Mens Rea
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21 terms
Terms | Definitions |
|---|---|
 Smith (1960) | F: bribery of a politician, intending to expose him I: intention =/= motive |
| X Steane (1947) | F: war propaganda crime - otherwise his family was in danger I: good intention / bad intention - and more weight should be given to the good intention (now it would be a defence of duress) |
| X Moloney (1985) | F: son and step-dad drunk, playing with gun, son shoots and kills step-dad I: the natural meaning of "intent" should be used by the jury - acting with the aim or purpose of bringing about that consequence - did D see the result as a natural consequence of his actions? test: i. D intended his actions, whether or nto he foresaw they would happen ii. D foresaw it would happen, whether or not he desired it |
| X Hancock and Shankland (1986) | F: miners on strike, shoved concrete slab off bridge onto taxi, killed the driver. I: intended only fright, but foresaw consequence - not enough for intent (now wrong) - degree of probability test |
| X Hyam (1975) | F: D set fire to ex's partners house through letterbox, intending only to scare, but killing V I: convicted because of high probability and foreseeability of death occurring |
| Nedrick (1986) | F: paraffin through letterbox, intention to scare, child died I: oblique intent = foresight of virtual certainty of the consequence, barring some unforeseen intervention |
| *Woollin (1999) | F: a father slammed his baby against a hard surface out of frustration because it was crying I: D seeing death or GBH as a virtually certain consequence of one's actions constituted OBLIQUE INTENT i. D foresees facts as virtually certain ii. and they are in fact virtually certain to infer > to find |
| Cunningham (1957) | F: guy stole coins form gas meter, the gas escaped into the resident house I: malice - subjective recklessness: i. D foresaw a risk of harm ii. it was objectively unreasonable for D to take that risk |
| Stephenson (1979) | F: D set fire to a haystack, but was a schizophrenic, so didn't know where he was, never mind foresight of risk. I: (appl. CUNNINGHAM) |
| X Caldwell (1982) | F: D set fire to a hotel whilst intoxicated I: objective recklessness: i. D does an act that creates a serious and obvious risk ii. D either didn't recognise the risk, or chose to ran it anyway cfd. by Lawrence (1982) overruled: R v G (2004) |
| ~ Elliot v C (1983) | F: retarded girl set fire to cottage in the middle of the night by methylated spirits, wanting to keep warm. I: (appl. CALDWELL) the age and mental capacity were irrelevant and D's actions constituted) RESKLESSNESS - so guilty of criminal damage |
| R v. G (2004) | F: 11 and 12-y-o went out without parents' knowledge, set fire to paper, threw it under a wheelie bin and caused £1m worth of damage I: OVERRULED CALDWELL re-instated subjective recklessness, so not guilty |
| Adomako (1994) | F: anesthetist failed to notice a certain tube was unplugget, resulting in V's death.s I: guilty of gross negligence - it was "SO BAD in all the circumstances as to amount to... a criminal act or omission." |
| Westminster (1986) | F: company allowed an unlawful license I: willful blindness is not acceptable |
| A-G's Ref. (no.3 of 1994) | F: D stabbed his GF, who was pregnant. GF recovered, but V (baby) was born prematurely and died soon after. I: no evidence that D intended to injure V - at time of injury, V was a foetus, not a child - so transferred malice would have to be mother > foetus > child, and that is too far removed. |
| Thabo Meli (1954) | F: 4 Ds conspired to kill V, hit him on the head, then rolled him off a cliff (he wasn't actually dead yet) - no MR when death occurred? I: single complex transaction - did exactly what they wanted to do, brought about the exact result they intended. the manner being unexpected is irrelevant. |
| Le Brun (1991) | F: guy had an argument with his wife outside house, pushed her into road, thought she was dead (she wasn't), so dragged her back into the house, which killed her I: single complex transaction - limits Thabo Meli principle: if the fatal injury happens when D is trying to HELP V, it's not a SCT. |
| Kay (1945) | F: driver fell asleep in place X, hit a bunch of soldiers in place Y I: convicted of dangerous driving, but at place Y was acting involuntarily (asleep) - fault was at place X where he fell asleep |
| @ Pedain | A terrorist who plants a bomb not necessarily foreseeing death or serious injury as virtually certain can nevertheless be found to have the intention required for murder if attention is paid to the terrorist's attitude to the risk he creates. Intention: happily accepting the risk that will result from D's actions = intentionally creating a risk Recklessness: D realises someone will / may be exposed to a risk |
| Warner (1969) | F: D was caught bringing controlled drugs into the country, but thought the box contained scent I: strict liability crime - what he thought was in the box was irrelevant and he was convicted |
| Lewis (1987) | F: landlord D's tenant kept drugs on the premises I: D guilty of drug possession if he had ample opportunity to find them |
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