108 terms

Con Law Cases

Marbury v. Madison
Judicial Review
Constitution is the law of the land, if 2 laws are in conflict.
Created authority for judicial review of executive actions (i where the executive has a legal duty and executive is acting ministerially)
Judiciary is responsible for interpreting the law enacted by the legislature in light of the constitution. If anything contradicts the constitution, it will be void
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee & Cohen's v. Virginia
State Courts and Supreme Court
State court judgments can be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
If Congress decided to not create any courts, then Supreme Court would have jurisdiction over nothing if it didn't have jurisdiction over the state courts.
State courts cannot be trusted to adequately protect federal rights because of outside influences. (Cohen's)
DC v. Heller
Theories of interpretation of Constitution
Originalism v "living constitution"/Non-originalism
narrow interpretation v broader interpretation of const.
Strict Construction: Do not imply things freely into the Constitution, only what is written down
Dynamic: Mold it into what is wanted
Evolving Constitution: (Brennan) Adapts to society's needs
Originalism: Reaction to Evolving Constitution
Go to the original intent of the Framers, popular today
Narrow Intent: What Framers would have meant 200 years ago
Purpose Based: look at the intent of the bigger purpose
Textualism: The text comes before the intent
Ex Parte McCardle
Exceptions and Regulations Clause
Congress denied jxn to Supreme Court to review writs of habeas corpus under the act. As Article III says, Congress "may make exceptions and under such regulations" for the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court - limitation on SCOTUS power
distinction: this was a writ of habeas corpus, NOT an appeal from a criminal case)
Congress can pass law limiting jxn of SCOTUS even during pending case
But Congress CANNOT reopen a final judgment.
US v. Klein
Separation of Powers- Presidential Pardons
Congress wanted to invalidate pardons to treat them as evidence of guilt, so that people who fought for Confederacy would not have claim on their property.
Congress cannot direct judgments of the SCOTUS - limitation on Congress's power
Only applies where Congress directs judiciary as to decision making under an existing law
(Distinction from Robertson, which involved federal lands that Congress could direct from the beginning. In Klein, the underlying right was an individual right that Congress really couldn't affect).
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society (Note Case
Separation of Powers
Supreme Court rejected claim that law was unconstitutional under Klein because it claimed that this situation was different: Here, Congress merely passed a new law and did not direct Supreme Court's decision on an existing law. However, the law did apply to pending suits.
Hayburn's Case (Note Case)
Advisory Opinions
Congress passed a law to allow veterans to have pension cases heard in federal court, but the determinations of the courts could be overridden by the Secretary of War.
Supreme Court said that this was unconstitutional because this would be an advisory opinion.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc
Advisory Opinions - new ruling to reopen cases
SCOTUS final judgments are final - cannot be reopened by Congress
BUT Congress can create new cause of action
Ex: Foodfight in cafeteria
Art. III only allows courts to only rule on "cases and controversies"
If new law enacted before final judgment, higher court applies new law
Nashville v. Wallace (Note Case)
Advisory Opinions:
Company received a declaratory judgment that a tax was unconstitutional because the matter would have been justiciable as a request for an injunction.
Allen v. Wright
Standing - IRS giving tax breaks to racially discriminating private schools
Constitutional Standing Requirements
Injury (or interest) - has suffered or imminently will suffer
Causation - fairly traceable to defendant's conduct
Redressability - a favorable decision will redress the injury
In this case, the Court determined that there was no direct injury because the plaintiffs did not have children who were trying to get into the schools. Also, the "chain of causation" between the challenged government conduct and asserted injury was too weak because there was no evidence that the lack of federal funds would cause the schools to desegregate any faster. This last reasoning is why redressability is a problem.
Mass v. EPA
Standing - global warming
Massachusetts says the EPA has abdicated its responsibility to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and thereby prevent global warming. They want the SC to answer 2 questions:
Whether EPA has statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emmissions
Whether its stated reasons for not doing so are consistent with the statute
EPA argues that none of them have standing. Since greenhouse gas emissions inflict such widespread harm, the doctrine of standing presents an insuperable obstacle.
The Supreme Court said the fact that Massachusetts (a sovereign state) was a plaintiff here is significant. Massachusetts owns a great deal of the territory to be affected. Its stake in the outcome is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of judicial power.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
Standing - Endangered Species
Injury in fact test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.
Imminence of injury is the key
Congress can't give standing to somebody if that violates Constitution
Congress can create an interest through reward or statute, but it cannot override constitutional standing requirements.
Court rejected "ecosystem nexus" "animal nexus" and "vocational nexus" standing theories
City of LA v. Lyons (Note Case)
Standing - Injury - Plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief must show a likelihood of future harm.
L wanted to enjoin police officers from using chokeholds when the police officers were not threatened. Because it was not certain that he would be choked in the future, there was no personal injury (And thus no standing).
US v. Hays (Note Case)
Standing - Injury - Racial gerrymandering case, but plaintiffs did not live in the district where they claim the racism exists. Only individuals residing within a district suffer an injury from how the lines for that district are drawn.
Federal Election Comm v. Akins (Note Case)
Congress, by statute, can create a right to information and the denial of such information was an injury sufficient to satisfy Article 3 standing reqs.
Linda v. Richard (Note Case)
Unwed mother sued to have the father of her child prosecuted for failure to pay child support. She challenged Texas policy of not prosecuting fathers of illegitimate children. Court dismissed for lack of standing because an injunction would not afford the mother any additional child support money. (Lack of Redressability)
Warth v. Seldin (Note)
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of zoning practices, and Court found that they lacked standing because they couldn't prove that they would build what they said that they were going to build. No redress.
Simon v. Welfare Organization (Note)
Plaintiffs, indigents, claimed that a new IRS ruling limited the healthcare that hospitals were supposed to provide in connection with their tax-payer exemption status. Plaintiffs were denied healthcare, but Court found that they lacked standing because other factors could have contributed to their being denied healthcare besides the IRS ruling.
Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental (Note)
Plaintiffs argued that new law that limited liability for nuclear reactor accidents was unconst. Court found that they had standing because a nuclear reactor was built in the plaintiffs' area and had already subjected them to many injuries, including radiation, pollution, and fear.
Singleton v. Wulff
Physicians bring action supporting medicaid covered abortions for pregnant women. Factors determining whether P can sue on behalf of 3rd party 1 Closeness of relationship between P and 3rd party 2 Likelihood that 3rd party can sue on own behalf.
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow
Constitutionality of Pledge of Allegiance
Federal courts reluctant to step into domestic issues because they are the responsibility of the state. Difficult to gain standing if interests of P and 3rd party are in conflict.
US v. Richardson
Prohibition of Generalized Grievances (Taxpayer Standing). Taxpayer bring action about public reporting of expenditures under CIA statute. Taxpayers do not have standing. No airing of grievances in a federal court. Must show direct injury not common to the general public
Flast v. Cohen
Taxpayer challenge expenditure of funds given to religious schools. Exception Establishment Clause, 1st amendment. Taxpayer has personal interest if 1 Logical link between taxpayer status & type of legislation attacked and 2 Show that challenged enactment exceeds specific const. limitations imposed upon congr. spending power
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation
(exception to the exception) challenge to expenditures by executive branch
Flast only applies to exercises of Congressional powers (legislature) does not extend to executive expenditures
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner
Statute said that drug companies have to print common name of drugs under the companys' own trademark name.This would cause the companies to lose a lot of money in the advertisements that it had already created.
Issue Is the controversy ripe? Do the companies have to wait until after they print the ads and are sued for not complying with the statute?
Court found that there was ripeness because the impact on the companies is sufficiently direct and immediate.
Baker v. Carr -
Political Gerrymandering.
Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment. This case was justiciable and did not present a political question. The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a case presents a political question are
Const. commitment of issue to another branch.
Lack of Standards.
Can't decide without becoming political.
Show disrespect to another branch.
Need for adherence to political decision.
Multifarious pronouncements from different departments.
Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004)
Political gerrymandering is nonjusticiable. One of the standards used in Baker for determining whether something is a political question is if there are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the question. That is the case here.
Powell v. McCormack (1969)
Facts After being elected to the House of Representatives, the other members of the house voted to exclude Powell from that body. This case is justiciable. The constitution does not give Congress authority to exclude members elect; they would have to expel him with a twothirds vote. Otherwise, the constitutional language about people choosing their representatives, and only being able to expel with a twothirds vote would be nullified.
Goldwater v. Carter (1979)
Carter rescinded a treaty with Taiwan, Sen. Goldwater challenged, saying Senate must rescind a treaty. Political Question because it involved the authority of the President to conduct foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate is authorized to negate the action of the President.
McCulloch v. Maryland
Justice Marshall, 1819supremacy of the federal government vs. states rights Congress has power to create a bank through necessary and proper clause and commerce/ taxing clauses. Necessary does not mean an absolute physical necessity, but could import that it is "convenient, useful, and essential." Maryland can't tax the bank because Constitution is supreme.
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)
scope of the commerce power; 10th amendment
NY tried to prohibit guy who had a federal license to ferry passengers. The Commerce Clause gives the federal government the power to regulate commerce among the states, and the states cannot undermine or usurp that power. Commerce power does not stop at the state lines; otherwise it would be useless. New York can't say that once the vessels come into New York they are under New York's control.
United States v. EC Knight Co. (1895)
Commerce clause v. Police Power
Sugar manufacturing. There is a distinction between the manufacturing goods and commerce. Manufacturing is not part of commerce. If the government wants to regulate manufacture of a good, it needs to use police power, which is given to the states.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936)
Congress passes a law to stabilize coal industry in the U.S.; law contains provisions regulating minimum and max prices of coal, hours, miner's wages, etc. The provisions of the Act regarding collective bargaining, the control of wages, hours, and working conditions of coal miners are not within the authority of Congress and are therefore unconstitutional. The provisions of the Act related to labor are beyond the powers of Congress, because production is not commerce.
Shreveport Rate Cases (1914)
Railway companies in Texas charged more for the line coming from Shreveport, LA than they did for longer routes within Texas. Railroads are instruments of interstate commerce, and the commerce clause has the right to control the operation of anything that has such a "close and substantial relation" to interstate commerce.
Schechter Poultry v. United States (1935)
Although poultry was bought from sellers out of state, the regulations apply when the poultry was no longer in the flow of interstate commerce. Although the regulations affect interstate commerce, it's not enough.
Hamer v. Dagenhart (1918)
Underage workers at cotton mill. Congress's act does not regulate commerce, but aims to standardize ages at which children may be employed within the states. Production of goods is a matter of local regulation. Commerce does not begin until goods are delivered to a common carrier for transportation. Congress has no power to require the states to use their police power to prevent unfair competition.
Dissent It's constitutional, the act only says goods made with child labor can't be transported across state lines.
Champion v. Ames (1903)
Lottery tickets sold from one state in other states. Congress passed a law forbidding lottery tickets from being transported from state to state. Const., but probably because the conservative bench at the time did not approve of gambling.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937)
Switch in time saves nine.
Facts Jones & Laughlin Steel, a major manufacturing company, was charged with discriminating against members of a union. The power to regulate commerce is the power to enact "all appropriate legislation" for commerce's "protection and advancement", to adopt measures to "promote its growth and ensure its safety", and to "foster, protect, control, and restrain." Activities which may be intrastate in character if considered separately can still be considered interstate activities if they have a "close and substantial relation" to interstate commerce.
United States v. Darby (1941)
While manufacturing is not itself interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is commerce, and prohibition of such shipment is a regulation of commerce. The 10th amendment is merely a declaration of the relationship between the national and state governments; if congress is authorized to do something by the constitution, state's rights can't prevent it.
Note The court rejects the reasoning and holding from Hammer v. Dagenhart.
Wickard v. Filburn (1942)
aggregation; Commerce includes all stages of business.
The power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to regulate commodity prices and practices affecting them. If, taken in the aggregate, an activity substantially influences interstate commerce, it can be regulated under the commerce clause. Wheat grown for home consumption is a factor with great volume and variability and it would have a substantial influence on price conditions.
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964)
Hotel didn't rent rooms to blacks. Congressional findings showed that discrimination by race affects interstate commerce. Although running a hotel appears to be a purely local matter, "if interstate commerce feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which provides the squeeze."
Katzenbach v. McClung, Sr. and McClung, Jr. (1964)
Ollie's BBQ, located near both a state and an interstate highway. Ollie's catered to a white crowd but only provided takeout for blacks. Restaurants in areas where discrimination is practiced sell less interstate goods b/c of the discrimination and Interstate travel was obstructed directly by it.
Criminal Laws Perez v. United States (1971)
Consumer Credit Protection Act, which forbids "loan sharking" constitutional under commerce clause. Extortionate credit transactions, even if they take place purely instate, may affect interstate commerce. Federal govt. can go into criminal law a bit. The test was whether Congress had a rational basis for passing the law. Substantial effects has gone away at this point.
This case mentions the 3 categories, but doesn't make them into a test yet.
National League of Cities v. Usery (1976)
(overturned by Garcia v. San Antonio)
The Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to regulate states or local governments in their integral governmental functions
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority (1985)
Overrules Nat'l League in favor of the electoral process as a check on federal commerce power
The federal govt applied the FLSA (regulates hours and wages) to San Antonio's Metropolitan Authority. Congress has full authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the traditional, or core, functions of state and local govts, notwithstanding the 10th Amendment. In Nat'l league, the Court ruled that the Act could not be applied to state and local govts "in areas of traditional govt functions" but did not provide an explanation of how a "traditional" function is to be distinguished from a "nontraditional" function
United States v. Lopez (1995)
The GunFree School Zones Act of 1990 Congressional authority to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause extends to only those activities that rationally implicate 1) the channels of interstate commerce, 2) the instrumentalities (persons or things) of interstate commerce and 3) activities having a substantial effect upon interstate commerce. There are outer limits to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause; these limits require that there be some rational basis for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce in order for the regulation be valid.
United States v. Morrison (2000)
Federal statute provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gendermotivated violence. Congress may not, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, regulate a local activity solely on the basis that it has substantial effects on interstate commerce when viewed in the nationwide aggregate. If it is not in the domain of economic activity then Congress has a lot less latitude in using the aggregation test.
Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen (2003)
Congress had adopted the Hazard Elimination Program (Sec. 409) and in exchange for federal $ the Program required states to systematically identify potentially dangerous areas. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate commerce.
Gonzales v Raich (2005)
Leaving homeconsumed MJ outside federal control would similarly affect price and market conditions. Only the 3rd test, the activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, is implicated in this case.
New York v. United States (1992) (Liu lecture)
Congress passed leg. requiring states to either provide for radioactive waste disposal or take title to waste generated within its borders. Congress can give monetary incentives or access incentives to induce a certain behavior of the states because those do not force the states to do anything. The take title provision was the problem here because it forced states to either create a site or take liability for all waste. (Adopting this would have removed accountability for federal officials and placed it upon state officials (confused constituents).
Printz v. United States (1997) (Liu lecture)
The federal Brady Act required local law enforcement officials to temporarily administer its background check program. Pres. has duty to faithfully execute the job, so if congress delegates powers to CLEOs, its given his job away without a method to supervise it.
Reno v. Condon (2000) (Liu lecture)
Congress passed leg. placing certain prohibitions on the dissemination of private information given states by individuals in applying for a driver's license. The selling of information is within the commerce clause. This doesn't require states to regulate their citizens. Prohibition of something is differnent than mandating enforcement (no discretion).
U.S. v. Butler (1936)
Congress attempted to regulate the quantity of local agricultural production through use of the taxing and spending powers.
Court said that this was okay because the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Const.
Sabri v. US (2004)
Developer bribes county officials. The Spending Clause authorizes Congress to spend money for the general welfare, and that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes it to take any reasonable steps to prevent such money from being misspent. These reasonable steps include prohibiting bribery.
South Dakota v. Dole (1987)
Feds. give highway money to states if they raise their drinking age to 21.This money was used in pursuit of the general welfare. The quid pro quo was unambiguously stated. Money given to states was reasonably related to highways because if states have differential different ages and that would confuse drivers and will create danger on highways.
Katzenbach v. Morgan & Morgan (1966)
Old Expansive Approach to 14th Amend.
Federal law prohibiting the states from requiring knowledge of English from its voters. Conflicted with the NY law requiring English. The law is constitutional; "plainly adapted" to furthering the aims of the Equal Protection Clause. Prophylactic measures are okay.
Court just needs to perceive Congress's rational basis for the law
City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)
Current, narrow federalist approach
Comes shortly after Smith decision (peyote case), which ruled that restriction free expression of religion only required a rational and generally applicable law
Same approach as Reynolds.Church in TX was prevented from remodeling bc it was a historical landmark; City challenged RFRA, which overturned the Smith decision and reinstated the "compelling government purpose test" §5 power is remedial, not definitional; RFRA is definitional
US v. Morrison (2000)
§5 does not apply to private behavior
Freshman girl is raped by Virginia Tech football players. § 5 CANNOT be used to regulate private behavior. The harm should have a state remedy. Text of the 14th Amend. is clear that it applies ONLY to the states
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996)
Tribe argues that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act abrogates State immunity from suit. Florida argues that it remains immune under the 11th Amendment. The 11th Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States. 1
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings
Rational Basis
Congress expressly amended patent laws to authorize suits against state governments for patent infringement. Legislation inappropriate because Congress "identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations."—not C&P
Kimel v. Fla. Board of Regents
Congress expressly authorized suits against state governments for discrimination against the elderly under ADEA. Legislation inappropriate b/c "no history of purposeful discrimination"—"age does not define a discrete and insular minority b/c all persons, if they live out their normal lifespans," will experience it—thus, not C&P. We learn that classifications that receive only rational basis scrutiny will generally have a very hard time proving cases of discrimination—since it only has to be rationally related, and almost anything can be, really tough
Board of Trustees, University of Alabama v. Garrett (2001)
Congress may abrogate the States' 11th Amendment immunity from suit when it (1) unequivocally intends to do so; and (2) when it acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Congress did not identify a pattern of discriminatory activities by the States as it did in Katzenbach. "Adverse and disparate" treatment does not amount to a constitutional violation where rationalbasis scrutiny applies.
Nevada Dept. of HR v. Hibbs
"Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a genderbased classification is more difficult to meet than our rationalbasis test . . . it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations." But—issues with whether they require a record at all? Doesn't even look like you need one under this standard
Tenn. v. Lane
"While § 5 authorizes Congress to enact reasonably prophylactic remedial legislation, the appropriateness of the remedy depends on the gravity of the harm Congress seeks to prevent."
In other words, you might be able to enact more than normal if the harm is worse
United States v. Georgia
A disabled inmate sued Georgia under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act over the conditions of his confinement. Title II created a private cause of action for damages against States for conduct that violates the 14th amendment. If the plaintiff is not alleging a constitutional violation and the case does not involve a type of discrimination or a right receiving heightened scrutiny, the state can only be sued if Congress finds pervasive unconstitutional state conduct.
Alden v. Maine
Probation officers sued, said state violated overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act and sought damages in federal court. Sovereign immunity is not derived from the 11th amendment; it is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty States enjoyed before Ratification, and which they retain today, except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional amendments. Allowing congress to subject nonconsenting states to private suits in their own courts is inconsistent with the structure of the Constitution and the principles of federalism.
Youngstown Sheet v. Sawyer
4 views of inherent executive power.
Whether Pres. was acting within constitutional power when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of Steel Mills because he thought that if the workers went on strike it would create a threat to national security.
4 different views from the Justices about this
There is no inherent presidential power; the president may act only if there is express Const. or statutory authority. (Majority opinion)
The President has inherent authority unless the Pres. interferes with the functioning of another branch of govt. or usurps the powers of another branch.
The Pres. may exercise powers not mentioned in the Const. so long as the Pres. does not violate a statute or the Const.
The Pres. has inherent power that may not be restricted by Congress and may act unless the Const. is violated.
US v. Nixon
Existence and limitations of the Executive Privelege.
Executive Privilege exists Confidentiality for the Pres. has constitutional underpinnings.
There is no absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications, especially when the court must decide between maintaining this privilege at the cost of due process in criminal cases. Absolute privilege infringes on the Judiciary's Constitutional function of seeing cases.
Clinton v. New York
Statutory Increase in Presidential Power is Unconstitutional.
The lineitem veto power is not constitutional.
Fomalist View
The lineitem veto power essentially gives the president the power to amend a bill, and that amendment will not be able to pass through congress.
Functionalist View
We need such a power when Congress seeks to pass a really long bill and it is of such importance that the Pres. can't wait to send it back to Congress, but he will only sign it if a portion is amended.
Panama Refining v. Ryan
Congress Must Lay Down Standards for Agencies.
A provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorized Pres. to prohibit transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum produced in excess of amount permitted by states.
Court found that Congress could not delegate this power because Congress failed to give the agency standards to limit its discretion.
However, Congress could lay down policies and standards and allow agencies to make subordinate rules.
Whitman v. American Trucking
Intelligible Principle
Whether the Clean Air Act delegates legislative power to the EPA.
Congress must when conferring decisionmaking authority lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform.
There is such an intelligible principle here, even if Congress is delegating a certain degree of discretion to the EPA.
Since Panama, the Court has found intelligible principles in such statements as "for the public good."
Immigration v. Chadha
No More Legislative Vetoes.
Formalist View The legislative veto is no longer usable because it is unconstitutional in the sense that it is legislation that bypasses bicameralism and presentment.
Functionalist View The Legislative Veto may not have been something written into the Const., but neither were the plethora of agencies and all the power that agencies have been delegated by Congress. We need the legislative veto as a check on these broad delegations of power.
Morrison v. Olson
Independent Counsel is an Inferior Officer.
Because independent counsel can be removed by the AG for sufficient cause and because the office has limited tenure and his power in comparison with AG is not as great, IC is an inferior officer, meaning that Congress can vest power in the courts to appoint him/her.
Functional Argument We need individuals that can investigate the executive branch from outside of the executive branch.
Dissent/Formalist Argument Executive power is vested in the pres. IC is fulfilling an exclusively executive function, so he shouldn't be able to work without being under the supervision and control of the President.
Myers v. US
Removal Power is Executive.
Pres. has the exclusive power of removing officers who he appointed and who have been approved by Senate because this is central to his role as executing the laws.
The removal power has roots in the Const., and for executive officers, the Pres. should have the power to remove them.
Humphries Exec. v. US
Independent Agencies
Congress can create independent agencies pursuant to Article 1 that are insulated from Pres. removal, unless there was good cause for firing. Courts must first look at whether the agency is executive or quasilegislative or quasijudicial in nature. If it is more quasilegislative, quasijudicial in nature, then Congress has the power to remove officers of that agency.
Weiner v. US
If Independent Agency, then Statutory Authority for Tenure not Required.
If Congress specifically states in a statute that the officer in the admin agency shall not be subject to removal by the Pres., then the Pres.'s has no power to remove him. And even without a statutory limit on removal, the Pres. cannot remove executive officials where independence from the Pres. is desirable.
Bowshner v. Synar
No Removal of Executive Officers, Except by Impeachment.
Congress was going to delegate to a member of Congress the power to cut the budget if it got out of control, and this would be an executive act of carrying out the law that they had passed.
But this member of Congress would only be able to be removed from his position by Congress.
Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws, except by impeachment.
Morrison v. Olson
Restrictions on Removal Power
Whether the AG's power to remove independent counsel only with good cause interferes with the Pres.'s constitutionally approved functions? It doesn't.
Court says that this is the ultimate line of analysis in determining whether the Pres. should have the removal power Whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the president's ability to perform his constitutional duty.
US v. Curtiss
Distinction Between Foreign and Domestic Affairs
The powers of Pres. and Congress in relation to foreign policy are not limited to those enumerated in the const.
The president has plenary power as the sole organ of the Federal govt. in international relations.
The pres. has more power in the field of foreign policy than he would have if domestic affairs were involved.
Criticism The Const. has enumerated the foreign powers of the Pres., and they are limited just like the rest of his powers.
Dames v. Regan
Pres. ended lawsuits with Iran through exec. agreement and subjected them to arbitration to broker a deal after the embassy was overrun. Congress has given him power to make Exec. agreements in this area. The policy is that this covers major foreign policy disputes between our country and another that need immediate action.
Hamdi v. Rumsfield
Can the Executive Branch hold a citizen in jail without giving him due process of law in the form of a hearing and notice if he has been labeled an enemy combatant?
No, there must still be due process, but the govt. will have lax standards in proving the guilt of the combatant
Boumediene v. Bush
Congress passed Military Commision Act, which sought to suspend habeas corpus by setting up a separate appeals process for military tribunals for enemy combatants. The act is unconstitutional because habeas corpus is a privilege not to be withdrawn except in conformance with the suspension clause, and Congress did not successfully suspend the writ. Even though US doesn't claim sovereignty over the place of detention (guantanamo bay), it maintains de facto sovereignty over this territory.
Ex Parte Quirin
Military tribunals; Are they constitutional? Because the acts of the detainees were against the laws of war, yes military tribunals are const. in the present case.
Courts martial are for soldiers, Military tribunals are for everything that is not covered in courts martial.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Military tribunals are invalid because they violate the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Accords.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald
Absolute Immunity for Official Acts.
F was fired, and Nixon said that he approved of the firing. He later said that he didn't mean that he approved. Pres is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts.There are other checks on Pres Press, impeachment, and Congressional oversight.
Clinton v. Jones
Pres. can be sued for acts that happen prior to taking office.
Bill is being sued for making abhorrent sexual advances on a woman while he was governor.
There are important policy considerations here Pres. needs to devote his time and energy to being Pres. and executing the laws. He can't do that while he is being dragged into court.
However, there is no immunity for ubofficial conduct, and this wasn't even close to official conduct because it happened before he became Pres.
Justification for Commerce Clause
A state may not promote its own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce.The whole reason why we have a commerce clause or a const. is because the framers wanted to avoid such provincialism.
State can exercise local police power, but it cannot exercise federal power over commerce. Ex. Inspection laws are Const., even though they have an effect on interstate commerce, because they regulate internal commerce in the state and fall under police power.
Criticism These two categories of state and federal commerce are not at all separate.
Distinction between local and national problems If it is a local problem, then states can take care of it.Regulation of pilots on boats is a local matter.
Criticism This allows for protectionism so long as the subject matter of the state law is deemed local.Also, there is no bright line between what is local and what is national.
South Carolina
Prohibitions on the size of vehicles that can be driven in the state. D commerce clause applies to methods as well as purpose of state laws. Highways are of state interest because states maintain them, and the law would apply equally to in state and out of state traffic. No violation of CC.
Southern Pacific
No more than 14 passenger of 70 freight cars, and state gets to recover money for each violation.
When the regulation of matters of local concern is local in character and effect, and its impact on the national commerce does not seriously interfere with its operaction, and the consequent incentive to deal with them is slight, such regulation has been generally held to be within state authority. Here there is a serious burden on interstate commerce.
If a law is found to be discriminatory, then there is a strong presumption against the law and it will be upheld only it is necessary to acheive an important purpose.
NJ law prohibits the importation of most waste that was collected outside of NJ.
All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection, even waste.
Clear example of protectionism blocking interstate commerce at a State's borders,
City paid private individual to build a waste plan, and it was going to buy it back from him.
However, it needed to have a minimum of waste transported to the plant, so it made a flow control law.
Flow control violates commerce clause because it allows only the favored operator to process waste that is within the limits of the town.
If there is a discriminatory law, it must pass rigorous scrutiny that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest.
Dissent This directly benefits the govt., not just a private individual.
Same facts as Carbone, but the city owns the plant at issue.
Because this involves a public entity, it should be treated differently.
Here, it is apparent that there are other legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism recycling.
If local businesses want a change, they can obtain it through the political process.
Dissent This is no different than above case, and it should not be treated differently.
Facially discriminates for conservation
No person can transport or ship minnows outside the state.
This obviously discriminates, and because of the strict scrutiny standard, there must be no alternative.
There are plenty of alternatives, like limitng the number that people can take and limiting the local citizens as well.
Recipricocity requirements are often struck only allowing out of state citizens access to a market if their state allows for the same thing.
Discriminatory Impact is Enough to Fall Under Dormant Commerce Clause.
A law is likely to be found discriminatory if it imposes costs on out of staters that instaters would not have to bear.
NC decided to only allow closed containers of apples that have US grade or standard.
WA standard is better than US standard, but it wouldn't be allowed to ship its apples in such a way.
This would affect WA apples being shipped into NC, while allowing NC apple growers to take that market share because they weren't subject to the law.
NC could allow both US standard and WA standard.
A law is likely to be found discriminatory if its effect is to exclude virtually all outofstaters from a particular state market, but not if it only excludes one group of out of staters.
Maryland statute producer of petroleum can't sell that petroleum as well.
There are many gas stations that do not produce petroleum.
There are many interstate suppliers that do not also produce, which would be unaffected.
Commerce clause protects interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.
Dissent The effects here are that none of the intrastate gas stations are affected, and all of the affected gas stations are interstate businesses, what other kinds of effects do you need
West Lynn
Facially neutral laws also can be found discriminatory if they were enacted for a protectionist purpose helping instaters at the expense of outofstaters.
MA pricing order imposes assessment on all fluid milk sold by dealers to MA retailers, and it gives a subsidy back to the milk producers in MA.
The subsidy is funded primarily by milk sales from out of state, and all of the benefit is felt by instate milk producers.
MI banned sale of milk in plastic containers, and local pulp wood manufacturers stood to benefit.
Not unconst. because it regulates evenhandedly by prohibiting all milk retailers from selling products in plastic, nonreturnable milk containers.
Doesn't discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce.
Only a slight burden on interstate commerce, and it serves a compelling interest conservation of materials.
Dean Milk
Rigorous Scrutiny; Dormant Commerce Clause Applies to Local as well as State Laws.
Madison enacts law that only allows milk sales within a 5mile radius.
Undue burden Yes.
Any reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives?
Yes, there is another model of pasteurization that would work.
Policy no economic isolation.
Only survivor of Rigorous Scrutiny
Law that doesn't allow golden shiners to come into Maine because they have bacteria.
Discriminatory? Yes.
Undue burden? Yes.
Legitimate local purpose? Yes. Fish have bacteria that native Maine fish do not.
Any reasonable alternatives? Probably not.
You have to kill the fish to test them for bacteria.
Dissent If Maine wants to enact such a law, it needs to show with specificity that there are no reasonable alternatives.
Pike v. Church
Analysis if law is deemed nondiscriminatory
Arizona has a law that if produce is grown there, it must be processed there.
Cal. company grew cantaloupes, but had a processing plant in Cal.
A nondisc. law will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
This is pretty excessive it would require a 200K packing plant, and the only interest is that AZ gets to say that the cantaloupe came from there.
Bibb v. Navajo
IL stat. requires the use of a certain type of rear fendre mudguard.
Law is nondisc. because all drivers must have the mud flaps.
And safety is a legitimate state interest. But
These mudflaps might be unsafe as well, and other states only allow for the usual kind, which would require a lot of money in the long run.
Super heavy burden on interstate commerce.
Iowa statute doesn't allow doubles of more than 60 ft. to come into the state.
This imposes a substantial burden on Interstate commerce 12 million/year.
State has an interest in safety, but doubles are no more dangerous than single semis, and they aren't prohibited.
Dissent other states have the exact same law.
Congress validly exercised commerce clause power and gave that power to states.
Tax on outofstate insurers doing business in Cal.
Supreme court doesn't limit the authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the states as it sees fit.
Congress can confer upon states an ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that states would not otherwise enjoy.
Congress passed an act that allowed states to tax insurers and did not limit the act.
State was Participant in the market.
Whether SD can in a time of shortage confine sale of cement it produces solely to its residents.
SD owns a cement company, and because it does so, it can determine who gets the cement from that company.
States can operate freely in the free market.
Dissent The market participant exception doesn't make sense the reason why we have the dormant commerce clause is to protect against protectionism,
Government program not Unconst.
Boston could say that construction crews for projects funded by city funds should be composed of at least half bostonians.
The city is a market participant in that it is expending its own funds, so it is const.
South Timber
Limitation on Market Participant If State goes beyond mere participation, then the exception is no longer valid.
Alaska wanted to sell 49 million boardfeet of timber, but it wanted the buyer to process the timber in Alaska.
Alaska is not a market participant because it is putting regulations on the sale that another private entity would not be able to do it is saying that the timber needs to be processed in the state,
Alaska has other options It can sale at a higher price and subsidize the timber processors.
The state cannot impose conditions that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of the particular market in which it is participating.
Dissent State can do the same thing in other ways, so why not just let it do it?