Yes. The provision "if the Red Sox win the World Series" is an express condition. It is worth memorizing the definition of condition found in Restatement § 224: A condition is an event, not certain to occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a contract becomes due.
The Red Sox winning the World Series is an event. It is not certain to occur. And the event must occur before the performances under the contract are due. Therefore it is a condition. It is an express condition, because it is stated in the contract. Notice that the email exchange does not include that condition.
Is it nevertheless a term of the contract? Yes. A bit of review from Topic 7, Parol Evidence and Interpretation, may be helpful. To apply the parol evidence rule, we must determine whether the parties intended the writing to be their complete and exclusive agreement.
Here, it is unlikely that they intended this informal exchange to be their complete agreement on a $500,000 contract. And even if they did, Restatement § 217 states that an agreement is not integrated when there is an oral condition to its performance. Therefore, the condition is part of the agreement.
Let's go back to the contract for the construction of a house to certain specifications for $500,000 in Questions 115-17. Assume that the contractor did not contract around the default rule, and the $500,000 was payable on completion of his performance. After he told her the
house had been completed, the woman inspected it. She told the contractor, "You did not satisfy the condition of building the house to specifications. There is no molding around the bedroom ceilings and the lawn was not sodded. Therefore, I don't have to pay you."Is the woman correct?
(A) Yes, because an express condition was not satisfied.
(B) Yes, because the contractor has not brought about the
event that had to occur before her performance
(C) No, because the contractor substantially performed.
(D) No, because the contractor did not breach since his
failure to perform according to the specifications was
A lawyer, who was currently leasing space in a building owned by Alpha, wanted to lease space for her growing law practice in a building owned by Beta. However, the lawyer could not afford to pay rent on two places. On July 1, she signed a contract agreeing to lease space in
Beta's building commencing September 1, subject to her being released by Alpha from her current lease, and commencing January 1 if Alpha did not release her.By September 1, the lawyer had been unsuccessful in getting Alpha to release her from her current lease. Can Beta begin charging the lawyer rent as of September 1?
(A) Yes, because she promised to pay rent to Beta starting
(B) Yes, because she promised to induce Alpha to release
her from her present lease and she failed to do so.
(C) Yes, because otherwise Beta, who could not arrange to
lease the space to someone else if the lawyer was
unable to move in by or shortly after September 1,
would suffer a forfeiture if the space went unleased.
(D) No, because the lawyer's obligation to move in was
conditioned on Alpha releasing her from her current
Assume that the specifications for the woman's home in Question 115 stated that the contractor was to use exclusively "Acme No. 63" bricks in constructing the circular fireplace, hearth, and chimney. When the contractor ordered the bricks, his supplier told him he did not have a sufficient inventory of Acme No. 63 bricks to fill the order, and would not have them for another three weeks, which would set the construction schedule back considerably. The contractor found another style of brick, Brown No. F-17, which appeared to be identical in every respect to Acme No. 63 bricks, except that they had "Brown," rather than "Acme," molded into the face of each brick. Because the contractor intended to install the bricks so that the "logoed" side of the bricks was not showing anyway, he ordered a sufficient supply of Brown No. F-17 bricks to timely complete the job.Did the contractor materially breach its contract by using Brown bricks instead of Acme bricks?
(A) Yes, because the contractor's use of Brown bricks,
rather than Acme bricks, substantially deprived the
woman of the benefit of her bargain.
(B) Yes, because the contractor cannot adequately
compensate the woman for any diminution in the value
of the house to the woman as a result of the contractor's
use of Brown bricks rather than Acme bricks.
(C) Yes, because the contractor's substitution of Brown
bricks for Acme bricks was inconsistent with the
contractor's duty of good faith and fair dealing.
(D) No, because the contractor's use of Brown bricks when
Acme bricks proved to be unavailable in adequate
quantities did not substantially deprive the woman of
the benefit of her bargain, was consistent with the
contractor's duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the
contractor can adequately compensate the woman for
any diminution in the value of the house as a result of
the contractor's use of Brown bricks rather than Acme