5 Written questions
5 Matching questions
- What are the key assumptions of arms control theory?
- What new initiatives did the Cold War introduce into arms control?
- How is the potential reunification of Korea a source of worry for other nations in the region?
- What were the two opposing views regarding China's rise and potential behaviour in Asia?
- Why was the Zangger Committee formed?
- a a. Nuclear Non-proliferation: to limit nuclear arms possession only to the states that already have them.
b. Counterproliferation: to take military or economic action against a country that attempted to develop a nuclear weapon.
c. By 1968, the NPT emerged as the materialization of these two initiatives.
- b a. It was formed to extend the NPT's requirements to the exporting practices of countries. It did so by creating "trigger lists." These were lists of materials that could be used to create a nuclear weapons program. Any item on the "trigger list" that was being exported would require the NPT safeguards to be applied to the recipient facility.
- c • Benign: militarily incapable of aggressive behaviour, restrained by interest in development, and adaptation to international society
• Aggressive: sometimes bellicose behaviour, lack of transparency, idea that rising powers like to assert their influence
o China as a revisionist power, not closely wedded to the international order; many territorial, cultural and status grievances against it
o Classic model of Authoritarian modernization; unrestrained by democracy, vulnerable to nationalism and militarism, plus aggressive behaviour and continued historical hatred of neighbours (Japan)
- d Traditional arms control theory was based on the premise that the superpowers inherently shared an area of common ground (avoiding nuclear war), and that this element of mutual interest could serve as the basis for limited, cooperative arrangements involving reciprocal restraint in the acquisition of weapons of mass distraction. So the common interests are avoidance of war, minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.
- e -- Tokyo worries that a unified Korea might see Japan as its 'natural enemy.'
-- Beijing worries that a unified Korea, under Seoul's rule and with the US-ROK alliance still intact, would remove its current bugger and could place a US ally closer to its borders.
-- Seoul's rule is seen as a far more attractive choice, something that should give Beijing cause for pause.
5 Multiple choice questions
- --It espoused a single set of universal values for everyone regardless of their cultural backgrounds, regardless of the existence of a long-standing set of Eastern values. (this propaganda about Eastern values was first used by the Japanese when they started their imperial campaign in 1895; before that, there are no records or mention of an Eastern way).
- As I said above, non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. While restricting the proliferation of military nuclear technology, it sought to disseminate civilian nuclear technology around the world. This was in good part as a positive reinforcement of its non-proliferation policy—to keep non-nuclear states from desiring to nuclearize on their own. The NPTs ultimate, as of yet unrealized goal, was the eventual denuclearization of the world. Thus, the NPT can be considered as a merger between (nuclear) arms control and (nuclear) total disarmament.
- a. It is very flexible and thus would have a high success rate—in so far as success can be measured by willingness to enter into agreements and cooperate with one another.
b. It is highly unpredictable, as there are as of yet neither safeguards, nor any concrete obligations. Such unpredictability will ultimately cause each party to act more cautiously about reductions than they would have under a more traditional regime of arms control.
- a. The CWC is in essence a call for the total disarmament of chemical weapons. It requires its signatories therefore to have eliminated all chemical weapons, and complete transparency regarding chemical weapons facilities, technologies, etc., within 10 years. Verification measures are also very severe, allowing inspectors much leeway in their intrusiveness, and allow short-notice inspections.
- • Security Regime: does not imply harmony amongst neighbours; conflict exists but the actors agree to deal with it. Some agreement on the status quo amongst the great powers, desire to avoid war, states are rational
• Conflict Formation: are the conditions and variables within a region that lead to conflict/war
5 True/False questions
What changes in Chinese thinking occurred starting in 2009? → --a) It started attacking the US as a force interfering with regionalism.
b) It started chastising Japan for its non-regionalist attitude (perhaps its encouragements of US presence in Asia)
c) It started combining the concepts of culture and security, particularly in contrast to globalization. The formula of Chinese thinking could be drawn up as regionalism vs. globalization (see the listed points on p.146) with the purpose of expelling globalization from the Asian model.
How did the Moscow Treaty of 2002 alter the role of arms control? → a. It shifted the focus of arms control from a balance between rivals with a mutual interest (that of avoiding nuclear war), to a cooperative effort to regulate and account for the nuclear stockpiles still extant. The danger was in the nuclear arsenals themselves and not the governments of the nations that inherited the nuclear arsenals.
How is the dominant power in a hierarchy not an informal empire? → -- The contrast with informal empire is important - in informal empire, the puppet governments collaborate with the imperial power against the wishes of the populace.
-- In hierarchy, independent sovereign nations accept the central position of the largest power in the system but are fully functional on their own terms.
What two paths did the US take regarding its weapons policy in the aftermath of WWII? → i. Total disarmament of military nuclear programs and internationalization of civilian nuclear programs. Furthermore, the international authority to handle—with force if necessary—the nuclear matters would have absolute authority, and no state would be able to veto its decisions on compliance.
b. Mass Retaliation
i. Although not stated in the chapter, as it does not apply to arms control, this was the path of deterrence threatening aggressors with a completely devastating first strike.
What are nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs)? → a. Like the demilitarized areas of yore (e.g. the Persia-Athens Concord to demilitarize the Aegean Sea), these are parts of the world (or universe) as yet unclaimed or unclaimable by any individual nation that the world has agreed to keep free from nuclear weapons. A state therefore, though it may explore these areas freely, may not do so for military purposes—for the purpose of establishing a nuclear weapon there. Such zones are the moon, the ocean floor, space, and Antarctica.
b. These are also regions of the world that as of yet have not contained a nuclear power state. South and Central America, Central Asia, and Africa are some examples.
c. It is interesting to note that although East Asia is one region, Southeast Asia is considered a NWFZ, but northeast Asia (because of China and the DPRK) are not. So the question whether Korea and Japan will nuclearize is valid, but the question whether Vietnam or Indonesia will nuclearize is rendered moot, since they are NWFZ.