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5 Written questions

5 Matching questions

  1. How is arms control different from disarmament?
  2. How has the US discouraged Asia from achieving its own independent security measures?
  3. In regards to arms control, what was accomplished in the Clinton administration?
  4. For Constructivists, how does international change result?
  5. What new partnerships emerged from the new arms control?
  1. a • balancing power falls to China alone thus little desire for security regimes such as ASEAN to play a more central role
    • projects nuclear non-proliferation in a strong way
    • cultivates Japan as a military dependant
    • traditionally opposed Asian multilateral security initiatives.
  2. b a. Little was.
    i. Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to retarget nuclear missiles on open areas of the ocean, rather than on targets in Russia and the US, so as to avoid a horrible catastrophe in case of an accident.
    ii. The US-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow
    1. To prevent false alarms, misjudgements, and accidents as Russia's ballistic missile early warning system slowly decayed. It should be noted however that this measure has still not come into effect. This is perhaps because Russia withdrew from support of this program.
    iii. START III was attempted but quickly failed.
  3. c "International change results from the work of intellectual entrepreneurs". On the one hand, intellectual entrepreneurs attempt to convert people to new ideas. On the other hand, they condemn actors whose behaviour is different from standards. (Importance of transnational activist networks)
  4. d Disarmament contains merely the reduction of armaments.

    Arms control is a broader concept. It first priority is to increase security. This can at times be counterintuitive, because in certain circumstances it might actually lead to an increase in armament to improve security. It also addresses number, character, development and use of armaments.
  5. e a. The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials for Mass Destruction
    i. Its aims are to prevent terrorists or states that support terrorists from acquiring or developing WMDs.
    b. The PSI
    i. Its aim is to create a dynamic approach to preventing proliferation to or from nation-states and non-state actors.
    c. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
    i. Its aim is for its partners to develop their individual and collective abilities to detect, defer, and defeat nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists.

5 Multiple choice questions

  1. Both the degree of interest in nuclear weapons and the decision to renounce a nuclear option, Hymans postulates, were largely unrelated to changes in the perceived external security environment
    or the state of the international non-proliferation regime. Rather, he argues, Australia's nuclear posture must be understood in terms of the NICs of different prime ministers. Consistent with this thesis, he finds that the only time Australia actively sought to acquire an independent nuclear capability was when it was led by John Gorton (1968-71), the one Australian prime minister between 1949 and 1975 to fit the oppositional nationalist NIC profile. According to Hymans, Gorton believed that Australia was both entitled to and capable of developing a nuclear deterrent. He therefore insisted that Australia remain outside the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) while seeking to
    develop indigenous uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities (pp. 126-129).
    Significantly, Gorton's nuclear orientation was not based on the perception of a more hostile international security environment than those of his predecessors. Indeed, if anything, Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1949-66) viewed the world in more threatening terms, especially following the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. Unlike Gorton, however, Menzies' NIC profile was that of an
    oppositional subaltern who was far more inclined to seek protection through assurances from "great and powerful friends" in the West than through an in-dependent nuclear deterrent (pp. 115-117).
    According to Hymans, Gorton's efforts to launch nuclear weapons pro-gram ultimately were stymied by his shaky hold on power and bureaucratic opposition from the Atomic Energy Commission (pp. 130-133). When Gorton's government fell and Gough Whitlam—a sports-manlike subaltern, replaced him—Australia predictably (from Hymans's perspective) soon adopted a new nuclear posture, renounced nuclear weapons, and ratified the NPT.
  2. --Chinese writings about regionalism described a gradual process with signs of multipolarity and cultural heterogeneity under a framework of political deference to ASEAN.
  3. According to constructivists, "foreign policy should be guided by ethical and legal standards", debates about ideas and values are the principal building blocks of international life. This theory "emphasizes the role of ideologies, identities, persuasion, and transnational networks is highly relevant to understanding the post-9/11 world."
  4. Based on on-going cost benefit calculations by the ruling coalition, because of the importance she attaches to regional dynamics and nuclear neighbourhoods. A widely subscribed to non-proliferation norm in the region may have a reinforcing effect on the nuclear calculus of individual states. Likewise, regional predominance of inward-looking models and a propensity for nuclear weapons adventurism may lead states that, for political and economic reasons, would have preferred nuclear weapons abstinence to tilt toward the regional centre of (proliferation) gravity. Thus, a state with an outward-looking ruling coalition may pursue nuclear weapons should these outward-oriented elites perceive extreme external threats and calculate that the political benefits of economic integration and nu-clear restraint no longer outweigh those of going nuclear.
  5. The Russians found it biased in favour of the US. Furthermore, when the USSR invaded Afghanistan, the US Senate, which must be appealed to, would almost certainly reject it. By 1992, during the Clinton administration, the interest in arms control had waned dramatically, and was shifted onto economics—an unprecedented shift in the history of politics, as up to that time, economics had been considered a matter of "low politics."

5 True/False questions

  1. Why is history―particular the history of its security dynamics before the 20th century―an important factor in the domestic politics of Asian states?Asia carries its own distinctive baggage: with the exception of Japan, China and Thailand, all states were post-colonial constructions (and even these were all heavily penetrated by the super powers)
    • unlike in other areas of the world, the process of decolonization left behind a system that by and large reflected the patters on pre-colonial political history; this carried pre-colonial history forward into post-colonial international relations

          

  2. Traditionally speaking, what is the role of arms control?Traditionally its goal is to:

    - enhance national security, especially by reducing nuclear threats.
    - overcome political and ideological conflict by advancing common interests.
    - It should be consistent with military strategy
    - And arms control regimes don't have to be formal

          

  3. What are the comparisons Buzan makes between Asia and 19th century Europe?• range of substantial powers with varying degrees of industrialization
    • Japan is Britain, China is Germany,
    • Nationalism is rampant and strongly rooted along with several ethnic, cultural, historical, status, and territorial issues to feed on
    • liberal democracy is only deeply rooted in a few places
    • desire to seem national economic advantage while at the same time pressure to get more entangled in economic interdependence

          

  4. Why was the NSG formed?a. For verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards agreements states have made by signing the NPT treaty. In other words, they make sure that nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful, civilian programs to nuclear weapons programs.
    b. In particular, it has been tasked with monitoring the nuclear programs of Iraq and N. Korea.
    c. It also serves as a resource to developing countries for assistance with peaceful nuclear applications, and, since 1986, for training in the safe operation of nuclear reactors.

          

  5. According to Buzan, what can we learn from these similarities and differences?• high probability of classic power politics emerging from Asia in the next few decades
    • focus on economic advancement
    • possibility of war is a given in the region