- 3 years - desire belief psychology: begin to talk about beliefs & thoughts as well as desires. seem to understand that beliefs are mental represenations that can be false as well as true. but still explain other people's actions in terms of desires rather than beliefs
- 4 years - belief desire psychology: begin to understand what people think & believe as well as what they desire crucially effects how they behave. beliefs & desires are thought to determine actions jointly
- ability to distinguish reality from pretence: pretend play may involve the child projecting his/her own feelings onto e.g. dolls. the ability to see others not just as an extension of his/her desires is a complex task. only when this appears will children not confuse mental states of others w/their own mental states. evidence that this does not occur until 4th year
- bartsch & wellman (1995): 2 years - desire psychology. elementary conception of simple desires, emotions & perceptual experiences. mentalistic but not representational - people are connected to things but do not yet understand that people mentally represent these things
- brown et al(1991): children's spontaneous talk of toehr's internalstates increases with age, at age 2 desire terms are most frequent, followed by feeling state & then mental state
- callaghan et al (2005): similar task completion age across ultures - canada, samoa, india, peru
- capacity for pretence: second-year on, children are able to engage in make-believe play e.g. child may endow various mental states on dolls - need a powerful imagination, for being able to work out how other people function
- critcisms of fb tasks: "critical conditions" for eliciting false beliefs task performance in 3 yr olds. young children have an excessive reality orientation - orientated to what is actually the case rather than what someone might think is the case. know people try to satisfy their desires. limited executive, linguistic or memory abilities that prevent them from understanding task questions keeping track of info. executive skills like self-regulation and inhibition of responses may be critical
- dennett (1978): false belief tasks. the prediction of another person's belief on the basis of this person's false belief. control questions to check child understand the sequence of events
- dennett (1978): the sally-anne task. 3 year olds - sally will look for marble in new location. 4-5 year olds - old location
- empathy: ability to appreciate other people's internal feelings & the knowledge that their over behaviour is governed by various inner motives is essential to 'reading' others and thus to mature social functioning
- Gergely et al (2002): infants by 15 months imitate on the basis of the intention of an actor rather than the basis of an actor's actual behaviour ->understand that the goals of another person transforms their bodily motions into purposeful behaviour
- harris (1989): younger children assumed ellie the elephant would have the same knowledge as themselves and know that there is milk in her can
- hughes et al (1998): individual differences in theory of mind. followed 50 children over a 1 year period. mean age - 3 years 11 months until 5 years. performance of different fb tasks highly correlated. verbal ability was significant covariate. performance also associated w/mental state talk & predicting actions or emotions based on false beliefs. increased mental stage references in conversation, increased fb understanding. shift from referring primarily to their ownmental states to referring at least as often to shared or others' mental stress
- implicit understanding: in the maxi task, 3 yr olds but not 2.5, look at the correct 1st location but state that maxi will look in the 2nd location
- infant pre-cursors of theory of mind: interested & highly attentive to faces & voices. able to discriminate facial expressions in first 2 years. follow another person's gaze
- Legerstee (1991): will imitate mouth openings & tongue protusions produced by adult but not object
- mentalism: an intuitive theory of action. actions caused by intentional mental states
- mitchell et al (1991): tube presented, 3 yr old children mailed a picture into a postbox of what they thought was inside (smarties). shown that crayons in box. most children correctly answered 'smarties' when asked what they thought was in the box. suggests that in the traditional task, children may give the wrong answer because they are biased to make judgements baout belief states on the basis of known physical reality.
- repacholi et al (1997): 14 month & 18 months. experimenter observed espressing disgust as she tasted one type of food, happiness when she tasted another. 14 months - offered whichever food they preferred themselves. 18 months - offered food corresponding w/prior positive affect
- russell et al (1991): unexpected contents tasks. competitive game. 4 year olds tell opponent to choose empty box, 3 year olds point to full. young children have difficulty pointing to a salient object. controlled their behaviour despite desire for sweets & frustration
- self-awareness: a precursor for theory of mind: evident from quite an early age - e.g. children's expressions of their feelings & desires. basic pre-requisite for understanding mental operations generally
- theory of mind: an understanding that the same world can be experienced in different ways by different people. each person therefore has a distinctive belief about reality. the ability to infer mental states in others & see them as a basis for overt action. ->a decive for understanding social behaviour
- wellman (1985): the litmus test of children's belief-desire psychology. assesses the understanding that mental representations are representations and therefore may be either true or false but still guide behaviour
- wellman et al (2001): meta-analysis of 178 studies. 4 factors increase likelihood of passing false belief: 1 target object out of sight & therefore reality less salient. 2. motive for the transformation 3. the child participated in the transformation 4. the protagonist's mental state during the transformation was salient e.g. max is gone and can't see. but, even under optimal conditions, children aged 3.5 perform around chance levels. correct performance increases w/age. a number of potentially relevant variables e.g. nature of target object, nature of protagonist, type of question did not affect children's age related performances. increased likelihood that their judgments reflect robus conceptions of human action rather than task0specific responses. -> conceptual change
- zahn-waxler et al (1982): first signs of empahty shown early in life. trained mothers kept records of what their children did when witnessing naturally occurring expressions of emotion. 10 months - showed some reaction, e.g. watching intently or about 1/3 showing signs of distress themselves. over the next year, signs of distress declined, children actively intervened. 18 months + verbally expressed sympathy, offered objects & made suggestions