Also secured warrant authorizing them to install overtly and monitor a gps tracking device on car
Warrant required this to be installed by 10 days in DC but was installed on the 11th day in Maryland
Learned he was expecting cocaine in october
Police executed warrants for number of locations and recovered cash, cocaine, weapons, and drug paraphernalia that resulted in multiple crimes against jones
Reversed conviction on basis of warrantless use of the gps device to monitor movement violated search and seizure
4th amendment protections do not extend to matters knowingly exposed to public
Person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another
Length of particular surveillance does not determine whether it constitutes a search
Attachment of gps yielded no info on its own (just created potential for information gathering) nor did it interfere with jones full use of car; therefore it was not a search or seizure
Had a reasonable expectation of privacy that gov't would not intrude on his property to affix a gps without knowledge or consent
Warrantless government gps surveillance is a grave and novel threat to personal privacy and security
Although a person traveling on public thoroughfares knowingly exposes himself to visual observations, he does not knowingly offer gps data to public viewing
Encroachment on 4th amendment rights is particularly serious when it occurs over a prolonged period of time
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones's' vehicle, without a warrant, constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court rejected the government's argument that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's movement on public thoroughfares and emphasized that the Fourth Amendment provided some protection for trespass onto personal property.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that the government had obtained information by usurping Jones' property and by invading his privacy. However, she further reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was not only concerned with trespasses onto property. She stated that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, which is particularly important in an era where physical intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.
Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment but criticized the framing of the question in terms of trespass to property. He believed that such a construction of the problem strained the language of the Fourth Amendment and that it would be better to analyze the case by determining whether the Government violated Jones' reasonable expectations of privacy.
Does not replace olmstead
Combined space is larger
Jones expanded protections under 4th amendment
Bloomingdale police received anonymous letter that sue and lance gates were selling drugs and gave them the details of their next dropoff and other details
Police verified points made in this letter and the flight reservation
Police obtain warrant to search car and home based on top and corroboration of facts
Gates' attorney argued that the judge should exclude the evidence because under aguilar-spinelli, policed lacked sufficient probable cause
The letter failed to state how the writer came across that information, a requirement under aguilar-spinelli
A-S test's requirement that informant's basis of knowledge be revealed was satisfied by detailed information in the letter
A-S test's requirement that police establish the veracity of informant's tip was satisfied by police corroboration of the facts stated in the letter and the fact that the informant had no reason to law
Although the requirements of a-s were met, test should be replaced by a new rule or a reinterpretation of precedent that imposes a simpler, more practical standard for the use of hearsay evidence to establish probable cause
Application for a warrant did not adequately establish how the informant acquired his knowledge
Police did not satisfy the requirement that the credibility of the informant be established; police did not know who the informant was and they verified very few of facts contained in informant's letter
Lower court correctly ruled under a-s test, probably cause was not sufficiently established and warrant should not be issued
The Court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the test for probable cause which the Court had announced in Spinelli v. United States (1969).
Justice Rehnquist argued that an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are important in determining probable cause, but that those issues are intertwined and should not be rigidly applied.
He argued that the "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to probable cause was the correct one to glean from Spinelli, and that the law enforcement officials who obtained a warrant abided by it in this case. -- if convinced that probable cause exists, a judge may issue a warrant that specifically defines area to be searched and people or things to be seized -- only seize things listed in the warrant unless those things found warrant a crime
They also have to execute warrant in orderly and timely fashion
With these requirements, search and seizure are likely to be reasonable
Exceptions to warrant requirement: searches incident to valid arrest, loss of evidence searches, consent searches, safely searches, plain view searches
More protection of searches and seizures in some places than others: courts
Police received unverified tip that weed was being grown of home of jardines
His home was placed under surveillance but blinds were drawn and there was no movement
Dog smelled weed so they obtained warrant and discovered weed plants and other evidence of drug trafficking
Jardines moved to suppress weed plants because he said the canine search was unreasonable
Florida supreme court upheld decision of trial court to exclude evidence because it was unsupported by probable cause and warrant would be invalid based on information gathered in search
Dog sniff is not a search requiring a warrant but an accepted, centuries-old law enforcement procedure
Warrantless sniffs by drug detection dogs in other contexts (traffic stops, airports, bus stations, etc.) have been constitutionally upheld
The drug detection dog remained on the ordinary path to the front door customarily opened to visitors
Use of trained narcotic dog to sniff at front door of home to reveal details inside the home that the officer is unable to perceive without a physical intrusion into the home is a search requiring a warrant based on probable cause
Area adjacent to door is constitutionally protected as the home itself; therefore a warrantless approach to the front door with a detection dog violates the 4th amendment
The Court held that the front porch of a home is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Typically, ordinary citizens are invited to enter onto the porch, either explicitly or implicitly, to communicate with the house's occupants. Police officers, however, cannot go beyond the scope of that invitation.
Entering a person's porch for the purposes of conducting a search requires a broader license than the one commonly given to the general public. Without such a license, the police officers were conducting an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Elena Kagan wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that the case dealt with privacy issues as well as the property issues the majority opinion addressed. People have a heightened expectation of privacy in their homes and the areas immediately surrounding their homes, and in this case, the police violated that expectation. Because the police officers used a device (a drug-sniffing dog) not in public use to learn details about the home, Justice Kagan argued that an illegal search had been conducted.
Instances where there is low expectations or other interests that reduce the level of justification necessary for a search:
Open fields - even when they're privately owned - anyone can walk through and fly over it
Jails, prisons, inmates
Exceptions: p. 488-489
Trespass: difference is that drug dog has different capacities
Purpose was intent to search; matters with trespass because he did not get explicit permission or implicit permission
CURTILAGE: reference as space around house; same constitutional protection as the house
Redding, 13 year old girl, was called away from class by assistant principal
Shown an unzipped day planner containing several knives, lighters, a permanent marker, and a cigarette
Admitted the day planner was hers but said she lent it to a friend and none of the items were here
Principal then showed redding 4 prescription pill bottles and 1 over the counter pol and told her he received report she was going to give them to students at lunch time
Redding denied and agreed to let him search her belongings but they found nothing
Nurse was instructed to search her clothes for pills and they found no pills
Mother filed suit against school for strip searching her
Searches of students in public school do not require probable cause, only reasonable suspicion (NJ v. TLO)
Reasonable suspicion is less than probable cause
Search was valid from its inception because there were reasonable grounds to believe she was violating drug policy
Given the place pills can be hidden, the scope of search was reasonable and extended no farther than necessary; search was brief and conducted in private by female school officials; she was not touched during the search
Info available to school officials would not give them reasonable suspicion to believe redding was hiding pills in her undergarments
Student who supplied key info lacked credibility
Search was invasive, degrading, and traumatizing, and far more exxtensive in scope that circumstances warranted
Amount of justification required for a student search should depend on the extensiveness of the search; greater justification is necessary for a strip search than a backpack search
Age and gender undoubtedly influenced court
Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers.
the Court reiterated that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."
Here, school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to her underwear.
The Court also held that the implicated school administrators were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment."
It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right
Police in burbank, CA received top from person of unproven reliability identifying stewart and sanchez as drug dealers
Informant said they kept small quantities of drugs in their house and a larger inventory at another residence
Police began surveillance of the house where they spotted a car belonging to del castillo who had history of drug possession which led them to Leon
Based on observation, continued relevance, and information from a second informant, officer rombach obtained a search warrant
Warrant seized large quantities of drugs and the 4 were arrested
Argued warrant was invalid because original informant lacked credibility and because much of the informant's info was based on observations from 5 months prior so judge did not have probable cause to issue warrant
Government admitted defendants had valid point but argued that they shouldn't throw out entire case because of a defective warrant
Officers acted in good faith and the police believed they had a legit warrant and acted accordingly
As a judicially create rule, the exclusionary rule may be modified by the court in light of experience
Only justification for exclusionary rule is its presumed deterrent effect on unlawful police conduct; should not be applied to situations where it would not have a deterrent effect on police behavior
Costs of exclusionary rule outweigh its benefits when applied to evidence obtained from a search that a reasonably well trained officer would not have recognized as violating the 4th amendment
Court should apply a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in cases, like this one, where police faithfully observe search and seizure rule
Good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to search warrants would bar any meaningful review of a magistrate's decision
4th amendment is not self-executing and the exclusionary rule operates as a disincentive to violating the constitution
Exclusionary rule results in the loss of very few convictions; in the vast majority of cases evidence gathered pursuant to a warrant is validly obtained
4th amendment rights are too fundamental to be subjected to a cost-benefit analysis
Yes, there is such an exception.
Good faith exception: objectively and reasonably rely on warrant
Validity of warrant
The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant could be introduced at trial.
The exclusionary rule, argued the majority, is not a right but a remedy justified by its ability to deter illegal police conduct.
In Leon, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits. The exclusionary rule is costly to society: Guilty defendants go unpunished and people lose respect for the law.
The benefits of the exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot deter police in a case like Leon, where they act in good faith on a warrant issued by a judge.
Letting people go free when police make an honest mistake
Exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct
Police obtained properly issued warrant to search home of hudson for drugs and firearms
At arrival, police knocked and announced their presence
Officers did not wait a reasonable amount of time for him to answer (3 to 5 seconds) before they entered
Inside they found surprised hudson and proceeded to search finding a large quantity of illegal drugs and loaded gun
Charged with unlawful possession of drugs and firearms
Attorneys argued that evidence should be excluded from trial because police had failed to comply with the traditional "knock and announce" rule that requires police executing a search to wit a reasonable amount of time for the occupant to respond before entering a home
Violation of knock and announce rule; failure to announce can lead to:
Invasion of privacy
Personal harm (ex. Someone shooting you because they think you are a threat)
Evidence found inside home following a knock and announce violation is the fruit of an illegal search because violation renders the entry illegal; evidence so gathered should be inadmissible
Inevitable discovery exception does not apply because there is no independent source for evidence
Exclusionary rule is the only available deterrent to knock and announce violations
Exclusionary rule is premised on the existence of a causal relationship between the incriminating evidence and the constitutional violation that furnished it; that is, had the police not engaged in unlawful conduct, they would not have obtained the evidence
If the case of knock-and-announce violation there is no such causal relationship: the same evidence would have been found if the officers had knocked and then waited longer than 3 to 5 seconds before entering
Court ruled that evidence need not be excluded when police violate the "knock-and-announce" rule.
The opinion by Justice Scalia reaffirmed the validity of both the knock-and-announce rule and the "exclusionary rule" for evidence obtained by police in most cases of Fourth Amendment violation.
However, the majority held that the exclusionary rule could not be invoked for evidence obtained after a knock-and-announce violation, because the interests violated by the abrupt entry of the police "have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence."
Justice Scalia wrote that the knock-and-announce rule was meant to prevent violence, property-damage, and impositions on privacy, not to prevent police from conducting a search for which they have a valid warrant.
The Court also found that the social costs of the exclusionary rule as applied to the knock-and-announce rule outweighed any possible "deterrence benefits," and that alternative measures such as civil suits and internal police discipline could adequately deter violations.
Scalia: "our last resort, not our first impulse" on suppression of evidence
Police arrested escobedo for murdering his brother in law
Attempted to interrogate im but on advice of his lawyer, he refused to make any statements and was released
Escobedo's friend who was also in custody told police escobedo murdered him because he abused and mistreated his sister
Escobedo and sister arrested; told him his friend already confessed so he might as well confess but he refused
Asked to see his attorney; police refused
Attorney came to see him and asked to see him multiple times but was denied access
Police questioned him for 14 hours before he made damaging statements
Appealed saying he was denied his right to cancel
Circumstances of interrogation render statements involuntary; objectionable conditions included failure of police to advise him of his rights, his being held incommunicado, his youthfulness and minority status, the length of his interrogation, and the deliberate deception practiced by police
He was denied right to counsel even though he wanted to see his attorney and his attorney was available and wanted to see him
His incriminating statements were voluntarily given; consulted with his attorney daily during 10 days following murder; was advised to remain silent by his attorney; no reason to believe he was less than normal in intelligence, maturity, and judgement
Court has never held right to counsel begins at arrest or applies to questioning immediately after arrest
"an absolute right to remain silent."
Escobedo had not been adequately informed of his constitutional right to remain silent rather than to be forced to incriminate himself.
The case has lost authority as precedent as the arguments in police interrogation and confession cases have shifted from the Sixth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment, emphasizing whether the appropriate warnings have been given and given correctly, and whether the right to remain silent has been waived.
If attorney present, it is unlikely that police would use even subtle methods to coerce a confession
Held that right to counsel begins at accusatory stage, defined as the point at which the investigation ceases to be general and focuses on a specific individual
Right is in effect for every critical stage of the process, which includes all interrogations
Time is factor:
Miranda allegedly kidnapped and raped a woman
Police arrested him and interrogated him
After 2 hours of questioning, miranda confessed
No evidence of any police misbehavior during the interrogation and at no point during questioning did miranda request an attorney
Because of gideon v. wainwright, which mandated all indigent criminal defendants receive a defense attorney at government expense, the trial judge appointed a lawyer to defend miranda
Attorney provided an inadequate defense -- wanted to prove miranda was mentally defective or insane
Failed; miranda hired new attorneys who presented different arguments to supreme court
Under 5th and 6th amendments, arrested persons have right to counsel when interrogated by police
Providing counsel to suspects does not unduly handicap the police in doing their work
Skilled interrogators can easily compel confessions from ignorant individuals without legal representation; providing legal assistance after a confession has been made is of little help of the suspect
In order to reduce the inherently coercive atmosphere of police interrogation, police should inform suspects of their right to counsel and their right to have the opportunity to consult counsel prior to being questioned
Nothing in this case justifies a rule of the constitutional impact and proportions sought by the petitioner
Miranda's confession was not coerced; he had sufficient education and emotional stability to understand what he was doing; no brutality or other coercive police behavior; questioning was of relatively short duration
Unlike escobedo, miranda did not have an attorney and did not request to see one, and the police did not deny him that right
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination is available in all settings.
Therefore, prosecution may not use statements arising from a custodial interrogation of a suspect unless certain procedural safeguards were in place.
Such safeguards include proof that the suspect was aware of his right to be silent, that any statement he makes may be used against him, that he has the right to have an attorney present, that he has the right to have an attorney appointed to him, that he may waive these rights if he does so voluntarily, and that if at any points he requests an attorney there will be no further questioning until the attorney arrives.
You have to tell people you have right to remain silent:
So you know you have that right
So they know consequences of remaining silent
The Court held that, in each of the cases, the interrogation techniques used did not technically fall into the category of coercive, but they failed to ensure that the defendant's decision to speak with the police was entirely the product of his own free will.
When they take suspect into custody, police required to provide warnings before interrogation
Custody means the any situation where suspect is under police control and may not freely leave
Not confined to formal interrogation rooms at police stations
Relatively broad interpretation of interrogation: justices ruled that any police action designed to elicit statements from a suspect's falls under the definition of interrogation and must be preceded by miranda warning
Burden of proving every aspect of rights outlined in 5th amendment on law enforcement
Communicates to person that police are aware of
Custody exception: any kind of traffic stop (custodial interrogation - situation in which the suspect's freedom of movement is restrained, even if he is not under arrest)
Interrogation: say or do anything to elicit testimony
Focuses on police interrogation that evolved from oregon v. elstad
tip provided by a neighbor during burglary investigation then elstad made incriminating statements before officers could advise him of self-incrimination rights
Elstad arrested and took him to station where he was advised of rights and he made full confession
Trial court judge did not allow the statements made at home but allowed confession from station
Appeal to SC: trial court ruled correctly
Seibert's son died and she feared she would be charged with child neglect because her son had a bad case of bedsores
To avoid charges, she and her 2 teenage sons and 2 of their friends devised a plan to conceal the facts
Decided to set phone on fire to make it seem like he died in accidental fire
Planned to leave donald rector, mentally ill teenager, in when fire was set: he died
Police took seibert into custody but they did not provide her with miranda warnings
Interrogated for 40 minutes where she made incriminating statements
Turned on tape recorder and gave seibert her miranda warnings
Seibert waived her rights and police resumed questioning
Asked seibert to repeat her incriminating statements and she did
Police admitted withholding miranda was a conscious decision but was following a technique he was taught: question first, then give miranda warnings, and finally question again with goal tf getting suspect to repeat
Trial court said admission was allowed because precedent set in oregon v. elstad but state sc reversed
Miranda imposes only a narrow exclusionary rule governing the admissibility of unwarned statements made during custodial interrogations
Oregon v. elstad established voluntary statements after miranda warnings have been given are admissible even if similar statements were previously obtained without miranda warnings
Constitution is not violated when police as questions without miranda warnings; only occurs when those statements are introduced as evidence in court; statements made without miranda warnings are already inadmissible; no other remedy is needed
All statements made following a willful and unreasonable refusal by police to give miranda warnings should be inadmissible
If court approves police strategy used here, it will encourage nationwide evasion of the spirit of miranda
Ulink in elsad, the "two part" interrogation used here was essentially one long interrogation period with miranda warnings intentionally not given until police extracted a confession under these circumstances, seibert's restarted confession was not voluntarily given
In a decision with no majority, a four-justice plurality found that the post-Miranda confession is only admissible - even if the two-stage interview was unintentional, as it was in Elstad - if the Miranda warning and accompanying break are sufficient to give the suspect the reasonable belief that she has the right not to speak with the police.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a concurring opinion that provided the fifth vote, found that evaluating the warning and accompanying break was only necessary if the police used the two-stage interrogation intentionally. Justice Kennedy wrote, "The admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to be governed by Elstad's principles unless the deliberate two-step strategy is employed. Then, the postwarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before they were made."
Even if you do give miranda, testimony is not guaranteed admissibleJust bc u give someone miranda doesn't mean u can use it in court
Unconstitutional to use post miranda testimony
Good faith exception
Furman v. Georgia:
Effectively stops death penalty temporarily
Way it's being executed today, it's cruel and unusual -- found it was very race based
Wasn't a lot of detail
Gregg v. Georgia:
After furman - unconstitutional
Wanted to get new plans
Introduced plan at the heart of it was bifurcated trial: 2 stages
Guilty: prosecution can seek death penalty at the penalty stage where the defense attorney presents mitigating facts (individual's record, family responsibility, psychiatric reports, chances for rehabilitation, and age) while the prosecution has to demonstrate that at least one codified aggravating factor was present
New jury is important: jurors in the first phase see wider arrange of evidence
Georgia specified ten aggravating factors including: murders committed while offender was engaged in the commission of another capital offense, murder of a judicial officer or district attorney because of his duty, murders that are outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhumane
After hearing both sides, they jury determines whether the convicted individual receives the death penalty
Law sought to reduce jury discretion and eliminate the arbitrary application of death penalty found unacceptable in furman and GA SC would review all jury determinations of death
Individual identified gregg and friend as possible assailants
Tried and convicted
Received death penaltY
Georgia capital punishment law allows discretionary judgements that subject defendants to arbitrary imposition of the death penalty
No legitimate penal purpose of the state justifies the extreme cruelty of extinguishing human life
8th amendment prohibits arbitrary exceptions being made to limitations on the state's power to punish
Penalty of death is an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment considering the evolving standards of decency of the last quarter of the twentieth century
Georgia death penalty are characterized by meaningful discretion
The death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual punishment condemned by the 8th or 14th amendment of the constitution
Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances.
In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed.
Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases.
Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.
Standards of decency have not evolved yet -- people are still okay with it
Atkins and jones wanted to buy more alcohol but after realizing they didn't have enough money, they decided to rob a customer
Shot and killed airman
Atkins and jones were originally charged with capital murder but jones was permitted to plead guilty in exchange of his testimony against atkins, making him ineligible for death penalty
Atkins sentenced to death but VA SC ordered a new penalty phase of the trial because the trial court had used an improper verdict form
2nd hearing: atkins was found to be mentally retarded but prosecution said he might have antisocial personality disorder, but he was at least of average intelligence
Sentenced to death
Appealed on grounds that it was unconstitutional to execute an individual who is intellectually disabled
An intellectual disability impairs understanding and functioning in ways that substantially reduce personal culpability
A sentence of death is grossly disproportionate to the person culpability of mentally retarded individuals
Executing the mentally retarded offends our society's "evolving standards of decency", requiring penry v. lynaugh to be overruled
Court correctly decided in penry that the retarded should be treated as individuals, not as a homogenous class; penry with the degree of culpability should be reaffirmed
Not all those intellectual disabilities lack capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty
Insufficient evidence to establish the existence of national consensus for removing all retarded persons from execution eligibility
Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
Since it last confronted the issue, the Court reasoned that a significant number of States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.
Moreover, the Court concluded that there was serious concern whether either justification underpinning the death penalty - retribution and deterrence of capital crimes - applies to mentally retarded offenders, due to their lessened culpability.
"Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender,"
Retribution with mentally handicapped defendants is different because culpability is less