Terms in this set (80)

• Victory by changing or paralyzing enemy senior leadership
• Core assumptions are not only about technology and weapon
• Also make assumptions about the nature of the enemy
• States rely on commands from national leaders
• These leaders rely on communication systems from elite to elite
• As they become more sophisticated, they become more brittle
• National command posts, television stations, radio transmitters are prominent, stationary targets
• Since the 1990s, leaders have focused on leadership decapitation
• Plan to incapacitate Saddam Hussein before the First Gulf War
• Wanted to go for "head of the snake," ie. Milosevic
• For modern air power advocates, decapitation has the advantage of minimizing collateral damage and focusing on just a critical target set
• Warden's target set for the first Gulf War had 84 targets
• Decapitation with precision air power has failed or backfired in all 8 cases in which it has ben tried
• Qaddafi in 1986
o We accidentally killed his 3 year old daughter
• Hussein in First Gulf War
o First in 1991, Instant Thunder
• Hussein in 1998
o Desert Fox, attacked 100 targets in and around Baghdad
o Wanted to go back with better intelligence
o CIA gave eavesdropping equipment to the UN Inspection Team
• Hussein in 2003
o Opened the war when we thought we had Saddam in our gunsites
o We killed the CIA agent
• In April 1996, the Russians assassinated the Chechyan leader
o Yeltsin said he wanted to negotiate a ceasefire over the phone
o Dudayev gets killed while he's on the cell phone which was beaming out a signal
o They get a new leader and kick the Russians out
• March 1999 US launched a three day air war to coerce Milosevic some peace accords
o Three day air war did not work
o 40,000 troops move into Kosovo to displace 900,000 Kosovar Albanians
• 2001 Opening Strikes in Afghanistan
o Tried to topple a Taliban leader
• 2006 Israel tries to kill the Hezbollah leader
• In each of these, failure or backfire.
o There are several core problems in decapitation.
• The ability to destroy a target is not the central problem.
• The target sets are small.
• Decapitation is primarily a function of highly accurate intelligence.
• Killing the leader under these circumstances is relatively easy.
• Everyone assumes they're being wiretapped.
• Its impact is really on denial.
• 1. Local ground threat (KLA) and NATO Tactical Air Power
• Although the KLA grew stronger during the course of the war, there is no evidence that the KLA could seize and take control of territory anytime soon.
• No offensive victories.
• Serb army had a lot of heavy artillery and troops, all in good condition.
• This is a non-starter.
• 2. Threat by NATO to inflict punishment on Serbian civilian
• Has some plausibility.
• Kosovo may be an exception to the general rule.
• Strategic air power was in fact in the process of destroying Serbia's economic infrastructure.
• We had destroyed bridges and oil refining capability.
• On May 23, we knocked out 70% of Serbia's electric power (a carbon fiber attack).
o "a cool , neat, new attack"
• Ultimately fails:
o 1. We did not inflict a lot of pain. We had killed 500 civilians. Pretty low.
o 2. We know something about the structure of the bombing that we were hitting week by week. After the war, Serbia came out with a 500 page damage assessment with every target we had hit. The air campaign peters out after the Chinese embassy bombing, right when the coercion should have been ramping up.
o 3. 50% of economy gone, with no concessions offered.
o 4. No evidence of popular revolt against Milosevic.
• 3. Threat of NATO ground invasion + a Russian carrot
• Russia's willingness to help Serbia seize a portion of Serbia, this could only happen if he surrendered immediately
• Starting in early May, there were efforts to negotiate with the Finns and the Russians
• Clinton would have approved ground options if Milosevic had not surrendered, 37,000 NATO troops are mobilized
• Russian came to Belgrade with a carrot
o Russians had a plan to partition Kosovo whether NATO liked it or not

o Pape thinks:
• 1. It's implausible that Milosevic surrendered due to the KLA.
• 2. Possible because of strategic attack.
• 3. The best option is the threat of NATO ground forces with Russian carrots.