Terms in this set (16)
Hume on Free Will
- soft determinist
- maintains that we have freedom (doctrine of liberty) and that determinism (doctrine of necessity) holds
- believes that the free will debate suffers from a lack of clarity
- actions and feelings can be virtuous and vicious
- sometimes be bestow praise or blame on people for their actions
- we bestow praise and blame only for voluntary actions
Ayer "Freedom and Necessity"
- to have free will, your actions must not be constrained or compelled in certain ways
Frankfurt "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of Person"
- distinguishes persons from other non-human animals by appealing to their capacity to have second-order desires
- does not think it is sufficient for a human to count as a person if they have second order desires; they also need second order volitions
Free Will and van Inwagen
- argues that free will is incompatible with determinism
Lewis's "Are we Free to Break the Laws"
- thinks that compatibilism does entail that we can break the laws, but there are two interpretations of "breaking the laws:" a weak interpretation and a strong interpretation
- it is objectionable that we can break the laws in a sense of the strong interpretation, but compatibilism only maintains that we can break the laws in the sense of the weak interpretation
Pereboom's "Determinism al dente"
- distinguishes between different varieties of determinism
- there are harder and softer versions of hard and soft determinism
- opts for soft hard determinism (al dente)
- explains how and why we can preserve certain moral attitudes under determinism al dente, even though we are not free on thus view not do we deserve moral praise and blame for our actions
Chisholm's "Freedom and the Self"
- maintains that we have free will and determinism is false
- argues for immanent causation
Clarke's "Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Actions"
- explains what it is for an agent to cause an event
- explains how to have an account of agent causation which allows actions/events to be both agent caused and event caused
- differs from Chisholm's account, which takes free actions to only be agent caused
Frankfurt and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
- it's natural to think that if you are morally responsible for an action, then you "could have done otherwise," or "had the power or ability to do something different than what you in fact did"
- Frankfurt thinks this is a misguided thought, no matter what your intuitive stance on the free will debate is
Ginet "In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I don't find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing"
- Ginet is not convinced by Frankfurt's counterexamples to PAP
Strawson's Freedom and Resentment
- draws a distinction between the types of attitudes we take toward one another: reactive attitudes and objective attitudes
- Reactive attitudes include ones of moral praise and blame
- he argues for what he calls "The optimistic viewpoint:" he thinks that even if determinism is true, we can and should still have reactive attitudes toward one another
- he doesn't try to establish this point by propounding a compatibilist account of free will
- he claims he does not even know what determinism is really
- does not think that any views about free will we have seen are viable
- he thinks that all of them are doomed to failure because we are in an impossible predicament
- any account of free will that satisfies our desires will be self-undermining
- in making this point, Nagel argues that our reflections on free will essentially involve a clash of "subjective" and "objective" standpoints
Wolf's "Asymmetrical Freedom"
- typically, we think we need to know whether a person is free in order to determine whether the person is a moral agent
- Wolf believes the situation is reversed
- our characterization of freedom should be "value-laden"
- we must understand moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness in order to understand human freedom
- moral praise and blame should be treated differently and provide distinct conditions on freedom
Fischer "My Compatibilism"
- argues for a view called "Semi-compatibilism"
- the view is compatibilistic in that it maintains that being morally responsible is compatible with the truth of determinism
- it is incompatible in that it accepts the validity of the consequences argument, which maintains that free will and determinism are not compatible
Salmon's "Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Science"
- discusses different formulations of determinism in scientific practice
- explains whether certain leading scientific theories count as deterministic.
- also discusses the relation between determinism and explanation