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Criminal Procedure: Investigation
Terms in this set (201)
Whether a law is criminal or noncriminal
Writ of Habeus Petition
o Post-conviction remedy
o "Produce the body"
o Check on the government and the officers
o All state options have been exhausted
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
United States v. L.O. Ward
SC held that a penalty imposed upon persons discharging hazardous substances into navigable waters was a civil penalty and therefore a reporting requirement for violators did not violate the 5th Amendment
Allen v. Illinois
o SC found that the legislature's characterization of the statute as civil and treatment-oriented was crucial, even though persons committed under the Act were kept in a maximum security institution
o 5th Amendment did not apply because not a criminal proceeding
• IL purpose was treatment and NOT punishment
• Legislative intent was civil and not going to invoke 5th Amendment right
o Dissent believed was criminal because of circumstances
Kansas v. Hendricks
o Violation of Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Issue
• Punishing him the same crime that he already served
o Hendricks admits that he agrees with the state physician's diagnosis that he suffers from pedophilia and is not cured and that he continues to harbor sexual desires for children that he cannot control when he gets "stressed out."
• he admits that he has no volitional control
o Trial court ordered him committed, State Supreme Court reversed.
o US Supreme Court (in a 5-4 decision) upheld the constitutionality of laws which allow for civil confinement if they can be proved to suffer from a "personality disorder" or "mental abnormality" that makes them likely to commit another serious sex crime
• Commitment is indefinite
• to determine whether an action is criminal or civil, the court should look to whether it fits within the goals of punishment
• since the act does not implicate either retribution or deterrence, the action is civil, not criminal.
o The statute is thus not punitive
• weakness of this argument is that even civil actions, like torts, contain punitive elements like punitive damages
• there is thus no dividing line between criminal and civil actions
• In addition, the statute does not require Mens Rea, unlike a criminal statute
• Instead, the commitment determination is made based on a "mental abnormality" rather than criminal intent.
o There are big problems as to this decision's implications for ex post facto, double jeopardy, etc.
Smith v. Doe
o SC upheld "Megan's Law" against a challenge that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
o Sex Offender Registry
• Did not violate → Civil regulation because of legislative intention
o Failed 2 prong test
o J. Kennedy
• Statutory scheme was civil rather than punitive
Barron v. Baltimore
o SC concluded that the Bill of Rights applied only against the Federal government and not against the states
o Eventually overruled by the 1960s
The incorporation doctrine is a constitutional doctrine through which selected provisions of the Bill of Rights are made applicable to the states through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Fundamental Fairness Standard
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments—are fundamental to state criminal justice systems and that the absence of one or the other particular guarantees denies a suspect or a defendant due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.974 Further, the Court has held that the due process clause protects against practices and policies which violate precepts of fundamental fairness,975 even if they do not violate specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
Total Incorporation Doctrine
o Warren Court
• Began to incorporate more and more Bill of Rights guarantees into the 14th Amendment
Duncan v. Louisiana
Brief Fact Summary
• The Appellant, Gary Duncan (Appellant), was convicted of simple battery, a misdemeanor, in a Louisiana district court. Under Louisiana law, jury trials are not granted in misdemeanor cases. The Appellant claimed the state's denial of trial by jury violated the United States Constitution (Constitution).
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees a right of trial by jury in all criminal cases.
• In 1966, the Appellant was driving his car when he saw his two younger black cousins on the side of the road with four white boys. The Appellant's cousins had recently transferred to another school with reported racial problems. The Appellant stopped the car and got out to approach the six boys. A discussion ensued and the Appellant and his cousins decided to get back into the car and leave. Prior to getting into the car, a white boy testified that the Appellant slapped his elbow. The Appellant stated that he merely touched the boy on the elbow. The Appellant was charged with simple battery and requested a trial by jury. His request was denied. The trial judge concluded the elements of simple battery were proven by the state and found the Appellant guilty of the crime.
• The Appellant sought review in the Louisiana Supreme Court, claiming the state's denial of trial by jury was a violation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied review.
• Does a state law granting a jury trial only in cases where the penalty is capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor violate the Constitution?
• The Constitution was violated when Appellant's demand for jury trial was refused. Justice Byron White (J. White) delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). Trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice because it works to prevent governmental oppression. Right of trial by jury in serious criminal cases works as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement and qualifies for protection under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the constitution. There has been debate over whether laymen can determine the facts in civil and criminal proceedings. Critics express a concern that juries are incapable of properly understanding evidence or determining issues of fact. However, juries do understand the evidence and come to sound conclusions in most cases presented to them. We are not suggesting that every criminal trial held before a judge is unfair or that a defendant may never be treated fairly by a judge. The purpose of a right to jury trial is to reduce the possibility of judicial or prosecutorial unfairness.
• Justice John M. Harlan (J. Harlan) and Justice Potter Stewart (J. Stewart) dissenting. There are a wide range of opinions concerning the desirability of trial by jury. Among the considerations pertaining to local conditions are the size of the criminal caseload, the difficulty in obtaining jurors and other circumstances bearing on the fairness of the trial. Each state should have the right to experiment with criminal procedure in the court system. The Supreme Court, other courts and the political process exist to correct any experiments in criminal procedure that prove fundamentally unfair to individuals.
• Trial by jury is an integral part of the criminal system. It is necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges and against judges who are too responsive to higher authority. Trial by jury is also a safeguard against overzealous prosecutors.
McDonald v. Chicago
o Banned private handgun ownership in the city
o SC held 2nd Amendment right is fully applicable to the States
a matter that has been adjudicated by a competent court and may not be pursued further by the same parties.
• Retroactivity can't apply to cases that have already been adjudicated
• BUT can bring in if case is still ongoing
• SC always has followed is to give the benefit of the new rule to the litigant who establishes it - even though that constitutes retroactive application
• Done so for 2 reasons
o 1) To provide litigants with incentives to improve past decisions of the Court, because few litigants would ask the Court to establish a new rule that they could not use
o 2) To assure that there is a concrete case or controversy before the Court
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)
Brief Fact Summary
• The petitioner, Teague (the "petitioner") was convicted in an Illinois state court of attempted murder and other offenses. The prosecutor used all ten of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury. The petitioner twice unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial arguing that he was entitled to a jury of his peers.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• An individual may not seek to enforce a new rule of law in federal habeas corpus proceedings if the new rule was announced after the petitioner's conviction became final, or if the petitioner is seeking to establish a wholly new rule or to apply a settled precedent in a novel way that would result in the creation of a new rule.
• The petitioner, a black man, was convicted in an Illinois state court for three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery by an all white jury. During jury selection, the prosecutor used all ten of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. The petitioner's attorney used one of his ten challenges to exclude a black woman married to a police officer. The petitioner's attorney moved for a mistrial after six blacks were struck, but the trial court denied the motion. Teague again moved for a mistrial after an additional four blacks were struck. The prosecutor defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve a balance of men and women on the jury. The trial court again denied the motion.
• The petitioner appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court which rejected his claim that the challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury representative of the community. The petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in United States District Court ("District Court") again arguing the fair cross section claim, and arguing that under Swain v. Alabama, a prosecutor could be questioned about his use of peremptory challenges once he volunteered an explanation. The District Court denied the Petitioner's petition, but a panel of the Court of Appeals agreed that the fair cross section requirement applied to a petit jury, and held that there was a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court of Appeals voted to rehear the case, but postponed it until a decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which overruled a portion of Swain. After Batson was decided, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioner could not benefit from the rule retroactively, that his Swain claim was procedurally barred, and the fair cross section claim was limited to jury venire.
• Is the petitioner prevented from benefiting from the rule in Batson since his conviction became final before Batson was decided?
• Is the petitioner procedurally barred from raising the Equal Protection Clause claim under Swain since he did not raise the claim at trial or on direct appeal?
• Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. O'Connor") delivered the opinion of the Court in regards to Parts I, II, and III.
• The Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") held that the Petitioner was procedurally barred from benefiting from the Batson rule since his conviction was final before Batson was decided.
• Also, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner is barred from raising a claim that he has established a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under Swain because he did not raise the Swain claim at trial or on direct appeal.
• The Supreme Court decided that an individual may not seek to enforce a new rule of law in federal habeas corpus proceedings if the new rule was announced after the individual's conviction became final, or if the individual is seeking to establish a wholly new rule or to apply a settled precedent in a novel way that would result in the creation of a new rule.
• The Supreme Court identified two exceptions:
o (1) rules prohibiting punishment for "private, primary individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe"; and
o (2) rules that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)
• Crack distribution was usually done by black gang members
• 3 Judge Panel said ∆ must "provide a colorable basis for believing that 'other similarly situated have not been prosecuted'" to obtain discovery
• SC reveres
o ∆ says there must be a threshold requirement
o Don't want to have prosecutorial discretion to be criticized all the time
• Undermine prosecutions and law enforcement
• Courts no longer relied on general entitlement of discovery
• Courts can no longer consider selective prosecution claims
• SC suggested that certain types of persons are more likely to commit certain crimes
Jamar Clark Example
Prosecutor chose no grand jury in shooting of black man by police officer
The Historical Role of the Grand Jury
• Origins believe its modern role as intermediary between the people and their government
• English grand jury was somewhat like a quasi-prosecutor for the King
o Expected to bring charges based on their own knowledge as well as consider charges brought by prosecutors
• American colonists adopted the grand jury as integral to the common law system
• Often used for political means
• Grand jurors no longer perform any other function but to investigate crimes and screen indictments and they tend to indict in the overwhelming number of cases brought by prosecutors
o Criticized as a "rubber stamp" for prosecutors
Hurtado v. US
o Right to a grand jury DOES NOT extend to defendants accused of state crimes
o Less than half the states require prosecution by indictment for serious crimes as a matter of state constitutional or statutory law
• 5th Amendment requires a grand jury indictment for the prosecution of an "infamous crime"
o Crime is infamous only if it can result in either hard labor or imprisonment in a penitentiary
Grand Jury Duties
• Grand juries summon witnesses and documents with subpoenas.
• Witnesses, including custodians of documents, report on the scheduled date not to a courtroom, but to a hallway outside the room where the grand jury is sitting. The witness must enter the grand jury room alone, without his or her lawyer.
• No judge presides and none is present.
• If no quorum, can't proceed
• Inside the grand jury room are sixteen to twenty-three grand jurors, one or more prosecuting attorneys, and a court reporter. 18 U.S.C. § 3321; Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(a)(1), (d) & (e).
• The witness is sworn, and questioning commences, all to the end of determining whether "there is adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge." United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1744, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992).
• Other than witnesses, each person present in the grand jury room or otherwise assisting the prosecutor is forbidden from disclosing "matters occurring before the grand jury,"
Model Grand Jury Charge
o 16 of 23 jurors makes a quorum
• Limitation on the Power of the grand jury
o Should not consider punishment
• The Grand Jury Procedures
• Deliberation and Vote
o Task is to determine whether the government's evidence as presented to you is sufficient to cause you to conclude that there is probable cause to believe that the person being investigated committed the offense charged
• Independence of the Grand Jury
• The Obligation of Secrecy
Procedures of the Grand Jury
• Rule 6 of FR of Criminal Procedure illustrates typical procedures of the GJ
• Discriminatory Selection of Grand Jurors
o Equal Protection Clause prohibits racial or ethnic discrimination
• Discriminatory Selection of GJ Forepersons
o As long as GJ itself was validly selected, discrimination in the selection of the two ministerial (foreman and deputy foreman) leaders did not prejudice the ∆
• Secrecy of Grand Jury Proceedings
o Important to remain secret
• Grand Jury Witnesses and Secrecy
o FR 6 does not require grand jury witnesses to maintain secrecy as to their own testimony
• 12 jurors must decide whether to indict
• Prosecutor can refuse to indict at the end
Relationship of the Grand Jury to the Prosecutor and the Court
• Federal court does not have supervisory power to dismiss a grand jury indictment based on perjured testimony unless it is shown that the prosecutor knew that the testimony was perjurious
• Role of the Prosecutor
o Legal Advisor to the Grand Jury
o Presents Evidence to the Grand Jury
o Prosecutor may negate a Grand Jury's decision to return an indictment by refusing to sign the indictment which dismisses the charges
o May get new GJ if they choose not to indict
THE GRAND JURY AS A PROTECTION AGAINST UNJUST PROSECUTION
• Traditional view of the grand jury as a protection against unwarranted prosecution
• Principal function of the GJ today probably is not to refuse indictment, but rather to force the prosecution to gather and to offer evidence in some systematic way before a charge is brought
o Protect those that are innocent
Costello v. United States
Brief Fact Summary
• After being indicted upon the hearsay testimony of three IRS agents, Petitioner sought to have his trial and conviction overturned because the agents had no personal knowledge of the truth of the information upon which they testified.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Hearsay evidence is admissible to obtain an indictment when its acceptable counterpart is to be presented at trial.
• Petitioner, Frank Costello, was indicted for tax evasion for the years 1947-1949. After the indictment, he brought a challenge, maintaining all evidence given to the grand jury was only hearsay and should not be used to indict him.
• At the trial of the matter, 144 witnesses were brought forth to assert the truth of all documents used against Petitioner, and the three agents who testified at his indictment were put on the stand to summarize the case against him.
• Whether a defendant should be required to stand trial and a conviction be sustained where only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand jury upon his indictment.
While the evidence is admittedly hearsay, it may be used to obtain an indictment, provided non-hearsay evidence can be produced at trial.
• Hearsay evidence may be used in an indictment when it is presented by officials having appropriate non-hearsay evidence.
Analysis of Costello
• Inadmissible evidence often has probative value and the GJ's function is
e*, not adjudicative
• Many evidentiary rules are designed to ensure fairness in an adversary proceeding, and the GJ is NOT adversarial
• Any misleading effect of inadmissible evidence will be remedied at trial
• GJ proceedings would be greatly burdened if the rules of evidence were applicable to them
Illegal Evidence in Grand Jury
• Illegally seized evidence CAN be used in the GJ proceeding
United States v. Williams
• US v. Williams rejected 10th Circuit supervisory rule that required prosecutors to present "substantial exculpatory evidence" to the grand jury
o Scalia said that a rule requiring the prosecutor to present all substantially exculpatory evidence exceeded the courts' supervisory authority, because the GJ is an institution separate from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside
• DOJ US Attorney's Manual
o When a prosecutor conducting a GJ inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against such a person
THE GRAND JURY'S POWERS OF INVESTIGATION
The SC has emphasized that the role of the grand jury is to investigate any and all potential criminal conduct, and that the power to obtain information is broad.
Grand Jury Subpoena Power
Scope of subpoena power of a federal grand jury is nationwide, which means that the burden of traveling to testify can be considerable
Grand Jury Cattle Call: United States v. Dionisio
An objection to the breadth of a GJ investigation is ordinarily dismissed out of hand
Subpoenaing Criminal Defense Attorneys
GJs have sometimes sought to obtain information from criminal defense attorneys concerning fees
o Allowed to do because fees are NOT privileged communication
Minimal Limits on Grand Jury Subpoena
US v. Nixon held TRIAL subpoena must satisfy 3 pronged test
• US v. R. Enterprises, Inc.
o REJECTED Nixon application to grand jury subpoenas
• Government cannot be required to justify the issuance of a grand jury subpoena by presenting evidence sufficient to establish probable cause because the very purpose of requesting the information is to ascertain whether probable cause exists
• Powers are not unlimited
o Can't be
Warnings to Witnesses Testifying Before the Grand Jury
Witnesses can be called to testify before the GJ without being told why they are being called, what the purpose of the inquiry is, or whether they are they are suspected of criminal wrongdoing
Counsel in the Grand Jury Room
Federal practice → a witness has not right to counsel while in the GJ room
The Problem of Gathering Evidence - Overview
Expectation to privacy
o Assumed privacy
• Plain view
o Left open and is visible
• "Unreasonable search and seizure"
• Who is subject to 4th Amendment
o Government officials
• Performing under official capacity of law enforcement
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
The people are protected
o Citizens tied to the community
• The people do NOT include foreign nationals and for searches conducted in foreign countries so 4th Amendment does not apply
• Similar to "minimum contacts" jurisdiction issues
o Violated federal law and this is "unavoidable correlative" power to enforce the criminal law
School officials are allowed to search students with reasonable suspicion
Need probable cause for search warrant and specificity as to where
• Needs to be in scope of the warrant
• Enough evidence that a reasonable person would believe a crime has committed
• Comes into play when not in plain view
o Writ allowing the officer to take action
o Protect from unwarranted government intrusion
Weeks v. United States
Facts: A federal marshal entered D's house without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and seized papers that were admitted at D's trial for lottery crimes. Before trial the D unsuccessfully sought the return of his papers and argued that they should not be used in evidence against him.
Issue: When property of the D is seized by federal officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment, may it be admitted in evidence at the D's federal trial?
Rule: (Day, J.) The Fourth Amendment must be enforced in federal courts through the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of its requirements. Unconstitutional seizures should find no sanction in the judgment of courts. The protection of the Fourth Amendment is of no value if exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence is not required.
o Evidence cannot be used in a court of law because obtained illegally
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Brief Fact Summary
• The petitioner, Katz (the "petitioner"), was convicted of transmitting wagering information over telephone lines in violation of federal law. The government had entered into evidence the petitioner's end of telephone conversations that the government had obtained by placing a listening device to the phone booth that the petitioner used. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner's contention that the evidence should be suppressed.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution"), against unreasonable searches and seizures, follows the person and not the place.
• The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to the top of the telephone booth and recorded the petitioner's end of the telephone conversations which was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.
• Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone conversations conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a person?
• Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area.
• However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from unreasonable intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his person.
• Not blocking out intruding eye, but the overhearing ear
2 Prong Test
o A person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and
o That the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable"
• Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self from public view when he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to a place where he could be seen. A person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the words he utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches and seizures.
• The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's telephone conversations constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.
• Justice Hugo Black ("J. Black") filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black observed that eavesdropping was an ancient practice that the Framers were certainly aware of when they drafted the United States Constitution ("Constitution"). Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution they would have added such language that would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations.
Dangerous to give courts this ultimate power
• Justice John Harlan ("J. Harlan") filed a dissenting opinion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to those people. First, that a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a telephone booth shuts the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted. On the other hand, conversations out in the open public would not be protected against being overheard as the expectation of privacy would not be reasonable.
Discussion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides constitutional protection to individuals and not to particular places. The two-part test for this protection is introduced by J. Harlan. First, the person must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must be reasonable.
United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012)
• Use of GPS device was a violation of the 4th Amendment
• Property based analysis
• Alito had 4 Major Problems
o 1) Circumstances involving
o Impinges on expectations of privacy between long term and short term
• Over a month → Important distinction for SC
• Revealing too much information and wasn't specific enough
• SC looks to Katz to see if expectation of privacy
o Also looks to Kylo and Riley
• See if took action
• Unanimous → 4th Amendment protects from trespassery searches
o Katz expands this
• First case where trespass law is recognized
• Technology has evolved so personal touch is no longer relevant
• Long term v. Short Term Monitoring
o 3rd Party Doctrine
• Person on a daily basis puts out tons of personal information on a daily basis
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013)
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court which held that police use of a trained detection dog to sniff for narcotics on the front porch of a private home is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and therefore, without consent, requires both probable cause and a search warrant.
In 2006, police in Miami, Florida received an anonymous tip that a home was being used as a marijuana grow house. They led a drug-sniffing police dog to the front door of the home, and the dog alerted at the front door to the scent of contraband. A search warrant was issued, which led to the arrest of the homeowner.
Twenty-seven U.S. states and the Federal government, among others, had supported Florida's argument that this use of a police dog was an acceptable form of minimally invasive warrantless search.
• In a 5-4 decision, the Court disagreed, despite three previous cases in which the Court had held that a dog sniff was not a search when deployed against luggage at an airport, against vehicles in a drug interdiction checkpoint, and against vehicles during routine traffic stops. The Court made clear by this ruling that it considers the deployment of a police dog at the front door of a private residence to be another matter altogether.
INTERESTS PROTECTED BY THE 4TH AMENDMENT UNDER KATZ AND JONES
SC has held that there is no legitimate privacy interest in illegal activity
• Possible reason Katz received protection is because gov't was not certain that his activity was illegal until officials listened to the conversations
• Courts have found that people have 3 legitimate interests
o (1) There is an interest in being free from physical disruption and inconvenience
o (2) Certain information, even though not indicative of criminal activity, may be personal or embarrassing; innocent citizens have a legitimate interest in keeping such information private
o (3) 4th Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures of property as well as searches
Seizures and Searches Implicate Different Interests
• A seizure may occur without a search and a search may occur without a seizure
o 4th Amendment protects:
• The interest in retaining possession of property
• Interest in maintaining personal privacy
• 4th Amendment regulates searches and seizures independently
Soldal v. Cook County
• A seizure of property occurs whenever there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property
APPLICATIONS OF THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY ANALYSIS (WITH THE TRESPASS SUPPLEMENT)
If the court finds that the police conduct is a search or seizure, it means only that the 4th Amendment is applicable and the police activity will still be permissible if it satisfies the requirements
• HOWEVER, if the courts finds that the police conduct is not a search and seizure, the 4th Amendment is inapplicable and police do NOT have to explain why they are doing what they are doing
• Expectation of privacy analysis is not the exclusive means of determining whether a search has occurred
• Policy activity is a search if it involves a trespass onto a person, house, paper or effect when the officer's purpose is to obtain information
o There will still be a search if the gov't trespasses to obtain information
Individuals must take affirmative steps to protect their privacy interests
o Otherwise, a police inspection will not constitute a search, due to failure to satisfy the "subjective manifestation" prong of Katz
United States v. Cofield
o Whether abandonment has occurred is a question of intent that may be inferred from acts, words, and other objective facts
Smith v. Ohio
o A citizen who attempts to protect his private property from inspection after throwing it on a car to respond to police officer's inquiry clearly has not abandoned that property
• Abandonment is often found when a person denies ownership of a container in the face of police inquiries
United State v. Garzon
o Abandonment is akin to the issue of standing because a ∆ lacks standing to complain of an illegal search or seizure of property which has been abandoned
Hester v. United States
o SC distinguished open fields from constitutionally protected areas like houses and held that a police entry into open fields was not regulated by the 4th Amendment
• Oliver v. United States
o A person does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in an open field
o Oliver might have had a subjective expectation of privacy, but it was not an expectation that society was prepared to accept as legitimate
4th Amendment protects curtilage
• United States v. Dunn
o SC held that a barn located approximately 50 yards from the fence surrounding a residence on almost 200 acres of property was outside the curtilage → police intrusion into that area did not constitute a search
• 4 Curtilage Factors
o Proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home
o Whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home
o The nature of the uses to which the area is put
o The steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by
• United State v. Hatfield
o We hold that police observation of a ∆'s open field is not a search under 4th amendment
Access by Members of the Public
SC found that there is no search if the police obtain information that members of the public could obtain
• HOWEVER, 3 Reasons that it cannot be stated that there is no search where police obtain information that members of the public could obtain
o (1) Trespass for investigation constitutes a search even if the citizen exposed the information to members of the public
o (2) Police surveillance of information known to the public can be a search if it is sufficiently pervasive and prolonged
o (3) May be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 3rd parties because that approach is ill-suited to the digital age in which people reveal a great amount of information about themselves
Consensual Electronic Surveillance
United States v. White
o SC held that when a Gov't informer carrying a radio transmitter engaged the ∆ in conversations that were overheard by an agent using a radio receiver, the ∆ had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversations
United States v. Gonzalez
o Gonzalez and associate arranged to receive a shipment of drugs in a package addressed to a hospital
o Police were tipped and installed video camera with consent of hospital
o SC held that he did not have an expectation of privacy in the public mailroom that society would accept as reasonable
United States v. Miller
o 4th Amendment was not implicated by a subpoena issued to a bank to obtain a depositor's records compiled by the bank
Smith v. Maryland
o Pen register did not constitute search
• A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in formation he voluntarily turns over to third parties and when he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
o Pen registers are not allowed unless:
• Provider gives consent OR
• Court order is obtained
o Probable cause is not required
Carnivore and Computers
Courts have generally found that surveillance of computers for pen-register-like information is not a search
California v. Greenwood
o Police asked a neighborhood trash collector to pick up plastic garbage bags that Greenwood left on the curb in front of his house and to turn the bags over to the police
o Police found items indicating narcotics use → led to search warrant of house
o SC found officer's inspection of the trash was not a search and therefore was permissible without a warrant or PC
o "The police cannot be reasonably expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public
Sometimes questions arise as to whether an area is truly public
Connecticut v. Mooney
o Court held that a homeless person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a duffel bag and cardboard box kept on public property
United States v. White
o Officer observed ∆ in a bathroom stall by looking through the gap between the bathroom stall door and the wall of the stall
• Not a search
California v. Ciraolo
o 4th Amendment not violated by aerial observation of a fenced-in backyard, from an altitude of 1,000 feet even though the officers were operation without a warrant or PC
o "The mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities does not preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be an which renders the activities clearly visible
Florida v. Riley
o Surveillance of a backyard from a helicopter hovering at 400 feet was not a search
o Burden was on Riley to show that members of the public did not regularly hover over his property in helicopters
Manipulation of Bags in Public Transit
Bond v. United States
o Court considered the question whether a law enforcement officer's physical manipulation of a bus passenger's carry-on luggage violated the 4th Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches
o Court held that it did
o Officer's manipulation of the bag went beyond what would be expected by members of the public and so constituted a search
o Bus passenger does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner
Special Needs Doctrine
o Allow searches in particular areas for certain reasons
o Essentially can't be challenged
Investigation that Can Only Reveal Illegal Activity
Investigation that threatens to uncover innocent, private activity can constitute a search because it invades a legitimate 4th Amendment secrecy interest
• In contrast, the SC has held that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in illegal activity
• THEREFORE at least under the expectation of privacy test - an investigation is not a search if it can only reveal illegal activity
United States v. Place
o Canine sniff of closed luggage for drugs was not a search under the expectation of privacy test
o Much less intrusive than typical search
o Despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited
• Limited disclosure → no embarrassment/inconvenience
o Canine sniff is sui generis
• in its own category, in its own group, of its own character, of its own class, of its own classification, of its own denomination, of its own desiggation, of its own genre, of its own kind, of its own nature, of its own type, of its own variety, peculiar, special, the only one of its kind, unique
• Took 90 minutes for the dog to arrive so detention of luggage was an exercise of dominion and control over the luggage
• Unreasonable seizure
o Jardines is an issue with the trespass and that's what the courts focused on
Dog Sniffs and Trespass
Police activity is a search if there is a trespass for investigatory purposes - presumably even if the investigation can only reveal illegal activity
Dog-Sniff of a Car During a Routine Traffic Stop: Illinois v. Cabales
• ∆ was illegally stopped for speeding
• Drug dog and officer came to scene to assist in stop
• Dog found marijuana
• NO VIOLATION OF 4TH AMENDMENT
o Dog sniff occurred without extending the time required for the traffic stop
o Relied on Place to say that the dog sniff did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy, and warned that "a seizure is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the drive can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.
• The use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests
Chemical Testing for Drugs
United States v. Jacobsen
o Upheld warrantless chemical field-testing of a powder that a Federal agent obtained from a package opened by FedEx employees
o A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy
o Did constitute a seizure but found was reasonable because only a minimal amount of the powder was destroyed and the officer had a clear indication that the powder was some kind of contraband before he tested it
o Police only tested the contraband so not considered a search
2 Prong Analysis to determining Expectation of Privacy
• Subjective of the person
• Objective belief that is a reasonable expectation
Other Drug Testing
• Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n
o Drug testing of urine was a search
• Drug testing of urine could uncover innocent secret information
• Process of collecting urine was intrusive and embarrassing
• "Collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable
Use of Technology to Enhance Inspection
• Issues of visual inspection aided by sophisticated technological devices
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)
• Uncovers information about heat source
o Not in of itself illegal
• So rarely used that the public wouldn't think that type of device would be used
o Focus on rarity of thermal technology
Brief Fact Summary
• The police obtained evidence of a marijuana growing operation inside the defendant, Kyllo's (the "defendant") home, by using a thermal imaging device from outside the home. The police used the device to gather evidence to support issuance of a search warrant for the home.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• The use of a device by the government, which is not generally used by the public, to obtain evidence from inside a home is a presumptively unreasonable search without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution").
• Upon suspicion that the defendant was growing marijuana in his home, police used a thermal-imaging device to detect heat radiating from the defendant's home. With this information, police obtained a search warrant for the home.
• Does the use of a device by the government to obtain evidence from a constitutionally protected area without physical intrusion constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution?
• Where police obtain information about the inside of a home without physical intrusion, using a device not normally used by the public, the police action constitutes a Fourth Amendment search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.
• The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and their property from unreasonable searches by the government. The home is one place where society deems an expectation of privacy reasonable. In order to preserve this degree of privacy, government searches under these circumstances must be supported by a warrant.
• The Fourth Amendment protections are not conditional upon the quality of information obtained by the government. So long as there is a subjective expectation of privacy and society is willing to recognize this expectation as reasonable, the government must obtain a warrant before conducting a search.
• Kyllo puts an end to the law enforcement use of thermal imaging devices to scan homes
• Such a scan would be a search, and searches require PC
• If an officer has PC to do thermal can, the he has no need for the thermal imaging scan
o He just gets a warrant
Tracking Public Movements
United States v. Knotts
o LE put beeper inside 5 gallon of chloroform
o Court Allowed beeper
o Nothing in record indicated that the beeper signal was used to monitor any activity in the cabin
o Buyer didn't have expectation of knowledge of it beforehand
United States v. Karo
o LE used a beeper attached to a can of ether
o SC held no authorization was necessary to place a beeper in the can of ether
• Actual placement of the beeper into the can did not violate 4th amendment
Beepers in the House
• SC condemned warrantless monitoring of a beeper inside a private house, but sustained the search warrant that agents obtained at the end of their surveillance
Knotts, Karo, and Public Tracking After Jones
• SC did not hold that electronic surveillance of public movements could never be a search
1) If the surveillance device was installed by trespassing on the citizen's person or property the tracking is a search under pre-Katz law
2) If the tracking is "prolonged" it is a search under Katz because members of the public would not reasonably expect such long-term tracking
Investigative Activity Conducted by Private Citizens - Private Activity
Burdeau v. McDowell (1921)
o SC held that private papers stolen from office safes that were blown open and a desk that was forced open, could be presented to a grand jury by a government prosecutor, because the search was conducted by private parties and so it was not regulated by 4th Amendment
United States v. Stevenson
o Internet service provider that scanned its users emails for evidence of child pornography, turned over suspicious information to the government, was a private actor and therefore the search did NOT violate the 4th Amendment
Investigative Activity Conducted by Private Citizens - Mixed Public and Private Action
Courts have found the 4th Amendment to apply if a private individual is acting, under the circumstances, as an agent for the government
Government Investigative Activity Subsequence to Private and Other Legal Searches
Limits Imposed by the Initial Search: Walter v. United States
• FBI agents who received a package of films from a recipient to whom it was misdelivered by a private carrier, could view the films without a warrant
• SC said not allowed to view
• The unauthorized exhibition of the films constituted an unreasonable invasion of their owner's constitutionally protected interests in privacy and that an officer's authority to possess a package is distinct from his authority to examine its contents
Reopening Permitted: United States v. Jacobsen
• DEA field test of cocaine permitted even though FedEx employees opened package
Controlled Deliveries: Illinois v. Andreas
• Customs conducted legal search of wooden crate and found drugs
• Customs sealed it up, made a controlled delivery to ∆, saw ∆ take package, Customs reopened crate
• SC allowed because "resealing the container to enable the police to make a controlled delivery does not operate to revive or restore the lawfully invaded privacy rights
o No legitimate expectation of privacy existed in the container at that time
• Privacy rights were not restored
• Gov't could do what it wanted to with its own property
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WARRANT CLAUSE GENERALLY
Per se Rule
o A search and seizure in some circumstances is presumed to be unconstitutional if no prior warrant is obtained, but in many other circumstances the prior warrant is unnecessary to justify a search or seizure
THE REASON FOR THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
• Want to limit police discretion
o Want neutral party to weigh in
• Prevents predictive testimony
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)
Brief Fact Summary
• Based on a tip from a confidential informant that the smell of opium was emanating from the defendant's hotel room, a Seattle narcotics detective and a group of federal agents entered without a warrant and proceeded to search the room.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• "When the right of privacy [protected by the Fourth Amendment] must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent" unless "there are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with."
• "An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his office and of the law which he personifies must then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion."
• Based on the information of a confidential informant and drug user, a Seattle detective went to the Europe Hotel. The confidential informant stated he could smell opium in the hallway.
• The detective contacted and returned to the hotel with four federal narcotics agents.
• They too, smelled opium, and followed it to the defendant's room.
• They did not know who was in the room. When a voice inside asked who was at the door, the detective identified himself. After a period of time, during which noises could be heard from inside the room, the door opened and the defendant appeared. The detective said they wanted to speak to her, and that she allowed them to enter. He then told her: "I want you to consider yourself under arrest because we are going to search the room." They found opium and a recently used smoking device.
• "[W]hether it was lawful, without a warrant of any kind, to arrest petitioner and to search her living quarters."
• No. "At the time entry was demanded the officers were possessed of evidence which a magistrate might have found to be probable cause for issuing a search warrant," specifically, the odor of opium coming from the room and the informant's testimony.
• The Fourth Amendment's "protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." While there are certain circumstances "in which a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with," they were not present here.
• Moreover, much of the grounds of the arrest are "not on the informer's tip and the smell the officers recognized before entry, but on the knowledge that she was alone in the room, gained only after, and wholly by reason of, their entry of her home.
• It was therefore their observations inside of her quarters, after they had obtained admission under color of their police authority, on which they made the arrest." Police officers must "have [a] valid basis in law" for the entry into private homes.
• Four justices dissented, but did not write an opinion.
• "The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance."
• Sufficient cause, but what would have happened if they waited for a search warrant?
o Evidence would have been discarded
THE FUNCTION OF THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
o Government must demonstrate a factually-based interest in people, places or things before using its power to disturb them
o The proof requirement protects against unjustified searches and seizures
o To be shown by persons willing to swear to or affirm the truth of their statements and thus be held accountable for their representations
• Specificity requirement implies that the gov't can only interfere with those persons, places or things that is has shown a valid interest in
o Limitations guard against arbitrary searches
• Neutral observer (magistrate) is to decide whether the probable cause and specificity requirements have been satisfied
• Also gives neutral magistrate an opportunity to refuse a warrant that would be unreasonable under the circumstances
• By imposing limitations on searches, a magistrate may prevent excessive governmental intrusions
Aguliar v. Texas
o Need some details
Spinelli v United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)
Brief Fact Summary
• Defendant was operating an illegal gambling outfit. The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") obtained a search warrant on the basis of observing the defendant, Spinelli (the "defendant") traveling to and from an apartment, and information supplied by a confidential informant.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• An affidavit used to support the issuance of a search warrant must set forth sufficient underlying circumstances which would cause a magistrate to judge the informant's information independently and support a finding that the informant is "reliable/credible".
• The defendant was traveling between Illinois and Missouri to conduct an illegal gambling operation in Missouri. The FBI observed the defendant traveling across state lines and going to and from a specific residence. The FBI also received information from an informant that the defendant was accepting wagers and operating a handbook by means of a telephone.
• If an informer's tip is necessary to support a finding of probable cause, does there have to be independent information to corroborate the information?
• An informant's tip must include underlying statements which describe the circumstances which give rise to the assertions.
• Bold assertions that a defendant is engaging in illegal behavior is insufficient by itself to support a finding of probable cause.
• An informant must explain why the information is reliable if the informant came upon the information indirectly.
• In order to issue a warrant, a magistrate must rely upon detailed criminal activities, which are more substantial than mere allegations of wrongdoing.
• Affidavit failed to set for the underlying circumstances that would be necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge of the validity of the informant's conclusion that the narcotics were where they said they were
2 Pronged Test
o 1) Underlying Circumstances
o 2) Credible and Reliable
• Majority accepts the following propositions
o A police officer is presumed to be honest when making an affidavit
o What may be questioned, however, is the source of the officer's information
o If the officer avers that she has first-hand knowledge of the facts used to demonstrate probable cause, the only question is whether the sworn facts are sufficient to meet the threshold
o If the officer is relying on someone else for part or all of the information, then it is necessary to make three additional determinations
• Who is the source and is it reliable?
• What are the bases and details of the source's knowledge?
• Are the facts either standing alone or taken together with other facts provided by the affiant, sufficient to satisfy the proof threshold, probable cause?
o If the source is not know to be reliable, the police may demonstrate reliability by corroborating the details provided by the informant
o If the informant's basis of information is unclear, it may be sufficient that the information is so detailed that it could only have come from the informant's personal observation
o If the information by the informant falls short of demonstrating probable cause, the police can gather other information to be included in the application for a warrant
o When the magistrate looks at all the information provided to assess whether probable cause is shown, she is to take a common sense approach to the application and ask whether the gov't has shown "the probability" of criminal acitivity
Spinelli only addresses warrant applications in which the police rely on:
o 1) Tipsters who operate as paid informants
o 2) Anonymous informants
• Is it court's duty to separate 2 prongs or whether it was totality of circumstances
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
Brief Fact Summary
• The police received an anonymous letter outlining specific details about the Defendants, Gates and others (the "defendants"), plans to traffic drugs from Florida to Illinois. When the details were corroborated by the defendants' actions, police obtained a search warrant and found drugs, weapons and other contraband in the defendants' home and automobile.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Where an anonymous tip is corroborated with actual police findings, a "totality of the circumstances" approach is an appropriate way of determining probable cause instead of using the two-pronged test of "veracity/reliability" and "basis of knowledge" from Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution") requires no more than a finding by an issuing magistrate that there is a "substantial basis" that a search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing.
• The police received a highly detailed anonymous tip that the defendants were trafficking drugs. The police, following up on the tip, observed the defendants conducting specific activities which were outlined in the tip. On the basis of the tip and the defendants' corroborating activities, the police obtained a search warrant. Upon execution of the warrant, the police found drugs, weapons and other contraband in the defendants' automobile and home.
• May a magistrate issue a valid warrant on the basis of an anonymous tip where there is no indicia of the informer's "basis of knowledge" if the information contained in the tip is corroborated with police findings?
• When a court decides whether or not to issue a search warrant, the elements of the informant's "credibility/reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are to be used as guides when considering the "totality of the circumstances" and are not to be exclusive requirements applied in every case.
• Aguilar and the elaboration in Spinelli sets forth the analysis magistrates should follow on determinations of probable cause. To sufficiently uphold Fourth Amendment rights, magistrates must look at both the "credibility/reliability" and "basis of knowledge" of the informant. "Basis of knowledge" cannot fully be supported solely on the basis that some factual assertions corroborate with actual police findings.
• Since some of the anonymous tips were not corroborated and actually proved false, the informant's "credibility/reliability" was undermined and therefore the warrant should not have been issued. Police cannot use findings of an illegal search to substantiate a previously issued warrant.
• Even if the factual findings by police were only corroborated by innocuous behavior, a valid warrant could still have been issued because the defendants' actions were suspicious. The main focus should be whether there is an inference, based upon the suspects' actions, that the informant is credible and the information was obtained in a reliable manner.
• "Credibility/reliability" and "basis of knowledge" of an informant are very relevant in determining the value of a tip. These elements alone do not form the entire basis of inquiry in deciding whether probable cause exists. So long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment is not violated.
• In Illinois v. Gates, probable cause was achieved for the warrant under the new "totality-of-the-circumstances" standard because the investigation by DEA and Detective Mader would have, on its own, been probable cause for a search warrant. The Gateses' actions were suspicious because Florida is a known source of illegal drugs. Lance Gates' stay at a motel for one night and immediate return to Chicago suggests that he was not going for a vacation and also implies that he might be involved in something illegal. The Court, after having heard oral argument, furthermore requested in November 1982 that the parties and amici submit briefs on the broader issue of whether the exclusionary rule should be modified. When the opinion in Gates was rendered, however, the Court declined to rule on the issue, stating that the issue was "not pressed or passed upon below" and that the exclusionary rule had become too difficult as an issue of great public importance to have been re-examined at the time.
• Totality is substituted in its place
• Gives wide discretionary powers
• Not same reliance as 2 pronged test
• However, a few states, including MA and NY, have stuck with 2 Aguliar/Spinelli Pronged Test
Note on Gates
COURT MOVES TO A TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST AND ABANDONS, AS TOO RIGID, THE 2-PRONGED TEST THAT IT HAD PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED
Strong Prong/Weak Prong
Carter v. United States
o No specific statement as to informant's basis of knowledge for stating that marijuana was growing on certain property; however, some detail concerning the location of the property was given, and any deficiency in basis of knowledge is compensated for by informant's prior track record of reliable tips
The Function of Corroboration After Gates
United States v. Peyko
o Court found that the tip, together with the corroboration, provided probable cause to seize a Federal Express package addressed to Peyko
• While corroboration was of innocent activity, it lent color to the tip, which lent color to the corroboration, which led to PC under Gate totality
United States v. Leake
o Not enough detail from tip nor was the corroboration sufficient to overcome defective tip
• United States v. Wilhelm
o Tip only gave directions to home and general description of marijuana
The Gates Test Applied: Massachusetts v. Upton
• Police Lt. Beland conducted a legal search of Richard Kelleher's motel room and found a number of stolen items that were taken during recent burglaries. The search did not procure, however, jewelry, gold, and silver that were taken. Subsequently, a woman identified as Upton's (defendant) ex-girlfriend called Beland. The woman told Beland that Upton's motor home was filled with stolen goods, including jewelry, gold, and silver.
• The woman also stated that Upton knew of the raid of Kelleher's motel room and would be moving the motor home soon as a result. She stated that Upton bought the jewelry, gold, and silver from Kelleher. Finally, she stated she had broken up with Upton, and that was why she was providing the information. Beland confirmed that the motor home was parked where the woman said it would be and applied for a search warrant.
• A magistrate judge issued the search warrant. Upton challenged the constitutionality of the warrant. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
• The state appealed the decision from the district court's reversal of defendant's conviction for burglary, and receiving stolen property. The police department assisted in the execution of a search warrant for a motel room. The search produced several items of identification, including credit cards, belonging to two persons whose homes had recently been burglarized. The police received a call from an unidentified female who told him that there was a motor home full of stolen stuff at the home of defendant. A magistrate issued the warrant, and a subsequent search of the motor home produced the items described by the caller and other incriminating evidence. The discovered evidence led to defendant's conviction. The district court held that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and reversed defendant's convictions. On appeal, the court concluded that the police affidavit provided a substantial basis for the issuance of the warrant. The court rejected after-the-fact, de novo scrutiny. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded.
• The court reversed the district court's decision on the warrant and remanded for further proceedings because the police affidavit provided a substantial basis for the issuance of the warrant.
• Anonymous informant → suspect informant
o Generally skeptical of veracity
• BUT fears for own safety and well being
The Citizen Informant
Courts have distinguished police informants and anonymous informants from an ordinary citizen who identifies himself and reports a crime
o Citizens are concerned for society of for their own safety
Citizen informant doctrine
o Presumption that they are right and trustworthy
United States v. Patterson
o Court held that the confession of a co-participant is itself sufficient to establish PC →
NO CORROBORATION REQUIRED
Equivocal Activity - United States v. Prandy-Binett
• The federal government challenged the holding of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which dismissed the indictment against defendant, suppressed the evidence against him, held that plain-clothes detectives had violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and that they did not have probable cause to arrest him.
• After spotting a rectangular package wrapped in plastic and duct tape in defendant's gym bag, two plain-clothes detectives, believing the block contained illegal drugs, handcuffed defendant, examined the wrapped object further, and seized it and the gym bag. Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii). The district court held that the detectives had violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and did not have probable cause to inspect his package, and dismissed the indictment. The federal government appealed and the court reversed. The court held that the detectives were not required to be aware of the specific crime a suspect was likely committing; it was enough that they had probable cause to believe that the suspect committed one or the other of several offenses, even though they could not be sure which one. The court found that the detectives' observations could not have been disregarded and that they had a solid foundation from which to evaluate relative frequency and to judge the percentage of times such packages held narcotics.
• The court reversed the orders of the district court, which dismissed the indictment of defendant, suppressed the evidence against him, and held that plain-clothes detectives had violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because they did not have probable cause to arrest him.
o Dissenting judge said was a race issue
United States v. Walker (2014)
• ∆ charged with 1 count of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the 3rd degree
• Burden placed on state to show PC
• Fellow officer role
o Police may make an arrest as long as at discretion of fellow officer regardless of personal knowledge (Hearsay informant)
o Officer must be generally trustworthy
o UC police gives positive buy signal and provides identification
• Still has to be some specification and some detail that is going to make sure arresting right suspects
Probable Cause to Arrest
Probable cause to search
o Determined by whether there is a fair probability that the area or object searched contains evidence of a crime
Probable cause to arrest
o Determined whether there is a fair probability to believe that the person arrested has committed a crime
United States v. Valez
• Defendant appealed a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which convicted him following his conditional guilty plea to a charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.S. § 841. Pursuant to his plea agreement and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), defendant reserved his right to appeal the denial of his pretrial suppression motion.
• Defendant appealed his conviction following a guilty plea to a charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.S. § 841; defendant reserved his right to appeal the denial of his pretrial suppression motion, pursuant to his plea agreement and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Undercover officers made a narcotics buy, and went to arrest the seller who had temporarily disappeared from view. Moments later, defendant was arrested as he matched the seller's description, but defendant was not the seller. Defendant was found with packets of cocaine on him and indicted for possession. Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine found in his possession as well as his post-arrest statements that he intended to sell the cocaine, all as fruits of an illegal arrest. The court affirmed because the arrest was valid under U.S. Const. amend. IV as the police had probable cause to arrest the person sought (the seller), and the arresting officer reasonably believed that defendant was the seller. The true seller was not known until after defendant's arrest and the packets of cocaine were found with defendant, and thereby provided independent probable cause to support defendant's arrest.
• The court affirmed the denial of defendant's pretrial suppression motion. There was a reasonable belief and probable cause to arrest defendant, even though he had been the victim of mistaken identity; no purpose would be served by suppressing clear evidence of defendant's guilt which came to the attention of the police as a result of their well-intentioned but misguided actions.
o Exigent circumstances
o Outside the home
o Search of person after arrest
o Inventory Searches
o Automobile Cars
• As long as probable cause
o Street Stop and Frisk
• Reasonable suspicious activity
o Certain Government employees
• School teachers
• Gov't employees
• Border stops
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)
Brief Fact Summary
• A federal postal inspector was informed by an informant that he was scheduled to receive stolen credit cards from the defendant, Watson (the "defendant") in the future. Subsequently, the defendant was arrested without a warrant when the informant confirmed such allegations with the postal inspector.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Government officers are permitted to arrest without a warrant for both misdemeanors and felonies committed in the presence of the officer or when there is probable cause to do so.
• A reliable informant told a federal postal inspector that the defendant had supplied him with stolen credit cards and would do so in the future. The postal inspector was present at the scheduled meeting between the informant and the defendant and proceeded to arrest the defendant without a warrant, after the informant confirmed that he had the stolen credit cards.
• May a government official make an arrest without a warrant where a felony has been committed in the official's presence?
• A government official may arrest a person without a warrant upon probable cause to believe the person is guilty of a felony.
• The defendant's warrantless arrest was valid because exigent circumstances existed at the time of arrest and therefore no warrant was necessary.
• An arrest is like a seizure for Fourth Amendment constitution purposes. Law enforcement would be overburdened if a constitutional rule allowed felony arrests only with a warrant or in the presence of exigent circumstances.
• Any arrest which is executed must be supported by either probable cause, a warrant, exigent circumstances or an Act of Congress, which authorizes various government officials to make warrantless arrests. Acts of Congress are presumptively valid and likewise, the acts of officials making proper arrests under the authority of such laws are presumptively reasonable.
• Common law allows arrest by police officers
• Warrantless arrest
o Police doesn't see crime occur
The Payton Rule
Warrantless entry into home
• 4th Amendment protects warrantless home
o Home deserved special protection
• Absent exigent circumstances
• Arrest Warrant
o PC on the warrant
• Court believed that the moment the police enter home, need an arrest warrant
• Arrest Warrant is essentially a Search Warrant of person
• Payton applies (Texas) in both misdemeanor and felonies
Riley v. CA
• Police do inventory search of vehicle
o Find 2 guns
o Link to previous crime
• Search of cell phone considered incident to arrest
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. ___ (2014)
• Officer was suspicious car was in accident, refused to present alcohol
• Officer asked him to exit vehicle, refuses, high-speed chase
• Donald Rickard led police officers on a high-speed car chase that came to a temporary halt when Rickard spun out into a parking lot.
• Rickard resumed maneuvering his car, and as he continued to use the accelerator even though his bumper was flush against a patrol car, an officer fired three shots into Rickard's car. Rickard managed to drive away, almost hitting an officer in the process.
• Officers fired 12 more shots as Rickard sped away, striking him and his passenger, both of whom died from some combination of gunshot wounds and injuries suffered when the car eventually crashed.
• Did the officers violate Rickard's 4th Amendment right?
• The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
• The officers acted reasonably in using deadly force. A "police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death."
• Under the circumstances when the shots were fired, all that a reasonable officer could have concluded from Rickard's conduct was that he was intent on resuming his flight, which would again pose a threat to others on the road.
• Petitioners did not fire more shots than necessary to end the public safety risk.
• A passenger's presence does not bear on whether officers violated Rickard's Fourth Amendment rights, which "are personal rights [that] may not be vicariously asserted."
• Even if the officers' conduct had violated the Fourth Amendment, petitioners would still be entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
o An official sued under §1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless it is shown that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was "'clearly established'" at the time of the challenged conduct.
• Followed Scott v. Harris
o Expanded to expressly include firing a driver
• Daughter filed 1983 action that officers used excessive force
o Argues 4th Amendment does not allow shooting
• District court said violated 4th amendment
• 6th Circuit affirmed
• Respondent's excessive-force argument requires analyzing the totality of the circumstances from the perspective "of a reasonable officer on the scene." Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396.
• Reasonableness of particular use of force has to be judged with particular use of force
• SC said did NOT violate 4th Amendment
o Did not join in Use of deadly force part
• Officers actions were reasonable
o Fact that outrageous dangerous, 2 dozen motorists, grave risk to public safety
o Record showed that even once thought chase was over, wasn't really, absolutely warranted once he resumed his flight
• Posed threat to others
o Did not have 4th amendment claim
o Largely irrelevant because it wasn't the passenger's rights
o Officers would have had qualified immunity anyway
• Imminent Danger
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?
• Public Safety Exception
o Reasonable belief that there is potential that suspect is in there
o Only need a cause to believe
• Does the act of terrorism need to be declared?
• Had search warrant for Elizabeth apartment
• Issue with exigent and public safety exceptions is TIME
Kentucky v. King
• Knocks on door and thought evidence is going to be destroyed
• PC for exigent circumstances
o HIGHER STANDARD
2 Prong Rule of Payton
• 2 Prong inquiry
o Must have reasonable belief that the residence is the suspect dwells
o Reason to believe the suspect is within that dwelling
Floyd v. New York
• 2008 NYPD allege people were being stopped unnecessarily
• 80% were not doing anything wrong
• 83% of cases people were black or Hispanic
• NY stop and frisk provisions were unconstitutional
• NY it became common for NYPD to stop people
• 2011 - Police stopped people 685K
o People could be stopped multiple times
• Federal court set up independent federal monitor
• DeBlasio said it would take time
• Peter Zimmeroff - Monitor
o Tried to put in place reforms
o Department reforms
o New Forms
o Supervisors would be required to review to see if they made stops with constitutional standards
• Court also implemented new training systems
• Department will need to create disciplinary system
• Pilot program now → Body cameras
• Major turning point in NY specifically
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Brief Fact Summary
• The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the "Petitioner"), was stopped and searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for questioning and decided to search him first.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.
• The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and down the same street.
• The men would periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more.
• The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street.
• The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were "casing" a store for a potential robbery.
• The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning.
• A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
• Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ("Constitution")?
• The Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") held that it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed.
• A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.
• Justice William Douglas ("J. Douglas") dissented, reasoning that the majority's holding would grant powers to officers to authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate would not possess.
• Justice John Harlan ("J. Harlan") agreed with the majority, but he emphasized an additional necessity of the reasonableness of the stop to investigate the crime.
• Justice Byron White ("J. White") agreed with the majority, but he emphasized that the particular facts of the case, that there was suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk.
• The facts of the case are important to understand the Supreme Court's willingness to allow the search. The suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if the officer's suspicions were correct then he would be in a dangerous position to approach the men for questioning without searching them.
• The officer also did not detain the men for a long period of time to constitute an arrest without probable cause.
• Reasonable suspicion to stop someone on the street
• If suspected of a gun, officer allowed to search
o Public Safety concerns
• Officer has to be able to articulate that person was/is/about to be involved in crime
• Reasonable Suspicion Definition
o Objective Reasoning
• Reasonable person in circumstances at time
• Not based on a hunch
• Don't have to articulate to person being stopped
• Police Report (Handout)
o Doesn't give details about conversation
• Does NOT need probable cause to do pat down for weapons
• Can only do pat down on outside of clothes, can't reach into pockets and take out drugs
o Incident to a legal search
o Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person
• Officer has to be able to articulate BOTH reason to stop him and then concern in articulable way they have a weapon
• Stop and Frisk must be immediate
• Gives the officers a great deal of power and control of who and why they are stopping
• Court held "you know what I'm after" suggested that the officer knew he had drugs on him
• Rather than protective frisk for weapons
• No indication criminal activity had occurred or was about to occur
• Officer follows two men sneaking around floor
• Court upheld search and seizure based on articulable facts
• Expands perimeter
• Purpose of stop and frisk is to allow an officer to pursue an investigation without the fear of violence rather than an attempt to discover evidence of a crime
o Necessity for safety
US v. Streef
o Late 2006, police received anonymous tip of narcotics being sold at a home
o Conducted search incident to arrest
o Drugs were found in arrest
o Prosecutors said even though agreed no reasonable suspicion to stop him, evidence should still be good
o SC finds no flagrant misconduct
o Evidence on Streef because as a result of an arrest
o 3 Factors
• Time/How soon after search evidence was found
• Presence of intervening circumstances
• How flagrant 4th Amendment Violation was
o 1 Favored Suppression
o 2 and 3 favored heavily to allow it
• Acted in good faith even if was wrong
• Sparked new uprising
• Allows police to stop you and check for outstanding traffic warrants
• US DOJ report
• Within a population of 21,000, 15K had outstanding warrants
• Nothing like what intervening circumstances should be
• People of color are disproportionately stopped and looked down upon
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)
Brief Fact Summary
• Robert Williams (the "Respondent") was convicted in Connecticut state court for illegal possession of a handgun found during a "stop and frisk" and heroin found during a search incident to this weapons arrest.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can be based on more than the officer's personal observation, but also on information supplied by another person.
• A police officer received a tip from an informant that the Respondent who was sitting in a vehicle early in the morning had drugs in his possession. The police officer investigated the informant's report by first tapping the car window and asking the Respondent to get out of the car.
• The Respondent rolled down the window and when he did so, the police officer reached in and removed a fully loaded gun from the Respondent's waist. The gun was not visible from outside the car, but exactly where the informant said it was. A search incident to the arrest was conducted shortly thereafter, and heroin, a second handgun and a machete were found on the Respondent's person and in the vehicle.
• Respondent was convicted in Connecticut state court for illegal possession of a handgun found during the "stop and frisk" and heroin found during the search incident to this weapons arrest. Respondent filed a habeus corpus petition that was denied by the federal district court and granted by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was an unlawful search and found the state court judgment should be set aside.
• Whether a stop and frisk has to be based on the officer's personal observation or if it can be based on information supplied by another person?
• The stop and frisk can be based on information from other people. Once the arresting officer "had found the gun precisely where the informant had predicted, probable cause existed to arrest Williams for unlawful possession of the weapon." Further, "[u]nder the circumstances surrounding Williams' possession of the gun seized by [the officer], the arrest on the weapons charge was supported by probable cause, and the search of his person and of the car incident to that arrest was lawful."
• Respondent's argument that the officers conduct violated [Terry v. Ohio] was rejected. Terry found that "a brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." Additionally, "[s]o long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective purpose."
• The majority, in applying [Terry"s] above principle's, found that the officer's conduct in response to the informant's tip was appropriate. The police officer knew the informant personally and had been provided information by him in the past. This is stronger than when the police receive an anonymous telephone tip. Although, "while the Court's decisions indicate that this informant's unverified tip may have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search warrant, the information carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop of [Respondent]."
• The majority observed that the arresting officer had ample reason to fear for his own safety when he approached the Respondent in a high-crime area early in the morning. Additionally, the Respondent would not get out of his car and instead he rolled down his window making the weapon in his waist an even greater threat. Based on the facts of this case, "the policeman's action in reaching to the spot where the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we conclude that it was reasonable."
• Justice William Brennan ("J. Brennan") drafted a dissenting opinion relying on Justice Friendly's opinion in the lower court, and argued that the arresting officer did not show sufficient cause to justify his "forcible stop."
• Justice [ ] Marshall and Justice [ ]Douglas drafted a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority improperly construed Terry, because Terry was meant to be a "narrowly drawn" exception to the warrant requirement. Additionally, that the court improperly construes the balance Terry sought to strike between a citizen's right to privacy and the importance of effective law enforcement.
• This is an interesting decision, showing how the Supreme Court thinks in certain situations a bright line rule will not cover every situation.
Pennslyvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
• The defendant was convicted in the court of common pleas in Philadelphia of carrying a concealed firearm and carrying a firearm without a license.
• The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and remanded the conviction, finding that the gun was seized as a result of an unlawful search and seizure by cops.
• The supreme court of the USA reverses the Penn Supreme Court holding and reinstates the trial court.
• Two Philly cops were on a routine patrol when they observed Mimms the defendant driving a car, which had an expired license plate on it. The officer's stopped the vehicle so they could ticket the driver for the moving violation. The officer pursuant to safety concerns asked the driver (Mimms) to exit the vehicle; he saw a bulge in a sport jacket he was wearing (An Eagle fan no doubt).
• A frisk of Mimms uncovered a loaded 38-caliber handgun in his waistband and his passenger had a loaded 32 caliber on him as well, so both were arrested for carry concealed firearms without a license and carry a firearm in general on their person without a permit.
• Whether the order to get out of the car, issued after the driver was lawfully detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the 4th Amendment?
• This was a common practice for police to ask motorists who were being cited for motor vehicle violations to step out of their car. Establishing the face-to-face contact between the police and the driver being detained on violation diminishes the possibility that a person will do movements unobserved in their car and assault the officer. Also if the stop is executed in a high traffic area, having the driver step around to the back of his vehicle gets the officer out of the danger of standing in the road near traffic. This amounts to a mere inconvenience for a driver, but is reasonable given a police officer's concern for his or her safety.
• By stepping out of the car he only revealed little more than was already visible when he was seated in the vehicle.
• The bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimm's was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer. In these circumstances, any man of "reasonable caution" would likely have conducted the "pat down." The decision of Penn Supreme Court is reversed.
• (Marshall) He saw Terry as involving the observations of a thirty-year police veteran, who had been patrolling the downtown area of Cleveland and knew what type of suspicious activity that would lead a police officer to have reasonable suspicion that an armed robbery was about to take place or had taken place. The stop and frisk under Terry was reasonable because one who was suspected of attempting a stick up is likely to be armed and a danger to the officer as well as other citizens. In this case officers didn't have the slightest hint that the respondent might have a gun in the car or was up to no good. The officer's response must bear a direct correlation to circumstances, which first justified the interference. Doesn't like how this decision broadens Terry, beyond what the original scope was suppose to.
• (Brennan, Stevens, Marshall) today without argument the Court adopts still another - and even lesser - standard of justification for a major category of police seizures. He sees officer safety as important, but finds the evidence of how officers are slain to be unconvincing since some law enforcement training manuals instruct officers not to have suspects get out of there cars, when issuing traffic tickets. If beyond the moving violation, the suspect has something he wishes to hide getting out of the car could lead to a violent confrontation between the officer and suspect who thinks the cop is on to him. This standard could lead to elderly people, mothers with small children and other who would otherwise raise no red flags with police inconvenienced by getting out of there vehicle pursuant to police orders.
• The court hold today that "third-class" seizures may be imposed without reason; how large this class of seizures may be or become we cannot know yet. The cops didn't have a good reason for asking Mimms to exit his vehicle!
Maryland v. Wilson
o Ordered driver and passenger (Wilson) out of vehicle in car stop
o Cocaine fell out of Wilson's pocket
o Bright-line rule of Mimms still applied
Protective Frisk of Passengers: Arizona v. Johnson
o SC upheld the next step of a process begun by Mimms: the protective search of a passenger when the driver has been lawfully stopped for a traffic violation
o SC stated that officers may perform a patdown of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous
Mimms Applied: New York v. Class
o Limited investigative entry into a car during the course of a stop
o Police officer may reach into the passenger compartment of a vehicle to move papers obscuring the VIN after its driver has been sopped for a traffic violation and has exited the car
o During this time, officer found gun
o Does not authorize a police officer to enter a vehicle to obtain a dashboard-mounted VIN when the VIN is visible from outside the automobile because if the VIN is in plain view of someone outside, there is no justification for governmental intrusion into the passenger compartment to see it
Detention of Occupants of a Residence During Legal Law Enforcement Activity
Michigan v. Summers
o Police officers with a search warrant for a home can require occupants of the premises, even if leaving when the police arrive, to remain while the search warrant is executed
Muehler v. Mena
o Upheld a more serious detention (handcuffing) of a person during the warranted search of the home of a suspected gang member
o Permissible for the officers to question the detainee about her alienage during the time it took to conduct the search
Bailey v. United States
o Police prepared to conduct a warranted search of an apartment, and saw the ∆ leave the apartment and get into a car
o Stopped ∆ a mile away from apartment, brought him back to apartment while search was being conducted
o Summer did NOT extend to a detention that was made so far way from the premises being searched
o Seizure of Bailey was more intrusive
When Does a Seizure Occur? The Line Between "Stop" and "Encounter"
• Deadly force is a seizure
• Force is excessive based on totality of circumstances
o Inquiry must be judged by the reasonable officer on the scene to be considered
o Have to understand and observed based on the moments
• Not most prudent or alternatives
• But whether objectively reasonable at the time of officer's shoes
• Legal standpoint have to look at officer's actions
o What does prosecution think?
• Objective analysis of a reasonable action based upon circumstances
White girl stopped in Bed-Stuy legal (seizure of person by stop)?
o Allowed because based on criteria
o Activity inappropriate in it's setting
o Stopping in an area known for criminal activity
o Seen associated with known criminals
o Individuals attempt to avoid contact with police
o Evasive answers, conflicting stories
o Flight or gestures
o Knowledge crime has been committed
o Lack of fit of suspect within the neighborhood
o Proximity to crime scene
o Observing evidence that is real
o Special training or knowledge of officer
o Time of day or night
o Traffic violations
o Visible apprehension at sight of police officer
• Supported for seizure of a person
Federal Good Faith Exception v. New York Law
• Ripe issues
• Federal Good Faith Exception
o Mistaken view of the law is not necessarily fatal to stop and search of ∆
• New York Court of Appeals
o People v. Biggalow 66 NY2d 417 (1985)
• No good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
• Even when a police officer in good faith relies on a mistaken view of the law, the fruits and seizures and subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule
o 2015 - Exception
• People v. Guthrie (2015)
• Held that a traffic stop made pursuant to an officer's objectively reasonable, but mistakenly made, is constitutionally valid under the law under US and NY constitutions
o Police officer stopped ∆ for passing stop sign, officer smelled strong alcohol, ∆ was arrested for DWI
o ∆ moved to suppress evidence because stop sign was not registered
• Court of Appeals reversed dismissal of charges, even though mistaken
o Carved out exception
• As long as officer made mistake objectively reasonable, stop is ok
The Mendenhall "Free to Leave" Test
United States v. Mendenhall
o ∆ was stripped search at airport after following DEA agents and giving permission to checking bag
o A person has been "seized" within the meaning of the 4th Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.
Applying the "Free to Leave" Test: Florida v. Royer
Brief Fact Summary
• Detectives stopped and questioned respondent Mark Royer after figuring out he fit the profile of a person transporting illegal drugs, and then asked him to accompany them to a small room about 40 feet away. Fifteen minutes later, he consented to search of his bags.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• A police officer asking a suspect to accompany them to a small police room, taking their ticket and driver's license and not mentioning that they are free to leave, has exceeded the scope of a valid stop based on reasonable suspicion under Terry.
• Police officers determined that a respondent matched the profile of a drug trafficker because he was a 25-35 year old man, casually dressed, pale, nervous, paid for his ticket in cash, and was carrying a certain type of luggage with only his name and destination on its tag. They then stopped the respondent and asked to see his identification and the name on it did not match his airline ticket. They took the respondent's documentation and asked him to go with them into a small room where they asked him if he would consent to a search of his luggage, to which he responded by handing them his key. He was convicted of felony possession of marijuana with the help of the fruits of this search, and the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed claiming that the respondent had been involuntarily confined within the small room without probable cause and that the subsequent consent was invalid because it was tainted by the unlawful confinement. The state of Florida was then granted certiorari.
• Is the permissible extent under the Fourth Amendment of a temporary Terry stop exceeded when a police officer asks a person suspected of criminal activity to go into a small closed room without telling them they may leave and they end up there for fifteen minutes?
• Can a search subsequent to an invalid detention be validly consented to under the Fourth Amendment?
• Affirm the judgment of the lower court that the detention and search was invalid.
• Police may not carry out a full search of a person merely but appropriately suspected of criminal activity, nor may they seek to verify their suspicions by means approaching that of a full-fledged arrest. This detention was a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than that that is allowable based on mere reasonable suspicion as the least intrusive investigatory means should be used in such stops.
• Since the detective's actions are held to exceed the permissible bounds of an investigative stop, the respondent's consent to the search of his suitcase is invalid, and the evidence found as a result is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and must be excluded.
• Justice Harry Blackmun expressed his view that the police conduct here was not all that intrusive, and given the strength of the public interest in apprehending and prosecuting drug traffickers, probable cause should not have been necessary for the type of stop that these police officers completed.
• Justice William Rehnquist also dissented by saying that the conduct of the detectives was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
• Justice Lewis Franklin Powell articulated the view that although protecting the public from drug traffickers was important, this suspect was actually under arrest, and his allowing the search of his luggage was therefore not really consensual.
• Justice William Brennan stated his opinion that not only was the suspect's consent to the search illegal, but the stop was, as well.
• This case seems to have had the impact of further clarifying what the limits of a Terry stop were. But there definitely is the argument that it has not been that successful at doing so since it is unclear whether the fifteen minutes he was held in the room can be used as a guideline, or even whether the fact that he was moved to another location was what was fatal under the Fourth Amendment. The case may arguably leave the system with not much more than one of its only clear statements: that the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel an officer's suspicion.
Factory Sweeps: INS v. Delgado
INS v. Delgado
o INS officers did NOT seize workers when they conducted factory surveys in search of illegal aliens
o Police questioning by itself is unlikely to result in 4th Amendment violation
Street Encounters: United States v. Cardoza
United States v. Cardoza
o Cardoza arranged a gun purchase for his friend Ragsdale.
o At the time of the encounter with police, Ragsdale was carrying the gun fully loaded, and Cardoza had possession of an extra bullet
o Cardoza convicted of being a felon in passion of a firearm and ammunition
o Court held that Cardoza had not been seized within the meaning of the 4th Amendment
• Every police-citizen encounter is transformed into a seizure
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002)
Brief Fact Summary
• A police search of bus passengers revealed drugs in the defendant's bags and on his person.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• "The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to searches."
• Respondents Drayton and Brown were traveling on a passenger bus that was stopped for a routine search by three police officers. Two positioned themselves up front; one proceeded down the aisle, engaging the passengers in conversation. According to his testimony, passengers were not required to cooperate. However, he did not inform the passengers of this fact. The respondents were seated next to each other. The officer informed them, in a voice "just loud enough" for them to hear, that he was part of an interdiction effort, and asked if they had any bags. When they indicated one above them, he requested permission to check it, which they granted. Finding nothing, the officer requested to check Brown's person. Brown granted permission. During the pat down, the officer detected hard packages similar to those used to transport drugs. Brown was taken into custody. When the officer asked Drayton, Drayton raised his hands about eight inches from his legs. The officer found similar hard packages, and took Drayton into custody. Upon further searching, both respondents were found to be carrying sizeable amounts of cocaine.
• "[W]hether officers must advise bus passengers during these encounters of their right not to cooperate."
• No. Under precedent, Florida v. Bostick, "if a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized." A determination of when this is true "necessitates a consideration of "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter." The Supreme Court then held the erred Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals when adopting the approach that the officer MUST warn the passengers that they may refuse to cooperate in an interdiction search. In the present matter, "there was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice." The officer's badge is not intimidating on its face, as officers wear uniforms, as well as side-arms. The officer at the front of the bus did nothing to intimidate passengers. The fact "only a few passengers have refused to cooperate does not suggest that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the bus encounter."
• Drayton argued that after Brown had been taken into custody "no reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter with the officers." The court held that "the arrest of one person does not mean that everyone around him has been seized by police,", and that if anything, "Brown's arrest should have put Drayton on notice of the consequences of continuing the encounter by answering the officers' questions."
• The search itself, under the circumstances, was voluntary.
• J. Souter, joined by J. Stevens and J. Ginsburg, focused on the fact that the driver, after a scheduled stop, took the passengers' tickets as they re-boarded, and then left the bus to allow the officers to search. As such, the respondents reasonably believed that they had no choice but to consent to a search.
• "In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of coercion."
State of Mind Required for a Stop: Brower v. County of Inyo
Brower v. County of Inyo
o Officers set up "blind" roadblock in an attempt to apprehend a fleeing suspect
o Suspect couldn't stop and crashed into the roadblock
o Wrongful death action was brought alleging the suspect had been illegally "seized" by the roadblock
o SC held YES he was seized
The Suspect Who Does Not Submit: California v. Hodari D.
Brief Fact Summary
• Petitioner, Hodari D. (Petitioner), continued to flee from police after being told to halt.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• An arrest (seizure) occurs when physical force has been applied to a person, or when a person submits to the assertion of authority.
• The Petitioner and other youths fled after seeing a patrolling police car. The police gave chase and ordered the Petitioner to stop. The Petitioner continued to flee, throwing a rock later identified as crack cocaine. The Petitioner was subsequently caught.
• Has a seizure occurred when a person, who is told to stop by police, runs from the police?
• No. A seizure of a person has not occurred until that person has been physically seized, or seized through the submission to authority.
• An arrest has not occurred when a person runs from the police.
Grounds for a Stop: Reasonable Suspicion
2 Questions when determining whether reasonable suspicion exists
o 1) Court must investigate the source of information upon which reasonable suspicion is based
o 2) Court must evaluate whether that information is sufficiently suspicious to justify a stop
3 Ways to Get In
• Can consent be implied from silence?
o Reasonable suspicion
o Search Warrant
Navarette v. California (2014)
• If use totality of circumstances, YES can stop car based on anonymous tipster's claim
o Tipster's claim ran her off the road and thought intoxicated
• 3 Reasons
o Tip came from Victim
o LE confirmed innocent details of the tip
o Alleged behavior of ongoing danger to other motorists and LE had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle
o Silver Ford had run an anonymous person off the road
o Officer spots this vehicle
o Officer follows him, does not observe abnormal driving after 5 minutes
o Officers get drivers information
o Notice odor of marijuana
o Find 30 lbs of marijuana
o Arrest them both
• Majority finds 2 precedents
o Alabama v. White
• SC held that an anonymous informant's tip that was "significantly corroborated" by a police officer's investigation provided reasonable suspicion for a stop
• Was enough to raise reasonable suspicion of stop
o Florida v. J.L.
• "An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person."
• Notes tipster in White's case because was able to predict FUTURE BEHAVIOR
o Look whether report had sufficient reliability
• Temporal proximity that occurs between viewing erratic driving and making the tip
• Justice Thomas points to excited utterance and present sense impressions
• Use of 911 suggests that tip is truthful and makes position assured
• Did report create reasonable suspicion?
o Determinations of reasonable suspicion demand rational, not practical considerations
• Didn't have to rule out possibility of innocent conduct
• SC ruled important to follow up on tip because of alleged drunk driver
• Scalia Dissent
o Dismisses reliance on White
o These were not intimate details
o Navarette was out of step
• Unrelated to the veracity of her report
• Excited utterance
• Too much time and takes away from temporal time period
• Unlikely average 911 tipster are readily identifiable
• Anonymous 911 reporting is not sufficiently reliable for reasonable suspicion
o Court's opinion gives freedom destroying cocktail
• 911 tips are reliable
• Reckless driving reasonable suspicion
o Freedom of movement is at risk
• Takes step further by allowing anonymous claims and opens ability to open up probe
Adams v. Williams
o Court held that the informant's tip could be credited toward reasonable suspicion
Anonymous Tips: Alabama v. White
• SC held that an anonymous informant's tip that was "significantly corroborated" by a police officer's investigation provided reasonable suspicion for a stop
• An informant's veracity and basis of knowledge remain highly relevant in determining the value of the report of an informant
• "Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause."
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000)
Brief Fact Summary
• Based on an anonymous tip that a black male in a plaid shirt was standing at a bus stop armed, police stopped and frisked J.L.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• "An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person."
• Miami-Dade police were told by an anonymous caller that an armed black male in a plaid shirt was standing at bus stop.
• There was no audio record of the call, no any other specific information.
• Two officers were instructed to respond. Upon arriving at the bus stop, the officers saw three black males, one of whom, respondent J.L., was wearing plaid.
• There was nothing else about the situation that suggested to the police that illegal activity was afoot.
• The officers could see no firearm, and the respondent did nothing threatening. The officers approached all three men, and frisked them. They found a gun on J.L.'s person.
• "[W]hether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person."
• The Court initiated their discussion with a review of the essential law of Terry v. Ohio, "where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . . he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him."
• The police could not observe a gun or any other threatening behavior beyond the tip.
• Further, the anonymous and uncorroborated tip lacked a "sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop" per Alabama v. White.
• Thus, the Court held that there were insufficient grounds for the police to frisk the respondent.
• J. Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice, noted that the indicia of reliability was actually widening, thanks to a variety of technologies, but did not take any particular issue with the Court's reasoning.
• "An anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability . . . does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm."
Tips and Corroboration After J.L.
Factors for determining whether reasonable suspicion can be found from an informant's tip after J.L.
o 1) Whether the informant lacked "true anonymity"
o 2) Whether the informant reported contemporaneous, firsthand knowledge
o 3) Whether the informant provided detailed information about the events observed
o 4) The informant's stated motivation for reporting the information
o 5) Whether the police were able to corroborate information provided by the informant
J.L. and a Tip About Domestic Violence
Tips by anonymous informants about domestic violence and related emergencies have been found to be sufficient for a stop even without corroboration through predictive activity
United States v. Hicks
o Distinguished J.L. and declared that "police delay while attempting to verify an identity or seek corroboration of a reported emergency may prove costly to public safety and undermine the 911 system's usefulness."
J.L. and a Tip About Reckless Driving
• Different than a firearm because there are easier ways to stop the suspect
• Court said substantial government interest in effecting a stop as quickly as possible
J.L. and "Anonymity"
United States v. Heard
o A face-to-face anonymous tip is presumed to be inherently more reliable than an anonymous telephone tip because the officers receiving the information have an opportunity to observe the demeanor and perceived credibility of the informant.
Quantum of Suspicion
United States v. Cortez
o Test for determining whether reasonable suspicion exists in a given set of circumstances
• Totality of the circumstances must be taken into account
Particularized suspicion contains 2 elements
• 1) The assessment must be based upon all the circumstances
• 2) An assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.
Reasonable Suspicion Comparison to Probable Cause
• Most important difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause is that reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard of proof - a stop is permissible upon something less than the fair probability standard that defines probable cause
• Appropriate to think of reasonable suspicion as "possible cause"
United States v. Winsor
o Officers chased suspected bank robbers fleeing from bank into hotel
• 40 guest rooms but didn't know what room
• Court held search of the hotel room in which the suspects were actually found was illegal
• A search for law enforcement purposes requires probable cause and cannot be justified under Terry
Assessment of Probabilities
Courts must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.
Reasonable Suspicion of a Completed Crime: United States v. Hensley
o Court approved stops where police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony
o Relying on the "collective knowledge" doctrine, SC concluded that one department or officer could act to make a stop if another officer or department had reasonable suspicion to stop the ∆ and asked for assistance.
Relevance of the Race of the Suspect in Reasonable Suspicion
State v. Barber
o Racial incongruity, i.e., a person of any race being allegedly out of place in a particular geographic area could not be considered in the reasonable suspicion inquiry
• Some courts have found it permissible for an officer to consider the race of a person in determining whether the person's conduct is suspicious
Use of Profiles for Reasonable Suspcion
A profile is a list of characteristics compiled by a law enforcement agency, which have been found through experience to be common characteristics of those engaged in a certain type of criminal activity
United States v. Berry
o Profile is nothing more than an administrative tool of the police. The presence or absence of a particular characteristic on any particular profile is of no legal significant in the determination of reasonable suspicion
United States v. Sokolow
o DEA stopped suspect for a number of weird travel reasons
o SC any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.
Overbroad Profile Factors
Can't say someone is suspicious because from CA when you're in Arkansas
o But allowed to use as a factor
Reasonable Suspicion and Flight from the Police
Illinois v. Wardlow
o ∆ fled upon seeing caravan of police vehicles converge
o Police caught up to ∆ and found guns on him in pat-down
o SC found had reasonable suspicion for pat-down
Limited Searches for Police Protection Under the Terry Doctrine
Terry and Adams indicate that an officer can frisk a suspect, and pull out objects found on the suspect, if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the search is necessary to protect the officer or others from bodily harm during the course of an otherwise legal stop
Frisk Cannot Be Used to Search for Evidence: Minnesota v. Dickerson
o Terry frisks are justified only for protective purposes and that a search for evidence is not permitted under Terry.
o Police officer did a pat and frisk, found drugs
o SC said police officer overstepped the bounds of the strictly circumscribed for weapons allowed under Terry
Frisking Based on the Type of Crime for Which the Person Is Suspected
Note that the reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk will depend in part on the nature of the crime for which the citizen is suspected
o Thus, if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that a person is going to commit a crime of violence with a weapon, there will automatically be reasonable suspicion to frisk that person
• Courts have expanded the assumption that certain crimes are weapons-related, beyond those crimes that by definition require a weapon
Protective Searches Beyond the Suspect's Person: Michigan v. Long
o Power to search under Terry can extend to protective examinations of areas beyond the person of the suspect.
o Terry permits a limited examination of an area from which a person, who police reasonably believe is dangerous, might gain control of a weapon
Officers had a legitimate concern that Long might gain access to a weapon, and use it on the officers,
once he returned to his car after the stop was completed
Protective Searches of Persons Other Than the Suspect - Ybarra v. Illinois
o SC refused to uphold the frisk of a patron of a bar who happened to be present when the police arrived to conduct a search of the bar pursuant to a valid search warrant
Mere presence in the bar was not enough to provide reasonable believe that he posed a risk of harm to the officers
Protective Sweeps: Maryland v. Buie
o Protective Sweep
Quick and limited search of a premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others
o Protective sweep could be justified by an officer's reasonable suspicion that the area swept harbored an individual posing danger to the officer or others
Protective Sweep Other Than During an Arrest
Courts have held that the self-protective principles of Buie and Terry can permit a protective sweep even though no arrest is involved and they have reasonable suspicion to believe that a person in the area can obtain access to a weapon and use it on the officers or others, the officers are permitted to conducted a protective sweep for weapons
Investigative Techniques That Are Permissible Within the Confines of a Terry Stop
• Most Common Investigative Techniques Permitted Pursuant to a Terry Stop
o 1) Preliminary investigation of the suspect's identity
o 2) Questioning concerning the suspicious circumstances giving rise to the stop
• Courts have permitted officers to detain suspects on reasonable suspicion in order to conduct a canine sniff or to conduct a preliminary investigation of other suspicious circumstances
Criminalizing the Refusal to Provide Identification During a Terry Stop: Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada
Hiibel was stopped on reasonable suspicion involve in a domestic assault.
• Hiibel refused to provide ID
• SC upheld conviction that an officer has a right to demand ID as part of an investigation during a Terry stop
Investigation of Matters Other Than the Reasonable Suspicion That Supported the Stop: Stop After a Stop
If the reasonable suspicion supporting the stop has been cleared up, or the person has been process (e.g. traffic ticket issued), then the stop is at an end and the suspect must be released
Reasonable Suspicion as to Another Crime
If in the course of a stop to investigate crime "A", the officer obtains reasonable suspicion to investigate crime "B", then the detention can be extended to investigation crime "B" even though the initial justification for the stop no longer exists
Consensual Encounters After a Stop Has Ended: Ohio v. Robinette
o ∆ legally stopped for speeding and given verbal warning.
o When the officer returned license, officer asked if ∆ was carrying illegal contraband
o ∆ said no, officer then asked to search car, ∆ gave consent, officer found guns and drugs
o ∆ consented to search so search was good
Interrogation Beyond the Confines of Terry: Dunway v. New York
o Police cannot detain a suspect and transport him to the stationhouse for questioning without probable cause, even if the detention is not deemed to be an arrest under state law
Detention of Property Under Terry: United States v. Van Leeuwen
o SC held that some detentions of property could occur upon reasonable suspicion
o SC upheld a one-day detention without probable cause, while an investigation was conducted
Unreasonably Lengthy Detention of Property: United States v. Place
o SC noted that it is often necessary to seize property upon reasonable suspicion, while an investigation of criminal activity continues
o SC however recognized that if a person is traveling with his property, then a seizure of that property "intrudes on both the suspect's possessory interest in his luggage as well as his liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary"
o The limitations applicable to investigative detentions of the person should define the permissible scope of the person's luggage on less than probable cause
Limited Searches for Evidence by Law Enforcement Officers Under Terry: Arizona v. Hicks
o Police lawfully entered premises from which a weapon had been fired and noticed 2 sets of expensive stereo components
o Suspecting they were stolen, officer looked for serial number and matched serial number of stolen equipment
o SC rejected search
It was still a search to turn over the turntable
• PC operates as a separate limitation in it's application to the plain view doctrine
• PC distinction
• 3 guns, drug paraphernalia, expensive stereo equipment
o Suspects stereo equipment and turntable has been stolen, looks up serial numbers (moves equipment to do so), calls up district, turntable is hot, police seize turntable
• Hicks is arrested for armed robbery
• Lower courts approve suppression of stolen equipment
• Did the officer's conduct constitute a seizure?
o SC says NO
Recording of serial numbers in not a seizure
• Did the officer's conduct constitute a search?
o SC says YES
Officers by moving equipment was beyond the scope of reason entered
• SC says under certain circumstance, the police may seize, in plain view, without a warrant. These occasions occur when police see it as plain view in exception to the warrant requirement
• Only when a police officer has PC could they then invoke the plain view doctrine
• Seeing stereo equipment out of place did not amount to PC
o Moving it a few inches trivializes the 4th Amendment
Spatial Limitations: Chimel v. California
395 U.S. 752 (1969)
Brief Fact Summary
• The defendant, Chimel (the "defendant"), was arrested inside his home and police asked him for consent to search the home.
• The defendant refused the request.
• The police proceeded nonetheless, incident to the lawful arrest and searched in different rooms. The police also had the defendant's wife open various dresser drawers and remove their contents.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Incident to a lawful arrest, a search of any area beyond the arrestee's immediate control, is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution"), unless there is a clear danger that evidence may be destroyed or concealed or there is an imminent threat of harm to the arresting officers.
• Any search in an arrestee's home beyond arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
• Contemporaneous searches incident to a lawful arrest are reasonable to seize weapons as well as prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence.
• Searches beyond the scope of these justifications are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
• Why no search warrant?
o SC didn't address it
• Express Consent to search home
• Harris/Rabinowitz Rule
o Allowed search of entire house
• SC CHANGES
o Search was unreasonable because exceeds ∆'s person
o All evidence may not be used
o EXCLUSIONARY RULE
• Major decision because broaden 4th Amendment Protection
• Search incident to arrest may only be within the immediate area
o HOWEVER court did not define this or bring up potential scenarios that would be problematic
• Search and arrest must be within a small time period
• Unlawful search
Timing of Grab Area Determination
Davis v. Robbs
o Court upheld seizure of a rifle that had be in close proximity to the arrestee at the time of the arrest.
United States v. Abdul-Saboor
o Agreed with Davis that the grab areas should be determined as of the time of the arrest, not the time of the search
o Thus, an officer's search of an area after the arrestee had been taken out of the room was permissible
Arizona v. Gant
o When a person in a car is arrested, the grab areas is to be determined as of the time of the search so if at the time of the search the arrestee has been placed in the squad car, the passenger compartment of his vehicle is no longer within the grab area
United States v. Shakir (3rd Cir. 2010)
o Shakir challenged the search of the bag that he was carrying when he was arrested. Argued that at the time of the search, he was already handcuffed
o Found no plausible reason to limit Gant to vehicle searches as opposed to any situation where the item search is removed from the suspect's control between the time of the arrest and the time of the search.
o BUT upheld the search of the ∆'s bag under the arrest-power rule
Arrest Leading to Exigent Circumstances
Court requires a showing of exigency on the particular facts of the case; the arrest of a person while, while certainly relevant, is not dispositive of whether there is a risk of destruction of evidence or harm to the officers or public that would excuse the warrant exception
Vale v. Louisiana
o State had not met its burden of showing exigent circumstances existed
o The goods ultimately seized were not in the process of destruction
o Allowed to as long as there is exigency
United States v. Socey (D.C. Cir. 1998)
o We believe that an officer can show an objectively reasonable belief that contraband is being, or will be, destroyed within a home if he can show
1) A reasonable belief that third persons were inside a private dwelling and
2) A reasonable belief that these third persons are aware of an arrest of a confederate outside the premises so that they might see a need to destroy evidence.
Protective Sweep After an Arrest: Maryland v. Buie
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990)
o Protective Sweep
A quick limited search of a premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.
o Protective sweep could be justified by a reasonable suspicion that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officers or others.
Safety-based; NOT evidence-based doctrine
Sequence of a Search and Arrest
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980)
o When the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.
Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541 (1990)
o A search cannot be used to provide the PC necessary to make the arrest
o That reasoning, justifying the arrest by the search and at the same time the search by the arrest, just will not do
Searches of the Person - and Containers on the Person - Incident to Arrest
United States v. Robinson
Brief Fact Summary
• The defendant, Robinson (the "defendant"), was pulled over for driving with a revoked license.
• He was then arrested and the police officer proceeded to do a thorough search of the defendant's person whereby the officer found a closed cigarette pack which contained heroin.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Incident to a lawful arrest, even for a driving violation, a thorough search (frisk) of an arrestee's person for weapons and also to prevent the concealment or destruction of incriminating evidence is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution").
• May a police officer conduct a thorough search of a person beyond frisking for weapons when the arrestee has committed only a traffic offense?
• A search of an arrestee's person beyond frisking for weapons is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, even where there is no reason to believe the arrestee committed any crime other than the traffic violation.
• Once a person has been lawfully arrested, the police may conduct a search of the arrestee beyond frisking for weapons, in order to preserve any incriminating evidence.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
532 U.S. 318 (2001)
Brief Fact Summary
• A mother was taken into custody for violation of Texas' strict seatbelt law.
• She subsequently sued for Fourth Amendment violations.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• "The standard of probable cause 'applies to all arrests, without the need to balance the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations.'"
• "[W]hether the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine."
• The Supreme Court noted that the respondent wanted a new rule "one not necessarily requiring violent breach of the peace, but nonetheless forbidding custodial arrest, even upon probable cause, when conviction could not ultimately carry any jail time and when the government shows no compelling need for immediate detention."
• The court was unwilling to do this, noting "complications arise the moment we begin to think about the possible applications of the several criteria [the respondent] proposes for drawing a line between minor crimes with limited arrest authority and others not so restricted."
• Citing several examples, the court concluded by noting that the respondent's rule would "place police in an almost impossible spot" and "guarantee increased litigation over many of the arrests that would occur."
• Given that it would cause more troubles than it would solve, the court refused to adopt the rule, and held arrests were permissible under all circumstances of criminal actions.
• "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender."
• Cultural differences
Arrests for Minor Offenses After Atwater
Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro Area Transit Auth (D.C. Cir. 2004)
o 12 year old girl was arrested, search, and handcuffed
o Arrest was the result of WMATA's zero-tolerance policy for violations of the rule prohibiting eating on the subway.
o Not unreasonable under the 4th Amendment
Riley v. California
134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)
• Police officer stopped Riley for driving with expired registration tags. During the stop, the officer learned Riley's license had been suspended. The officer impounded the car. Another officer conducted an inventory search and found two handguns under the car's hood. Riley was arrested for possession of concealed and loaded firearms.
• In a search incident to the arrest, an officer seized a cell phone (a smart phone) from Riley's pants pocket. Upon examination of the phone, a detective found photographs and videos the detective believed linked Riley to additional crimes. Some photos were admitted into evidence at trial and the detective testified to some of the contents of Riley's phone.
• Police officer observed Brima Wurie make an apparent drug sale from a car. Officers arrested Wurie.
• At the police station, they seized two cell phones from Wurie's person, one was a flip-phone. The flip-phone received repeated calls from a caller labeled "my house." Officers opened the phone and saw a picture of a woman and a baby as the phone's wallpaper. The officers accessed the call log and determined the phone number associated with "my house."
• They traced that number to an apartment building. They went to the building and saw Wurie's name on a mailbox and observed through a window a woman resembling the woman on the phone's wallpaper. They secured the apartment, obtained a warrant, and searched the apartment, finding drugs, a firearm, ammunition, and cash
• Fourth Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause ..." Case Brief Reasonableness normally requires a warrant. Vernonia. There are specific exceptions to the warrant requirement. King.
• Trilogy of US SC cases dealing with exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches incident to arrest:
o Chimel (1969): warrantless search incident to arrest is reasonable when it is needed to protect officer safety or to preserve evidence.
o Robinson (1973) & Chadwick (1977): warrantless search incident to arrest is reasonable if it is limited to personal property immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.
o Gant (2009): Chimel could authorize police to search an arrestee's vehicle's passenger compartment only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search and when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle
• Balancing of interests: intrusion on individual's privacy and need to promote legitimate governmental interests. Houghton (1999).
• Police must get a warrant before searching a cell phone seized incident to arrest. Reversing Riley and affirming Brima Wurie.
• The United States and California focus primarily on preventing the destruction of evidence as the legitimate governmental interest.
• However, officers could have seized and secured cell phones to prevent destruction of evidence.
• The governments' argument that information on a cell phone may be vulnerable to destruction (via "remote wiping" and "data encryption") is not convincing as there is little evidence that this is a prevalent problem. "Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person."
• "[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house..."
• Privacy comes at a cost.
The Belton Rule
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
o SC held that the passenger compartment of an automobile constituted the grab area of the car, and therefore officers arresting someone in the car were permitted to search the car incident to arrest, and also open any containers that are found in the passenger compartment (other than the trunk)
• Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 614 (2004)
o SC held that the search power granted by Belton applied whenever the person arrested was a recent occupant of the car to be searched.
o ∆ was stopped a few feet from car subjected to Terry frisk, which uncovered narcotics. Officers searched passenger compartment of car and found gun
o SC held that search was permissible because Thornton was recent occupant and any other rule would only encourage drivers to pop out of a car when they saw police coming, in order to avoid a search of the passenger compartment
Limitations on Arrest-Power Rule as Applied to Automobile Searches: Arizona v. Gant
• May a police officer properly search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and its contents as a warrantless search incident to arrest if the arrestees are secured and cannot possibly reach any of the contents of the vehicle?
• No, the police are authorized to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.
• Police received an anonymous tip that a certain house was being used to sell drugs
• Officers went to the house, and Gant answered the door and provided ID. Officers later found that Gant's DL had been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest
• Officers returned later that day and when Gant drove up, he exited the vehicle and the officers arrested him away from his car and put into a patrol car
• Officers then searched Gant's car and found a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backset
• Robinson: The exception to the warrant requirement of a search incident to arrest derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations
• Chimel: A search incident to arrest may only include the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control
• Belton: When an officer lawfully arrests the occupant of a vehicle, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the vehicle and any containers therein
• Belton reading too broad:
o Belton does not authorize an officer to search a vehicle incident to arrest under all circumstances including when the arrestee is secured and poses no threat
• Police are authorized to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search
o When it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle, a search incident to arrest of the vehicle is justified
• Does not apply for arrest for traffic violations
• Gant's search unreasonable:
o Because Gant could not have accessed his car at the time of the search, the search was unreasonable
o Unreasonable search under those circumstances
• Gant essentially limits Belton to its facts, i.e., when an arrestee is unsecured and could possibly reach into the vehicle at the time of arrest.
• Practitioners, you will want to cite Gant for vehicle searches incident to a lawful arrest. This case significantly changes the game when it comes to vehicle searches, so chances are courts and other attorneys will still be citing Belton. Be sure to avoid this legal anachronism.
• However, just because Gant severely limits searches incident to arrest of vehicles, that does not necessarily mean that significantly more suppression motions will be granted. The "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule will probably prevent suppression in many cases (based on inevitable execution of an inventory search).
The Arrest Power Rule Where No Custodial Arrest Takes Place
o SC established bright-line rule permitting full-blown searches when a person has been subjected to a custodial arrest
o Allows a search of a passenger compartment upon arrest if the occupant has access at the time of search or if there "reason to believe" that evidence pertinent to the crime is located there.
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)
o SC held that the arrest-power rule is limited to situations in which the person is subjected to a custodial arrest.
o The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest.
o The threat of destruction of evidence of a traffic stop was nonexistent
The police may search an automobile without a warrant, so long as the have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminal activity
The Carroll Doctrine: Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
o ∆s pulled over in bootlegging area
o Officers knew the men had been previously involved in transporting liquor
o ∆s car was searched without warrant
o SC found search to be constitutional
o Major contention was not PC but whether a warrant was required
Warrant could not reasonably have been demanded in light of mobility of vehicle
Chambers v. Maroney
399 U.S. 42 (1970)
Brief Fact Summary
• A robbery suspect was arrested while riding in a car. The car was taken to the police station, searched, and yielded incriminating evidence.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• "For constitutional purposes [there is] no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant."
• Whether evidence "seized from an automobile, in which petitioner was riding at the time of his arrest, after the automobile was taken to a police station and was there thoroughly searched without a warrant" is admissible.
• The court first referenced the Carroll case, which held that "if an effective search [of a car] is to be made at any time, either the search must be made immediately without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without a warrant" until a warrant is obtained.
• The court pointed out that probable clause applied in either circumstance, and so "there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained." Generally, the court held, the level of intrusion under the Fourth Amendment, immediate search vs. seizure in anticipation of a warrant, "may depend on a variety of circumstances."
The Diminished Expectation of Privacy Rationale: California v. Carney
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
o SC re-evaluated the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and concluded that the reasons for the less rigourous vehicle exception are 2-fold
1) Element of mobility
2) Expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996)
o SC reaffirmed that exigent circumstance are not required to justify the warrantless search of an automobile
o SC upheld the warrantles searches of 2 cars where the police had probable cause to believe that each contained drugs.
o Did not matter that there was no risk of destruction at the time the searches were conducted
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999)
o SC stated the automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement and that the PC finding alone satisfies the automobile exception to the 4th Amendment's warrant requirement
• The Court declined to distinguish between worthy and unworthy vehicles which are either on the public roads or highways or situated such that it is reasonable to conclude that the vehicle is not being used as a residence
• Some factors might be relevant in determining whether a warrant would be required
o Connected to Utilities
o Convenient Access to a Public Road
Mobile Containers in the Car: California v. Acevedo
Brief Fact Summary
• The defendant, Charles Acevedo ("Mr. Acevedo"), put a container in his trunk that the police suspected contained marijuana.
• The police stopped the defendant and searched the container, leading to the defendant's arrest.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution") does not require a warrant when probable cause exists to search a container in a vehicle.
• Whether the police are required to obtain a warrant to search a container in a car - a car that they otherwise lack probable cause to search?
• The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution does not require a warrant to search a container in a vehicle if there is probable cause to search the container.
• This holding applies even if there is no probable cause to search the entire vehicle.
• This holding clearly negates any former rulings that would give separate treatment to searches specifically for containers in a vehicle.
• The majority's decision makes an attempt to simplify the prior conflicting decisions and reduce illogical outcomes.
• As the concurring opinion points out, there is still room for illogical outcomes, such as allowing searching of a suitcase once it enters an automobile, but not allowing the same suitcase to be searched while being carried on the street.
Search of Passenger's Property: Wyoming v. Houghton
Brief Fact Summary
• The driver of car stopped by police had a syringe in his pocket which he admitted was his. The police then searched the car, finding a purse which the respondent passenger claimed was hers that held two containers, both containing methamphetamine.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for police officers to examine packages and containers inside without an individualized showing of probable cause for each one.
• Yes. Reverse the judgment of the Wyoming Supreme Court.
• Police officers with probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a car for contraband are still in compliance with the Fourth Amendment if they search a passenger's belongings capable of concealing contraband.
• The precedent case, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), holding that probable cause to search a vehicle that has been stopped validly justifies a search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the subject of the search, makes no distinction among containers and packages based on ownership.
• Since a passenger's privacy expectations are diminished, and governmental interests at stake are large, the balancing of Fourth Amendment interests leans toward allowing searches of passengers' belongings.
• The Supreme Court clearly viewed the Wyoming Supreme Court's "notice of ownership" test as not providing clear guidelines to law enforcement, and as putting them in a position where they had to make difficult decisions as to which container belonged to which person. The ability to easily conceal contraband in someone else's container was a central part of this case having the result it did. A rule contrary to the result in this case likely would have resulted in encouraging efforts by search subjects to conceal contraband, and this was something the Supreme Court was looking to avoid.
PRETEXTUAL STOPS AND ARRESTS
Pretextual stop is a valid stop for an improper reason
o Police Stop on PC or reasonable suspicion as a device or method to search for an unrelated offense in which PC is lacking
o Ex: police stopped for minor traffic violations
o Evidence obtained in pretext stop is inadmissible
Motorist leaves known drug area and enters the highway, police officer follows driver for 20 miles, sees motorist change lanes without signaling
Was the traffic stop a mere pretext? If so, is the stop and search invalid?
• Suppression of evidence because purpose was to find narcotics
• Based on traffic violation so not invalidated
• Might not because depends on officer's subjective state of mind and looks to usual police practices
3 Schools of Thought to Pretext Stops
• Unreasonable if search is invalid regardless
Leads to lots of variation
Validity of Stop of violation
• Whether an officer could have made stop without any pretext
Reasonable officer would have stopped the vehicle for a minor traffic violation
Standard is subjective because requires court to determine what police practice is
Hine v. NC
• As long as the ignorance of the law of the police officer was reasonable, there will not be a 4th Amendment violation
• 8-1 Decision
o If an officer pulls over a car based on a reasonable but mistaken belief that the motorist was pulled over
o To be reasonable is not to be perfect
o Fair leeway in the community's protection
o Mistake was reasonable
• If no case law, mistake can be considered reasonable
Wisconsin v. Richard
• Wisconsin supreme court
• Police officer was ignorant of law in 2 ways
o 1) Thought needed a front license plate
o 2) Thought air freshener was illegal hanging
• Pulled over, found marijuana
• Court found reasonable mistake of law
• In officer's experience, drug users use air fresheners to mask drugs
Horton v. California
496 U.S. 128 (1990)
• 3 Part Test for Plain View Doctrine All together
o Discovering officer be lawfully present when the evidence is in plain view
o Objects incriminating character must be immediately apparent/readily viewable
o Officer has to have lawful right of access to the object itself
Exigent Circumstances Generally
• Exigent circumstance cases concern fact-specific situations in which the state must show that immediate action was reasonably necessary to prevent flight, or to safeguard the police or public, or to protect against the loss of evidence
• EC Exception excuses the officer from having to obtain a magistrate's determination that PC exists; it does NOT permit a search in the absence of PC
• The officer must have PC to search, PC to believe that the persons or items to be searched or seized might be gone, or that some other danger would arise, before a warrant could be obtained
• Refers specifically to a law enforcement officer is allowed to enter without a warrant for constitutional rights
Hot Pursuit will excuse an arrest warrant where one would otherwise be required, and it will also excuse a search warrant where a search of an area is conducted in order to find and apprehend the suspect
o Unreasonable to have officers stop in middle of chase to get warrant
• Active pursuit
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
o SC rejected the mere evidence limitation on searches and seizures
o Fact that officers found clothing as opposed to weapons in the washing machine was not problematic, because the officers had the right, in these emergency circumstances, to search the washing machine to look for weapons, and thus the seizure of the clothing was permissible under the plain view doctrine
• Hot Pursuit does NOT apply where the suspect is unaware that he is being pursued by police officers
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)
o If the hot pursuit doctrine were determined only by how expeditiously the police were pursuing the suspect, then it would exist in virtually every case.
• United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)
o SC held that the police officers were permitted to follow Santana into her house under the doctrine of hot pursuit.
o SC noted that the hot pursuit doctrine serves to ensure that a suspect ma not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place by the expedient of escaping into a private place.
The fact that the pursuit here ended almost as soon as it began did not render it any the less a hot pursuit sufficient to justify the warrantless entry
Police and Public Safety
A warrant is excused if the delay in obtaining it would result in a significant risk of harm to the police or to members of the public
• Police and public safety are going to qualify
Drawing Blood in a DUI Arrest to Prevent the Loss of Evidence
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
o SC upheld warrantless blood test of an individual arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol because the officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence
o Because of the disappearing nature of alcohol in the blood stream represents an emergency type situation makes it appropriate to draw blood without a search warrant incident to an arrest
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)
o SC held that exigency must be established case-by-case based on the totality of the circumstances
o Totality of the Circumstance Exigency Analysis
If it would significantly undermine the legitimacy of a case
o Need reasonable suspicion to stop car
The question presented was whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presented a per se exigency that justified an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases. The Court held that it did not. While the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, it did not do so categorically.
911 Calls and Public Safety: United States v. Martinez
o Procedural Posture
The court granted a rehearing in banc to consider whether the state's warrantless entry that led to the arrest and conviction of defendant was lawful pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of U.S. Const. amend. IV, and if so, whether law enforcement agents improperly created the exigent circumstances.
Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C.S. § 2, and use of a firearm in connection with narcotics trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 924(c), 2. A divided panel of the court concluded that the trial court erred when it found that a warrantless entry by law enforcement agents into an apartment was justified on the basis of the exigent circumstances exception to the U.S. Const. amend. IV warrant requirement. The court granted a rehearing in banc to determine whether the warrantless entry was lawful due to exigent circumstances, and if so, whether law enforcement agents improperly created the exigent circumstances. The court vacated the decision of the original panel and affirmed the conviction. The court held that exigent circumstances existed because an undercover officer had witnessed drug trafficking between men with loaded, semi-automatic weapons. The court held that the officers did not create the exigent circumstances because they properly knocked on the door before entering and had attempted a peaceful entry.
Dorman Factors => Justifies Warrantless Entry
1) The gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged
2) Whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed
3) A clear showing of PC to believe that the suspect committed the crime
Impermissibly Created Exigency
Kentucky v. King
In some cases suspects are alerted to the presence of police activity, and at that point there is little dispute about the risk of destruction of evidence or other danger when the officers make an entry
• The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed respondent's drug conviction, holding that exigent circumstances could not justify the officers' search under the Fourth Amendment because it was reasonably foreseeable that the occupants in the apartment would destroy evidence when the police knocked on the door and announced their presence. Petitioner State of Kentucky's petition for certiorari was granted.
• The exigent circumstances rule justified a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency was reasonable.
• The exigent circumstances rule applied when the police did not gain entry by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.
• One officer testified without contradiction that the officers banged on the door as loud as they could and announced either "Police, police, police" or "This is the police."
• There was no evidence they either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so prior to the point when they entered the apartment.
• There was no evidence of a "demand" of any sort, much less a demand that amounted to a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment.
• Any contradictory evidence not brought to the Supreme Court's attention was for the state court to address on remand.
• As the officer testified, noises inside the apartment then led the officers to believe that drug-related evidence was about to be destroyed, and, at that point they explained they were going to make entry.
• Given that the announcement was made after the exigency arose, it could not have created the exigency.
Seizing Premises in the Absence of Exigent Circumstances
Illinois v. McArthur
Brief Fact Summary
• The police refused to allow an individual to enter his home after being informed by his wife that there was dope in the home.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• The restriction at issue was reasonable, and hence lawful based on various circumstances including the fact that the police officers had probable cause to believe that the home contained contraband, the contraband could have been destroyed, and the restraint was "both limited and tailored reasonably to secure law enforcement needs while protecting privacy interests."
• Whether the police violated an individual's rights when they refused to allow him to enter his home for two hours so as to obtain a search warrant?
• No. The court began by observing that there are certain situations where a warrant is not required. "When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable."
• The search here was reasonable for four reasons.
First, "the police had probable cause to believe that [Mr.] McArthur's trailer home contained evidence of a crime and contraband, namely, unlawful drugs."
Second, "the police had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, Mr. McArthur would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant.
Third, "the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy."
Finally, "the police imposed the restraint for a limited period of time, namely, two hours."
Individual Stops Without Suspicion: Delaware v. Prouse
o SC held that an officer could not, in the absence of a reasonable suspicion, stop an automobile and detain the driver in order to check his license and registration
o An ad hoc stop was not a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion and that there were other, better ways to effectuate the state interest in vehicle registration and safety, such as yearly inspections.
It was not foreclosing as one possible alternative the "questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops."
o Single stop of particular motorist and whether this stop was reasonable under the 4th Amendment
o Can't specifically target
o Balancing Test Objective
Intrusion of 4th Amendment Rights
o Here, officer lacked reasonable suspicion
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
o SC approved suspicionless stops at permanent checkpoints removed from the border.
o SC emphasized that suspicionless stops were necessary to implement the state interest in regulating the flow of illegal aliens, and noted that the fixed checkpoint was minimally intrusive.
o Border checkpoints
Constitutional because fixed checkpoint
o Designed to limit flow of illegal aliens SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST
o Intrusion is Limited
Limited in scope
Motorists knew in location about fixed border checkpoints
o Directed Power Under Guidelines
Because guidelines, less likely to result in overuse of power
o Falls outside particular suspicion because does not deal with homes
o BP agents allowed to look in, ask for ID, etc
Temporary Checkpoints to Check for DUI
Petitioners set up programs for sobriety checkpoints, and respondents, all licensed drivers, challenged the constitutionality. Respondents argued that the analysis had to proceed from a basis of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and there must be some governmental need beyond the normal need before a balancing analysis was appropriate. On review the court found that a three prong test was appropriate, balancing the state's grave and legitimate interest in curbing drunk driving; the checkpoints were generally effective, and the subjective intrusion on individual liberties was not substantial. The court found that a seizure occurred when a vehicle was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint. However, the court held that such stops were reasonable considering the increasing number of alcohol-related deaths and mutilation on the nation's roads. The State program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who were briefly stopped weighed in favor of the State program.
The judgment finding that the State's sobriety checkpoints were unconstitutional was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion because the proper analysis was a three prong test balancing the state's grave interest in curbing drunk driving, the effectiveness of the stops, and the insubstantial subjective intrusion on individual
o 2 Different Tests
• Emergency Circumstances
o Exceptional Circumstances
o Analyzed in the specific factual circumstances
Only going to apply when:
• 1) Specific special need exists
• 2) If exists, court determine whether special needs make warrant impracticable
• Must be beyond normal law enforcement and then warrant or PC is impractical
• No special need beyond criminal law enforcement
• COURT REJECTS THIS ARGUMENT
Reasonably Balancing Approach
• Relies on Terry precedent to approve suspicionless test for temporary
• Brown v. Texas Balancing Test Analysis
• Court recognizes that state has legitimate interest in preventing drunk driving
• Checkpoint program only proposes slight intrusion on motorists
• Court looks to see how effective
o 1/126 is still sufficient
• Should be upheld as constitutional
o Dissent argues checkpoint are not known
• What Roadblocks Need
o Minimal Intrusion,
o All or nothing approach (all vehicles stopped),
o Public Interest
Drug Checkpoints: City of Indianapolis v. Edmond
Brief Fact Summary
• Indianapolis set up a series of checkpoints to intercept drugs. Two motorists sued.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Police must have the "usual requirement of individualized suspicion where [they] seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes."
• The City of Indianapolis instituted a series of traffic checkpoints. At each checkpoint location, the police stopped a predetermined number of vehicles, an officer approached the vehicle, advised the driver to produce a license and registration, and watched for signs of impairment and conducts an open-view examination of the vehicle.
• They could only do so with consent. A narcotics officer walked around the car with a dog. The whole stop was to be only two or three minutes.
• Whether "a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics" is constitutional.
• First, the court reaffirmed that "a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of Fourth Amendment."
• The court also noted that it had "never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." In response to Indianapolis' assertion that the checkpoints "had the same ultimate purpose of arresting those suspected of committing crimes," the Court held that "there would be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of the American life."
• The Court also dismissed Indianapolis' assertion that the drug problem was a social harm of the "first magnitude," instead, opting to consider "the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to the particular law enforcement practices as issue."
• "We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime."
• Checkpoints were very visible, planned far in advance
• Primary purpose is the real issue
o Narcotics Dog isn't even relevant
o Fear of illegal aliens
o Getting drunk drivers off the road
• Gravity of threat alone cannot be dispositive of checkpoint
• Court needed to draw a line to have officers roadblock anything
4 Types of Checkpoints
• Roadblock is quick
• Gives police opportunity to check tags, licenses, peer for plain view
• Can't search car
o Need PC unless exigent circumstances
o US Border
Can search you and belongings without PC or search warrant
Anytime you cross border, you're consenting to search
Reasonable suspicion can allow body searches
o Drug Checkpoints
o TSA Checkpoints
Part of Homeland Security and allowed to search you and belongings
DNA Testing: Maryland v. King
• The case was heard before the Supreme Court in February 2013, and a verdict was released four months later, in June 2013. Dr. Steven D. Schwinn's article titled "Fourth Amendment," published by the American Bar Association, best gives a full detailed progression of the case. Alonzo Jay King Jr. was arrested for first- and second-degree assault. As according to Maryland police protocol, the Maryland DNA Collection Act, a DNA sample was taken from King at the time of the arrest and entered into Maryland's database. It was matched to an unsolved rape case in 2003.
• A Maryland officer presented the evidence to a Wicomico County grand jury, which called for an indictment, procured a warrant to obtain a second buccal DNA sample that could be used as incriminating evidence for the 2003 rape case.
• King filed a motion to suppress the DNA evidence, stating that it infringed upon his Fourth Amendment rights, which prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. His motion was denied, and King pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape and appealed the ruling. The Maryland Court of Appeals then reversed the original ruling, agreeing that the DNA sampling was a violation of the Fourth Amendment and could not be used as evidence.
• The State of Maryland then appealed the ruling and called for the case to be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
• The decision was close, 5-4 in favor of Maryland. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, filed a scathing dissenting opinion. The justices maintained that "categorically" and "without exception," "The Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for evidence of a crime when there is no basis for believing the person is guilty of the crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence" (133 S.Ct. at 1980). Some Supreme Court cases seem to contradict the claim.
• The dissent also warned that "because of today's decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason" (133 S. Ct. at 1999).
• Justice Scalia took the rare step of reading his dissent from the bench, "signaling deep disagreement" on the Court.
• Maryland v. King presented competing issues regarding social ethics and the law. The case deals with the issue of consent, because King did not give consent to a cheek swab that led to his DNA being entered into the Maryland CODIS database. However, King did not find that to be an issue until after his arrest for a rape that took place nearly a decade earlier, predicated on the fact that his DNA matched DNA acquired from the original rape victim. Regardless of how the evidence was obtained, King was considered a danger to society because of his association with a prior violent crime.
• Trial court allows evidence in
• Maryland law in place did not violate the 4th Amendment
o Maryland's DNA Collection Act
• Issue is technological advances
o Court acknowledges DNA testing is widespread
Although those statutes vary in their particulars the case implicates more than just Maryland law
Broad overarching decision generally
o Argue not invasive check swab
No surgical intrusion
o Analogize DNA Sample to Identification Process
Part of the normal routine
Fingerprints, photographs, etc
5 Reasons Why DNA Plays Critical Role in Removing Someone When PC
o ***Arrestee Identification
o Facility/Inmate Safety
o Availability for Trial
o Public Safety
o ***Exoneration of Others
o Nothing more that 21st Century Fingerprinting
Scalia says not necessary aspect of ID
Specifically couldn't process it under the act
Moot because only a matter of time when DNA identification will be fast
o DNA testing would speed up apprehension but would also help in the protection of innocent people
• 311 people
• 18 sentenced were death
• Average time served 13.5 years
• 70% of color
Irony is that people of color are arrested more often
• A consent search occurs when a person
• Assessing Voluntariness
o Voluntariness is based on the totalilty of circumstances
o The prosecutor must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was voluntary
Force, Threats of Force, and Other Threasts
• Consent to search given in submission to force, threat of force, or other show of authority is not volunatary
• Depsite the coercive nature of an initial confrontation, an officer may still obtain a valid consent to search if the consent
Voluntariness Distinguished from Waiver: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
o SC held the subject's knowledge or a right to refuse is not a requirement to establishing a voluntary search
o What if an undercover officer is invited into a home being used to distribute narcotics?
o What happens when a third party gives consent?
o Procedural Posture
Petitioner sought certiorari to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which vacated an order that denied a writ of habeas corpus to respondent and that remanded the case for further proceedings.
The court of appeals held that consent to a search could not be found solely from the absence of coercion and a verbal expression of assent.
Respondent was brought to trial on a charge of possessing a check with intent to defraud. Respondent moved to suppress the introduction of certain material as evidence against him on the ground that the material had been acquired through a warrantless search and seizure that were unconstitutional.
The court of appeals vacated an order that denied the petition for habeas corpus relief on grounds that there was insufficient proof that respondent knew that he had a right to refuse to give his consent to the search.
The Court disagreed that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent was a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating "voluntary" consent.
Rather, the Court held that individual consent could only be ascertained by analyzing all of the circumstances.
The traditional definition of voluntariness, which the Court adhered to, did not require proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search.
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