ban on distributing contraceptives to unmarried persons has a tenuous relation to achieving that goal- it is unreasonable to think that pregnancy and childbirth are the punishment the state wants to inflict on those who fornicate. Therefore, a law cannot be upheld as either a health measure or as a deterrent to fornication. Regardless of what the law's purpose is, the rights of access to contraceptives must be the same for the unmarried as they are married. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."

Roe v. Wade (1973

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)

Topic:

Facts: PA's abortion law provided, with some exceptions, that a married woman must notify her husband of her decision to have an abortion. Abortion clinics challenged the requirement as a violation of due process and equal protection.

Holding: A state abortion law's husband-notification requirement violates due process and equal protection.

Sternberg v. Carhart:

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Gonzales v. Carhart

Topic:

Facts: Congress passed a statute that criminalized doctors' performance of partial-birth abortions.

Holding: The Partial-Birth Abortion Act does not place a substantial obstacle to late-term, but pre-viability, abortions.

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health (1990):

Topic:

Facts:Missouri required clear and convincing evidence of prior consent by an individual prior to the cessation of life support systems operating upon that individual.

Holding: A state may require clear and convincing evidence of prior consent by an individual prior to the cessation of life support systems operating upon that individual.

Weighs the right to refuse artificial hydration and feeding again st a state's interest in the regulation. The state's interest involved is the lives of its citizens, a highly compelling interest. A state is free to adopt procedures designed to ensure that, prior to the cessation of artificial life support, the individual undergoing such support had, when competent, desires the such support be withheld. Due to the highly compelling natures of the state's interest in this type of situation, a clear and convincing evidentiary standard does not run afoul of any right to terminate such treatment that may exist.

Washington v. Gluckberg (1997):

Topic: Right to Physician Assisted Suicide

Facts: A group of Washington physicians and a nonprofit organization that counseled people considering physician-assisted suicide filed suit seeking a declaration that the state's assisted-suicide ban was facially unconstitutional.

Holding: The right to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. NO historical roots. There are state interests in preventing suicide: preventing causes of suicide, protecting the integrity of the medical profession, protection of vulnerable groups, and protection against euthanasia

Court must exercise extreme prudence in expanding the DPC to include new fundamental rights and liberties.

Vacco v. Quill (1997):

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Romer v. Evan (1996)

Topic:
Facts:
Holding:

Lawrence v. Texas (2003):

Topic:

Overruled Bowers
Facts: Police officers saw Lawrence, a man, having anal sex with another man inside an apartment. The two men were charged with, and convicted of, the Texas crime of deviate sexual intercourse with a member of the same sex.

Holding: A statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause.

Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The defendants are adults and their conduct was in private and consensual.

The right to privacy is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.

Roe v. Wade recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed that the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person. It is clear that in Bowers v. Hardwick this Court failed to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To declare the issue as one related to the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.

Whalen v. Roe

Topic:

Rule: A NY state law that requires storage of the private information of medical patients who received prescriptions for drugs susceptible to illegal abuse does not violated the patients' constitutionally protected privacy right.

Holding:The law was passed in response to a legislative concern that the drugs were being diverted for illegal use. States have wide latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to such problems Cases dealing with the right to privacy involve two kinds of interest: 1)right to avoid disclosure of personal matters, and 2) right to independence in making certain kinds of decisions. NY law does not on its fact pose sufficient threat to either interest.

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