C-130-J Hercules - 44k / 8 Pallets / 1,700 Nautical Miles
C-17 Globemaster - 170,900 / 18 Pallets / 2,400 Nautical Miles
C-5 Galaxy - 270k / 36 Pallets / 4,800 Nautical Miles
KC-10 Extender - 170k / 27 Pallets or 17 Pallets, 75 Personnel / 3,800 Nautical Miles
There are four basic airlift missions to support strategic, operational, and tactical RQMTs: PAX and cargo movement, combat employment and sustainment, aeromedical evacuation, and special OPS support.
The marshaling area is provided by the installation or base CDR of the geographic OA from which the deploying unit departs. Marshaling area activities are the responsibilities of the deploying unit CDR. The marshaling area activities shall take place as close as possible to the departure airfield. However, the marshaling activities may take place within the deploying unit's permanent assigned area in order to ease movement. The location must not cause unnecessary congestion to airfield OPS or undue hardship to the deploying unit. Units shall maximize preparation before arriving at the marshaling area, which is used for final preparations. Using a marshaling area allows rapid clearing of the POE and makes aircraft/vessel loading space available for its primary purpose.
Responsibilities within the marshaling area are indicated below.
1. Support installation/host activity responsibilities include:
a. Designate and control the marshaling area
b. Provide necessary support functions to allow the deploying unit to concentrate on deployment preparations
c. Provide energy maintenance, POL (including defueling capability), and related services.
2. Deploying unit responsibilities include:
a. Conduct final preparations for loading
b. Assemble vehicles, equipment, supplies, and personnel into mission loads/chalks or in convoy order for
movement to the POE
c. Prepare personnel and cargo manifests
d. Prepare any additional required paperwork (e.g., hazardous certification, agricultural certification)
e. Appoint and brief planeload or troop CDRs for departure
f. Ensure that adequate shoring and dunnage material for aircraft loading is readily available
g. Provide personal safety equipment to load-team members
h. Brief personnel on the situation and mission, movement plan, assembly plan, OPLAN, convoy
discipline, loading procedures, safety, and assembly procedures
i. Provide liaison with activities agreed to during the joint planning conference.
3. Departure airfield control group (APOE only) responsibilities include:
a. Arrange for technical assistance
b. Provide liaison with the deploying unit and mobility force.
4. Mobility force (APOE) responsibilities include:
a. Provide technical assistance
b. Provide aircraft scheduled departure times
Route Reconnaissance and Selection. A reconnaissance of possible convoy routes should precede the actual selection of a route in order to avoid predictability. (Don't be easily timed, approached, or observed.) Higher headquarters may specify the route selected or the determination may be left to the CC. The CC or a designated representative should make a reconnaissance of
both the primary and alternate route by ground or air if circumstances will allow it.
NOTE: Route characteristics and other key information required may be requested through higher headquarters. CC should request information in advance to allow for sufficient time for planning
(1) A map reconnaissance is made first, followed by a physical (ground or air) reconnaissance, if possible. When making the map reconnaissance, other available information such as engineer intelligence, military police/security force information, civilians supporting military (e.g., security contractors and military contracted vehicle operators), and overhead photos should be used. Since route conditions are susceptible to change in a relatively short time due to enemy action or weather, a physical reconnaissance is highly beneficial if time and the security situation permit.
(2) Ground/physical reconnaissance should be conducted in concert with the supporting engineer element. This is particularly critical when gap crossings and route construction may be required. Aerial reconnaissance may be conducted visually, using overhead photography, or using other intelligence assets to identify danger areas and choke points on each proposed route.
c. Convoy Reconnaissance Considerations.
In general, convoy routes are selected by identifying, evaluating, and comparing those factors which tend to facilitate convoy movement and control.
Route Characteristics. Considerations related to route characteristics include:
Road surface and bridge capacity.
Height, weight, widths, and turning radius limitations.
Rural versus urban areas.
Estimated operating speeds over various sections of the route.
Probable traffic conditions.
Probable effect of adverse weather on trafficability.
Convoy control requirements.
Friendly and threat force locations.
(3) Enemy Capability. The enemy's capabilities along a route are fully evaluated based on current intelligence. Other considerations in evaluating the enemy threat include recent experiences by other convoys utilizing the route and
the identification of danger areas along the route, which enhance the enemy's ability to interdict the convoy.
(4) Route Classifications. Movement restrictions and highway route control classifications must be considered within the AO. Route classification is assigned to a route using factors of minimum width, worst route type, least bridge, raft, or
culvert military load classification, and obstructions to traffic flow.
1. OPTAR ALLOCATION. The Supplies and Equipage (S&E) OPTAR, the Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM) OPTAR, and the Repair of Other Vessels (ROV) OPTAR can be allocated by the Commanding Officer of the ship or activity to the divisional or departmental level. Therefore, it is imperative that each division and department within a ship or activity provides accurate budget input in the form of anticipated requirements for operating funds during the upcoming fiscal year. These requirements are based on past usage data as well as on anticipated requirements and operating schedules for the next fiscal year. This process will help the Supply Officer in making recommendations to the Commanding Officer as to how Operating Target (OPTAR) funds will be allocated within the unit's departments and divisions. Flight Operations (FLTOPS) and reimbursable OPTARs are not allocated to the divisional level.
2. OPTAR HOLDERS. Each ship, aviation squadron, or other command issued an OPTAR is responsible for its efficient and effective use, including accurate and timely accounting and reporting. OPTAR holders will take prompt action to comply with all requirements of this manual, including submission of obligations, Budget OPTAR Reports and process, research, and validation of Summary Filled Order Expenditure Listings (SFOEDL) and Unfilled Order Listings (UOL).
Depot Level Repairables (DLR) are those Navy managed items which, based on
unit cost, annual demand, difficulty of repair, or other economic considerations, have been
selected by cognizant inventory managers for special inventory control. DLRs must be returned
to the Designated Support Point (DSP) / Designated Overhaul Point (DOP) when they are
Beyond Capable Maintenance (BCM) at the authorized maintenance activity. DLR items are
listed and identified by NSN, cognizance symbol, and Material Control Code (E, G, H, Q or X) in
FEDLOG. All stock records, custody records, and supply documentation for DLR items will
include the applicable Material Control Code (see Appendix 9I) as a mandatory data element. An
appropriate Source, Maintenance, and Recoverability (SM&R) Code is assigned to each DLR
indicating the level and degree of maintenance authorized. Every effort should be made to
screen and repair all DLRs through 2M.
2. AVIATION ACTIVITIES. Aviation activities will use the Aviation Intermediate Maintenance
Department (AIMD) or the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) to provide local repair of not
ready for issue (NRFl) DLRs. DLRs which may be locally repaired are known as Local Repair
Cycle Assets (LRCA). Financial posting and carcass tracking procedures for repairables issued
from stock do not begin until the issue is posted via DIFM return from NALCMOMIS.
Items requiring JARB approval generally include procurements costing over $200,000, force protection items, and other special interest items that must be prioritized for procurement. The JARB is a review board. It does not determine unit requirements, nor does it really "validate" those requirements. Commanders determine requirements, and the staffing process through the MSC provides the validation. The JARB simply reviews the requests and verifies that the requirement has been well justified and properly validated through the MSC. Of course it also verifies that the package submitted is complete and self-sufficient to complete any funding action needed, (if the package is not complete the JARB cell will return the package back to the unit to complete it) but I'll get into more detail on what that means as we go. Then the JARB, with its "corporate wisdom" discusses the request and determines as a collective body whether or not to recommend that we spend limited theater resources on it. How do they do that? The JARB is made up of "voting members" and advisors, and is chaired by the MNC-I C4 Deputy. MNC-I staff sections C1, C3, C4, C7, and C8 provide a field grade officer to validate JARB requirement documents and be voting members. These five members are the JARB voting representatives. The following agencies provide officers to review JARB document and serve as advisors: PARC, DCMA and LOGCAP (may provide equivalent civilian pay grade). Additionally, MNC-I provides another field-grade SJA officer to validate JARB requirement documents, be an advisor and provide written legal reviews of all packets reviewed by the JARB. Furthermore, MNC-I provides an additional field-grade officer to serve as an advisor and validate force protection issues. The advisors are non-voting members, but have expertise in special areas. MNC-I C4 provides a field-grade officer to manage the JARB cell, review the requirement documents and assist the process. They also provide the MNC-I C4 Deputy to chair the JARB. The MNC-I CoS serves as the final review and approving authority for the JARB requirement documents. However, they may designate other personnel as non-voting JARB advisors as the need arises. Downed Driver
VC gains control of steering wheel.
If possible, third person pulls driver out of driver's compartment and VC moves into driver's seat.
Used when vehicle is inoperative or when occupants are required to use the vehicle as cover.
Crew on the cold side dismounts, assumes hasty position to the rear of the vehicle and returns fire.
Hot side returns fire until clear to dismount on the cold side and moves to the front of the vehicle.
Assume firing positions using the vehicle as cover.
Establish 360 degree security. Look for indications of enemy presence.
Hasty Vehicle Recovery
Use a strap, cable, or chain. Preposition the straps, cable, or chain ahead of time.
After fire superiority is obtained, recovery vehicle moves forward.
Driver stays in vehicle while VC ties onto disabled vehicle.
VC gets into disabled vehicle to steer/work brakes.
Recovery vehicle moves out pulling disabled vehicle behind it.
Recovery vehicle moves to a rally point and reconfigures to a more stable means of towing.
If unable to get in front of disabled vehicle, push-through is an option.
Pre-mounting a used tire on the front of the vehicle assists with pushthrough.
In-Stride Hasty Vehicle Recovery
For small to medium vehicles and not a heavy or tractor trailer configuration.
Minimum of two 10,000 lb (HMMWV/NTV) or 25,000 lb straps (LMTV, 5-ton, 7-ton, or HEMTT) with a connecting device (clevis or 10,000 lb carabineer).
Straps are mounted on the left front and right rear of the vehicles.
Straps are s-rolled and held in place by a break-away method (retainer bands, Velcro, ¼" 80 lb test cotton webbing or 100 mile-per-hour tape).
Front strap runs into the driver's compartment.
Rear strap runs into VC compartment.
If vehicle is disabled, the driver and VC extend the strap from both the disabled and recovery vehicle.
Recovery vehicle moves alongside disabled vehicle.
VC and driver attach connecting device and release straps.
Recovery vehicle continues to move forward slowly taking up the slack
and pulling the vehicle out.
Dismount call is made by the VC.
Dismounts do not get in between any vehicles but protect space between vehicles.
Dismounts use buddy teams to overwatch each other. They always maintain line of sight with buddy.
Rear security is the only one behind a vehicle, but should stay off to the side.
If necessary, dismounts use hand motions and verbal commands to motion civilians back. If that fails, they use weapon at port arms to motion civilians back.
If more force is required, dismounts ensure actions taken are in accordance with current ROE.
If fired upon, dismounts move to cover, suppress with fire, or mount and extract (situation dependent).
Vehicles moving forward can signal the mounting call.
Dismount: Short Halt. Used for slow traffic, market places, or for quick rests:
Rear of convoy is protected by vehicles and 360 degree security.
Dismounts act as a buffer between third party personnel and vehicles.
Dismounts maintain situational awareness. They continually scan sectors and act as a deterrent. They begin by scanning the area within 5 meters and increase the scan out to 25 meters (5/25 meter scan technique).
Have more than one egress route at all times.
Dismounts should be prepared to use the vehicle as a lethal weapon if necessary.
CSWs remain manned and have interlocking sectors of fire.
Drivers remain in vehicles and ready to drive.
If vehicles are slowly moving with dismounts, VCs make sure that dismounts can keep pace. If dismounts are running, then either slow down orremount.
Dismounts ensure no third party personnel/vehicles get between or near vehicles.
Remount call given by CC through VCs. Dismounts collapse the perimeter
back into vehicles.
Dismount: Long Halt
Used for longer durations, i.e., vehicle breakdowns, dropping off cargo, etc.
Dismounts seek out and use hard cover, i.e., vehicle hard points, buildings, etc.
Dismounts clear blind spots and cover adjacent alleys and streets.
React to Contact: Blow Through
Signal. Visual signal to indicate general direction of enemy.
Return fire. Proportional and accurate fires within the ROE.
Send a report.
Move to a rally point away from site based on SOP and METT-TC.
Establish 360 degree security.
Send ACE report.
Continue the mission.
React to Contact: Recovery: No Obstacle
Convoy is forced to stop; no obstacle to movement.
Dismounts establish 360 degree security. Maintain sector of scan/fire. Look for indications of enemy presence.
Achieve fire superiority by maneuvering gun trucks (escorts if available) to support by fire positions.
Report to higher headquarters and request assistance if needed.
Dismounts recover casualties from cold side of vehicle.
Recovery vehicle executes hasty recovery with strap, chain, or cable, or have a rear vehicle push disabled vehicle out of kill zone.
Convoy continues movement. Gun trucks/escort vehicles cover
movement out of area.
Convoy moves to rally point.
It establishes 360 degree security.
CC sends ACE report.
Convoy continues the mission.
React to Contact: Recovery: Obstacle
Crowd or other impediment prevents movement and convoy is forced to stop.
VCs and other personnel on vehicles dismount. Drivers and CSW operators remain on vehicle and remain ready to react.
Establish 360 degree security. Maintain sector of scan/fire. Look for indications of enemy presence.
Achieve fire superiority by maneuvering gun trucks/escorts to support by fire positions.
Dismounts recover casualties from cold side of vehicle.
CC assesses situation and establishes a hasty defense and awaits QRF, or directs escort force to assault through ambush using fire and maneuver
Gun trucks, designated marksmen, assault force suppress identified threat with accurate fires.
Gun trucks maneuver to suitable position to protect convoy and cutoff enemy egress route by fire.
IEDs are one of the greatest threats to convoys and are often used to initiate an ambush. Convoy personnel should always expect an ambush immediately following an IED detonation. CCs should brief convoy personnel on the latest
IED threat: what types of IEDs are being used and where they have previously been emplaced along the route.
The bottom line is to protect the convoy. All personnel must maintain situational awareness looking for actual IEDs and likely IED hiding places. Varying routes and times, switching lanes at random, entering overpasses on one side of the road and exiting on the other, training weapons on overpasses as the convoy passes under them, and avoiding chokepoints will reduce the risk from these devices.
When to expect an IED attack.
Anytime. IEDs present reduced exposure time for the enemy compared to a traditional ambush.
Mornings are especially dangerous. Many IEDs are emplaced under cover of darkness.
Periods of reduced visibility.
Suspicion categories. The following categories enable leaders to better prioritize responses and minimize wasting time or resources:
Level 1: Large amounts of debris on road that has a history of recent IED attacks.
Level 2: Evidence of on-going emplacement: prepared holes (no device visible), removed curbstone, suspicious activity or total lack of activity when there would be otherwise. Report immediately.
Level 3: Suspicious object, activity, or condition on road. Rucksacks, mail bags, dead animals, meals ready to eat (MRE) bags, roadside mounds, rock piles, etc. could conceal IED. There are no obvious IED indicators (wires, det cord, antennas). Report immediately. Requires explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) response.
Level 4: Clear indicators of imminent IED activity: protruding wires, an individual with a command detonating device, etc. Verifiable and easily identified. Report immediately. Requires direct action or EOD response.
IEDs may be constructed using mortar shells, artillery projectiles, antitank mines, diesel fuel, rockets, black powder, fertilizer, chemical explosives, etc. Construction is only limited by the enemy's imagination.
IEDs can be hidden in potholes, abandoned vehicles, in dead animal carcasses, and secured to telephone poles and guardrails.
IEDs may be disguised as loose trash/debris, trash bags, soda cans, milk cans, buckets, burlap bags, MRE bags, etc.
IEDs can be command detonated, victim activated, or timed. Car alarms, battery-powered remote doorbell devices, remote controlled light switches, and cordless and cellular telephones are common means of detonation.
Insulated wire or det cord is used to connect the detonator to the explosive.
IEDs can be dropped from or attached to the underside of overpasses. Drivers should watch for suspicious activity on overpasses and never stop under one.
Enemy hide positions will usually have line of sight to the kill zone and an easy escape route. IEDs are commonly placed along the side of the road on the shoulder or placed on the median strip (Figure IV-2).
IEDs can be daisy chained in a decoy attack. A daisy chain is two or more explosive devices wired together so that a single signal will detonate all the munitions at once.
VBIEDs, can be initiated by either the driver, an occupant, or remotely. SUVs, pickup trucks, and delivery trucks can carry a large payload. Watch for abandoned vehicles, vehicles parked where they do not belong, vehicles sitting low on suspension system (due to weight of explosives), and vehicles with loose wires hanging off of them. Mobile VBIEDs may ignore warnings or wave-offs when approaching checkpoints, TCPs or convoys.