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Criminal Procedure: Investigation

Terms in this set (201)

Brief Fact Summary
• The Appellant, Gary Duncan (Appellant), was convicted of simple battery, a misdemeanor, in a Louisiana district court. Under Louisiana law, jury trials are not granted in misdemeanor cases. The Appellant claimed the state's denial of trial by jury violated the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees a right of trial by jury in all criminal cases.

Facts
• In 1966, the Appellant was driving his car when he saw his two younger black cousins on the side of the road with four white boys. The Appellant's cousins had recently transferred to another school with reported racial problems. The Appellant stopped the car and got out to approach the six boys. A discussion ensued and the Appellant and his cousins decided to get back into the car and leave. Prior to getting into the car, a white boy testified that the Appellant slapped his elbow. The Appellant stated that he merely touched the boy on the elbow. The Appellant was charged with simple battery and requested a trial by jury. His request was denied. The trial judge concluded the elements of simple battery were proven by the state and found the Appellant guilty of the crime.
• The Appellant sought review in the Louisiana Supreme Court, claiming the state's denial of trial by jury was a violation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied review.

Issue
• Does a state law granting a jury trial only in cases where the penalty is capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor violate the Constitution?

Held
• Yes.
• The Constitution was violated when Appellant's demand for jury trial was refused. Justice Byron White (J. White) delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). Trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice because it works to prevent governmental oppression. Right of trial by jury in serious criminal cases works as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement and qualifies for protection under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the constitution. There has been debate over whether laymen can determine the facts in civil and criminal proceedings. Critics express a concern that juries are incapable of properly understanding evidence or determining issues of fact. However, juries do understand the evidence and come to sound conclusions in most cases presented to them. We are not suggesting that every criminal trial held before a judge is unfair or that a defendant may never be treated fairly by a judge. The purpose of a right to jury trial is to reduce the possibility of judicial or prosecutorial unfairness.

Dissent
• Justice John M. Harlan (J. Harlan) and Justice Potter Stewart (J. Stewart) dissenting. There are a wide range of opinions concerning the desirability of trial by jury. Among the considerations pertaining to local conditions are the size of the criminal caseload, the difficulty in obtaining jurors and other circumstances bearing on the fairness of the trial. Each state should have the right to experiment with criminal procedure in the court system. The Supreme Court, other courts and the political process exist to correct any experiments in criminal procedure that prove fundamentally unfair to individuals.

Discussion
• Trial by jury is an integral part of the criminal system. It is necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges and against judges who are too responsive to higher authority. Trial by jury is also a safeguard against overzealous prosecutors.
Brief Fact Summary
• The petitioner, Teague (the "petitioner") was convicted in an Illinois state court of attempted murder and other offenses. The prosecutor used all ten of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury. The petitioner twice unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial arguing that he was entitled to a jury of his peers.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• An individual may not seek to enforce a new rule of law in federal habeas corpus proceedings if the new rule was announced after the petitioner's conviction became final, or if the petitioner is seeking to establish a wholly new rule or to apply a settled precedent in a novel way that would result in the creation of a new rule.

Facts
• The petitioner, a black man, was convicted in an Illinois state court for three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery by an all white jury. During jury selection, the prosecutor used all ten of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. The petitioner's attorney used one of his ten challenges to exclude a black woman married to a police officer. The petitioner's attorney moved for a mistrial after six blacks were struck, but the trial court denied the motion. Teague again moved for a mistrial after an additional four blacks were struck. The prosecutor defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve a balance of men and women on the jury. The trial court again denied the motion.
• The petitioner appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court which rejected his claim that the challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury representative of the community. The petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in United States District Court ("District Court") again arguing the fair cross section claim, and arguing that under Swain v. Alabama, a prosecutor could be questioned about his use of peremptory challenges once he volunteered an explanation. The District Court denied the Petitioner's petition, but a panel of the Court of Appeals agreed that the fair cross section requirement applied to a petit jury, and held that there was a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court of Appeals voted to rehear the case, but postponed it until a decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which overruled a portion of Swain. After Batson was decided, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioner could not benefit from the rule retroactively, that his Swain claim was procedurally barred, and the fair cross section claim was limited to jury venire.

Issue
• Is the petitioner prevented from benefiting from the rule in Batson since his conviction became final before Batson was decided?
• Is the petitioner procedurally barred from raising the Equal Protection Clause claim under Swain since he did not raise the claim at trial or on direct appeal?

Held
• Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ("J. O'Connor") delivered the opinion of the Court in regards to Parts I, II, and III.
• The Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") held that the Petitioner was procedurally barred from benefiting from the Batson rule since his conviction was final before Batson was decided.
• Also, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner is barred from raising a claim that he has established a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under Swain because he did not raise the Swain claim at trial or on direct appeal.

Discussion
• The Supreme Court decided that an individual may not seek to enforce a new rule of law in federal habeas corpus proceedings if the new rule was announced after the individual's conviction became final, or if the individual is seeking to establish a wholly new rule or to apply a settled precedent in a novel way that would result in the creation of a new rule.
• The Supreme Court identified two exceptions:
o (1) rules prohibiting punishment for "private, primary individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe"; and
o (2) rules that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
Brief Fact Summary
• The petitioner, Katz (the "petitioner"), was convicted of transmitting wagering information over telephone lines in violation of federal law. The government had entered into evidence the petitioner's end of telephone conversations that the government had obtained by placing a listening device to the phone booth that the petitioner used. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner's contention that the evidence should be suppressed.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution"), against unreasonable searches and seizures, follows the person and not the place.

Facts
• The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to the top of the telephone booth and recorded the petitioner's end of the telephone conversations which was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.

Issue
• Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone conversations conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a person?

Held
• Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area.
• However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from unreasonable intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his person.
• Not blocking out intruding eye, but the overhearing ear
2 Prong Test
o A person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and
o That the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable"
• Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self from public view when he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to a place where he could be seen. A person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the words he utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches and seizures.
• The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's telephone conversations constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.

Dissent
• Justice Hugo Black ("J. Black") filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black observed that eavesdropping was an ancient practice that the Framers were certainly aware of when they drafted the United States Constitution ("Constitution"). Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution they would have added such language that would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations.
Dangerous to give courts this ultimate power

Concurrence
• Justice John Harlan ("J. Harlan") filed a dissenting opinion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to those people. First, that a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a telephone booth shuts the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted. On the other hand, conversations out in the open public would not be protected against being overheard as the expectation of privacy would not be reasonable.

Discussion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides constitutional protection to individuals and not to particular places. The two-part test for this protection is introduced by J. Harlan. First, the person must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must be reasonable.
• Uncovers information about heat source
o Not in of itself illegal
• So rarely used that the public wouldn't think that type of device would be used
o Focus on rarity of thermal technology
Brief Fact Summary
• The police obtained evidence of a marijuana growing operation inside the defendant, Kyllo's (the "defendant") home, by using a thermal imaging device from outside the home. The police used the device to gather evidence to support issuance of a search warrant for the home.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• The use of a device by the government, which is not generally used by the public, to obtain evidence from inside a home is a presumptively unreasonable search without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution").

Facts
• Upon suspicion that the defendant was growing marijuana in his home, police used a thermal-imaging device to detect heat radiating from the defendant's home. With this information, police obtained a search warrant for the home.

Issue
• Does the use of a device by the government to obtain evidence from a constitutionally protected area without physical intrusion constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution?

Held
• Where police obtain information about the inside of a home without physical intrusion, using a device not normally used by the public, the police action constitutes a Fourth Amendment search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.

Discussion
• The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and their property from unreasonable searches by the government. The home is one place where society deems an expectation of privacy reasonable. In order to preserve this degree of privacy, government searches under these circumstances must be supported by a warrant.
• The Fourth Amendment protections are not conditional upon the quality of information obtained by the government. So long as there is a subjective expectation of privacy and society is willing to recognize this expectation as reasonable, the government must obtain a warrant before conducting a search.

• Kyllo puts an end to the law enforcement use of thermal imaging devices to scan homes
• Such a scan would be a search, and searches require PC
• If an officer has PC to do thermal can, the he has no need for the thermal imaging scan
o He just gets a warrant
Brief Fact Summary
• Based on a tip from a confidential informant that the smell of opium was emanating from the defendant's hotel room, a Seattle narcotics detective and a group of federal agents entered without a warrant and proceeded to search the room.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• "When the right of privacy [protected by the Fourth Amendment] must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent" unless "there are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with."
• "An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his office and of the law which he personifies must then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion."

Facts
• Based on the information of a confidential informant and drug user, a Seattle detective went to the Europe Hotel. The confidential informant stated he could smell opium in the hallway.
• The detective contacted and returned to the hotel with four federal narcotics agents.
• They too, smelled opium, and followed it to the defendant's room.
• They did not know who was in the room. When a voice inside asked who was at the door, the detective identified himself. After a period of time, during which noises could be heard from inside the room, the door opened and the defendant appeared. The detective said they wanted to speak to her, and that she allowed them to enter. He then told her: "I want you to consider yourself under arrest because we are going to search the room." They found opium and a recently used smoking device.

Issue.
• "[W]hether it was lawful, without a warrant of any kind, to arrest petitioner and to search her living quarters."

Held
• No. "At the time entry was demanded the officers were possessed of evidence which a magistrate might have found to be probable cause for issuing a search warrant," specifically, the odor of opium coming from the room and the informant's testimony.
• The Fourth Amendment's "protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." While there are certain circumstances "in which a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with," they were not present here.
• Moreover, much of the grounds of the arrest are "not on the informer's tip and the smell the officers recognized before entry, but on the knowledge that she was alone in the room, gained only after, and wholly by reason of, their entry of her home.
• It was therefore their observations inside of her quarters, after they had obtained admission under color of their police authority, on which they made the arrest." Police officers must "have [a] valid basis in law" for the entry into private homes.

Dissent
• Four justices dissented, but did not write an opinion.

Discussion
• "The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance."
• Sufficient cause, but what would have happened if they waited for a search warrant?
o Evidence would have been discarded
Brief Fact Summary
• Defendant was operating an illegal gambling outfit. The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") obtained a search warrant on the basis of observing the defendant, Spinelli (the "defendant") traveling to and from an apartment, and information supplied by a confidential informant.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• An affidavit used to support the issuance of a search warrant must set forth sufficient underlying circumstances which would cause a magistrate to judge the informant's information independently and support a finding that the informant is "reliable/credible".

Facts
• The defendant was traveling between Illinois and Missouri to conduct an illegal gambling operation in Missouri. The FBI observed the defendant traveling across state lines and going to and from a specific residence. The FBI also received information from an informant that the defendant was accepting wagers and operating a handbook by means of a telephone.

Issue
• If an informer's tip is necessary to support a finding of probable cause, does there have to be independent information to corroborate the information?

Held
• An informant's tip must include underlying statements which describe the circumstances which give rise to the assertions.
• Bold assertions that a defendant is engaging in illegal behavior is insufficient by itself to support a finding of probable cause.

Discussion
• An informant must explain why the information is reliable if the informant came upon the information indirectly.
• In order to issue a warrant, a magistrate must rely upon detailed criminal activities, which are more substantial than mere allegations of wrongdoing.
• Affidavit failed to set for the underlying circumstances that would be necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge of the validity of the informant's conclusion that the narcotics were where they said they were

2 Pronged Test
o 1) Underlying Circumstances
o 2) Credible and Reliable
• Majority accepts the following propositions
o A police officer is presumed to be honest when making an affidavit
o What may be questioned, however, is the source of the officer's information
o If the officer avers that she has first-hand knowledge of the facts used to demonstrate probable cause, the only question is whether the sworn facts are sufficient to meet the threshold
o If the officer is relying on someone else for part or all of the information, then it is necessary to make three additional determinations
• Who is the source and is it reliable?
• What are the bases and details of the source's knowledge?
• Are the facts either standing alone or taken together with other facts provided by the affiant, sufficient to satisfy the proof threshold, probable cause?
o If the source is not know to be reliable, the police may demonstrate reliability by corroborating the details provided by the informant
o If the informant's basis of information is unclear, it may be sufficient that the information is so detailed that it could only have come from the informant's personal observation
o If the information by the informant falls short of demonstrating probable cause, the police can gather other information to be included in the application for a warrant
o When the magistrate looks at all the information provided to assess whether probable cause is shown, she is to take a common sense approach to the application and ask whether the gov't has shown "the probability" of criminal acitivity

Spinelli only addresses warrant applications in which the police rely on:
o 1) Tipsters who operate as paid informants
o 2) Anonymous informants
• Is it court's duty to separate 2 prongs or whether it was totality of circumstances
Brief Fact Summary
• The police received an anonymous letter outlining specific details about the Defendants, Gates and others (the "defendants"), plans to traffic drugs from Florida to Illinois. When the details were corroborated by the defendants' actions, police obtained a search warrant and found drugs, weapons and other contraband in the defendants' home and automobile.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Where an anonymous tip is corroborated with actual police findings, a "totality of the circumstances" approach is an appropriate way of determining probable cause instead of using the two-pronged test of "veracity/reliability" and "basis of knowledge" from Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution") requires no more than a finding by an issuing magistrate that there is a "substantial basis" that a search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing.

Facts
• The police received a highly detailed anonymous tip that the defendants were trafficking drugs. The police, following up on the tip, observed the defendants conducting specific activities which were outlined in the tip. On the basis of the tip and the defendants' corroborating activities, the police obtained a search warrant. Upon execution of the warrant, the police found drugs, weapons and other contraband in the defendants' automobile and home.

Issue
• May a magistrate issue a valid warrant on the basis of an anonymous tip where there is no indicia of the informer's "basis of knowledge" if the information contained in the tip is corroborated with police findings?

Held
• When a court decides whether or not to issue a search warrant, the elements of the informant's "credibility/reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are to be used as guides when considering the "totality of the circumstances" and are not to be exclusive requirements applied in every case.

Dissent
• Aguilar and the elaboration in Spinelli sets forth the analysis magistrates should follow on determinations of probable cause. To sufficiently uphold Fourth Amendment rights, magistrates must look at both the "credibility/reliability" and "basis of knowledge" of the informant. "Basis of knowledge" cannot fully be supported solely on the basis that some factual assertions corroborate with actual police findings.
• Since some of the anonymous tips were not corroborated and actually proved false, the informant's "credibility/reliability" was undermined and therefore the warrant should not have been issued. Police cannot use findings of an illegal search to substantiate a previously issued warrant.

Concurrence
• Even if the factual findings by police were only corroborated by innocuous behavior, a valid warrant could still have been issued because the defendants' actions were suspicious. The main focus should be whether there is an inference, based upon the suspects' actions, that the informant is credible and the information was obtained in a reliable manner.

Discussion
• "Credibility/reliability" and "basis of knowledge" of an informant are very relevant in determining the value of a tip. These elements alone do not form the entire basis of inquiry in deciding whether probable cause exists. So long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment is not violated.

Additional points
• In Illinois v. Gates, probable cause was achieved for the warrant under the new "totality-of-the-circumstances" standard because the investigation by DEA and Detective Mader would have, on its own, been probable cause for a search warrant. The Gateses' actions were suspicious because Florida is a known source of illegal drugs. Lance Gates' stay at a motel for one night and immediate return to Chicago suggests that he was not going for a vacation and also implies that he might be involved in something illegal. The Court, after having heard oral argument, furthermore requested in November 1982 that the parties and amici submit briefs on the broader issue of whether the exclusionary rule should be modified. When the opinion in Gates was rendered, however, the Court declined to rule on the issue, stating that the issue was "not pressed or passed upon below"[2] and that the exclusionary rule had become too difficult as an issue of great public importance to have been re-examined at the time.

• Totality is substituted in its place
• Gives wide discretionary powers
• Not same reliance as 2 pronged test
• However, a few states, including MA and NY, have stuck with 2 Aguliar/Spinelli Pronged Test
Facts
• Police Lt. Beland conducted a legal search of Richard Kelleher's motel room and found a number of stolen items that were taken during recent burglaries. The search did not procure, however, jewelry, gold, and silver that were taken. Subsequently, a woman identified as Upton's (defendant) ex-girlfriend called Beland. The woman told Beland that Upton's motor home was filled with stolen goods, including jewelry, gold, and silver.
• The woman also stated that Upton knew of the raid of Kelleher's motel room and would be moving the motor home soon as a result. She stated that Upton bought the jewelry, gold, and silver from Kelleher. Finally, she stated she had broken up with Upton, and that was why she was providing the information. Beland confirmed that the motor home was parked where the woman said it would be and applied for a search warrant.
• A magistrate judge issued the search warrant. Upton challenged the constitutionality of the warrant. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Overview
• The state appealed the decision from the district court's reversal of defendant's conviction for burglary, and receiving stolen property. The police department assisted in the execution of a search warrant for a motel room. The search produced several items of identification, including credit cards, belonging to two persons whose homes had recently been burglarized. The police received a call from an unidentified female who told him that there was a motor home full of stolen stuff at the home of defendant. A magistrate issued the warrant, and a subsequent search of the motor home produced the items described by the caller and other incriminating evidence. The discovered evidence led to defendant's conviction. The district court held that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and reversed defendant's convictions. On appeal, the court concluded that the police affidavit provided a substantial basis for the issuance of the warrant. The court rejected after-the-fact, de novo scrutiny. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded.

Outcome
• The court reversed the district court's decision on the warrant and remanded for further proceedings because the police affidavit provided a substantial basis for the issuance of the warrant.
• Anonymous informant → suspect informant
o Generally skeptical of veracity
• BUT fears for own safety and well being
Procedural Posture
• The federal government challenged the holding of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which dismissed the indictment against defendant, suppressed the evidence against him, held that plain-clothes detectives had violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and that they did not have probable cause to arrest him.

Overview
• After spotting a rectangular package wrapped in plastic and duct tape in defendant's gym bag, two plain-clothes detectives, believing the block contained illegal drugs, handcuffed defendant, examined the wrapped object further, and seized it and the gym bag. Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii). The district court held that the detectives had violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and did not have probable cause to inspect his package, and dismissed the indictment. The federal government appealed and the court reversed. The court held that the detectives were not required to be aware of the specific crime a suspect was likely committing; it was enough that they had probable cause to believe that the suspect committed one or the other of several offenses, even though they could not be sure which one. The court found that the detectives' observations could not have been disregarded and that they had a solid foundation from which to evaluate relative frequency and to judge the percentage of times such packages held narcotics.

Outcome
• The court reversed the orders of the district court, which dismissed the indictment of defendant, suppressed the evidence against him, and held that plain-clothes detectives had violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because they did not have probable cause to arrest him.
o Dissenting judge said was a race issue
Procedural Posture
• Defendant appealed a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which convicted him following his conditional guilty plea to a charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.S. § 841. Pursuant to his plea agreement and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), defendant reserved his right to appeal the denial of his pretrial suppression motion.

Overview
• Defendant appealed his conviction following a guilty plea to a charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.S. § 841; defendant reserved his right to appeal the denial of his pretrial suppression motion, pursuant to his plea agreement and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Undercover officers made a narcotics buy, and went to arrest the seller who had temporarily disappeared from view. Moments later, defendant was arrested as he matched the seller's description, but defendant was not the seller. Defendant was found with packets of cocaine on him and indicted for possession. Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine found in his possession as well as his post-arrest statements that he intended to sell the cocaine, all as fruits of an illegal arrest. The court affirmed because the arrest was valid under U.S. Const. amend. IV as the police had probable cause to arrest the person sought (the seller), and the arresting officer reasonably believed that defendant was the seller. The true seller was not known until after defendant's arrest and the packets of cocaine were found with defendant, and thereby provided independent probable cause to support defendant's arrest.

Outcome
• The court affirmed the denial of defendant's pretrial suppression motion. There was a reasonable belief and probable cause to arrest defendant, even though he had been the victim of mistaken identity; no purpose would be served by suppressing clear evidence of defendant's guilt which came to the attention of the police as a result of their well-intentioned but misguided actions.
Brief Fact Summary
• A federal postal inspector was informed by an informant that he was scheduled to receive stolen credit cards from the defendant, Watson (the "defendant") in the future. Subsequently, the defendant was arrested without a warrant when the informant confirmed such allegations with the postal inspector.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Government officers are permitted to arrest without a warrant for both misdemeanors and felonies committed in the presence of the officer or when there is probable cause to do so.

Facts
• A reliable informant told a federal postal inspector that the defendant had supplied him with stolen credit cards and would do so in the future. The postal inspector was present at the scheduled meeting between the informant and the defendant and proceeded to arrest the defendant without a warrant, after the informant confirmed that he had the stolen credit cards.

Issue
• May a government official make an arrest without a warrant where a felony has been committed in the official's presence?

Held
• A government official may arrest a person without a warrant upon probable cause to believe the person is guilty of a felony.


Dissent
• The defendant's warrantless arrest was valid because exigent circumstances existed at the time of arrest and therefore no warrant was necessary.

Concurrence
• An arrest is like a seizure for Fourth Amendment constitution purposes. Law enforcement would be overburdened if a constitutional rule allowed felony arrests only with a warrant or in the presence of exigent circumstances.

Discussion
• Any arrest which is executed must be supported by either probable cause, a warrant, exigent circumstances or an Act of Congress, which authorizes various government officials to make warrantless arrests. Acts of Congress are presumptively valid and likewise, the acts of officials making proper arrests under the authority of such laws are presumptively reasonable.
• Common law allows arrest by police officers
• Warrantless arrest
o Police doesn't see crime occur
Facts
• Officer was suspicious car was in accident, refused to present alcohol
• Officer asked him to exit vehicle, refuses, high-speed chase
• Donald Rickard led police officers on a high-speed car chase that came to a temporary halt when Rickard spun out into a parking lot.
• Rickard resumed maneuvering his car, and as he continued to use the accelerator even though his bumper was flush against a patrol car, an officer fired three shots into Rickard's car. Rickard managed to drive away, almost hitting an officer in the process.
• Officers fired 12 more shots as Rickard sped away, striking him and his passenger, both of whom died from some combination of gunshot wounds and injuries suffered when the car eventually crashed.

Issue
• Did the officers violate Rickard's 4th Amendment right?

Rule
• The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Holding
• No
• The officers acted reasonably in using deadly force. A "police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death."
• Under the circumstances when the shots were fired, all that a reasonable officer could have concluded from Rickard's conduct was that he was intent on resuming his flight, which would again pose a threat to others on the road.
• Petitioners did not fire more shots than necessary to end the public safety risk.
• A passenger's presence does not bear on whether officers violated Rickard's Fourth Amendment rights, which "are personal rights [that] may not be vicariously asserted."
• Even if the officers' conduct had violated the Fourth Amendment, petitioners would still be entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
o An official sued under §1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless it is shown that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was "'clearly established'" at the time of the challenged conduct.
• Followed Scott v. Harris
o Expanded to expressly include firing a driver
• Daughter filed 1983 action that officers used excessive force
o Argues 4th Amendment does not allow shooting
• District court said violated 4th amendment
• 6th Circuit affirmed
• Respondent's excessive-force argument requires analyzing the totality of the circumstances from the perspective "of a reasonable officer on the scene." Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396.
• Reasonableness of particular use of force has to be judged with particular use of force
• SC said did NOT violate 4th Amendment
• Ginsburg
o Did not join in Use of deadly force part
• Officers actions were reasonable
o Fact that outrageous dangerous, 2 dozen motorists, grave risk to public safety
o Record showed that even once thought chase was over, wasn't really, absolutely warranted once he resumed his flight
• Posed threat to others
• Passenger?
o Did not have 4th amendment claim
o Largely irrelevant because it wasn't the passenger's rights
o Officers would have had qualified immunity anyway
Brief Fact Summary
• The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the "Petitioner"), was stopped and searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for questioning and decided to search him first.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.

Facts
• The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and down the same street.
• The men would periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more.
• The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street.
• The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were "casing" a store for a potential robbery.
• The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning.
• A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.

Issue
• Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ("Constitution")?

Held
• The Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") held that it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed.
• A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.

Dissent
• Justice William Douglas ("J. Douglas") dissented, reasoning that the majority's holding would grant powers to officers to authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate would not possess.

Concurrence
• Justice John Harlan ("J. Harlan") agreed with the majority, but he emphasized an additional necessity of the reasonableness of the stop to investigate the crime.
• Justice Byron White ("J. White") agreed with the majority, but he emphasized that the particular facts of the case, that there was suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk.

Discussion
• The facts of the case are important to understand the Supreme Court's willingness to allow the search. The suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if the officer's suspicions were correct then he would be in a dangerous position to approach the men for questioning without searching them.
• The officer also did not detain the men for a long period of time to constitute an arrest without probable cause.
• Reasonable suspicion to stop someone on the street
• If suspected of a gun, officer allowed to search
o Public Safety concerns
• Officer has to be able to articulate that person was/is/about to be involved in crime
• Reasonable Suspicion Definition
o Objective Reasoning
• Reasonable person in circumstances at time
o Articulable
• Not based on a hunch
• Don't have to articulate to person being stopped
• Police Report (Handout)
o Doesn't give details about conversation
• Does NOT need probable cause to do pat down for weapons
• Can only do pat down on outside of clothes, can't reach into pockets and take out drugs
o Incident to a legal search
• Seizure
o Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person
• Officer has to be able to articulate BOTH reason to stop him and then concern in articulable way they have a weapon
• Stop and Frisk must be immediate
• Gives the officers a great deal of power and control of who and why they are stopping
Brief Fact Summary
• Robert Williams (the "Respondent") was convicted in Connecticut state court for illegal possession of a handgun found during a "stop and frisk" and heroin found during a search incident to this weapons arrest.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can be based on more than the officer's personal observation, but also on information supplied by another person.

Facts
• A police officer received a tip from an informant that the Respondent who was sitting in a vehicle early in the morning had drugs in his possession. The police officer investigated the informant's report by first tapping the car window and asking the Respondent to get out of the car.
• The Respondent rolled down the window and when he did so, the police officer reached in and removed a fully loaded gun from the Respondent's waist. The gun was not visible from outside the car, but exactly where the informant said it was. A search incident to the arrest was conducted shortly thereafter, and heroin, a second handgun and a machete were found on the Respondent's person and in the vehicle.
• Respondent was convicted in Connecticut state court for illegal possession of a handgun found during the "stop and frisk" and heroin found during the search incident to this weapons arrest. Respondent filed a habeus corpus petition that was denied by the federal district court and granted by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was an unlawful search and found the state court judgment should be set aside.

Issue
• Whether a stop and frisk has to be based on the officer's personal observation or if it can be based on information supplied by another person?

Held
• The stop and frisk can be based on information from other people. Once the arresting officer "had found the gun precisely where the informant had predicted, probable cause existed to arrest Williams for unlawful possession of the weapon." Further, "[u]nder the circumstances surrounding Williams' possession of the gun seized by [the officer], the arrest on the weapons charge was supported by probable cause, and the search of his person and of the car incident to that arrest was lawful."
• Respondent's argument that the officers conduct violated [Terry v. Ohio] was rejected. Terry found that "a brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." Additionally, "[s]o long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective purpose."
• The majority, in applying [Terry"s] above principle's, found that the officer's conduct in response to the informant's tip was appropriate. The police officer knew the informant personally and had been provided information by him in the past. This is stronger than when the police receive an anonymous telephone tip. Although, "while the Court's decisions indicate that this informant's unverified tip may have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search warrant, the information carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop of [Respondent]."
• The majority observed that the arresting officer had ample reason to fear for his own safety when he approached the Respondent in a high-crime area early in the morning. Additionally, the Respondent would not get out of his car and instead he rolled down his window making the weapon in his waist an even greater threat. Based on the facts of this case, "the policeman's action in reaching to the spot where the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we conclude that it was reasonable."

Dissent
• Justice William Brennan ("J. Brennan") drafted a dissenting opinion relying on Justice Friendly's opinion in the lower court, and argued that the arresting officer did not show sufficient cause to justify his "forcible stop."
• Justice [ ] Marshall and Justice [ ]Douglas drafted a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority improperly construed Terry, because Terry was meant to be a "narrowly drawn" exception to the warrant requirement. Additionally, that the court improperly construes the balance Terry sought to strike between a citizen's right to privacy and the importance of effective law enforcement.

Discussion
• This is an interesting decision, showing how the Supreme Court thinks in certain situations a bright line rule will not cover every situation.
Procedure
• The defendant was convicted in the court of common pleas in Philadelphia of carrying a concealed firearm and carrying a firearm without a license.
• The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and remanded the conviction, finding that the gun was seized as a result of an unlawful search and seizure by cops.
• The supreme court of the USA reverses the Penn Supreme Court holding and reinstates the trial court.

Facts
• Two Philly cops were on a routine patrol when they observed Mimms the defendant driving a car, which had an expired license plate on it. The officer's stopped the vehicle so they could ticket the driver for the moving violation. The officer pursuant to safety concerns asked the driver (Mimms) to exit the vehicle; he saw a bulge in a sport jacket he was wearing (An Eagle fan no doubt).
• A frisk of Mimms uncovered a loaded 38-caliber handgun in his waistband and his passenger had a loaded 32 caliber on him as well, so both were arrested for carry concealed firearms without a license and carry a firearm in general on their person without a permit.

Issue
• Whether the order to get out of the car, issued after the driver was lawfully detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the 4th Amendment?

Rule/Holding
• This was a common practice for police to ask motorists who were being cited for motor vehicle violations to step out of their car. Establishing the face-to-face contact between the police and the driver being detained on violation diminishes the possibility that a person will do movements unobserved in their car and assault the officer. Also if the stop is executed in a high traffic area, having the driver step around to the back of his vehicle gets the officer out of the danger of standing in the road near traffic. This amounts to a mere inconvenience for a driver, but is reasonable given a police officer's concern for his or her safety.
• By stepping out of the car he only revealed little more than was already visible when he was seated in the vehicle.
• The bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimm's was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer. In these circumstances, any man of "reasonable caution" would likely have conducted the "pat down." The decision of Penn Supreme Court is reversed.

Dissenting
• (Marshall) He saw Terry as involving the observations of a thirty-year police veteran, who had been patrolling the downtown area of Cleveland and knew what type of suspicious activity that would lead a police officer to have reasonable suspicion that an armed robbery was about to take place or had taken place. The stop and frisk under Terry was reasonable because one who was suspected of attempting a stick up is likely to be armed and a danger to the officer as well as other citizens. In this case officers didn't have the slightest hint that the respondent might have a gun in the car or was up to no good. The officer's response must bear a direct correlation to circumstances, which first justified the interference. Doesn't like how this decision broadens Terry, beyond what the original scope was suppose to.

Dissenting
• (Brennan, Stevens, Marshall) today without argument the Court adopts still another - and even lesser - standard of justification for a major category of police seizures. He sees officer safety as important, but finds the evidence of how officers are slain to be unconvincing since some law enforcement training manuals instruct officers not to have suspects get out of there cars, when issuing traffic tickets. If beyond the moving violation, the suspect has something he wishes to hide getting out of the car could lead to a violent confrontation between the officer and suspect who thinks the cop is on to him. This standard could lead to elderly people, mothers with small children and other who would otherwise raise no red flags with police inconvenienced by getting out of there vehicle pursuant to police orders.
• The court hold today that "third-class" seizures may be imposed without reason; how large this class of seizures may be or become we cannot know yet. The cops didn't have a good reason for asking Mimms to exit his vehicle!
Brief Fact Summary
• Detectives stopped and questioned respondent Mark Royer after figuring out he fit the profile of a person transporting illegal drugs, and then asked him to accompany them to a small room about 40 feet away. Fifteen minutes later, he consented to search of his bags.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• A police officer asking a suspect to accompany them to a small police room, taking their ticket and driver's license and not mentioning that they are free to leave, has exceeded the scope of a valid stop based on reasonable suspicion under Terry.

Facts
• Police officers determined that a respondent matched the profile of a drug trafficker because he was a 25-35 year old man, casually dressed, pale, nervous, paid for his ticket in cash, and was carrying a certain type of luggage with only his name and destination on its tag. They then stopped the respondent and asked to see his identification and the name on it did not match his airline ticket. They took the respondent's documentation and asked him to go with them into a small room where they asked him if he would consent to a search of his luggage, to which he responded by handing them his key. He was convicted of felony possession of marijuana with the help of the fruits of this search, and the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed claiming that the respondent had been involuntarily confined within the small room without probable cause and that the subsequent consent was invalid because it was tainted by the unlawful confinement. The state of Florida was then granted certiorari.

Issue
• Is the permissible extent under the Fourth Amendment of a temporary Terry stop exceeded when a police officer asks a person suspected of criminal activity to go into a small closed room without telling them they may leave and they end up there for fifteen minutes?
• Can a search subsequent to an invalid detention be validly consented to under the Fourth Amendment?

Held
• Affirm the judgment of the lower court that the detention and search was invalid.
• Police may not carry out a full search of a person merely but appropriately suspected of criminal activity, nor may they seek to verify their suspicions by means approaching that of a full-fledged arrest. This detention was a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than that that is allowable based on mere reasonable suspicion as the least intrusive investigatory means should be used in such stops.
• Since the detective's actions are held to exceed the permissible bounds of an investigative stop, the respondent's consent to the search of his suitcase is invalid, and the evidence found as a result is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and must be excluded.

Dissent
• Justice Harry Blackmun expressed his view that the police conduct here was not all that intrusive, and given the strength of the public interest in apprehending and prosecuting drug traffickers, probable cause should not have been necessary for the type of stop that these police officers completed.
• Justice William Rehnquist also dissented by saying that the conduct of the detectives was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Concurrence
• Justice Lewis Franklin Powell articulated the view that although protecting the public from drug traffickers was important, this suspect was actually under arrest, and his allowing the search of his luggage was therefore not really consensual.
• Justice William Brennan stated his opinion that not only was the suspect's consent to the search illegal, but the stop was, as well.

Discussion
• This case seems to have had the impact of further clarifying what the limits of a Terry stop were. But there definitely is the argument that it has not been that successful at doing so since it is unclear whether the fifteen minutes he was held in the room can be used as a guideline, or even whether the fact that he was moved to another location was what was fatal under the Fourth Amendment. The case may arguably leave the system with not much more than one of its only clear statements: that the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel an officer's suspicion.
Brief Fact Summary
• A police search of bus passengers revealed drugs in the defendant's bags and on his person.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• "The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to searches."

Facts
• Respondents Drayton and Brown were traveling on a passenger bus that was stopped for a routine search by three police officers. Two positioned themselves up front; one proceeded down the aisle, engaging the passengers in conversation. According to his testimony, passengers were not required to cooperate. However, he did not inform the passengers of this fact. The respondents were seated next to each other. The officer informed them, in a voice "just loud enough" for them to hear, that he was part of an interdiction effort, and asked if they had any bags. When they indicated one above them, he requested permission to check it, which they granted. Finding nothing, the officer requested to check Brown's person. Brown granted permission. During the pat down, the officer detected hard packages similar to those used to transport drugs. Brown was taken into custody. When the officer asked Drayton, Drayton raised his hands about eight inches from his legs. The officer found similar hard packages, and took Drayton into custody. Upon further searching, both respondents were found to be carrying sizeable amounts of cocaine.

Issue
• "[W]hether officers must advise bus passengers during these encounters of their right not to cooperate."

Held
• No. Under precedent, Florida v. Bostick, "if a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized." A determination of when this is true "necessitates a consideration of "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter." The Supreme Court then held the erred Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals when adopting the approach that the officer MUST warn the passengers that they may refuse to cooperate in an interdiction search. In the present matter, "there was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice." The officer's badge is not intimidating on its face, as officers wear uniforms, as well as side-arms. The officer at the front of the bus did nothing to intimidate passengers. The fact "only a few passengers have refused to cooperate does not suggest that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the bus encounter."
• Drayton argued that after Brown had been taken into custody "no reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter with the officers." The court held that "the arrest of one person does not mean that everyone around him has been seized by police,", and that if anything, "Brown's arrest should have put Drayton on notice of the consequences of continuing the encounter by answering the officers' questions."
• The search itself, under the circumstances, was voluntary.

Dissent
• J. Souter, joined by J. Stevens and J. Ginsburg, focused on the fact that the driver, after a scheduled stop, took the passengers' tickets as they re-boarded, and then left the bus to allow the officers to search. As such, the respondents reasonably believed that they had no choice but to consent to a search.

Discussion
• "In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of coercion."
• If use totality of circumstances, YES can stop car based on anonymous tipster's claim
o Tipster's claim ran her off the road and thought intoxicated
• 3 Reasons
o Tip came from Victim
o LE confirmed innocent details of the tip
o Alleged behavior of ongoing danger to other motorists and LE had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle
• Facts
o Silver Ford had run an anonymous person off the road
o Officer spots this vehicle
o Officer follows him, does not observe abnormal driving after 5 minutes
o Officers get drivers information
o Notice odor of marijuana
o Find 30 lbs of marijuana
o Arrest them both
• Majority finds 2 precedents
o Alabama v. White
• SC held that an anonymous informant's tip that was "significantly corroborated" by a police officer's investigation provided reasonable suspicion for a stop
• Was enough to raise reasonable suspicion of stop
o Florida v. J.L.
• "An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person."
• Notes tipster in White's case because was able to predict FUTURE BEHAVIOR
o Look whether report had sufficient reliability
• Temporal proximity that occurs between viewing erratic driving and making the tip
• Justice Thomas points to excited utterance and present sense impressions
• Use of 911 suggests that tip is truthful and makes position assured
• Did report create reasonable suspicion?
o Determinations of reasonable suspicion demand rational, not practical considerations
• Didn't have to rule out possibility of innocent conduct
• SC ruled important to follow up on tip because of alleged drunk driver
• Scalia Dissent
o Dismisses reliance on White
o These were not intimate details
o Navarette was out of step
o Eyewitness
• Unrelated to the veracity of her report
• Excited utterance
• Too much time and takes away from temporal time period
• Unlikely average 911 tipster are readily identifiable
• Anonymous 911 reporting is not sufficiently reliable for reasonable suspicion
o Court's opinion gives freedom destroying cocktail
• 911 tips are reliable
• Reckless driving reasonable suspicion
o Freedom of movement is at risk
• Takes step further by allowing anonymous claims and opens ability to open up probe
Brief Fact Summary
• Based on an anonymous tip that a black male in a plaid shirt was standing at a bus stop armed, police stopped and frisked J.L.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• "An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person."

Facts
• Miami-Dade police were told by an anonymous caller that an armed black male in a plaid shirt was standing at bus stop.
• There was no audio record of the call, no any other specific information.
• Two officers were instructed to respond. Upon arriving at the bus stop, the officers saw three black males, one of whom, respondent J.L., was wearing plaid.
• There was nothing else about the situation that suggested to the police that illegal activity was afoot.
• The officers could see no firearm, and the respondent did nothing threatening. The officers approached all three men, and frisked them. They found a gun on J.L.'s person.

Issue
• "[W]hether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person."

Held
• No.
• The Court initiated their discussion with a review of the essential law of Terry v. Ohio, "where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . . he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him."
• The police could not observe a gun or any other threatening behavior beyond the tip.
• Further, the anonymous and uncorroborated tip lacked a "sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop" per Alabama v. White.
• Thus, the Court held that there were insufficient grounds for the police to frisk the respondent.

Concurrence
• J. Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice, noted that the indicia of reliability was actually widening, thanks to a variety of technologies, but did not take any particular issue with the Court's reasoning.

Discussion
• "An anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability . . . does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm."
Brief Fact Summary
• The defendant, Chimel (the "defendant"), was arrested inside his home and police asked him for consent to search the home.
• The defendant refused the request.
• The police proceeded nonetheless, incident to the lawful arrest and searched in different rooms. The police also had the defendant's wife open various dresser drawers and remove their contents.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Incident to a lawful arrest, a search of any area beyond the arrestee's immediate control, is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution"), unless there is a clear danger that evidence may be destroyed or concealed or there is an imminent threat of harm to the arresting officers.

Held
• Any search in an arrestee's home beyond arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.

Discussion
• Contemporaneous searches incident to a lawful arrest are reasonable to seize weapons as well as prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence.
• Searches beyond the scope of these justifications are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
• Why no search warrant?
o SC didn't address it
• Express Consent to search home
• Harris/Rabinowitz Rule
o Allowed search of entire house
• SC CHANGES
o Search was unreasonable because exceeds ∆'s person
o All evidence may not be used
o EXCLUSIONARY RULE
• Major decision because broaden 4th Amendment Protection
• Search incident to arrest may only be within the immediate area
o HOWEVER court did not define this or bring up potential scenarios that would be problematic
i.e. vehicles
• Search and arrest must be within a small time period
• Unlawful search
Brief Fact Summary
• A mother was taken into custody for violation of Texas' strict seatbelt law.
• She subsequently sued for Fourth Amendment violations.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• "The standard of probable cause 'applies to all arrests, without the need to balance the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations.'"

Issue
• "[W]hether the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine."

Held
• No.
• The Supreme Court noted that the respondent wanted a new rule "one not necessarily requiring violent breach of the peace, but nonetheless forbidding custodial arrest, even upon probable cause, when conviction could not ultimately carry any jail time and when the government shows no compelling need for immediate detention."
• The court was unwilling to do this, noting "complications arise the moment we begin to think about the possible applications of the several criteria [the respondent] proposes for drawing a line between minor crimes with limited arrest authority and others not so restricted."
• Citing several examples, the court concluded by noting that the respondent's rule would "place police in an almost impossible spot" and "guarantee increased litigation over many of the arrests that would occur."
• Given that it would cause more troubles than it would solve, the court refused to adopt the rule, and held arrests were permissible under all circumstances of criminal actions.

Discussion
• "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender."
• Cultural differences
Facts
• Police officer stopped Riley for driving with expired registration tags. During the stop, the officer learned Riley's license had been suspended. The officer impounded the car. Another officer conducted an inventory search and found two handguns under the car's hood. Riley was arrested for possession of concealed and loaded firearms.
• In a search incident to the arrest, an officer seized a cell phone (a smart phone) from Riley's pants pocket. Upon examination of the phone, a detective found photographs and videos the detective believed linked Riley to additional crimes. Some photos were admitted into evidence at trial and the detective testified to some of the contents of Riley's phone.
• Police officer observed Brima Wurie make an apparent drug sale from a car. Officers arrested Wurie.
• At the police station, they seized two cell phones from Wurie's person, one was a flip-phone. The flip-phone received repeated calls from a caller labeled "my house." Officers opened the phone and saw a picture of a woman and a baby as the phone's wallpaper. The officers accessed the call log and determined the phone number associated with "my house."
• They traced that number to an apartment building. They went to the building and saw Wurie's name on a mailbox and observed through a window a woman resembling the woman on the phone's wallpaper. They secured the apartment, obtained a warrant, and searched the apartment, finding drugs, a firearm, ammunition, and cash

Rules
• Fourth Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause ..." Case Brief Reasonableness normally requires a warrant. Vernonia. There are specific exceptions to the warrant requirement. King.
• Trilogy of US SC cases dealing with exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches incident to arrest:
o Chimel (1969): warrantless search incident to arrest is reasonable when it is needed to protect officer safety or to preserve evidence.
o Robinson (1973) & Chadwick (1977): warrantless search incident to arrest is reasonable if it is limited to personal property immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.
o Gant (2009): Chimel could authorize police to search an arrestee's vehicle's passenger compartment only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search and when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle
• Balancing of interests: intrusion on individual's privacy and need to promote legitimate governmental interests. Houghton (1999).

Holding
• Police must get a warrant before searching a cell phone seized incident to arrest. Reversing Riley and affirming Brima Wurie.

Reasoning
• The United States and California focus primarily on preventing the destruction of evidence as the legitimate governmental interest.
• However, officers could have seized and secured cell phones to prevent destruction of evidence.
• The governments' argument that information on a cell phone may be vulnerable to destruction (via "remote wiping" and "data encryption") is not convincing as there is little evidence that this is a prevalent problem. "Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person."
• "[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house..."
• Privacy comes at a cost.
ISSUE
• May a police officer properly search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and its contents as a warrantless search incident to arrest if the arrestees are secured and cannot possibly reach any of the contents of the vehicle?

HOLDING
• No, the police are authorized to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.

FACTS:
• Police received an anonymous tip that a certain house was being used to sell drugs
• Officers went to the house, and Gant answered the door and provided ID. Officers later found that Gant's DL had been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest
• Officers returned later that day and when Gant drove up, he exited the vehicle and the officers arrested him away from his car and put into a patrol car
• Officers then searched Gant's car and found a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backset

RULES:
• Robinson: The exception to the warrant requirement of a search incident to arrest derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations
• Chimel: A search incident to arrest may only include the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control
• Belton: When an officer lawfully arrests the occupant of a vehicle, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the vehicle and any containers therein

REASONING:
• Belton reading too broad:
o Belton does not authorize an officer to search a vehicle incident to arrest under all circumstances including when the arrestee is secured and poses no threat
• Police are authorized to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search
• Exception:
o When it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle, a search incident to arrest of the vehicle is justified
• Does not apply for arrest for traffic violations
• Gant's search unreasonable:
o Because Gant could not have accessed his car at the time of the search, the search was unreasonable
o Unreasonable search under those circumstances

COMMENTS:
• Gant essentially limits Belton to its facts, i.e., when an arrestee is unsecured and could possibly reach into the vehicle at the time of arrest.
• Practitioners, you will want to cite Gant for vehicle searches incident to a lawful arrest. This case significantly changes the game when it comes to vehicle searches, so chances are courts and other attorneys will still be citing Belton. Be sure to avoid this legal anachronism.
• However, just because Gant severely limits searches incident to arrest of vehicles, that does not necessarily mean that significantly more suppression motions will be granted. The "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule will probably prevent suppression in many cases (based on inevitable execution of an inventory search).
Brief Fact Summary
• The driver of car stopped by police had a syringe in his pocket which he admitted was his. The police then searched the car, finding a purse which the respondent passenger claimed was hers that held two containers, both containing methamphetamine.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for police officers to examine packages and containers inside without an individualized showing of probable cause for each one.

Held
• Yes. Reverse the judgment of the Wyoming Supreme Court.
• Police officers with probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a car for contraband are still in compliance with the Fourth Amendment if they search a passenger's belongings capable of concealing contraband.
• The precedent case, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), holding that probable cause to search a vehicle that has been stopped validly justifies a search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the subject of the search, makes no distinction among containers and packages based on ownership.
• Since a passenger's privacy expectations are diminished, and governmental interests at stake are large, the balancing of Fourth Amendment interests leans toward allowing searches of passengers' belongings.

Discussion
• The Supreme Court clearly viewed the Wyoming Supreme Court's "notice of ownership" test as not providing clear guidelines to law enforcement, and as putting them in a position where they had to make difficult decisions as to which container belonged to which person. The ability to easily conceal contraband in someone else's container was a central part of this case having the result it did. A rule contrary to the result in this case likely would have resulted in encouraging efforts by search subjects to conceal contraband, and this was something the Supreme Court was looking to avoid.
Hot Pursuit will excuse an arrest warrant where one would otherwise be required, and it will also excuse a search warrant where a search of an area is conducted in order to find and apprehend the suspect
o Unreasonable to have officers stop in middle of chase to get warrant
• Active pursuit

Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
o SC rejected the mere evidence limitation on searches and seizures
o Fact that officers found clothing as opposed to weapons in the washing machine was not problematic, because the officers had the right, in these emergency circumstances, to search the washing machine to look for weapons, and thus the seizure of the clothing was permissible under the plain view doctrine
• Hot Pursuit does NOT apply where the suspect is unaware that he is being pursued by police officers

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)
o If the hot pursuit doctrine were determined only by how expeditiously the police were pursuing the suspect, then it would exist in virtually every case.
• United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)
o SC held that the police officers were permitted to follow Santana into her house under the doctrine of hot pursuit.
o SC noted that the hot pursuit doctrine serves to ensure that a suspect ma not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place by the expedient of escaping into a private place.
The fact that the pursuit here ended almost as soon as it began did not render it any the less a hot pursuit sufficient to justify the warrantless entry
o Procedural Posture
The court granted a rehearing in banc to consider whether the state's warrantless entry that led to the arrest and conviction of defendant was lawful pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of U.S. Const. amend. IV, and if so, whether law enforcement agents improperly created the exigent circumstances.
o Overview
Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C.S. § 2, and use of a firearm in connection with narcotics trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 924(c), 2. A divided panel of the court concluded that the trial court erred when it found that a warrantless entry by law enforcement agents into an apartment was justified on the basis of the exigent circumstances exception to the U.S. Const. amend. IV warrant requirement. The court granted a rehearing in banc to determine whether the warrantless entry was lawful due to exigent circumstances, and if so, whether law enforcement agents improperly created the exigent circumstances. The court vacated the decision of the original panel and affirmed the conviction. The court held that exigent circumstances existed because an undercover officer had witnessed drug trafficking between men with loaded, semi-automatic weapons. The court held that the officers did not create the exigent circumstances because they properly knocked on the door before entering and had attempted a peaceful entry.

Dorman Factors => Justifies Warrantless Entry
1) The gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged
2) Whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed
3) A clear showing of PC to believe that the suspect committed the crime
In some cases suspects are alerted to the presence of police activity, and at that point there is little dispute about the risk of destruction of evidence or other danger when the officers make an entry

CASE SYNOPSIS
• The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed respondent's drug conviction, holding that exigent circumstances could not justify the officers' search under the Fourth Amendment because it was reasonably foreseeable that the occupants in the apartment would destroy evidence when the police knocked on the door and announced their presence. Petitioner State of Kentucky's petition for certiorari was granted.

DISCUSSION
• The exigent circumstances rule justified a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency was reasonable.
• The exigent circumstances rule applied when the police did not gain entry by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.
• One officer testified without contradiction that the officers banged on the door as loud as they could and announced either "Police, police, police" or "This is the police."
• There was no evidence they either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so prior to the point when they entered the apartment.
• There was no evidence of a "demand" of any sort, much less a demand that amounted to a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment.
• Any contradictory evidence not brought to the Supreme Court's attention was for the state court to address on remand.
• As the officer testified, noises inside the apartment then led the officers to believe that drug-related evidence was about to be destroyed, and, at that point they explained they were going to make entry.
• Given that the announcement was made after the exigency arose, it could not have created the exigency.
Illinois v. McArthur
Brief Fact Summary
• The police refused to allow an individual to enter his home after being informed by his wife that there was dope in the home.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• The restriction at issue was reasonable, and hence lawful based on various circumstances including the fact that the police officers had probable cause to believe that the home contained contraband, the contraband could have been destroyed, and the restraint was "both limited and tailored reasonably to secure law enforcement needs while protecting privacy interests."

Issue
• Whether the police violated an individual's rights when they refused to allow him to enter his home for two hours so as to obtain a search warrant?

Held
• No. The court began by observing that there are certain situations where a warrant is not required. "When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable."
• The search here was reasonable for four reasons.
First, "the police had probable cause to believe that [Mr.] McArthur's trailer home contained evidence of a crime and contraband, namely, unlawful drugs."
Second, "the police had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, Mr. McArthur would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant.
Third, "the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy."
Finally, "the police imposed the restraint for a limited period of time, namely, two hours."
o Overview
Petitioners set up programs for sobriety checkpoints, and respondents, all licensed drivers, challenged the constitutionality. Respondents argued that the analysis had to proceed from a basis of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and there must be some governmental need beyond the normal need before a balancing analysis was appropriate. On review the court found that a three prong test was appropriate, balancing the state's grave and legitimate interest in curbing drunk driving; the checkpoints were generally effective, and the subjective intrusion on individual liberties was not substantial. The court found that a seizure occurred when a vehicle was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint. However, the court held that such stops were reasonable considering the increasing number of alcohol-related deaths and mutilation on the nation's roads. The State program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who were briefly stopped weighed in favor of the State program.
o Outcome
The judgment finding that the State's sobriety checkpoints were unconstitutional was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion because the proper analysis was a three prong test balancing the state's grave interest in curbing drunk driving, the effectiveness of the stops, and the insubstantial subjective intrusion on individual


o 2 Different Tests
Special Needs
• Emergency Circumstances
o Exceptional Circumstances
o Analyzed in the specific factual circumstances
Only going to apply when:
• 1) Specific special need exists
• 2) If exists, court determine whether special needs make warrant impracticable
• Must be beyond normal law enforcement and then warrant or PC is impractical
• No special need beyond criminal law enforcement
• COURT REJECTS THIS ARGUMENT
Reasonably Balancing Approach
• Relies on Terry precedent to approve suspicionless test for temporary
• Brown v. Texas Balancing Test Analysis
• Court recognizes that state has legitimate interest in preventing drunk driving
• Checkpoint program only proposes slight intrusion on motorists
• Court looks to see how effective
o 1/126 is still sufficient
• Should be upheld as constitutional
o Dissent argues checkpoint are not known
• What Roadblocks Need
o Minimal Intrusion,
o All or nothing approach (all vehicles stopped),
o Public Interest
Brief Fact Summary
• Indianapolis set up a series of checkpoints to intercept drugs. Two motorists sued.

Synopsis of Rule of Law
• Police must have the "usual requirement of individualized suspicion where [they] seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes."

Facts
• The City of Indianapolis instituted a series of traffic checkpoints. At each checkpoint location, the police stopped a predetermined number of vehicles, an officer approached the vehicle, advised the driver to produce a license and registration, and watched for signs of impairment and conducts an open-view examination of the vehicle.
• They could only do so with consent. A narcotics officer walked around the car with a dog. The whole stop was to be only two or three minutes.

Issue
• Whether "a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics" is constitutional.

Held
• No.
• First, the court reaffirmed that "a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of Fourth Amendment."
• The court also noted that it had "never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." In response to Indianapolis' assertion that the checkpoints "had the same ultimate purpose of arresting those suspected of committing crimes," the Court held that "there would be little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of the American life."
• The Court also dismissed Indianapolis' assertion that the drug problem was a social harm of the "first magnitude," instead, opting to consider "the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to the particular law enforcement practices as issue."

Discussion
• "We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime."
• Checkpoints were very visible, planned far in advance
• Primary purpose is the real issue
o Narcotics Dog isn't even relevant
• Martinez-Fuerte
o Fear of illegal aliens
• Sitz
o Getting drunk drivers off the road
• Gravity of threat alone cannot be dispositive of checkpoint
• Court needed to draw a line to have officers roadblock anything
Background
• The case was heard before the Supreme Court in February 2013, and a verdict was released four months later, in June 2013. Dr. Steven D. Schwinn's article titled "Fourth Amendment," published by the American Bar Association, best gives a full detailed progression of the case. Alonzo Jay King Jr. was arrested for first- and second-degree assault. As according to Maryland police protocol, the Maryland DNA Collection Act, a DNA sample was taken from King at the time of the arrest and entered into Maryland's database. It was matched to an unsolved rape case in 2003.
• A Maryland officer presented the evidence to a Wicomico County grand jury, which called for an indictment, procured a warrant to obtain a second buccal DNA sample that could be used as incriminating evidence for the 2003 rape case.

Procedural History
• King filed a motion to suppress the DNA evidence, stating that it infringed upon his Fourth Amendment rights, which prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. His motion was denied, and King pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape and appealed the ruling. The Maryland Court of Appeals then reversed the original ruling, agreeing that the DNA sampling was a violation of the Fourth Amendment and could not be used as evidence.
• The State of Maryland then appealed the ruling and called for the case to be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States.[1]

Decision
• The decision was close, 5-4 in favor of Maryland. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, filed a scathing dissenting opinion. The justices maintained that "categorically" and "without exception," "The Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for evidence of a crime when there is no basis for believing the person is guilty of the crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence" (133 S.Ct. at 1980). Some Supreme Court cases seem to contradict the claim.[2]

Dissent
• The dissent also warned that "because of today's decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason" (133 S. Ct. at 1999).
• Justice Scalia took the rare step of reading his dissent from the bench, "signaling deep disagreement" on the Court.

Implications
• Maryland v. King presented competing issues regarding social ethics and the law. The case deals with the issue of consent, because King did not give consent to a cheek swab that led to his DNA being entered into the Maryland CODIS database.[4] However, King did not find that to be an issue until after his arrest for a rape that took place nearly a decade earlier, predicated on the fact that his DNA matched DNA acquired from the original rape victim. Regardless of how the evidence was obtained, King was considered a danger to society because of his association with a prior violent crime.
• Trial court allows evidence in
• Maryland law in place did not violate the 4th Amendment
o Maryland's DNA Collection Act
• Issue is technological advances
o Court acknowledges DNA testing is widespread
Although those statutes vary in their particulars the case implicates more than just Maryland law
Broad overarching decision generally
o Argue not invasive check swab
No surgical intrusion
o Analogize DNA Sample to Identification Process
Part of the normal routine
Fingerprints, photographs, etc
o SC held the subject's knowledge or a right to refuse is not a requirement to establishing a voluntary search
o What if an undercover officer is invited into a home being used to distribute narcotics?
o What happens when a third party gives consent?
o Procedural Posture
Petitioner sought certiorari to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which vacated an order that denied a writ of habeas corpus to respondent and that remanded the case for further proceedings.
The court of appeals held that consent to a search could not be found solely from the absence of coercion and a verbal expression of assent.
o Overview
Respondent was brought to trial on a charge of possessing a check with intent to defraud. Respondent moved to suppress the introduction of certain material as evidence against him on the ground that the material had been acquired through a warrantless search and seizure that were unconstitutional.
The court of appeals vacated an order that denied the petition for habeas corpus relief on grounds that there was insufficient proof that respondent knew that he had a right to refuse to give his consent to the search.
The Court disagreed that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent was a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating "voluntary" consent.
Rather, the Court held that individual consent could only be ascertained by analyzing all of the circumstances.
The traditional definition of voluntariness, which the Court adhered to, did not require proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search.