173 terms


How is the anarchy of the international system considered seen in a positive light by Realists?
Realism seems pessimistic, however, in a positive light, realists consider that states can prevent wars by reducing the danger they pose to each other. "Clear-sighted states can mitigate the causes of war by finding ways to reduce the danger they pose to each other"
What does Realism get right about the post 9/11 world?
Realism was able to explain correctly the situation of the post-9/11 world. Indeed, according to realists the military response of the U.S. to terrorist attacks is understandable. "When a state grows vastly more powerful than any opponent, realists expect that it will eventually use that power to expand its sphere of domination, whether for security, wealth, or other motives."
What challenges does the post 9-11 world present to Realism? How does Realism attempt to address these challenges?
Challenge 1: The importance of non-state actors
Difficulties to explain why the U.S. declared a war against a terrorist organization (al Qaeda)
Responses of Realists:
- The "war on terror" has been fought against Afghanistan and Iraq, not non-state actors.
- The behaviour and motivations of non-state actors can be a strategy to expel powerful states of their homelands
Challenge 2: The balance of power
Weaker states are supposed to form an alliance against the stronger state and recreate a balance of power. However, after the cold war the U.S. are the only superpower in the world.
Responses of Realists:
- The US don't represent a danger because, the country is geographically far from other countries and its intentions are nonthreatening.
- Moreover, some scholars consider that resistance in Afghanistan and Iraq constitutes the emergence of a counter-power against the U.S.
How does Liberalism reject the international view of Realism?
Liberals think that realists have a stunted vision that cannot include improvements in relations between states. But, they argue that if we apply the principles of Liberalism, there a possible way out from the anarchic world.
What are some challenges that Liberalism must take account of?
Challenge 1: International Institutions cannot stop superpowers. (Example: the US invaded Iraq in 2003 despite the opposition at the UN)
Challenge 2: Even if democracies never fight each other, they fight eventually authoritarian regimes "to make the world safe for democracy".
Challenge 3: Sometimes, countries fail their transitions to democracy and get into war; because, they have weak political institutions.
According to the article, what are the tenets of Constructivism?
According to constructivists, "foreign policy should be guided by ethical and legal standards", debates about ideas and values are the principal building blocks of international life. This theory "emphasizes the role of ideologies, identities, persuasion, and transnational networks is highly relevant to understanding the post-9/11 world."
For Constructivists, how does international change result?
"International change results from the work of intellectual entrepreneurs". On the one hand, intellectual entrepreneurs attempt to convert people to new ideas. On the other hand, they condemn actors whose behaviour is different from standards. (Importance of transnational activist networks)
How does Constructivism differ from Liberalism?
Whereas liberalists account on the power of int'l economics and democracy, constructivists think that the power comes from individuals and groups who debate about ideas and convince others to follow them. In addition, constructivists consider that their theory explain the origins of the forces driving the forces of the two other theories.
What contradiction is posed in the constructivist view towards progress in the international community?
Constructivists consider that political order arise from mutual understanding and dialogue across cultures, however, the essential task they preconize is to "shame rights abusers", "cajole powerful actors" if they promote proper values, and "holding perpetrators accountable to int'l standards
According to Snyder, according to Mearsheimer, what is the main goal of states according to defensive realists? Or, less playfully, what does Mearsheimer claim is the main goal of states for defensive realists? Why?
-- The international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states. (Mearsheimer)
-- In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit and power. The first concern of states is not to maximise power but to maintain their positions in the system (Waltz)
-- Defensive realists contend that the primary goals that states seek to achieve are survival and security. Therefore, power is a tool for achieving the goal of security, and not a goal in itself.
What is the main goal of states for offensive realists, such as Mearsheimer?
-- Offensive realists believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. Power is a means and an end in itself.
What are the different classes of hegemony?
-- Global hegemony is virtually impossible, except for a state that has acquired "clear cut nuclear superiority," defined as "a capability to devastate its rivals without fear of retaliation"
-- Regional hegemony - A hegemon is the only great power in its system. Thus, if a region contains more than one great power, there is no hegemon. The United State is the only regional hegemon in modern history, through its domination of the western hemisphere.
-- Potential hegemon is the most powerful state in a regional system, but it is more than that. It is so powerful that it stands a good chance of dominating its region by overcoming its great power neighbours, if not all together, at least in sequence. There is a "marked gap" between the size of its economy and army, and that of the second most powerful state in the system. They always aspire to be hegemons, and they will not stop increasing their power until they succeed.
How is security defined and conceptualized by Mearsheimer? What is the critique of this position by Waltz and the defensive realists?
-- Security might be defined crudely as the probability that one's core interests will not be challenged or violated over some reasonable time span. The amount of security actually "purchased" by an increment of power would then translate into an increase in that probability.
-- Waltz would argue that at some point well short of hegemony, power/security accumulation runs into diminishing marginal returns, until costs begin to exceed benefits and security purchases fade to nothing.
What bedrock assumptions do all forms of realism have in common? What assumptions distinguish them from one another?
-- The system is anarchic, great powers possess some offensive capabilities, no state can be certain of others' intentions, survival is the primary goal, and actors are rational.
How does Mearsheimer defend states' desires for evermore power, especially given Waltz's critique (as seen above in question number 4)?
-- Striving to attain security from... attack, states are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.
Due to their diverging perceptions of the appropriate amount of security, defensive realists only seem to permit status-quo states into the international system, while offensive realists seem to only make room for revisionist states. Under what conditions then, rare though they may be, can a status-quo state be found in the international system as seen by offensive realists?
-- It is very difficult to find a status quo state in international politics, as the anarchical nature of the international system has left most states with a security deficit. Only in the rare case when a state reaches the rank of hegemon does the drive for power relax and the state becomes satisfied with the status quo. There may be occasional lulls before then because of a lack of opportunity to expand, but the desire for power remains and will be reactivated when circumstances permit.
How does offensive realism under Mearsheimer explain the fact that the US or England did not expand into Europe or Asia?
-- The US and Britain didn't expand because of the "stopping power of water" - large bodies of water, he claims, drastically limit the power-projection capabilities of armies. Thus the Atlantic Ocean not only protected the US from Europe, but also Europe from the US; likewise the English Channel blocked British expansion in Europe.
What is balancing and buck passing?
-- Balancing means acting to preserve an existing distribution of power (e.g. by supporting a state that is challenged by a revisionist state). Buck-passing is to hold back and take no action, with the intent of shifting the burden of resistance on to an ally or some other state.
When is buck passing preferable to balancing and vice versa?
-- Buck-passing is most attractive in a balanced multipolar system because, with roughly equal capabilities, each great power individually can hold off an aggressor, and is therefore capable of accepting the buck.
-- In an unbalanced system, when one state is markedly more powerful than its neighbours, those neighbours are too weak to accept the buck, so everyone will have a strong common interest in balancing against the powerful state.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of passing the buck?
-- The reasons buck-passing is preferred are threefold. (1) it is cheap - the cost of fighting is born by the ally and oneself takes a 'free-ride' (2) the aggressor and the buck-catcher may get involved in a long and debilitating war that leaves the buck-passer stronger than both (3) if a state faces several adversaries, it may employ buck-passing to tackle them sequentially
-- The chief drawback to passing the buck is, of course, that the designated buck-catcher might fail to resist the aggressor, or resist unsuccessfully, leaving the buck-passer in the field alone with the aggressor. Thus the Soviet Union found itself all alone with Germany in 1940, after France and Britain failed to catch the buck that the Soviet Union passed them in 1939.
Band wagoning, the allying of weaker states with―or under―a stronger state, is dismissed by Mearsheimer. Why?
-- Great powers rarely bandwagon. Mearsheimer gives a peculiar reason for this rarity: Band wagoning, he says, entails shifting the distribution of power in the stronger ally's favour, which 'violates the basic canon of offensive realism - that state maximize relative power.' Band wagoning means 'conceding that the formidable new partner will gain a disproportionate share of the spoils they conquer together'
What are the two types of multipolar systems? Why are they more prone to war than a bipolar system?
-- The two multipolar systems are more unstable than bipolar ones for three reasons
-- (1) they have more potential conflict dyads; (2) the likelihood of power imbalances is greater, including two states ganging up on one; and (3) there is greater potential for miscalculation
-- Unbalanced multipolarity is the most unstable system. By definition, an unbalanced multipolar system contains a potential hegemon. Such a state will push further toward regional hegemony, because 'hegemony is the ultimate form of security,' and because it has the capability to achieve supremacy.
-- Other states will become more fearful and will take greater risks in attempting to correct the imbalance. These balancing efforts, however, will be viewed as 'encirclement' by the would-be hegemon, who may take further steps to advance its security, setting off a spiral of mutual fear that is likely to culminate in war.
Why does Mearsheimer believe international institutions are essentially irrelevant?
-- International institutions are essentially irrelevant because they merely reflect state interests and policies and do not exert any independent effects on the struggle for power.
How did the end of the Cold War affect Asia?
enhanced the importance of the regional security complex (as opposed to global importance)
• Before end of the Cold War there were three RSCs which merged into two after the collapse of the USSR.
• China was the main benefactor of the greatly reduced level of penetration in the area
• SE Asia also benefited from the withdrawal of the superpowers as the area moved away from a conflict formation zone towards and ASEAN based regional security regime.
Why is history―particular the history of its security dynamics before the 20th century―an important factor in the domestic politics of Asian states?
Asia carries its own distinctive baggage: with the exception of Japan, China and Thailand, all states were post-colonial constructions (and even these were all heavily penetrated by the super powers)
• unlike in other areas of the world, the process of decolonization left behind a system that by and large reflected the patters on pre-colonial political history; this carried pre-colonial history forward into post-colonial international relations
What are the "shaping factors" in the region?
• insulating qualities of its geographical size and diversity
• the presence of great powers within Asia
What can be said to set Asia apart from other regions?
it contains two great powers (Jap/Chn) and a third state (Ind) that is an aspirant for greater power
• 4 nuclear states: China, India, Pakistan & N. Korea
• three nuclear threshold states: Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan all practicing recessed deterrence
What are the comparisons Buzan makes between Asia and 19th century Europe?
• range of substantial powers with varying degrees of industrialization
• Japan is Britain, China is Germany,
• Nationalism is rampant and strongly rooted along with several ethnic, cultural, historical, status, and territorial issues to feed on
• liberal democracy is only deeply rooted in a few places
• desire to seem national economic advantage while at the same time pressure to get more entangled in economic interdependence
What differences does Buzan notice between Asia and 19th century Europe?
• Europe did not suffer from the recent trauma of colonization and decolonization by outsiders
• the contemporary powers in Asia are boxed in by one superpower and two other great powers
• more globally connected than the European concert of powers
• 2 big differences: 1. nuclear deterrent 2. an outside superpower prepared to hold the ring for regional security.
• much bigger than Europe; geography matters
According to Buzan, what can we learn from these similarities and differences?
• high probability of classic power politics emerging from Asia in the next few decades
• focus on economic advancement
• possibility of war is a given in the region
What were the two opposing views regarding China's rise and potential behaviour in Asia?
• Benign: militarily incapable of aggressive behaviour, restrained by interest in development, and adaptation to international society
• Aggressive: sometimes bellicose behaviour, lack of transparency, idea that rising powers like to assert their influence
o China as a revisionist power, not closely wedded to the international order; many territorial, cultural and status grievances against it
o Classic model of Authoritarian modernization; unrestrained by democracy, vulnerable to nationalism and militarism, plus aggressive behaviour and continued historical hatred of neighbours (Japan)
According to Buzan, how have these concerns panned out since the 90's?
• China's relationship with the region settled into a mix of unilateral bellicosity (Taiwan & S. China Sea), increasingly comfortable and skilled use of multilateral forum such as ARF to support regional voices still concerned about excessive US influence in the region
• came out well from the economic crisis and strengthened its position against Japan
With the end of the Cold War, what has been the main agenda of ASEAN?
• forced to see itself as part of a bigger security picture, no longer confined just to SE Asia
• wants to engage China openly in a more 'pacific/global' context through the ARF (ASEAN regional forum)
How does Buzan view the effectiveness of ARF?
• Whatever its operational feebleness as a regional security regime, ARF was a symbolically important move in tying together Northeast and Southeast Asia. However, because of ASEAN the ARF was much better at tying northern powers to SE Asia than the reverse
• cultivated new ideas of peace laid the framework for building a stronger regional security regime
What role did Japan play in the economic interdependence of East Asia?
• "flying geese" model: Japan set up a hierarchy of finance, production, and technology spreading out from Japan to the countries of E. Asia.
• created concentric circles of investment throughout Asia
• unique form of regionalism largely based on private capital and no international political institutionalization
How did the economic interdependence of Asia, brought about by the Japanese model of political economy, assume an important role in the security of the region?
• using a line of thought close to liberal interdependence, political rivalries, territorial disputes and historical antagonisms could all be overcome by subordinating them to the common economic enterprise.
• domestically it supported the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes that might otherwise not have been
• Internationally flying geese model provided a strong and immediate common interest amongst states
How did the financial crisis of the late 90's become a security concern?
• A) threatened stability in some authoritarian states
• B) threatened the region's economic model thus raising major concerns about future growth
• C) stripped away the economic blanket that had been used to cover the many unresolved political and territorial issues
What was the aftermath of the financial crisis?
• doubts about the Asian model and the future
• strong securitization against globalization and a strong demand for a regional response
• revealed a contradiction between domestic political legitimacy, and global economic rules and norms that undermined distinctive national development projects
What can be seen as the causes of the financial crisis?
• Two lines of thought:
A) Asian model of capitalism with its cronyism, lack of investment in longer-term development, unsound investments and over-capacity
B) Western financial liberalism, reinforcing credit bubbles, empowering currency speculators, creating unstable collective irrationalities in global finance markets
What resolved the Taiwan Straits crisis of 95-96?
• US military intervention; US exerted its naval dominance over China in its own home waters
• this left the impression in Asia that China's military bellicosity had been restrained only by a strong US response
Why is it unlikely that China will become the hegemon of the East Asian region?
• no state, external (US) or internal has the power to overlay the region
• China lacks the coercive ability and the civilization attractiveness it once possessed
• China has negative soft-power
• Asia has too many substantial powers within it to allow one power to dominate
Why is it unlikely that East Asia (and thus Asia in general) will develop from a conflict formation into a security community in the foreseeable future?
strong shared value of the status quo, either or both shared cultures and well developed institutions are all absent.
• lack of democracy which is a huge asset
• divided countries and rampant nationalism
What might be some responses to the rise of a bellicose China?
could draw the US in ( constructing China as a global rival) or push the US out (fear of engagement in Asian wars)
How is a security regime different from a conflict formation?
• Security Regime: does not imply harmony amongst neighbours; conflict exists but the actors agree to deal with it. Some agreement on the status quo amongst the great powers, desire to avoid war, states are rational
• Conflict Formation: are the conditions and variables within a region that lead to conflict/war
What conditions are necessary, according to some, in order for Asia to develop into a security regime?
• stronger institutionalism
• spread of democracy
• agreement on a status quo amongst the great powers
• China fails to develop into a dominant power instead becoming a regional power that is perceived as benign by its neighbours
• the US remains significantly engaged in Asia as the holder of the ring
Buzan claims there are striking similarities between India and China. What are they? Why is the value in making such connections?
• Both hold strongly realist perspectives towards their regions and the wider world
• both locate themselves in a historical self-perspective as great and ancient civilizational centres to which other peoples traditionally came for trade and enlightenment, but which themselves were not usually militarily expansive outside their region
• both have been sensitized by colonial experiences which leads to stronger nationalism
• both give high value to the autonomy of the economy, foreign policy, military capability
• both are moving towards a more liberalized economy despite strong anti-capitalist traditions
• both see US as a key threat but pragmatic enough to align with it on some matters
• both favour multipolar international systems
• IMPORTANCE: These deeply rooted and shared features make both India and China likely to be essentially Westphalian great power players in Asian security.
What are the immediate effects of the US presence in Asia?
• Stabilizing forces
• enables Japan to remain a civilian power
• suspends the question of what Sino-Japanese relations would become if left to their own devices
• provided leadership for local fire fighting (Korea, Taiwan)
Why, in light of China's aggressiveness, is there a proportional lack of balancing behaviour against it?
A) China does not represent a serious threat to its neighbours and therefore they are correct in keeping their securitizations of it at a rather low level
B) Chinese diplomacy has somehow been so successful that it has been able to intimidate its neighbours into a form of appeasement that restrains them from publicly responding to provocations. The mechanism at work here is the threat that any balancing responses will cause an immediate worsening of relations and escalation of threats. (Also China's treatment of Taiwan is seen as a special case)
C) The possibility that the Asian international subsystem is dressed in Westphalian clothes, but is not performing according to Westphalian script. A Chinese World Order has survived - a form of sino-centric hierarchy in international relations in the region. This replaces traditional balancing of power and leads to band wagoning (intriguing but impossible to test until US pulls out of Asia; India also does not fit this mould as it has never been part of a Chinese World Order)
D) impact of US engagement in Asia explains the lack of counterbalancing.
How has the US discouraged Asia from achieving its own independent security measures?
• balancing power falls to China alone thus little desire for security regimes such as ASEAN to play a more central role
• projects nuclear non-proliferation in a strong way
• cultivates Japan as a military dependant
• traditionally opposed Asian multilateral security initiatives.
What is the essence of regionalism and what are its three components?
--The essence of regionalism, regardless of how extensive its economic interdependence is, is its sense of shared community. The three aspects of this shared community are 1) the social networks that bridge national boundaries; 2) strategic thinking that recognizes common security interests; and 3) a regional identity capable of overriding national identities on matters of shared significance.
What was the position of China regarding regionalism in the early 2000s?
--Chinese writings about regionalism described a gradual process with signs of multipolarity and cultural heterogeneity under a framework of political deference to ASEAN.
What was China's approach to regionalism in the mid-2000s?
--a) accruing economic benefits from the regional free trade regime.
b) allaying fears of the threat it might pose to the Southeast.
These approaches brought China many benefits, especially in the light of a disinterested US under the Bush regime, and a Japanese prime minister who was intent on respecting the dead at the Yasukuni Shrine.
What changes in Chinese thinking occurred starting in 2009?
--a) It started attacking the US as a force interfering with regionalism.
b) It started chastising Japan for its non-regionalist attitude (perhaps its encouragements of US presence in Asia)
c) It started combining the concepts of culture and security, particularly in contrast to globalization. The formula of Chinese thinking could be drawn up as regionalism vs. globalization (see the listed points on p.146) with the purpose of expelling globalization from the Asian model.
How was the US considered intolerant of diversity by Chinese theorists?
--It espoused a single set of universal values for everyone regardless of their cultural backgrounds, regardless of the existence of a long-standing set of Eastern values. (this propaganda about Eastern values was first used by the Japanese when they started their imperial campaign in 1895; before that, there are no records or mention of an Eastern way).
What were Eastern values as espoused by Chinese theorists in 2009-10?
-- They were a heralding of a Confucianism that was rephrased in support of continuity with communism. These rephrasing worked around the differences between the peaceful nature of the East in the past under China's benevolent tribute system, and the bellicose nature of the imperialistic West.
What were the negative reactions to the return of the US in Asia?
--It was criticized by China as an attempt to impose an alien cultural orientation on the region while interfering with the natural course of China's rise. As there can be no compromise, no blending of values that are mutually exclusive (according to China, Eastern and Western values are incompatible), Asia must decide whether they want to accept China, the traditional origin and future embodiment of Eastern civilization, as the basis of a new community, or accept the US, and be trapped in its plot to impose Western imperialistic values, and impede Asia from realizing its greatness.
What are the effects of this dichotomy of values?
--a) It distorts the cultural diversity of Asia.
b) It denies the appeal of universal values in the region.
c) It blurs the line between socialism and Confucianism in Chinese values, and ignores the strong resistance across East Asia to China's civilizational arguments.
What made multilateralism so favourable to China by 2001?
--a) It didn't have to commit itself to a security community or a particular vision for regional identity. It just had to follow (or shape in its own image) the loose guidelines for regional integration set up by the ASEAN way.
b) Cooperation was centred on economic ties between countries and avoided sovereignty disputes.
c) It gave China a leading role in diplomacy in the region, particularly regarding the Six Party Talks over the future of N. Korea.
d) It also gave China to benefit from divisions among its allies
What other advantages did China have during the 2000s?
--a) The US seemed to be tied up elsewhere, and looked like it was willing to give China leeway to act in Taiwan, N. Korea, and with all contentious issues in East Asia in general.
b) The rise of China was giving it lots of credibility with its neighbours.
This all led to the possibility of a regionalism led by China and excluding the US altogether.
Given Chinese optimism throughout the 2000s and the world financial crisis that emerged at the end of the decade, how did China's policy change?
--a) They became aggressive again in the South China Sea (the first time was in 94, I believe).
b) They insisted that instead of ASEAN+3, ASEAN form an ASEAN+1 group.
c) They demanded that Obama admit that the US does not belong in Asia, and so leave. This was the main obsession in Chinese political writing in 2009-11
What were the three factors that made the US presence in Asia unjust?
--a) Hegemonism based on an obsolete Cold War politics
b) the self-interested desire of the US to contain China's growth, rather than share or concede power where it is appropriate (as in the case of East Asia)
c) Cultural imperialism, or the belief the Western way must have ascendancy over all other ways.
This can all be boiled down to the fact that the US just wants to undermine long term regional stability for the selfish desire to maintain its own leadership even though conditions are no longer conducive to that.
What are China's strategic goals in the region?
--a) to weaken US military ties in the region
b) to strengthen ties to Russia
c) to capitalize on the disruptive behaviour of N. Korea, Pakistan, and Iran.
What are the criticisms of the US military presence in Asia by China?
--mainly that it is an old Cold War relic that is no longer necessary. Its presence prevents Asia from taking its natural course towards the more benign tribute system of Sinocentrism.
What is the backlash towards the China's purported Sinocentric model? In other words, what have been the results of China's Sinocentric interpretations of and actions in the region?
--a) South Korea, instead of letting down its guard in regards to N. Korea, is working even closer with the US on the issue.
b) Japan, despite financial crisis is expanding its defence capabilities and working even closer with the US
c) Many states in Southeast Asia have tightened security ties with the US
d) Indo-US ties have also advanced
There have been many pessimistic predictions made during the past two decades regarding the conflict formation tendencies of East Asia. Why did scholars, according to Kang, start doubting these pessimistic predictions in the years leading up to the mid 2000s (the time this article was written)?
-- These doubts have focused on pointing out numerous empirical problems with the pessimistic viewpoint. Most importantly, a number of scholars have pointed out that other Asian states do not appear to be balancing against China.
-- Others have argued that the security dilemma is currently not intense in East Asia (the only security dilemma is caused by the rapid deterioration in the capabilities and security environment of a risk-acceptant second-tier power NK).
-- Some note that institutional growth in SE Asia has been much more extensive than the pessimists have noted, and they also argue that shared norms and values are beginning to unite Asians.
-- Asian states do not fear their survival.
What is Kang's alternative to power as the variable by which to measure a state's existence in IR?
-- The preferences and intentions of states, expectations, reputations, adaptational mechanisms, and domestic processes are all important in determining the pattern and stability of a system.
What is Kang's definition of hierarchy?
-- His definition is it's a system of international relations organized around a central, dominant power that involves shared expectations of rights and responsibilities for both the dominant and secondary powers
What were the signs in the 90s that East Asia may be returning to the hierarchic system?
-- The late 1990s saw the re-emergence of a strong and confident China, continuing Japanese reluctance to assert itself internationally, the increasing stabilisation of Vietnam, the establishments and consolidation of postcolonial states in Southeast Asia, and soon perhaps, a unified Korea.
Lack of balancing against China
What other example of hierarchy in IR does Kang give to support his claim that hierarchy is not unique to Asia?
-- Relationships between United States and the Latin American countries.
-- Latin American states do not balance the United States, but rather accommodate it.
-- As long as Latin American states rhetorically support basic US goals and intentions such as democracy and capitalism, the United States either provides material benefits or does not interfere in these states' affairs.
-- However, if one of the Latin American states moves too far away from US interests or rhetoric, the US sends punitive expeditions to the regions to restore order.
-- On the whole, these states adjust to the inevitable power and influence of the United States.
What is asymmetric information and how does it affect relations between states?
-- Information is asymmetric or incomplete when different actors know or believe different things about a situation.
-- The problem of asymmetric information manifests itself in two general areas - (1) difficulties in assessing the relative power of various states, and (2) difficulties in discerning the preferences of states.
-- These asymmetries typically take the form of uncertainty about states' goals or capabilities.
Why is a hierarchy more peaceful than the Westphalian system?
-- When two nations are in a dispute, and when their relative capabilities are not clear, then occasionally states resort to war in order to sort out which is the more powerful.
-- Were both states to know which was more powerful, there would be no need to fight, as the outcome of the war would be certain
How is the hierarchic system different than Realism, particularly offensive realism?
-- A hierarchic world is one that involves a dominant power that still operates in anarchy, but does not cause other nations to balance against the largest power in the system, and does not fold them under its wing in empire.
-- In contrast to balance of power, a hierarchic perspective sees equality as most dangerous, because two roughly equal states may need to resort to war to determine which state is dominant.
What would be necessary for stability in a hierarchic system?
-- Hypothetically, a system with an unequal distribution of power should have more stability, because the relative capabilities will be clearer to all states in the system.
-- The strong will have no need to fight, and the weak will have no desire to fight.
Once established, what preserves hierarchy?
-- It is possible to theorise that if a dominant state does not face any threats and is satisfied with the status quo in the system, it would not feel the need to pursue empire.
-- Furthermore, a satisfied or status quo dominant state would not cause fear and balancing among the secondary states.
What are the differences between band wagoning and accommodation?
-- Band wagoning is taking active steps to curry favour or benefit from the economic and military might of another country.
-- Accommodation is a strategy between these two extremes - a focus on gaining benefits from the dominant state, but also an attempt to retain as much independence as possible.
What are the differences between a hegemon and the dominant power in a hierarchy?.
-- Hegemony has focus mainly on trade and the formation of international regimes, and previous work has not explored security or overall system sustainability in any detail. (Hegemony is purely a relationship between hegemon and the weak states in a system)
-- Hierarchy also ascribes to all states within the system a place and a means of interacting with each other, and also allows for substantial autonomy and freedoms among the secondary states.
-- However, it more accurately describes the interaction and ordering of states up and down the hierarchy.
How is the dominant power in a hierarchy not an informal empire?
-- The contrast with informal empire is important - in informal empire, the puppet governments collaborate with the imperial power against the wishes of the populace.
-- In hierarchy, independent sovereign nations accept the central position of the largest power in the system but are fully functional on their own terms.
When looking at the behaviour of China and the "lesser" states in Asia, what should we keep in mind when deciding if states' behaviours in the region tend towards hierarchy or a more Westphalian model?
-- Discerning what actions China takes towards its neighbours.
-- Focus on the strategies that other nations take to adjust to China's rise.
-- A hierarchic theoretical approach will focus empirical scrutiny on the domestic aspects of China's rise.
Why does the East Asia Region appear to be a dangerous breeding ground for the security dilemma according to the Realist perspective?
There is an unequal distribution of capabilities amongst state actors and this distribution could change suddenly (China's deployment of a stealth fighter, for instance). The importance of nearby sea-lanes for energy supplies also means that vital interests are at stake. The importance of power projection forces in the region (such as China's new carrier) will also help feed a security dilemma.
How, therefore, could the region protect itself from getting caught up in a security dilemma? Why would security dilemma theory fail in East Asia in regards to TMDs?
There are several ways to escape a security dilemma. An outside power could help police the actors. Multilateral institutions may help disarm suspicions by improving transparency between the actors. TMD, a defensive system, should not cause a security dilemma under normal circumstances because it is a purely defensive system. Nevertheless, in East Asia the issue of TMDs is actually feeding the security dilemma.
What are some modern signposts that justify the fears East Asia has regarding the militarization of Japan?
During the Cold War the Japanese developed naval and air forces to counter the Soviet threat. The Japanese defence budget is large in absolute size. Japanese weapons are technologically advanced. High-grade nuclear fuel shipped to Japan from France in the 1990s means that Japan can make nuclear weapons whenever it wants.
What are some sign posts that this fear of Japan may be artificially induced―at least in China, but very probably in other East Asian countries too, particularly Korea?
The Japanese do not have the "trappings" of a Great Power. Likewise, there are constitutional and non-constitutional limits on its power projections. Also, the Japanese have seemed content to let the Americans defend them.
How does the US-Japan Alliance take part in the Japan-China security dilemma?
By basing themselves in Japan, and defending Japan from potential enemies, the Americans take away any justification for a re-armament of Japan. This prevents a security dilemma between Japan and China from spiralling out of control. However, by asking for a more active Japanese role in the Alliance, the Americans may actually cause instability.
In the mid 90's what brought the US to question the value in sustaining the US-Japan alliance?
After the end of the Cold War, economic and trade tensions between Japan and America, Japan's lukewarm support of the Gulf War, and the 1994 North Korea crisis caused many Americans to doubt the value of the pre-existing relationship. Japan did not seem to be giving enough.
When the alliance didn't deteriorate but strengthened under the Nye initiative, China's outlook was generally positive, but soon became pessimistic. Why?
Originally, the Chinese were worried that a collapse of the US-Japan Alliance would bring a re-armed and possibly aggressive Japan into the world. When the alliance recovered, Chinese analysts were relieved. Soon they were worried that the Americans were encouraging the Japanese to develop new military capabilities and technologies. The Chinese either see the alliance as a bottle cap—keeping Japan down—or an eggshell—protecting Japan while it rearms.
What is the main concern about Japan developing a TMD? Why would the establishment of a TMD in Japan be considered an offensive manoeuvre?
A Japanese TMD worries the Chinese because it would weaken their ballistic missile deterrent against the home islands. This means that Japan would be less likely to fear China. If the TMD was ship-based, the Chinese would be even more worried because these assets could be used to safeguard Taiwan—perhaps even play a role in encouraging the island to make a bid for independence
How does China encourage Japan to build its defence, thus further escalating the security dilemma?
China's aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, its weapons development, and periodic sabre-rattling all encourage Japan to build its defences. For example, China's fighter planes constantly test Japan's air defences.
What steps can China, Japan, and the US take to avert a security dilemma spiralling out of control?
Multilateral security regimes are one way to improve transparency and defuse the security dilemma. By participating in a trilateral security forum, the Chinese could reassure their neighbours and establish improved ties. In addition, the Americans have to stay in Japan—finding the balance between getting more Japanese involvement without arousing Chinese suspicions. The Japanese, on the other hand, should apologize for WW2 and do their best to rebuild the region's trust.
What is Cossa's assessment of The US's strategy towards China?
-- U.S strategy toward a rising China seems based on the premise that China can, and wants to, play a constructive role in the emerging new world order.
Why should the size and exponential growth of China's army not be cause for alarm in the region?
-- Relative to the United States, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is still several generations behind and the gap is not likely to close anytime soon. China's army may be the largest in Asia but it is not the most capable.
In discussing the Taiwan Imbroglio, Cossa states that for China it is a matter of principle, but for the US it is a matter of policy. Wherein lies the difference?
-- Beijing claims that there is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Tainwa belong to one China. Reunification is the only option; peaceful reunification is much preferred, but the use of force cannot be ruled out and may be necessary if possibilities for peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.
-- Washington does not preclude eventual unification, if it is the will of the people on both sides of the strait, but can foresee other alternatives as well. It has clearly announced its opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait, even while being careful not to clearly define what constitutes the status quo.
Japan has long been established as a great power in the world, but has recently been rising as well. In what ways has it been rising to its already established great power-hood?
-- Japanese officials now discuss the potential utility of power projection forces, although Tokyo has not yet begun to pursue such weapons systems. More to the point, Tokyo is becoming more geopolitically active, and they are aggressively seeking a permanent seat on the UNSC
How is the potential reunification of Korea a source of worry for other nations in the region?
-- Tokyo worries that a unified Korea might see Japan as its 'natural enemy.'
-- Beijing worries that a unified Korea, under Seoul's rule and with the US-ROK alliance still intact, would remove its current bugger and could place a US ally closer to its borders.
-- Seoul's rule is seen as a far more attractive choice, something that should give Beijing cause for pause.
How is India a potential factor in East Asia, according to Cossa?
-- It is neither seen, nor attempts to portray itself, as a military power in Asia.
-- Its impace is more political and perhaps psychological; it is, after all, the worlds largest democracy and rivals China both in size and economic potential.
What is Russia's role in E. Asia?
-- Moscow would like the region under its sphere of influence.
-- The prospects of a twenty-first century " Great Game" between Beijing and Moscow for influence in Central Asia, plus other historical avenues of mistrust and the fact that both Beijing and Moscow value good relations with Washington at least as much as they do with one another, provides limits to the utility of this strategic partnership.
What are the core features of US policy in East Asia?
-- Emphasis on alliances with Japan and South Korea
-- Deepening economic and political relations with China
-- Support for the status quo in the Taiwan Strait
-- A frustrating effort to get North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons
-- An ambivalent attitude toward East Asian regionalism.
Cossa states that ARF has been useful as the consolidating tool behind security initiatives proposed by individual governments, and that it has aided the fight against terrorism and against the proliferation of WMD's. He then, however, points out that there are several constraints on ARF's ability to contribute to the regional order. What are those constraints?
-- Taiwan has not been permitted to participate
-- Beijing has insisted that internal Chinese affairs not be on the agenda, effectively blocking ARF discussion of cross-strait tensions despite their obvious broad regional implications.
What role has APEC played in East Asian security issues?
-- APEC provides a useful venue not only for the promotion of free trade but also for fighting the war on terrorism
-- We can expect that Washington will continue to be an active player.
-- It will remain more suited to talking about security problems than to actually helping to implement the solutions.
What was the purpose of the Six-Party Talks?
-- Provides a framework for broader Northeast Asia multilateral cooperation in the future.
-- Most parties agree that a more formalized mechanism must evolve in order to implement the agreement, provide necessary security assurances, and monitor compliance, as well as facilitate whatever aid packages are associated with the final accord.
What are the three objectives of Arms control?
- Reduce likelihood of war
- Reduce political and economic costs
- Minimize scope of war
What three elements were considered necessary for arms control during the Cold War? How has thought changed since the Cold War?
According to the Cold War paradigm, the three key elements of arms control were:

- Formal treaty
- System of inspections
- Enforcement mechanism (if parties do not oblige to the regulations)
This has changed as arms control nowadays can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral as well as implicit or explicit cooperation. So a country could decide to unilaterally conduct arms reduction without publicly declaring it.
How is cooperative security different than collective security or collective defense? Why has arms control been categorized under cooperative security?
- Cooperative security: Regulate the military forces for mutual benefit of all parties.
- Collective security: Defend integrity of states within a group.
- Collective defense: Defend all members of an alliance against outside aggressors.
How is arms control different from disarmament?
Disarmament contains merely the reduction of armaments.

Arms control is a broader concept. It first priority is to increase security. This can at times be counterintuitive, because in certain circumstances it might actually lead to an increase in armament to improve security. It also addresses number, character, development and use of armaments.
Traditionally speaking, what is the role of arms control?
Traditionally its goal is to:

- enhance national security, especially by reducing nuclear threats.
- overcome political and ideological conflict by advancing common interests.
- It should be consistent with military strategy
- And arms control regimes don't have to be formal
How has arms control changed since the end of the Cold War?
- Increased complexity of political landscape
- Tension and arms race in certain regions increased.
- WMD proliferation to rouge nations and groups
- 1990s climax of arms control
- Setback by Bush's emphasis on unilateral approach to security
How is arms control inherently counterintuitive? Why do countries still involve themselves in arms control despite this inherent counterintuitiveness?
The counterintuitive element of arms control is that it countries gain security by giving up military power. This sometimes stands in contrast to the realist perspective that military expansion will lead to more security. Countries will commit to, for example banning or reducing nuclear weapons, because the mutual destruction they would pose in case of usage would be enormous. So a countries security would increase if the other party also agrees on not using certain weapons.
What are the key assumptions of arms control theory?
Traditional arms control theory was based on the premise that the superpowers inherently shared an area of common ground (avoiding nuclear war), and that this element of mutual interest could serve as the basis for limited, cooperative arrangements involving reciprocal restraint in the acquisition of weapons of mass distraction. So the common interests are avoidance of war, minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.
What setbacks did Arms Control face in the wake of the post-Cold War world?
The Bush administration disliked arms control agreements because treaties undermined the US' potential to unilaterally pursue its security goals. He abandoned many negotiations and treaties, such as Start III, ABM Treaty, Moscow Treaty etc. (p.12)
What was the focus of disarmament before the modern era?
a. Disarmament was a tool of the victors over their conquered enemy to prevent them from undoing their subjugation. A clear example is of the Philistines banning the Jews from ironworking to prevent them from forging weapons in 1100BCE, or the Romans proscribing the use of elephants in war after defeating Carthage in 201BCE. A recent example would be the disarmament required of the Germans by the Versailles Treaty of WWI.
b. By the 17th century—particularly with the signing of the Strasbourg agreement of 1675, signed between France and the Holy Roman Empire to ban the use of poisoned bullets—, the notion of (in)humanity started appearing as a factor. This changed the role of disarmament as an imposition of the victor on the vanquished into a mutual cooperative effort.
c. Aside from total disarmament, as the above is concerned with, there were also agreements between rivals to de-militarize certain areas in dispute or where conflict might arise, such as the demilitarization by the Persia and Athens in 448 BCE. A later example still with relevance today would be the Rush-Bagot Agreement that demilitarized the Great Lakes, leading to the largest unfortified border in the world.
i. In this regard, though, instead of the parties involved being directly affected, a geographical area was affected.
d. Another focus of disarmament had to do with putting reins on the nature of war, exemplified by concept of a just war. This aspect of disarmament attempted to limit the damage in future warfare, particularly damage against non-combatants. This trend can be said to have begun in 989CE at the Synod of Charoux. Where the 17th century introduced (in)humanity or morality as a factor, here was introduced a sort of pragmatic humanity. Leaders realized that total disarmament was naïve and so instead thought on how to wage war with less destruction.
e. It is interesting to note that these developments through history are quite similar to the formulation of the three key elements of Arms Control in the 20th century.
What transformations did disarmament undergo in the 20th century?
a. Up until the 19th century, disarmament was sporadic at best, and usually a tool of the victors over the vanquished. The horrors of the world wars brought major voices in nations to call for the literal disarmament of every nation. These attempts were futile, but they didn't stop, and distinguished advocates have been persistent in this regard to the present day (search on the internet for Global Zero). Despite the dedication for total disarmament, and in light of the failure to eliminate or internationalize nuclear weapons (remember the Baruch plan of last semester), there was also a movement to control arms and mitigate the catastrophic consequences of their effect in the case they would be used.
b. The point is that in the 20th century disarmament split into the two camps of disarmament and arms control. They did not work against each other or with each other, but independently of one another, achieving separate goals to the same effect—namely, security and peace.
c. Another noteworthy change was that the new branch of arms control dealt explicitly and virtually exclusively with the spread of nuclear information and technology and mitigation of the use and effects of nuclear weapons.
What new initiatives did the Cold War introduce into arms control?
a. Nuclear Non-proliferation: to limit nuclear arms possession only to the states that already have them.
b. Counterproliferation: to take military or economic action against a country that attempted to develop a nuclear weapon.
c. By 1968, the NPT emerged as the materialization of these two initiatives.
What was the purpose of the NPT?
As I said above, non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. While restricting the proliferation of military nuclear technology, it sought to disseminate civilian nuclear technology around the world. This was in good part as a positive reinforcement of its non-proliferation policy—to keep non-nuclear states from desiring to nuclearize on their own. The NPTs ultimate, as of yet unrealized goal, was the eventual denuclearization of the world. Thus, the NPT can be considered as a merger between (nuclear) arms control and (nuclear) total disarmament.
How did members of the NPT react to India's nuclear tests in 1974?
They created trigger lists to help monitor, control, and restrict the trade of nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies. Trigger lists were lists of items related to nuclear development. If such an item were in the process of being traded internationally, the trigger would go off and the NPT would intervene in the trade.
What are nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs)?
a. Like the demilitarized areas of yore (e.g. the Persia-Athens Concord to demilitarize the Aegean Sea), these are parts of the world (or universe) as yet unclaimed or unclaimable by any individual nation that the world has agreed to keep free from nuclear weapons. A state therefore, though it may explore these areas freely, may not do so for military purposes—for the purpose of establishing a nuclear weapon there. Such zones are the moon, the ocean floor, space, and Antarctica.
b. These are also regions of the world that as of yet have not contained a nuclear power state. South and Central America, Central Asia, and Africa are some examples.
c. It is interesting to note that although East Asia is one region, Southeast Asia is considered a NWFZ, but northeast Asia (because of China and the DPRK) are not. So the question whether Korea and Japan will nuclearize is valid, but the question whether Vietnam or Indonesia will nuclearize is rendered moot, since they are NWFZ.
What does the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) require from its signatories?
a. The CWC is in essence a call for the total disarmament of chemical weapons. It requires its signatories therefore to have eliminated all chemical weapons, and complete transparency regarding chemical weapons facilities, technologies, etc., within 10 years. Verification measures are also very severe, allowing inspectors much leeway in their intrusiveness, and allow short-notice inspections.
How can arms control during the Cold War be divided into two phases?
a. Bounding, or setting limits, on existing nuclear arsenals. i. This stopped the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, making the nuclear balance—particularly between the superpowers—more manageable.
b. Reducing strategic inventories and delivery systems. i. The next step. After limiting the number of nuclear states to the existing five (UK, France, US, USSR, and China), the issue turned to limiting the arsenals of the nuclear 5, but mainly the US and USSR.
How did the Moscow Treaty of 2002 alter the role of arms control?
a. It shifted the focus of arms control from a balance between rivals with a mutual interest (that of avoiding nuclear war), to a cooperative effort to regulate and account for the nuclear stockpiles still extant. The danger was in the nuclear arsenals themselves and not the governments of the nations that inherited the nuclear arsenals.
What are the powers of the UN Security Council?
a. The Security Council, of which there are five permanent members (the US, France, the UK, China, and Russia—the five acknowledged nuclear states) and 10 other members elected biannually to the council, has the authority to deploy troops drawn from UN member countries;
b. It can mandate cease-fires during conflict;
c. It can impose economic penalties on countries for violating their UN or other international security obligations;
d. It can dispatch or impose military operations, economic sanctions, arms inspections, human rights and election monitors, etc.
What is the IAEA responsible for?
a. For verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards agreements states have made by signing the NPT treaty. In other words, they make sure that nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful, civilian programs to nuclear weapons programs.
b. In particular, it has been tasked with monitoring the nuclear programs of Iraq and N. Korea.
c. It also serves as a resource to developing countries for assistance with peaceful nuclear applications, and, since 1986, for training in the safe operation of nuclear reactors.
What are some criticisms directed towards the IAEA and the NPT in general?
a. That there are serious flaws in its methods of monitoring and verification.
b. That it lacks the funds to adequately safeguard the growing supply of potential bomb-grade nuclear material, or to detect in time when these such supplies are being diverted towards use in weapons manufacture.
c. It's data regarding minimum requirements for weapons manufacture is obsolete, creating many loopholes for countries to potentially exploit.
d. Equipment and facilities are also obsolete, making monitoring even more difficult.
e. It is noteworthy that significant reforms have been made to address these problems.
What is the NPT? What is its place in arms control?
It is a treaty—or rather a grand bargain—between the nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). NNWS, in return for not pursuing a nuclear weapons program, are rewarded with aid from developed countries towards the acquisition of civilian nuclear power programs and related support. The NPT also adds that in return for such a pledge from NNWSs, the NWSs will "one day" get rid of their own nuclear weapons and themselves become NNWSs too.
b. It is the largest agreement so far ratified, with all but three countries (Pakistan, India, and Israel) taking part in it, and only one country so far having reneged it.
c. In being so universally ratified, the NPT can be seen as the heart of arms control. The health and status of the NPT therefore can represent the health and status of arms control as a whole: Where and when the NPT is weak, so too is arms control in general; when and where it is strong, so too is arms control in general.
Why was the Zangger Committee formed?
a. It was formed to extend the NPT's requirements to the exporting practices of countries. It did so by creating "trigger lists." These were lists of materials that could be used to create a nuclear weapons program. Any item on the "trigger list" that was being exported would require the NPT safeguards to be applied to the recipient facility.
How about the Australia Group?
a. It was established in 1984 in response to the production of chemical weapons (CW) during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran and Iraq had been able to run CW programs through foreign trade.
b. The Australia Group therefore makes sure that countries do not intentionally or inadvertently assist trading partners develop a CW program. Like the Zangger Committee, it uses a "trigger list" of 54 precursor chemicals related to CW, and which also would apply to biological weapons (BW).
c. It also serves as a forum for countries to discuss experiences in implementing and enforcing CBW export controls.
d. After 9/11, the Australia Group also added "catchall controls," which cover items not listed in the trigger lists. These "catchall controls" attempt to control intangible transfers of technology directed towards countries already in possession of a CW or BW program.
What are some of the successes of the MTCR?
a. Its partners have persuaded most major suppliers of missile technologies to control responsibly their missile related exports.
b. It has reduced the number of countries with MTCR-class programs. Examples are Argentina's Condor missile program, and missile programs in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. Currently, it is working on getting Bulgaria to terminate its missile program.
c. They have helped halt numerous shipments of proliferation concern
d. They have worked extensively to increase awareness of the global missile threat among transhipment centres and other MTCR partners.
Why was the NSG formed?
a. It was formed mainly as a reaction to India's nuclear test of 1974. India's nuclearization was seen as a failure to regulate the use of nuclear technologies and materials intended for peaceful purposes. To ensure that nuclear technologies and materials would not be misused again, the NSG came into existence.
b. It stated that recipient governments of nuclear exports follow safeguards and pledge not to use the materials for nuclear weapons, that there was adequate physical protection, and caution in the transfer of sensitive materials.
What are some successes the NSG has had?
a. They passed created an agreement in which all signatories are required to implement full-scope safeguards as a condition nuclear supply to non-nuclear states;
b. Nuclear dual-use equipment, material, and technology was better regulated.
What are some challenges to the CWC?
a. Implementation of its provisions;
b. Verification that all parties are in compliance with its terms.
To what—or to whom—can the demise of the old arms control paradigm be attributed to?
a. To Bush and his administration. In their assessment of arms control, they found it to be utterly ineffective, unverifiable, and at times detrimental to US security, and counterproductive in its traditional form for various reasons. They were also obsolete, not addressing the new threats faced by the international community.
b. After this assessment they began a spree of rejections, such as the rejection of the BWC and reneging on the ABMT with Russia, and the abandonment of the CTBT, which the US had initially created and promoted itself.
i. The rejection of the CTBT was rejected on account of the low verifiability of the treaty regarding low test yields, and the changing security needs and international dynamic in the post Cold War world.
ii. The BWC was rejected because due to the Bush administration's belief in its utter ineffective, particularly regarding verifiability: it would be able to verify BW production in large, developed nations like the US, but not verify undeveloped nations and criminal organizations that did not have hi-tech, modern facilities. Thus, it would have penalized industrial states while ignoring the small operations conducted by terrorists.
iii. The ABMT was rejected along similar lines as the CTBT—that the international scene had changed and required ABMT's for security, rather than the absence of them for security. (See page 55 for explicit reasons) Bush's decision was somewhat reluctantly confirmed by Putin, who stated in so many words that the acquisition of an ABM was not the start of another arms race and another Cold War.
How did the actions of N. Korea and Iran undermine the effectiveness and validity of the NPT?
a. N. Korea, by reneging without any punitive consequences, showed that the NPT was as effective as its signatories wished it to be. There was nothing stopping a state from subscribing to the NPT to gain the technology and materials it required and then reneging when it was ready to pursue its own nuclear weapons program.
b. Iran presented a worse situation to the NPT: it showed that states didn't even have to renege the NPT in order to pursue a nuclear weapons program. The Iran case showed the NPT to be inadequate in detecting clandestine efforts to build nuclear weapons.
What was the focus of the new Arms Control initiative?
a. Combating the proliferation of WMDs;
b. Closing gaps in the international non-proliferation regime by creating coalitions of states to intercept and interdict air, ground, and sea transportation of WMDs;
c. Addressing new threats from non-state actors;
d. Depending on bilateral and multilateral initiatives for results
What were ways in which the new arms control would assess success?
a. By deterring and responding to treaty withdrawal by states in violation of the NPT's obligations;
b. By seeking to achieve universal adherence to the IAEA Model Additional Protocol, giving international inspectors the authority they need to detect undeclared nuclear activity and making protocol part of the safeguard standard;
c. By attempting to ensure compliance with the non-proliferation obligations that form the core of the NPT
d. By seeking to foster recognition of the need for all states to live up to the strictest standards of safety and security in their peaceful nuclear activities;
e. By continued support of NNWS with their civilian nuclear applications.
What were the main criticisms of the Moscow Treaty?
a. It deviates from the traditional arms control paradigm;
b. It lacks its own verification provisions, relying instead on the old START provisions;
c. There was no call for any permanence to its reduction measures.
d. The treaty expired almost immediately after the date of expected completion of the provisions by the involved parties
How is the Moscow Treaty representative of the new arms control?
a. Instead of assigning fixed numbers and parity, it assigns a general range to which the parties involved should confine themselves. This range gave the treaty's members more flexibility.
b. The brevity of the actual treaty—a sharp distinction from the old arms control.
c. The degree of trust and good faith it placed in the other members of the treaty—it's informality.
How can Libya be seen as the confirmation of the new arms control and the nail in the coffin of the old?
a. Like Iran, its pursuit of a nuclear weapons program went undetected and thus undeterred by the NPT.
b. Libya was assisted not directly by states but by non-state actors in its pursuit of nuclear materials.
What new partnerships emerged from the new arms control?
a. The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials for Mass Destruction
i. Its aims are to prevent terrorists or states that support terrorists from acquiring or developing WMDs.
b. The PSI
i. Its aim is to create a dynamic approach to preventing proliferation to or from nation-states and non-state actors.
c. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
i. Its aim is for its partners to develop their individual and collective abilities to detect, defer, and defeat nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists.
How was the India-US nuclear collaboration seen as a threat to the new arms control? How has it been ameliorated?
a. It was seen as a threat to the NPT since it created an exception to the rule of non-proliferation.
b. It was ameliorated when
i. India agreed to implement strong regulatory procedures with its exports and restrict much of its nuclear export.
ii. India unilaterally adhered to the NSG and MTCR Guidelines on nuclear and ballistic missile transactions.
iii. India promised to work towards a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
What are the two paradoxes that have arisen in the post Cold War world?
a. More states than ever are interested in nuclear weapons;
b. The US and Russia have abandoned strategic nuclear arms control and have begun to dismantle their arms control accomplishments.
What two paths did the US take regarding its weapons policy in the aftermath of WWII?
i. Total disarmament of military nuclear programs and internationalization of civilian nuclear programs. Furthermore, the international authority to handle—with force if necessary—the nuclear matters would have absolute authority, and no state would be able to veto its decisions on compliance.
b. Mass Retaliation
i. Although not stated in the chapter, as it does not apply to arms control, this was the path of deterrence threatening aggressors with a completely devastating first strike.
Why did the Baruch plan fail?
a. The Soviets suspected it as an underhanded attempt by the US to monopolize nuclear technology, and as a way to invalidate the USSR's veto power in the UN. Before the USSR would subscribe to such a proposal, they demanded that the US complete disarm first.
b. Western Europe too was sceptical of the plan.
c. China, however, was willing to entertain the plan and even brought it to a vote.
In light of the failure of the Baruch plan, what steps were made towards disarmament?
a. The radical Baruch plan was changed for more moderate, noncontroversial methods of arms control such as the Nuclear Weapons Free Zones and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. These were successful because of their non-controversiality, but in part from this they did not contribute much to arms control.
What led Nixon to resort to arms control measures that would yield major contributions to security, as opposed to the directly inconsequential ones that had come in the administrations before his?
a. The growing thought during the 1960's that it was impossible to outdo the Soviet Union in an arms race, and that the US would eventually lose nuclear superiority (as National Security Memorandum 162/2 predicted).
b. In short despair and lack of confidence brought Nixon to change his staunch anti-communist position and work with Brezhnev towards arms control.
c. One perspective could be that for Nixon and his administration, in their hopelessness perspective regarding sustaining superiority over the USSR, arms control was a means of assuring MAD, of assuring that the US would be able to destroy the Soviet Union under all conditions. It was intended to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons.
What were the arms control agreements and treaties Nixon was able to make with Brezhnev?
a. The Accidental Measures Agreement
i. To improve technical safeguards against accidental and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
ii. To notify each other should the risk of nuclear war arise;
iii. To provide advance notification of missile launches into international airspace or waters
b. The Incident at Sea Agreement
i. For both superpowers' navies to follow safe practices when their warships operated in close proximity
c. The Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
i. To avoid confrontations likely to lead to nuclear war;
ii. If such a crises arose anyway, to consult with each other on ways to solve the differences peacefully.
d. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation talks (SALT)
i. To limit strategic offensive arms
What criticisms did SALT II come under in the Carter administration?
a. From conservatives
i. It did nothing to improve the survivability of US retaliatory forces.
1. Remember this was the point Nixon embarked upon serious arms control measures with the USSR in the first place.
ii. SALT II made matters much worse by granting the Soviets unilateral advantages in heavy ICBMs.
iii. SALT II seemed to be unverifiable.
b. From the liberals
i. It did not limit deployed warheads.
ii. Deployed nuclear warheads would grow in number as modern multiple-warhead ballistic missile systems replaced older ones carrying single warheads.
What contributions did the Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations make to the arms control process?
He proposed entirely new bilateral negotiations that would call for serious reductions in nuclear arms:
i. INF Treaty
1. Eliminated an entire class of US and USSR nuclear weapons;
2. Set new standards in verification, information exchange, and on-site monitoring.
1. Reduced both countries nuclear arsenals by a third.
2. Further advanced the verification, information exchange, and on-site monitoring methods employed in the INF treaty.
iii. PNI (Bush)
1. Unilateral steps towards reducing nuclear tensions taken on good faith that the USSR would do the same (and vice versa)
a. The US removed its heavy bombers from quick-reaction alert ("the delicate balance of terror").
b. The US reduced the number of nuclear missiles on submarines.
2. Removed a vast number of theatre nuclear weapons from forward deployment sites
3. Cancelled various theatre nuclear force modernization programs
4. Relaxed the alert postures of their respective strategic retaliatory forces.
What problems did START II face?
The Russians found it biased in favour of the US. Furthermore, when the USSR invaded Afghanistan, the US Senate, which must be appealed to, would almost certainly reject it. By 1992, during the Clinton administration, the interest in arms control had waned dramatically, and was shifted onto economics—an unprecedented shift in the history of politics, as up to that time, economics had been considered a matter of "low politics."
In regards to arms control, what was accomplished in the Clinton administration?
a. Little was.
i. Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to retarget nuclear missiles on open areas of the ocean, rather than on targets in Russia and the US, so as to avoid a horrible catastrophe in case of an accident.
ii. The US-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow
1. To prevent false alarms, misjudgements, and accidents as Russia's ballistic missile early warning system slowly decayed. It should be noted however that this measure has still not come into effect. This is perhaps because Russia withdrew from support of this program.
iii. START III was attempted but quickly failed.
How did Moscow initially react to Bush's withdrawal of the ABMT?
a. It played the threat card: It tried to frighten Europe into persuading the US not to abandon the ABMT. Then it announced that it would withdraw from START II.
What made the Moscow Treaty unique?
a. It had no verification provisions, no data exchange requirements, and no milestones for elimination. Nor did it have any provisions to make reductions permanent.
Why has traditional strategic nuclear arms control ended?
a. There is a new international security dynamic.
b. There no longer is a bipolar rivalry between the US and the USSR.
c. Rogue states are the current threat the US (and the international community) has securitized.
d. Traditional arms control perpetuates old Cold War relationships and attitudes, which it would be better to discard in the more cooperative post Cold War security dynamic.
e. Traditional arms control can potentially restrict or inhibit defence programs that that the new threats require.
What criticisms are made against the new Arms Control?
a. By breaking the old arms control arrangements; it is reneging on security assurances made to Russia. Trust between the nations is therefore compromised.
b. Mistrust may turn into apprehension in light of certain moves, like the US deploying antiballistic missiles in Central Europe despite Russian protestations.
c. Dismissal of Russian security interests during periods of national distress.
i. Compare China's dismissal of Japan's concern over its 'defensive' actions.
What are future prospects for the new arms control?
a. That measures begun in the Bush administration be reinforced with verification measures and other safeguards so that there is not an over-reliance on "good faith."
What would be the benefits of returning to traditional methods of arms control?
a. The process itself is deeply dignified.
b. It is cautious.
c. It is respectful of the rights of states parties.
d. It confers status on the participants.
e. It reflects the prerogatives of legislative institutions and constitutional forms.
f. It is observable to third parties, including the public, but in ways that do not allow them to interfere with the process.
g. It is the most predictable form of arms control, and provides a forum for the parties involved to exchange their views about their own, and their competitors', strategic views
What reasons support continuing with the new arms control paradigm?
a. The old paradigm is suited to parity of arms. In an international arena where the US has achieved military superiority, such checks will only be at the expense of the US, as they will constrain US power, allowing the gap between the US and lesser powers to shrink.
What are the pros and cons of the new arms control?
a. It is very flexible and thus would have a high success rate—in so far as success can be measured by willingness to enter into agreements and cooperate with one another.
b. It is highly unpredictable, as there are as of yet neither safeguards, nor any concrete obligations. Such unpredictability will ultimately cause each party to act more cautiously about reductions than they would have under a more traditional regime of arms control.
What is Hyman's thesis?
According to Hymans, although the non-proliferation regime may have many virtues, the appearance of its success in containing proliferation results mainly from the fact "that few state leaders have desired the things it prohibits". A major determinant of this reticence to pursue nuclear weapons, Hymans explains, is the revolutionary nature of a decision to acquire them, which is recognized as such by all top decision makers. Only leaders who possess a deep-seated "national identity conception" (NIC) of a particular type will acutely perceive the need for the bomb and have the exceptional will-power to take that extraordinary step.
What are NICs? How does Hyman make use of this concept?
Leaders who see their nations in starkly "us against them" terms are labelled "oppositional," in contrast to those "sportsmanlike" leaders who see the world in a less dichotomous light. Leaders who regard their nations as equal or superior to the external "other" are referred to as "nationalists," while those who have a lower regard for their nations' international standing are known as "subalterns." This matrix yields four ideal-type NICs: sportsmanlike nationalists, sportsmanlike subalterns, oppositional nationalists, and oppositional subalterns. Hymans makes use of this concept by arguing that irrational, emotional actors are responsible for the big decision of nuclear proliferation and other leader types are not predisposed to pursue nuclear weapons.
What is the requisite NIC for the acquisition of nuclear weapons?
The requisite NIC profile for a weapons proliferator, according to Hymans, is an "oppositional nationalist" who combines intense enmity to-ward an external rival and intense pride in his/her own state's ability to challenge the external foe. Oppositional nationalism, he argues, thrives on the explosive mixture of fear and pride, emotions that link national identities with foreign policy choices.
How does the case study Hyman make of Australia illustrate his thesis?
Both the degree of interest in nuclear weapons and the decision to renounce a nuclear option, Hymans postulates, were largely unrelated to changes in the perceived external security environment
or the state of the international non-proliferation regime. Rather, he argues, Australia's nuclear posture must be understood in terms of the NICs of different prime ministers. Consistent with this thesis, he finds that the only time Australia actively sought to acquire an independent nuclear capability was when it was led by John Gorton (1968-71), the one Australian prime minister between 1949 and 1975 to fit the oppositional nationalist NIC profile. According to Hymans, Gorton believed that Australia was both entitled to and capable of developing a nuclear deterrent. He therefore insisted that Australia remain outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) while seeking to
develop indigenous uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities (pp. 126-129).
Significantly, Gorton's nuclear orientation was not based on the perception of a more hostile international security environment than those of his predecessors. Indeed, if anything, Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1949-66) viewed the world in more threatening terms, especially following the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. Unlike Gorton, however, Menzies' NIC profile was that of an
oppositional subaltern who was far more inclined to seek protection through assurances from "great and powerful friends" in the West than through an in-dependent nuclear deterrent (pp. 115-117).
According to Hymans, Gorton's efforts to launch nuclear weapons pro-gram ultimately were stymied by his shaky hold on power and bureaucratic opposition from the Atomic Energy Commission (pp. 130-133). When Gorton's government fell and Gough Whitlam—a sports-manlike subaltern, replaced him—Australia predictably (from Hymans's perspective) soon adopted a new nuclear posture, renounced nuclear weapons, and ratified the NPT.
What is Solingen's thesis?
The crucial explanatory variable for her is the domestic political survival model preferred by the ruling coalition. Solingen distinguishes between outward-looking regimes that derive domestic legitimacy from ensuring economic growth through global integration and inward-oriented ones that employ import-substituting models favouring extreme nationalism and autarky. Different orientations toward the global political economy and its associated economic, political, and security institutions, she argues, have direct implications for the nuclear choices that are taken.
When do states seek to acquire nuclear weapons, according to Solingen?
Alternatively, dominant political coalitions dependent on inward-looking bases of support and hostility to integration into the global political economy are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons programs.
How does Solingen make a case for her thesis from the seemingly unlikely example of Japan?
What was decisive in determining Japan's nonnuclear status, she argues, was the adoption of the "Yoshida model" of development that required "a strong economic infrastructure, manufacturing capabilities...and swimming with (not against) the great tide of market forces" (p. 70). From this perspective, Japan's Liberal Democratic Party's hold on power was contingent on securing Japan's place in the global economy, an objective incompatible with the pursuit of nuclear weapons. As such, the decision to renounce nuclear weapons preceded the negotiation of the NPT
How do Hyman and Solingen differ regards to rationality?
For Hymans, the choice of nuclear weapons is a revolutionary decision that is beyond "a reasonable cost-benefit calculation" (p. 10). Defined by the NIC in the leader's mind and driven by intense emotions of pride and fear, the decision is made in haste and without careful consideration
of consequences. Solingen argues that the decision to pursue nuclear weapons is in almost all instances the result of a careful, rational calculation that reflects the domestic survival interests of the ruling coalition.10 In its emphasis on rational choice, Solingen's decision making model resembles that of neoliberal institutionalism, except that for her the choice is for the benefit of the domestic regime rather than the state. It also is not dependent on the existence of an international non-proliferation regime.
What does a state's desire to go nuclear depend on for Solingen?
Based on on-going cost benefit calculations by the ruling coalition, because of the importance she attaches to regional dynamics and nuclear neighbourhoods. A widely subscribed to non-proliferation norm in the region may have a reinforcing effect on the nuclear calculus of individual states. Likewise, regional predominance of inward-looking models and a propensity for nuclear weapons adventurism may lead states that, for political and economic reasons, would have preferred nuclear weapons abstinence to tilt toward the regional centre of (proliferation) gravity. Thus, a state with an outward-looking ruling coalition may pursue nuclear weapons should these outward-oriented elites perceive extreme external threats and calculate that the political benefits of economic integration and nu-clear restraint no longer outweigh those of going nuclear.
What is the difference between proliferation optimists and pessimists?
Proliferation has positive influence on regional stability
Governments are risk adverse when it comes to nuclear weapons
Hence, there is a "nuclear balance of terror", where nobody dares to act aggressively, cause of retaliation of other members.
Multi-party situation increases stability, cause even non-nuclear countries are unlikely to being attacked because fear of retaliation from 3rd party countries.
Regional stability will decrease
"Nth country" problem (factors of Cold War different from 3rd World countries)
Cold War factors essential for war-prevention
Singular political and geostrategic character
Territorial separation
No previous hostility
Status quo-orientation
Simplicity of bipolar rivalry
What are the problems that pessimism has traditionally suffered from?
Deductive logic: History is used for illustration rather than theory building.
Ethnocentric bias: 3rd World country leaders are seen as less responsible and more prone to use nuclear weapons.
How is the new proliferation pessimism similar to optimistic proliferation?
Cold War logic is applicable to new proliferant countries, i.e. 3rd World leaders are rational actors who fear 2nd strike retaliation.
Deliberate wars are less likely to occur. However, accidental wars are more likely to occur. (The latter is not part of optimistic proliferation.)
According to the new pessimism, why will new nuclear states fail to achieve the level of deterrence required to recreate the peace that occurred during the Cold War?
Possibility of first strike might be reasonable sometimes.
No secure retaliatory arsenals, which are essential for retaliation.
Accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, which might occur due to structural deficiencies.
Why do optimists view the increased number of nuclear states in direct proportion to stability? What is the pessimistic counter-argument?
Optimists think that states will have to learn to live with other emerging nuclear weapon states. The uncertainty over the reaction of other parties will make all states hesitant to strike individually.
Pessimists, however, think that a pre-emptive strike is still possible. Also the destabilization by pre-empting the emergence of nuclear weapon capabilities in the 3rd World might occur.
What problems do emerging nuclear powers in the Third World particularly face according to proliferation pessimists?
They might lack technological and financial resources. So they are either not able to acquire sufficient secure retaliatory arsenals or not able to control and apply them properly.
How does Karl address these pessimistic arguments?
Karl argues, that exactly this fact will lead to small and well manageable nuclear arsenals. It will also make counterforce capabilities risky because it might not be sufficient to deliver a decisive blow to the enemies nuclear facilities.
What is the deterrence method of "non-weaponization"?
Time-lag, which results from making the decision to use nuclear weapons and their assembly, prevents precipitant reactions.
This concept my well work in peacetime but loses power as tension increase. This leads to an "Attack-on-warning" dilemma.
3rd World countries don't have the same technical capabilities as Cold War parties, which makes it impossible for them to be in a state of permanent alert. This leads to a reduction of the nuclear threat if one compares 3rd World countries to the Cold War powers.
Rather than the superpowers, current and former, informing nuclear emerging powers, how, according to Karl, can the emerging nuclear powers inform the superpowers?
Ambiguity in nuclear doctrines increases deterrence, because by not highlighting deficiencies, countries avoid the security dilemma. Otherwise they would make their weaknesses obvious, invest in balancing them, and hence give incentives to the opponent to do the same.
The countries also have more reaction choices in case of war, because they are not bound to a certain strategy, which they proclaimed beforehand.
Non-integration of conventional military forces is important because otherwise they might be target of attack. Nuclear weapons which aren't assembled yet are harder to target and are less prone to fall into the opponents hands.
What warning does Karl give proliferation pessimists?
Emerging nuclear powers might behave differently from Cold War powers but could also behave in the same way. They have no incentives for offensive actions and preventive war. Their behaviour of nuclear weapon states will depend on nature of states and region. Therefore future empirical research should deal with the question of how nuclear powers behave instead of whether proliferation is good or bad.