The police obtained an arrest warrant for D for an armed robbery of a restaurant and executed the warrant at D's home. Upon entering the home, the officers spread out to find D. One officer proceeded to check the basement and, with his gun drawn, shouted down the basement stairs for anyone down there to come out. Eventually, D emerged and he was arrested. Another officer then went into the basement to ensure no one else was present who could pose a threat to the police. In the basement, and in plain view, the officer noticed a red running suit that matched the description of what the thief was wearing when the restaurant was robbed.
Incident to an arrest, police may conduct a protective sweep of a premises based on reasonable suspicion that other people who pose a threat are in the building, provided the search is limited to those areas where a person may be hiding.
Like in Terry, the concern about officer safety outweighs the subject's privacy interest and justifies a warrantless search. This holding is consistent with Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Chimel held that the police may search the area in the immediate control of an arrestee where he may access a weapon or destroy evidence. Similarly, a protective sweep is a limited search of potential hiding places. A more extensive search is permissible only when there is reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts.
The police, responding to a domestic disturbance call made by his wife, arrived at D's house. When the police arrived at the house, D's wife proceeded to tell them that D used cocaine. The police asked for permission to search the home for evidence. Randolph's wife gave consent but D, who was present with his wife, refused. Based on the wife's consent, the police proceeded to search the home despite D's objections and discovered cocaine in D's bedroom. Over D's objections, the cocaine was admitted into evidence at trial because, the court reasoned, D's wife had the authority to consent to the search. The court of appeals reversed and the state supreme court affirmed.
Here, the police sought entry into the home to look for evidence and they did not claim exigent circumstances to preserve evidence or protect D's wife. D was physically present when his wife gave consent and he flatly refused to give permission for the search. Therefore, the police search was unreasonable.
The police may not enter a home without a warrant to search for evidence where they obtain consent from an occupant but a co-occupant is present and objects to the search.
When there are two occupants of a dwelling present and one is consenting to a search by the police and the other is objecting to the search, the police may not enter the home and conduct a warrantless search for evidence.
The holding in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S 164 (1974), that the police may search a home with consent of a co-occupant even when another occupant later objects, is premised on social expectations and commonly held assumptions about people sharing a home. In Matlock, the primary assumptions at issue involved the equal authority of all of the occupants and the assumption of risk when living with others.
Therefore, when one occupant who is present expressly objects to a police search, the consent of another occupant actually provides no additional authority to the police to enter absent a warrant or exigent circumstances.
Police entered a junkyard in Brooklyn, New York owned by D to inspect the premises. D did not have a license or a record book of his inventory, as required by New York law. D made no objection to the inspection. Police found stolen vehicles and arrested D.
The New York law in this case meets these requirements. Automobile dismantling businesses in New York and other states are required to maintain licenses and records, thus it is a heavily regulated industry where business owners have a reduced expectation of privacy. There is a substantial state interest in reducing auto theft, which is a major problem with serious repercussions in the state. Inspections of dismantlers are necessary to prevent the sale of stolen vehicles. Lastly, the statute provides adequate notice to business owners of the inspection scheme and appropriately limits the discretion of inspectors.
A business in a closely regulated industry may be searched without a warrant so long as the searches are necessary, there is a substantial government interest, and the authorizing statute serves the functions of a warrant.
Warrantless inspections of businesses operating in heavily regulated industries are permitted under the following three conditions. First, the inspection program must serve a substantial governmental interest. Next, the inspections must be necessary to serve that interest. Finally, the authorizing statute must serve as a substitute for a warrant. This means that the statute must provide notice to business owners of the scope of the inspection scheme and specifically limit the authority of inspectors.
D was attempting to cross the United States border through the Otay Mesa Port of Entry in California when a customs official inspected his vehicle. The inspector took D's car to a secondary inspection station. The gas tank sounded solid when tapped, so the inspector called a mechanic to remove the tank. The inspector found 37 kilograms of marijuana in the tank. The entire process took approximately one hour. D was indicted by a grand jury for the Southern District of California for importing and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 841(a)(1). D moved to suppress the evidence found in the gas tank.
Thus, the search of D's fuel tank was valid, and the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
Reasonable suspicion is not required for the routine search of the gas tank of a vehicle attempting to enter the United States.
D's arguments that his rights to privacy and property in the fuel tank were violated fail. First, cars entering at the border are subject to search, and there is certainly less of a privacy interest in the fuel tank than the passenger area. Second, gas tanks can be removed, inspected, and replaced without damaging the car, and the infringement of property rights is outweighed by the government's interests in controlling its borders. In addition, the one to two hour delay associated with a gas tank inspection is not unreasonable.
Customs officials noted the number of trips D had made into the country and questioned her. The officials did not believe D's story that she had come into the country with no hotel reservation, appointments, checks, or credit cards in order to buy items for sale in Columbia. Officials believed D was smuggling drugs. A patdown and strip search revealed that D was wearing two pairs of underwear and her stomach was firm. Officials believed D was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. After the inspector was unable to book a return flight to Columbia, D was held for observation for over 16 hours until a court order authorizing an x-ray and rectal exam was obtained. Drugs were found, D was arrested.
There was no violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the ruling of the lower court is reversed.
A person entering the country may be subjected to more intrusive searches than routine border searches, if there is reasonable suspicion that drugs are being smuggled in that person's alimentary canal.
People and property entering the country may be searched without probable cause or a warrant. In addition, if there is reasonable suspicion that drugs are being smuggled inside a person's alimentary canal, that person may be subjected to additional detention and search. Reasonable suspicion is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person" of the criminal activity. Indeed, the nature of this type of smuggling makes it unlikely that officials would ever have probable cause. The customs officials in this case had reasonable suspicion the Montoya de Hernandez was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal based on the surrounding circumstances, experience and training, and common sense. D's lengthy detention was reasonable in light of the manner of smuggling she chose.
D established a drunk driving checkpoint system. All vehicles passing through the checkpoint would be stopped and officers would briefly examine the drivers of the vehicles to determine if they were intoxicated. Where the officer believed the driver to be intoxicated, the driver would need to show his license and registration, further sobriety tests would be conducted, and arrest would be made if the tests so warranted. All other drivers would be immediately sent on their way and the average duration of each stop was twenty-five seconds. During seventy-five minutes of operation, 126 vehicles passed through one checkpoint, two drivers were detained for further sobriety testing and two drivers were arrested for drunk driving.
Plaintiff filed a complaint the day before the checkpoint went into effect, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
The checkpoint at issue is sufficiently effective and reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, drunk driving checkpoint system is constitutional, and the judgment of the state appeals court is reversed.
In Brown v. Texas(1979), the Court established a three prong test to determine the constitutionality of this checkpoint.
Considered is the state's interest in preventing drunk driving accidents
Drunk driving is a huge problem in the United States and the states have a strong interest in preventing them.
Considered is the effectiveness of such checkpoints in achieving this goal.
Consider is the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoint. The objective intrusion on a motorist is minimal since the length of the average stop was merely 25 seconds. The subjective intrusion is also slight because it is determined based on the fear and surprise that a reasonable, law-abiding driver would experience.
During the time the checkpoint was in operation, 1.6 percent of drivers were arrested for drunk driving. The national average is one percent of motorists stopped at checkpoints are arrested for driving drunk. Therefore, while another method may be proven more effective, law enforcement techniques are left to the police and not the courts.
In order to interdict illegal drugs, the city began to set up vehicle checkpoints in 1998. The city had six such checkpoints, and between August and November of 1998 it stopped 1,161 vehicles and arrested 104 motorists. Fifty five of the arrests were for drug related offenses, while forty nine were unrelated to drugs. The procedure is as follows: At each checkpoint the police stop a predetermined number of vehicles, and the driver is asked for a license and the car registration. The driver in each case is inspected for signs of impairment. The directives authorize that the police can conduct a search only by consent or if they have "particularized suspicion." The officers must stop each car in a particular sequence, and they cannot stop vehicles out of sequence. A dog was used to sniff around the car. Moreover, officers have no discretion to vary the predetermined plan for the checkpoint search.
Plaintiffs were stopped at such a checkpoint in September 1998. They filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all motorists who were, or would be, stopped. Plaintiffs claimed the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
A suspicionless roadside checkpoint established for the purpose of deterring general criminal activity is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. We proceed under the assumption that stopping a vehicle represents a seizure. We must determine whether such seizure is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), we ruled that a roadside checkpoint was constitutional because the primary purpose of the program was to ensure highway safety by stopping and arresting motorists who might be impaired by alcohol. In Sitz, there was an obvious connection between the need for highway safety and the means employed to effect such safety. Absent some quantum of individualized suspicion, which would justify a stop, such roadblocks are unconstitutional. Even if the plaintiffs claim that a legitimate secondary purpose of the program is to keep impaired motorists off the road and verify licenses and registration, we cannot give sanction to the program. For it would be easy to institute all manner of illegal searches as long as license verifications were included, just to make the search "legal."
Assistant principal of the middle school confronted D about certain belongings including painkillers, which were generally banned under school rules without advance permission. She denied accusation of possession and selling to classmates and allowed a search of her belongings, which revealed no proscribed items. The principal then asked a female administrative helper to take D to the school nurse's office to search her clothes. The helper and the nurse asked D to remove her jacket, socks, and shoes. Finding nothing, they then asked her to remove her stretch pants and T-shirt. Still finding nothing, they told her to remove her bra and to shake it, as well as to pull out the elastic on her underwear.
D's privacy interests surely were violated by this search, and there are no countervailing governmental interests that could justify the extreme type of intrusion that it posed. There was simply no reasonable suspicion to suspect that D was hiding the painkillers in her bra or underwear.
A school-related strip search of an adolescent, conducted without probable cause, is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.
The search must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Reasonable suspicion is the standard for school-related searches.
Applying the standard articulated in T.L.C., we believe that the intimate search was not "reasonably related to the objectives of the search." an invasive search for non-dangerous drugs in D's intimate places is not a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
A border patrol agent in an area of often travelled by smugglers received an alert that a traffic sensor had been triggered, Based upon his experience, the agent became suspicious that he was smuggling contraband. The agent based this suspicion on numerous facts including: the van occupants' behavior, D's effort to avoid checkpoints, the peculiar elevation of the back passenger's knees, the fact that the van's registered address was in an area populated by smugglers, and the fact that minivans are commonly used for struggling.
In that case, none of the suspect's individual acts warranted a stop, but the suspect's behavior as a whole created suspicion. In this case, the totality of the circumstances created reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. The border patrol agent relied on his training and experience to determine that D's behavior and the relevant facts suggested D might be smuggling contraband. Therefore, the stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
An officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based upon the totality of the circumstances may stop a car.
Although there is no specific test for reasonable suspicion, officers must use their training and experience to assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there are objective grounds to suspect a particular person of crime.
A witness implicated D in the crime burglary of a home. Officers obtained search warrant and went to D's home, his mother let them inside. While one officer went to explain what was happening to D's mother, the other officer remained with D. Without reading D his Miranda warnings, the officer said that he believed D was involved in the robbery, D replied, "Yes, I was there." D was read his Miranda warnings at the station which he then waived and made a full statement implicating himself in the burglary, put it in writing, and signed it and it was admitted at trial.
However, here, there is no indication D's initial statement was anything but voluntary.
He then willingly waived his rights after being read his Miranda warnings and continued to talk to the police.
A suspect can make a statement that is admissible in court after being read his Miranda warnings, even when he previously made an unwarned statement, because the initial failure to read a suspect his Miranda warnings does not taint later voluntary statements.
Therefore, while a subsequent statement, made after Miranda has been given, will be inadmissible if it is coerced, there is no such presumption that arises due to the initial Miranda violation.
However, if the unwarned statement was in fact coerced, the voluntariness of any subsequent statements would be suspect.
D was arrested and convicted of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. Post arrest, D was given his Miranda warnings and a form to read outlining his rights. When asked, D said that he understood his rights. He refused to sign the form indicating that he waived his rights, but agreed to talk to the agents and made self-incriminating statements, he never requested an attorney or tried to stop the agent's questions. D sought to exclude statements from evidence, arguing that he had not waived his right to counsel.
In this case, D was fully informed of his rights and his waiver was therefore knowing and voluntary. The judgment of the state supreme court cannot stand.
An explicit waiver is not necessary in all cases to support a finding that the defendant waived the right to remain silent or right to counsel guaranteed by Miranda.
Usually, requires gov't to prove suspect validly waived rights in some cases waiver can be inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated AFTER the Miranda warnings are given.
Butler implicitly waived rights by actions. During a custodial interrogation, a suspect need not specifically waive his right to counsel but may do so implicitly through his actions and words. Whether or not a suspect has effectively waived his right to counsel is not an issue of form, but about asking whether the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda. A court must look at the particular facts and circumstances surrounding a case and the suspect's waiver to determine if it was knowingly and voluntarily made.