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Terms in this set (89)

D was arrested for driving with a suspended license shortly after getting out of his car. He was handcuffed and then put in the back of a police car. With D secured in the police car, officers proceeded to search the passenger compartment of his vehicle and found a gun and cocaine. D was charged with possession of a narcotic drug and drug paraphernalia.
The arrestee was securely restrained, deprived of the ability to reach for a weapon, and police could not reasonably believe that it was possible to find evidence related to the crime of arrest in his car.
Both reasons make the subsequent search of D's car unreasonable.
Police may search a vehicle after a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe that crime-related evidence is located in the vehicle.
Considering Chimel and Belton together, we hold that police can search a vehicle after the occupant's recent arrest only when arrestee is unrestrained and within reach of the passenger compartment, and objects within it.
Following Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004), we also affirm that police, having stopped a vehicle, can search for evidence only when it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."
Police may search a vehicle after a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe that crime-related evidence is located in the vehicle.
The police, responding to a domestic disturbance call made by his wife, arrived at D's house. When the police arrived at the house, D's wife proceeded to tell them that D used cocaine. The police asked for permission to search the home for evidence. Randolph's wife gave consent but D, who was present with his wife, refused. Based on the wife's consent, the police proceeded to search the home despite D's objections and discovered cocaine in D's bedroom. Over D's objections, the cocaine was admitted into evidence at trial because, the court reasoned, D's wife had the authority to consent to the search. The court of appeals reversed and the state supreme court affirmed.
Here, the police sought entry into the home to look for evidence and they did not claim exigent circumstances to preserve evidence or protect D's wife. D was physically present when his wife gave consent and he flatly refused to give permission for the search. Therefore, the police search was unreasonable.
The police may not enter a home without a warrant to search for evidence where they obtain consent from an occupant but a co-occupant is present and objects to the search.
When there are two occupants of a dwelling present and one is consenting to a search by the police and the other is objecting to the search, the police may not enter the home and conduct a warrantless search for evidence.
The holding in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S 164 (1974), that the police may search a home with consent of a co-occupant even when another occupant later objects, is premised on social expectations and commonly held assumptions about people sharing a home. In Matlock, the primary assumptions at issue involved the equal authority of all of the occupants and the assumption of risk when living with others.
Therefore, when one occupant who is present expressly objects to a police search, the consent of another occupant actually provides no additional authority to the police to enter absent a warrant or exigent circumstances.
San Francisco ordinance authorized city building inspectors to enter buildings to perform any duty imposed upon them by the municipal code. City building inspectors sought to inspect the apartment. D refused to let the inspectors enter his home without a warrant, and he was charged with violating a provision of the municipal code that made it illegal to refuse a lawful inspection.
Here, the type of area code inspection at issue in this case is a "reasonable" search because: there is a long history of judicial and public acceptance of such inspections

The public has an interest in the prevention and abatement of dangerous conditions. No other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results

D had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search his home.
Special Probable Cause Standard for Administrative Searches: Probable cause exists to issue a warrant to inspect premises for administrative code violations as long as there are reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection that are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.
Administrative searches are significant intrusions upon the privacy and security interests, so such searches are subject to the same probable cause requirement. And these inspections involve a relatively limited invasion of the inhabitant's privacy.

"Probable cause" for an area code enforcement inspection exists if reasonable legislative and administrative standards for conducting the area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.
Police entered a junkyard in Brooklyn, New York owned by D to inspect the premises. D did not have a license or a record book of his inventory, as required by New York law. D made no objection to the inspection. Police found stolen vehicles and arrested D.
The New York law in this case meets these requirements. Automobile dismantling businesses in New York and other states are required to maintain licenses and records, thus it is a heavily regulated industry where business owners have a reduced expectation of privacy. There is a substantial state interest in reducing auto theft, which is a major problem with serious repercussions in the state. Inspections of dismantlers are necessary to prevent the sale of stolen vehicles. Lastly, the statute provides adequate notice to business owners of the inspection scheme and appropriately limits the discretion of inspectors.
A business in a closely regulated industry may be searched without a warrant so long as the searches are necessary, there is a substantial government interest, and the authorizing statute serves the functions of a warrant.
Warrantless inspections of businesses operating in heavily regulated industries are permitted under the following three conditions. First, the inspection program must serve a substantial governmental interest. Next, the inspections must be necessary to serve that interest. Finally, the authorizing statute must serve as a substitute for a warrant. This means that the statute must provide notice to business owners of the scope of the inspection scheme and specifically limit the authority of inspectors.
Customs officials noted the number of trips D had made into the country and questioned her. The officials did not believe D's story that she had come into the country with no hotel reservation, appointments, checks, or credit cards in order to buy items for sale in Columbia. Officials believed D was smuggling drugs. A patdown and strip search revealed that D was wearing two pairs of underwear and her stomach was firm. Officials believed D was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. After the inspector was unable to book a return flight to Columbia, D was held for observation for over 16 hours until a court order authorizing an x-ray and rectal exam was obtained. Drugs were found, D was arrested.
There was no violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the ruling of the lower court is reversed.
A person entering the country may be subjected to more intrusive searches than routine border searches, if there is reasonable suspicion that drugs are being smuggled in that person's alimentary canal.
People and property entering the country may be searched without probable cause or a warrant. In addition, if there is reasonable suspicion that drugs are being smuggled inside a person's alimentary canal, that person may be subjected to additional detention and search. Reasonable suspicion is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person" of the criminal activity. Indeed, the nature of this type of smuggling makes it unlikely that officials would ever have probable cause. The customs officials in this case had reasonable suspicion the Montoya de Hernandez was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal based on the surrounding circumstances, experience and training, and common sense. D's lengthy detention was reasonable in light of the manner of smuggling she chose.
D established a drunk driving checkpoint system. All vehicles passing through the checkpoint would be stopped and officers would briefly examine the drivers of the vehicles to determine if they were intoxicated. Where the officer believed the driver to be intoxicated, the driver would need to show his license and registration, further sobriety tests would be conducted, and arrest would be made if the tests so warranted. All other drivers would be immediately sent on their way and the average duration of each stop was twenty-five seconds. During seventy-five minutes of operation, 126 vehicles passed through one checkpoint, two drivers were detained for further sobriety testing and two drivers were arrested for drunk driving.
Plaintiff filed a complaint the day before the checkpoint went into effect, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
The checkpoint at issue is sufficiently effective and reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, drunk driving checkpoint system is constitutional, and the judgment of the state appeals court is reversed.
In Brown v. Texas(1979), the Court established a three prong test to determine the constitutionality of this checkpoint.
Considered is the state's interest in preventing drunk driving accidents
Drunk driving is a huge problem in the United States and the states have a strong interest in preventing them.
Considered is the effectiveness of such checkpoints in achieving this goal.
Consider is the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoint. The objective intrusion on a motorist is minimal since the length of the average stop was merely 25 seconds. The subjective intrusion is also slight because it is determined based on the fear and surprise that a reasonable, law-abiding driver would experience.
During the time the checkpoint was in operation, 1.6 percent of drivers were arrested for drunk driving. The national average is one percent of motorists stopped at checkpoints are arrested for driving drunk. Therefore, while another method may be proven more effective, law enforcement techniques are left to the police and not the courts.
In order to interdict illegal drugs, the city began to set up vehicle checkpoints in 1998. The city had six such checkpoints, and between August and November of 1998 it stopped 1,161 vehicles and arrested 104 motorists. Fifty five of the arrests were for drug related offenses, while forty nine were unrelated to drugs. The procedure is as follows: At each checkpoint the police stop a predetermined number of vehicles, and the driver is asked for a license and the car registration. The driver in each case is inspected for signs of impairment. The directives authorize that the police can conduct a search only by consent or if they have "particularized suspicion." The officers must stop each car in a particular sequence, and they cannot stop vehicles out of sequence. A dog was used to sniff around the car. Moreover, officers have no discretion to vary the predetermined plan for the checkpoint search.
Plaintiffs were stopped at such a checkpoint in September 1998. They filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all motorists who were, or would be, stopped. Plaintiffs claimed the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
A suspicionless roadside checkpoint established for the purpose of deterring general criminal activity is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. We proceed under the assumption that stopping a vehicle represents a seizure. We must determine whether such seizure is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), we ruled that a roadside checkpoint was constitutional because the primary purpose of the program was to ensure highway safety by stopping and arresting motorists who might be impaired by alcohol. In Sitz, there was an obvious connection between the need for highway safety and the means employed to effect such safety. Absent some quantum of individualized suspicion, which would justify a stop, such roadblocks are unconstitutional. Even if the plaintiffs claim that a legitimate secondary purpose of the program is to keep impaired motorists off the road and verify licenses and registration, we cannot give sanction to the program. For it would be easy to institute all manner of illegal searches as long as license verifications were included, just to make the search "legal."
Assistant principal of the middle school confronted D about certain belongings including painkillers, which were generally banned under school rules without advance permission. She denied accusation of possession and selling to classmates and allowed a search of her belongings, which revealed no proscribed items. The principal then asked a female administrative helper to take D to the school nurse's office to search her clothes. The helper and the nurse asked D to remove her jacket, socks, and shoes. Finding nothing, they then asked her to remove her stretch pants and T-shirt. Still finding nothing, they told her to remove her bra and to shake it, as well as to pull out the elastic on her underwear.
D's privacy interests surely were violated by this search, and there are no countervailing governmental interests that could justify the extreme type of intrusion that it posed. There was simply no reasonable suspicion to suspect that D was hiding the painkillers in her bra or underwear.
A school-related strip search of an adolescent, conducted without probable cause, is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.
The search must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Reasonable suspicion is the standard for school-related searches.
Applying the standard articulated in T.L.C., we believe that the intimate search was not "reasonably related to the objectives of the search." an invasive search for non-dangerous drugs in D's intimate places is not a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
In response to an increase in the number of pregnant women using drugs MUSU instituted a policy to set forth a criteria to identify pregnant women suspected of using cocaine and required drug screenings be performed on urine samples from those women. The screenings were performed without a probable cause or informed consent. Initially, patients who tested positive for drugs were referred to drug counseling and treatment. Then they began working with police to prosecute patients that tested positive for drugs. Ten women arrested after testing positive filed suit against the city.
Thus, the drug screenings in this case cannot be justified on the grounds of special needs.
A state hospital may not drug test pregnant women without a warrant or informed consent for law enforcement purposes under the Fourth Amendment.
The privacy expectation of a patient that medical test results will be kept confidential is a compelling one. In previous cases permitting suspicionless drug testing, the employer or school doing the testing did not share the results with police or other third parties, and the consequence of a positive test was loss of a promotion or suspension from extracurricular activities. Further, the government's special need in those cases was something other than law enforcement.
In this case, MUSC worked with police to create the policy, and the policy was designed to comply with police procedures. MUSC attempted to achieve its goal of protecting pregnant women and their children from drugs through standard law enforcement.
Police pulled over car that fit the description of a car used in a robbery, there were four occupants ordered out of the car. Police searched the vehicle and found a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat. D and the other man in the car were arrested. Neither D nor the other man had been driving the car, neither owned the car, and neither claimed he owned the shells or the rifle. D moved to have the rifle and shells suppressed at trial, but the trial judge ruled the two men lacked standing and denied the motion to suppress
D was simply a casual visitor, he had no authority to exercise dominion or control of the car, and the items seized did not belong to him.
This affords him no Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy and he therefore does not have the right to question the constitutionality of the search and seizure.
Standing is determined by whether or not the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched by police.
Only people with a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or thing seized may challenge a search or seizure as unconstitutional.
A person "legitimately on the premises" may only claim a Fourth Amendment violation if he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or thing seized. Instead of deciding cases such as this in terms of standing, it is preferable to decide them under Fourth Amendment doctrine. The fact that a search is directed at obtaining incriminating evidence against an individual does not alone give that person standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search or seizure and invoke the exclusionary rule.
D was arrested and convicted of kidnap, robbery and murder. At the time of arrest he was unarmed and read his Miranda warnings but police suspected he hid the gun nearby. Along the way, two of the officers began speaking to each other, expressing their concern that a student from the nearby school for handicapped children would find the weapon and hurt himself. At this point, D told the police to turn around and he would show them where the gun was. Before showing them the location of the gun he was read his Miranda warnings again.
Therefore, D was not interrogated for the purpose of Miranda because he was not subject to questioning or the functional equivalent.
"Interrogation" applies not only to express questioning but also to the functional equivalent which is "any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody).
Focus is on the perception of the suspect not the intent of police (primarily objective test)
Unless police officers reasonably should know that their comments will elicit an incriminating response from a suspect, comments made between police officers in the presence of a suspect do not constitute interrogation for the purpose of Miranda.
Under Miranda, "interrogation" is not limited to situations where the police actually question a suspect.
In this case, there is no indication that the two officers knew or should have known that Innis was particularly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience. Furthermore, there is no indication that D was disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest.
D was arrested and convicted of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. Post arrest, D was given his Miranda warnings and a form to read outlining his rights. When asked, D said that he understood his rights. He refused to sign the form indicating that he waived his rights, but agreed to talk to the agents and made self-incriminating statements, he never requested an attorney or tried to stop the agent's questions. D sought to exclude statements from evidence, arguing that he had not waived his right to counsel.
In this case, D was fully informed of his rights and his waiver was therefore knowing and voluntary. The judgment of the state supreme court cannot stand.
An explicit waiver is not necessary in all cases to support a finding that the defendant waived the right to remain silent or right to counsel guaranteed by Miranda.
Usually, requires gov't to prove suspect validly waived rights in some cases waiver can be inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated AFTER the Miranda warnings are given.
Butler implicitly waived rights by actions. During a custodial interrogation, a suspect need not specifically waive his right to counsel but may do so implicitly through his actions and words. Whether or not a suspect has effectively waived his right to counsel is not an issue of form, but about asking whether the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda. A court must look at the particular facts and circumstances surrounding a case and the suspect's waiver to determine if it was knowingly and voluntarily made.
Facts: An undercover narcotics officer, went to an apartment to buy drugs. He knocked on the door of an apartment and a man inside opened it 12 to 18 inches. LEO told the man what he wanted and handed over some money. The man inside closed the door and, when he returned, he handed LEO two bags of drugs. While the door was opened., LEO stood about two feet away from the man inside. The transaction took place during daylight hours so the sun was coming in through windows on the stairwell and windows from inside the apartment. The entire transaction took about five to seven minutes.

When LEO left the building, he drove to police headquarters where he gave other officers a detailed description of the man who had sold him the drugs. One of the officers recognized the description as that of Defendant. The officer then found a photo of D and put it in LEO's office for him to look at.

Two days later, and when he was alone, LEO looked at the photo and identified the man as the person who had sold him the drugs. D was charged with possession and sale of heroin. The photo from which LEO identified D was introduced into evidence. LEO testified he had no doubt that the man in the photo was the one who sold him the drugs. LEO also made an in-court identification. The jury found D guilty. The court of appeals applied a per se rule, holding that suggestive, pre-trial witness identifications must be excluded from evidence.

Law: Gets at overly suggestive identifications that give rise to questioning reliability
Suggestive identification
Procedure impermissibly suggestive
Likelihood of irreparable misidentification (how much can you rely?)
Totality of Circumstances - to establish reliability and nevertheless admit suggestive identification
Factors: (Biggers) -S.A.A.C.T.
Opportunity to see suspect at time of crime
Degree of attention
Accuracy of prior description (does it match)
Level of certainty
Time between crime and identification