D gets stopped by DEA agents in an airport. They take his plane ticket, driver's license, and wallet, and ask him to accompany them to another room.
A seizure occurred when the officer's took D's ticket, driver's license, and luggage and started walking away because D could not leave the airport without them.
In Mendenhall, no luggage was involved, the ticket and identification were immediately returned, and the officers were careful to advise that the suspect could decline to be searched. Here, the officers had seized D's luggage and made no effort to advise him that he need not consent to the search.
Stated that the failure to cooperate in a consensual encounter cannot be treated as suspicious conduct that would justify a Terry stop.
o Otherwise, the officers would have it both ways: an encounter would be permissible because it is consensual, and yet a stop would be permissible when the individual refuses to consent.
As cops were approaching a small car, the youths huddled around the car saw the officers and took off running. Suspicious, the officers gave chase. Just before one officer caught up with him, D. tossed the crack cocaine he had been carrying.
Rule: A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs where the police exercise physical force over a subject or where a subject actually submits to an officer's show of authority. While an arrest can occur by the slightest application of physical force, if the subject frees himself from such restraint the arrest and seizure come to an end until the subject is brought back into police custody.
Therefore, when D was fleeing the police, he was not yet subject to a Fourth Amendment seizure. Hence, when he threw the drugs away before the officer caught him, he abandoned the drugs and the confiscation was not the fruit of a seizure.
The Mendenhall test when "read carefully," says that a person has been seized "only if," not "whenever" the officer uses a show of authority. Thus, where the officer engages in a non-physical show of authority, it must be such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, and the citizen must actually submit.
The defendant, the only African-American male on a flight from Los Angeles to Kansas City, was stopped on a suspicion of drug trafficking.
• "Had the officer relied solely Weaver's race as a basis for his suspicions, we would have a different case before us. As it is, however, facts are not to be ignored simply because they may be unpleasant - and the unpleasant fact in this case is that Hicks had knowledge that young black Los Angeles gangs were flooding the Kansas City area with cocaine."
• "Race, when coupled with the other factors Hicks relied upon, (i.e., that Weaver came from a source city for drugs, had no identification, and appeared unusually nervous when encountered by police officers) was a factor in the decision to approach and ultimately detain Weaver."
• "We wish it were otherwise, but we take the facts as they are presented to us, and not as we would like them to be."
Cops arrest D in his house and search the entire house.
Rule: A search incident to arrest is limited to the person and his "grab area," the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items.
Justification for search incident to arrests: safety, destruction of evidence (of any crime).
It's reasonable to permit a search in the grab area of the arrestee. That is the area in which she has immediate access, which is only going to be the room in which she is arrested.
There is no comparable justification, I however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.
When an arrest occurs, it is reasonable for the police to search the person being arrested to insure he is not armed and to ensure no evidence is destroyed. This rule is easily extended to include a search of the area that the person under arrest may access. However, a search of the area outside of the suspect's immediate control cannot be similarly justified and is therefore not reasonable
Different from Buie sweeps
o Searches incident to arrest are looking for weapons/evidence, Buie sweeps are looking for people
Officer stopped to talk to a friend who was in D's flower shop. While in there, the officer illegally picked up and opened an envelope and found money and gambling slips in it. His friend, without knowledge of what was in the envelope, then told him that the envelope belonged to D. 4 months later, the FBI showed up and questioned the officer's friend without mentioning what was in the envelope. The friend was willing to testify against D and did.
• Noted that the willingness of the witness to testify is very likely, if not certain, to break the chain of causation under Wong Sun.
• Also noted that the exclusion of a live witness would have a serious cost, as it would "perpetually disable a witness from testifying about relevant and material facts, regardless of how unrelated such evidence discovered thereby."
o Because of this, the exclusionary rule can only apply if there is a very close and direct link between the illegality and the witness's testimony.
• No close link here b/c witness was willing to testify, four months had passed between the illegality and the agent's contact with the witness, and the witness was unaware of the illegality.
Court held that requiring a suspect to participate in a police line-up did not violate the Fifth Amendment.
D was arrested for robbing a bank, was forced to stand in a line-up with several other prisoners, each of whom wore strips of tape on their faces, as had the actual robber. In addition, the defendant, for identification purposes, was required to utter the words allegedly spoken by the robber.
Compelling D to speak within hearing distance of the witnesses, even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not compulsion to utter statements of a "testimonial" nature; he was required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his guilt.
But the lineup was riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might crucially derogate from a fair trial.
-- once a witness has picked out the accused at the lineup, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so in practice the issue of identity may for all practical purposes be determined there and then before trial.
Rule: attorney must be present at witness identification at pre-trial lineups, or else the state must prove that the courtroom identifications were founded on observations other than the lineup procedure, such as substantial opportunity to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime. --> "purged of the primary taint."
Only through the presence of counsel at the lineup can both the lineup identification and the courtroom identification be effectively challenged. The court needs to determine whether the courtroom identification arose exclusively from the impermissible lineup or whether it arose from circumstances sufficiently distinct from the lineup to remove it from exclusion as the fruit of illegal procedure.
Held that the line between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence must be determined by whether the witness faces the "cruel trilemma" in disclosing the evidence.
D was pulled over on suspicion of drunk driving. After he failed sobriety tests, police officers placed D under arrest, took him to a booking center, asked him the date of his 6th birthday. Did not give him Miranda warnings. D responded with slurred speech, stumbled over his answers, and said that he did not know the date of his sixth birthday. Both the manner of speech and the content of D's answers were used at trial as evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol.
Court concluded that evidence of the slurred nature of D's speech was not testimonial
• Requiring a suspect to reveal the physical manner in which he articulates words, like requiring him to reveal the physicsal properties of the sound produced by his voice does not, without more, compel him to provide a "testimonial" response for purposes of the privilege.
With respect to the answer to the sixth bday question, Court held that D's response was testimonial, and therefore that the use of it at evidence was error.
• D was left with the choice of incriminating himself by admitting that he did not then know the date of his sixth bday, or answering untruthfully by reporting a date that he did not then believe to be accurate (an incorrect guess would be incriminating as well as untruthful).
o The content of his truthful answer supported an inference that his mental faculties were impaired, because his assertion (he did not know the date of his sixth bday) was different from the assertion that the trier of fact might reasonably have expected a lucid person to provide.
BOOKING EXCEPTION to Miranda: exempts from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services, unless it is designed to elicit incriminating admissions
D, ran a day care home, sued officers who extracted a confesion from him about the death of a child when, during the interrogation, an officer falsely reported that a medical report indicated the child's death was caused by shaking (which defendant did in order to revive the baby) when in fact, the medical doctors had not excluded other possibilities.
This confession was involuntary because he was given false info that seriously distorted his rational choice.
He did shake the baby, albeit gently, but if medical opinion excluded any other possible cause of the child's death, then, gentle as the shaking was, and innocently intended, it must have been the cause of death
The Fifth Amendment is the touchstone for determining the admissibility of any statements obtained thru custodial interrogation by govt officials.
Without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely
-In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored
Prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards, effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination
-By "custodial interrogation" we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way
-As for the "procedural safeguards" to be employed, the following measures are required:
1) prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that
a) he has a right to remain silent,
b) that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and
c) that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed
2) the defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
3) However, if he indicates in any manner and at any state of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning
4) Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him
-The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of his right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter, consents to be questioned
Was a compilation of 3 cases that each involved incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.
All the principles embodied in the 5A privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery
D is arrested for murder, questioned for 30-40 mins until she confesses to knowing that the fire was intended to kill the boy. After this confession, D was given a 20-minute break and then brought in for more questioning. At this point, she was read her Miranda warnings. She was then asked the same questions again, being reminded of her initial answers where the police deemed necessary. D confessed again. This system, an initial interrogation followed by Miranda warnings and then a second interrogation, was standard practice in this county.
Court struck down the confession.
Different from Elstad: there it was a good-faith mistake, here it was police coercion. In Elstad, the two interrogations were under different circumstances. Here, the warned questioning took place 15 to 20 mins later, in the same lace, with the same officer who said nothing about the applicability of the Miranda protections to statements she already gave. Upon hearing Miranda warnings right after confessing, no reasonable suspect would think that he now has the right to remain silent. In fact, the very purpose of this technique is to make the warning ineffective so suspects will continue to speak.
Lower courts lower courts have held that Kennedy's concurrence is controlling because it is the narrowest view on which five members of the Court agree and this means that a confession made after a Miranda-defective confession will be admissible unless 1) the officers were in bad faith in not giving the warnings before the first confession; and 2) the second confession proceeded directly from the first in time, place, and circumstances.
Even after Dickerson, the exclusionary rule does not bar the physical fruits of a Miranda-defective confession because the introduction of physical evidence at trial does not implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause.
D arrested for violating restraining order, cops try to read him his Miranda rights but he cuts them off. Cops ask about gun, D lets them seize it.
Kennedy concurrence (controlling opinion): admission of nontestimonial physical fruits (the Glock, in this case), even more so than the post-warning statements to the police in Elstad does not run the risk of admitting into trial an accused's coerced incriminating statements against himself
Thomas plurality: Miranda protects 5A privilege, which is a fundamental trial right. Only violate the constitution when you admit unwarned statements at trial and, at that point, the exclusion of unwarned statements is a complete and sufficient remedy for any perceived Miranda violation
-Thus, unlike unreasonable searches under the Fourth or actual violations of the Due Process Clause or the Self-Incrimination Clause, there is, with respect to mere failures to warn, nothing to deter and there is therefore, no reason to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun
Rule: The prophylactic safeguards of Edwards do not apply if the suspect, after invoking his right to counsel, is released from custody on the crime for which he is suspected, for an extended period. In that circumstance, the officers are free to take the suspect back into custody and initiate interrogation, and a resulting confession is admissible so long as the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waives his Miranda rights.
D was serving time on a child sex abuse offense when officers sought to interrogate him about the abuse of his son. He invoked right to counsel and was returned to the prison population. 2 years later, cops initiated a new interrogation, and D waived his rights and confessed. If Edwards applied, D's confession would be inadmissible because he didn't initiate the new interrogation.
Court set 14-day time limit: once the suspect has been out of custody for 14 days, this eliminates the coercive effect. At this point, any change of heart is less likely attributable to "badgering" than it is to the fact that further deliberation in familiar surroundings has caused him to believe (rightly or wrongly) that cooperating with the investigation is in his interest.
When a suspect is arraigned before a judicial officer and asks for counsel, he is invoking his 6th Amendment right, not his Miranda right, and therefore gets no protection from Edwards, which is a prophylactic rule designed to safeguard Miranda rights.
D gets indicted, invokes 6A right to counsel. Then cops from other jurisdiction ask him questions about another crime.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific, and cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions.
---->Although both the Sixth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment (through Miranda) involve a right to counsel, these right to counsel guard against two different risks. The Sixth Amendment preserves a defendant's right to meet the "expert adversary" of the government with an equally skilled adversary. The Miranda right to counsel, by contrast, guards against the inherently coercive nature of police interrogation and ensures that criminal suspects give statements to the police voluntarily. Thus, the Miranda right to counsel is not offense specific, for once a suspect has invoked the protections of Miranda, the police may not approach him again at all.
D turns himself in for kidnapping. Consults with lawyer, who tells him not to say anything until they can talk. Cops go to pick him up and bring him back to city where he committed the crime, and agreed not to question him. Once in the car, D told police he would tell them everything once they got back and he talked to his lawyer. Then the cop gives the "Christian burial" speech. The officer knew that Williams had escaped from a mental institution and also that he was very religious. The officer also testified that his statement was intended to get information from Williams. D eventually told the police to stop and showed them where the body was hidden.
Court says D did not waive his right to counsel.
Rule: Under Massiah, once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him.
An effective waiver requires actual relinquishment of a right and where a defendant consistently relies on the advice of counsel in dealing with the police, any suggestion that he waived his right to counsel is refuted.
*courts engage in presumption against waiver
The officer's "Christian burial speech" amounted to interrogation because the officer himself testified that his statements were intended to elicit information from Williams. Williams invoked his right to counsel throughout his ordeal. He contacted his attorney before turning himself in, he continued to employ the advice of counsel by remaining silent, and he even told the police he would tell them everything but only after he consulted with his attorney. Despite this, the officer elicited incriminating statements from Williams without first reading him his Miranda rights or ascertaining whether Williams wished to waive his right to counsel. Under such facts, no effective waiver took place.
If the witness had an accurate picture of the perp in her head before the police used suggestive tactics, suggestiveness doesn't violate Due Process. Rape victim has image burned into her mind.
For 7 months after the rape, the victim viewed lineups, one person showups, and photographs and couldn't identify D. One day the police arrested D on an unrelated charge. They brought D into the police station, walked D past her, and directed him to utter certain words. Then she identified him.
Essentially the Court found that the witness had an independent source for the identification - her experience with the perpetrator at the time of the crime.
Thus, the Court's approach to admissibility under the Due Process Clause is whether the witness had an accurate pitcher of the perpetrator in his mind before the unnecessary police suggestiveness occurred, and whether that suggestiveness altered the picture in any way.
To determine whether suggestiveness caused the identification, a court must investigate how clear the witness's pre-identification picture was; this is determined by such factors as how good a look the witness got during or before the crime, how attentive the witness was, and whether memory loss has faded the picture in the witness's mind by the time of the identification.
After Biggers, police suggestiveness is not the predominant inquiry that it may have appeared to be in Stovall. Rather, it is only one factor among the totality of the circumstances to be considered.
Undercover cop goes to apartment to buy drugs, sellers opens door 12-18 inches while cop stood 2 feet away. Closed door, went and got drugs, then handed drugs to cop. Took place during daylight hours so the sun was coming in. When Glover left the building, he drove to police headquarters and gave other officers a detailed description of the man who had sold him the drugs. One of the officers recognized the description as that of D. The officer then found a photo of D and put it in Glover's office for him to look at. Two days later, and when he was alone, Glover looked at the photo and identified the man as the person who had sold him the drugs.
Rule: Where a defendant claims that his right to due process of law has been violated because of the manner in which he was forced to confront a witness, the court must look to the reliability of the identification to determine whether it is admissible.
--adopts the totality of the circumstances analysis for suggestive police pre-trial identifications instead of the per se exclusionary rule
Cop's ID was reliable. First, he had plenty of time, and good light, to view D in the door way. Second, as a trained police officer working undercover, the officer knew he would need to later identify his seller; therefore, the officer paid careful attention to what D looked like. Third, the description the officer gave before identifying D was made immediately following the encounter and was detailed and accurate. Fourth, the officer had no doubt that the man in D's photo was the seller. And fifth, only two days passed between the commission of the crime and the officer's identification.