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Criminal Justice Final

Terms in this set (317)

Court held that requiring a suspect to participate in a police line-up did not violate the Fifth Amendment.

D was arrested for robbing a bank, was forced to stand in a line-up with several other prisoners, each of whom wore strips of tape on their faces, as had the actual robber. In addition, the defendant, for identification purposes, was required to utter the words allegedly spoken by the robber.

Compelling D to speak within hearing distance of the witnesses, even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not compulsion to utter statements of a "testimonial" nature; he was required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his guilt.

But the lineup was riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might crucially derogate from a fair trial.
-- once a witness has picked out the accused at the lineup, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so in practice the issue of identity may for all practical purposes be determined there and then before trial.

Rule: attorney must be present at witness identification at pre-trial lineups, or else the state must prove that the courtroom identifications were founded on observations other than the lineup procedure, such as substantial opportunity to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime. --> "purged of the primary taint."

Only through the presence of counsel at the lineup can both the lineup identification and the courtroom identification be effectively challenged. The court needs to determine whether the courtroom identification arose exclusively from the impermissible lineup or whether it arose from circumstances sufficiently distinct from the lineup to remove it from exclusion as the fruit of illegal procedure.
Held that the line between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence must be determined by whether the witness faces the "cruel trilemma" in disclosing the evidence.

D was pulled over on suspicion of drunk driving. After he failed sobriety tests, police officers placed D under arrest, took him to a booking center, asked him the date of his 6th birthday. Did not give him Miranda warnings. D responded with slurred speech, stumbled over his answers, and said that he did not know the date of his sixth birthday. Both the manner of speech and the content of D's answers were used at trial as evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol.

Court concluded that evidence of the slurred nature of D's speech was not testimonial
• Requiring a suspect to reveal the physical manner in which he articulates words, like requiring him to reveal the physicsal properties of the sound produced by his voice does not, without more, compel him to provide a "testimonial" response for purposes of the privilege.

With respect to the answer to the sixth bday question, Court held that D's response was testimonial, and therefore that the use of it at evidence was error.
• D was left with the choice of incriminating himself by admitting that he did not then know the date of his sixth bday, or answering untruthfully by reporting a date that he did not then believe to be accurate (an incorrect guess would be incriminating as well as untruthful).
o The content of his truthful answer supported an inference that his mental faculties were impaired, because his assertion (he did not know the date of his sixth bday) was different from the assertion that the trier of fact might reasonably have expected a lucid person to provide.

BOOKING EXCEPTION to Miranda: exempts from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services, unless it is designed to elicit incriminating admissions
5th Amendment privilege is not self-executing → have to expressly invoke it; prosecutors can use silence to a question at trial.
D, not in custody, was being questioned by police officers about a murder. He answered a number of questions voluntarily but balked and did not answer when the officer asked whether a ballistics test of shell casings found at the crime scene would match his shotgun; he then answered a few other questions. At trial, prosecutors argued that D's silence regarding the outcome of a ballistics test constituted an admission of guilt, and D claimed that the use of his silence violated his Fifth Amendment right.
• Court held that D's Fifth Amendment right was not violated by the use of his silence.
• D could not rely on his Fifth Amendment right at trial because he had not invoked it at the time he was questioned.
• The privilege is generally not self-executing and a witness who desires its protection must claim it.
o This requirement ensures that the government is put on notice when a witness intends to rely on the privilege so that it may either argue that the testimony sought could not be self-incriminating or cure any potential self-incrimination through a grant of immunity.
• 2 recognized exceptions to the invocation requirement:
o 1) Griffin v. California: a criminal D need not take the stand and assert the privilege at his own trial
o 2) a witness' failure to invoke the privilege must be excused where government coercion makes his forfeiture of the privilege involuntary.
• There was no allegation that D's failure to assert the privilege was involuntary, and it would have been easy for him to say that he was not answering the officer's question on Fifth Amendment grounds.
Police can pressure suspects into talking (outside of custody) by telling them that their silence can be used against them later.
o So long as police do not deprive a witness of the ability to voluntarily invoke the privilege, there is no Fifth Amendment privilege.
The Fifth Amendment is the touchstone for determining the admissibility of any statements obtained thru custodial interrogation by govt officials.

Without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely
-In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored

Prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards, effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination
-By "custodial interrogation" we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way
-As for the "procedural safeguards" to be employed, the following measures are required:
1) prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that
a) he has a right to remain silent,
b) that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and
c) that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed
2) the defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
3) However, if he indicates in any manner and at any state of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning
4) Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him
-The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of his right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter, consents to be questioned

Was a compilation of 3 cases that each involved incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.

All the principles embodied in the 5A privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery
D is arrested for murder, questioned for 30-40 mins until she confesses to knowing that the fire was intended to kill the boy. After this confession, D was given a 20-minute break and then brought in for more questioning. At this point, she was read her Miranda warnings. She was then asked the same questions again, being reminded of her initial answers where the police deemed necessary. D confessed again. This system, an initial interrogation followed by Miranda warnings and then a second interrogation, was standard practice in this county.

Court struck down the confession.

Different from Elstad: there it was a good-faith mistake, here it was police coercion. In Elstad, the two interrogations were under different circumstances. Here, the warned questioning took place 15 to 20 mins later, in the same lace, with the same officer who said nothing about the applicability of the Miranda protections to statements she already gave. Upon hearing Miranda warnings right after confessing, no reasonable suspect would think that he now has the right to remain silent. In fact, the very purpose of this technique is to make the warning ineffective so suspects will continue to speak.

Lower courts lower courts have held that Kennedy's concurrence is controlling because it is the narrowest view on which five members of the Court agree and this means that a confession made after a Miranda-defective confession will be admissible unless 1) the officers were in bad faith in not giving the warnings before the first confession; and 2) the second confession proceeded directly from the first in time, place, and circumstances.
Emergency exception to Miranda

Woman tells cops she was raped by man who just entered supermarket and that he had a gun. Cops go in to store and see him, handcuff him, then ask where the gun is.

Both the gun and the statement revealing its location were admissible despite the Miranda violation.

Court concluded that "overriding considerations of public safety" can justify an officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings and that an unwarned confession obtained under such circumstances is admissible in the govt's case-in chief despite Miranda

So long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the public safety; an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon it
-In such a situation, if the police are required to recite the Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles' position might well be deterred from responding

After Dickerson, the Quarles public safety exception to Miranda is apparently justified as a necessity exception to the constitutionally-based Miranda rule - much like the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement

questions without warnings in order to be permissible must be addressed to the public safety risk
-so for example, it was permissible to ask Quarles about the location of the gun but it would not have been within the public safety exception to ask whether he had committed the crime that he was arrested for
D gets arrested for murder and kidnapping. Gets read his Miranda rights and says he wants to speak to a lawyer. At the time of his arrest, D was unarmed, but the police suspected that he had hidden a gun somewhere nearby. He was placed in a police car with 3 other officers to ride to the police station. One officer mentioned that there was a school nearby for handicapped children and it'd be a shame if a child found the gun and hurt themselves. D then told the police to turn around and he would show them where the gun was. Before pointing out the gun's location, D was again read his Miranda rights. Innis responded that he understood but he did not want any children to come across the gun and get hurt.

Rule: the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.
-Meaning that:, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect

D was not interrogated here. There was no express questioning nor its functional equivalent. The officers were talking amongst themselves. There is nothing to suggest that the officers were aware that D was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children or that they knew he was unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest. Given the fact that the entire convo appears to have consisted of no more than a few off-hand remarks, we cannot say that the officers should have known that it was reasonably likely that Innis would so respond.
D turns himself in for kidnapping. Consults with lawyer, who tells him not to say anything until they can talk. Cops go to pick him up and bring him back to city where he committed the crime, and agreed not to question him. Once in the car, D told police he would tell them everything once they got back and he talked to his lawyer. Then the cop gives the "Christian burial" speech. The officer knew that Williams had escaped from a mental institution and also that he was very religious. The officer also testified that his statement was intended to get information from Williams. D eventually told the police to stop and showed them where the body was hidden.

Court says D did not waive his right to counsel.

Rule: Under Massiah, once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him.

An effective waiver requires actual relinquishment of a right and where a defendant consistently relies on the advice of counsel in dealing with the police, any suggestion that he waived his right to counsel is refuted.
*courts engage in presumption against waiver

The officer's "Christian burial speech" amounted to interrogation because the officer himself testified that his statements were intended to elicit information from Williams. Williams invoked his right to counsel throughout his ordeal. He contacted his attorney before turning himself in, he continued to employ the advice of counsel by remaining silent, and he even told the police he would tell them everything but only after he consulted with his attorney. Despite this, the officer elicited incriminating statements from Williams without first reading him his Miranda rights or ascertaining whether Williams wished to waive his right to counsel. Under such facts, no effective waiver took place.
Undercover cop goes to apartment to buy drugs, sellers opens door 12-18 inches while cop stood 2 feet away. Closed door, went and got drugs, then handed drugs to cop. Took place during daylight hours so the sun was coming in. When Glover left the building, he drove to police headquarters and gave other officers a detailed description of the man who had sold him the drugs. One of the officers recognized the description as that of D. The officer then found a photo of D and put it in Glover's office for him to look at. Two days later, and when he was alone, Glover looked at the photo and identified the man as the person who had sold him the drugs.

Rule: Where a defendant claims that his right to due process of law has been violated because of the manner in which he was forced to confront a witness, the court must look to the reliability of the identification to determine whether it is admissible.
--adopts the totality of the circumstances analysis for suggestive police pre-trial identifications instead of the per se exclusionary rule

Cop's ID was reliable. First, he had plenty of time, and good light, to view D in the door way. Second, as a trained police officer working undercover, the officer knew he would need to later identify his seller; therefore, the officer paid careful attention to what D looked like. Third, the description the officer gave before identifying D was made immediately following the encounter and was detailed and accurate. Fourth, the officer had no doubt that the man in D's photo was the seller. And fifth, only two days passed between the commission of the crime and the officer's identification.