Structure of scientific revolutions
Normal science and paradigm shifts: idea that normal science is continual and incremntal and will continue until a crisis point is reached that requires a shift that is not consistent with the old paradigm.
-Social construction of reality
-Impossible to create a shared reality because people have different backgrounds and understanding, which changes
how they view reality
-Language is the mechanism by which shared understanding is transferred
-Can also tie to the monkey rule
Logic of violence in civil wars: strategic use of violence against civilians in conflict
-There is a point at which using violence in civil war is no longer logical, and a point at which the interests of each side
drive them to greater violence
-Contingencies ("black swans" that have disproportionate effects) and continuities (patterns exists over time)
-Zoom in and zoom out:
-Historians are more akin to hard science than social scientists because the results have been cataloged
-American way of war
-Linn counters Weigley
-Link to Dolman (from Dan: attrition is inevitable in Dolman's view)
-Normal science -> game-changing event -> new paradigm
-Crisis precipitates the new paradigm
-Challenging to know if you're pushing the edge of normal science or if you've truly busted into a new paradigm
-Indirect vs. direct conflict
-Be water (Daoism)
-Influence of culture and relevance between ruler, military leadership, and society
-Know yourself, enemy, and the terrain
-cognitive tension between tactics and strategy
-SOD flawed because of language used and articulation of purpose, divorced of enemy
-See of Art of Design student text, pg. 6
-Influence of French on American military doctrine and thought [Jomini and Napoleon]
-Shift to German influence -> preference for clans
-Industrialization triggered move to German school of thought [tie to Kuhn or Bousquet]
->now a hybrid of the two
-Flexibility of tactics (non-dogmatic)
-Time horizons (preferences, long-term choices)
-power and preferences: I have the power, I don't care about your preferences
-legitimacy: allows for concessions in short-term
-long-term relationships allows the same
-Theory without real practice and experience in war - developed theory academically, then saw battle
-Livelihood depended on Napoleon and selling how great Napoleon was
-Roots: Lloyd, Bülow
-Nature of war
-Formative experience (at 12) in battle, grew up with rapidly changing society, then developed theory
-Simultaneous and continuous
-Outcycle the enemy -> constantly evaluate, breakdown, and reconstruct paradigms IOT avoid entropy
-Systems are constantly moving to entropy
-OODA: observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA)
-How wars end
-What comes out of political system is emergent rather than a deliberate act
-Structures built at end, and how it ends determines durability of the peace
-Suggests that there is no such thing as a universal soldier
-Cultural lens/aspect to battle
-War is an expression of culture
-Argues against materialism/technology factors in war (stress the cultural aspects)
-Understand that different cultures approach war differently
-Rise of the Prussian general staff
-decisive battle- mass forces [Kesselschlacht?]
-Model army of time
-Logistics, synchronization, mass (early principles of war)
-Relationship between means and coercion and accumulation of capital determines the structure of society
-Structures relative between ruler, military, and ruled
-Conflict exists at the narrative level
-Narratives are directed at different audiences
-Tied to front stage/back stage
-Deterrence: escalation is a potential in deterrence efforts.
-Level I and level II actors
-Aligning win sets and preferences between levels IOT achieve desired goals
-Tie in to faces of power (Nye); level I actors can influence/manipulate agenda (face 2) and set preferences (face 3
-Failure in systems, not 1 point
system interrelationships (74)
* Positive feedback: tends to undermine stability. increase in a given variable produces further increase in that variable.
* negative feedback: in a system means increase in one variable proiduces decrease in another. maintqains equilibirium in a s system. should a disturbance ovccur, it will help return balance.
* well buffered system: system incorporatingn many variables regulated by negative feedback.
* critical variables: interact mutually with a large number of other variables in the system. If altered, they will have significant impact.
* indicator variables: are those that depend on other variables in the system, but they themselves exert little influence on the system
Cohen and Gooch
-3 types: 1) failure to learn; 2) failure to predict; 3) failure to adapt
-Model to determine
-Acknowledge step back to view problem as a system
-Activating change is inhibitive to interactions
-Architecture and design
-Design traps: 1) category trap, 2) puzzle trap, 3) number trap, 4) icon trap, 5) image trap
-His views align with Clausewitz
-Forms the basis of unified action because "people live upon the land, not upon the sea"
-Land power is thus decisive
-However, land and sea must work together to be decisive and achieve unified action
-The power of influence
-Asserts that relying on positional authority is costly and inefficient
-Also linked to his "leading change" model
-influencing your boss
-States making war to make states... structure and process
-War structures a society, but society structures how a war is waged
-Sea power as opposed to Corbett's more comprehensive maritime strategy (naval supports littoral)
-The decisionmaking process matters more than the decision
-Synthesis occurs in process - the decision itself simply captures what occurred in the process
-Slack in system: compensates for possible failure of anticipation
-Start to see more on the scale of Soviet armies and operations
-Adapting Svechin for 1944 after the purges
-Operational level of war
-Deep battle: the enemy is not the front line, the enemy is in the towns. Fight past the front IOT address the real
source of conflict (classes and capitalism)
Schneider vs. Epstein:
-Napoleonic vs. Civil War (U.S.): Civil War as emergence of campaign, and shift from Napoleon
-Air can overcome land based industrial advantage.
-Hit them deep and hard, where they are defenseless. The system compensate with diffusion and defense
-Douhet's theories have often been proven invalid
-Indirect vs. direct means
-People's war: 3 phases; Can move between phases as needed based on what the enemy is doing
-Need support of population
-Can force a revolution
-synthesized Clause and Sun Tzu
-Combination of hard and soft power
-3 faces of power: 1) coercion; 2) agenda setting; 3) preference setting
-3 level chess board: 1) military (U.S.); 2) economic (US, China, Europe, Japan); 3) non-state actors, nature, smart
power, cooperation required to solve
-Complexity vs. chaos
-Mapping the mess allows a glimpse of the "second order machine" that generates patterns and enables recognition of
the emergence of a complex system
-Structure, function, process, and purpose
-Military theorist or political scientist?
-Describes a realist view of international relations: the state's strength and survival are paramount
-Initiated concepts of the elephant (sparta) and whale (athens)
-early model for analysis of war and the motives behind it (fear, honor, interest)
Strange Model for COG Analysis
-COG -> critical capabilities -> critical requirements -> critical vulnerabilities
-The COG executes the critical capability while using critical requirements. Some of those critical requirements are
within our capacity to affect, hence they are critical vulnerabilities
-SCOA 1 and 13
-Actors are shaped by and shape system (cannot be repaired, one you interact with the system you are now part of it)
-Everyone has different ideas of the system (Berger)
-Unintended consequences, non-linearity, feedback, indirect effects, causal chains
-Flexibility and resilience, retain capability to react to system response
Front stage/back stage:
-Relates to level 1 and 2 constituents (Putnam) It is how the Level 1 interact toward the level 2. Think level 2 as the audience, and Level 1 as the actors in theater
TOA Course Statement
The Theory of Operational Art course provides the student with the knowledge and skills to analyze and assess military theories of war and warfare in order to: define the linkage between theory, as a lens for analysis, history, as warfare unfolds in the modern era from the late 18th century to the present, and doctrine, both at the time of its writing in the era of modern war and today with Unified Land Operations.
EOA Course statement
Our goal is for you to develop the capability to evaluate this aspect of conflict by studying historical campaigns and military theory from the late eighteenth century through the beginning of the twenty-first century. We will be covering a wide range of topics, theories, case studies, and readings. We study commanders and staffs and see how they planned and executed their campaigns. What did they know? What did they overlook? How did the enemy react? What were the overall results? What can we learn from their experience? How do operational art theory and doctrine help resolve the problems they encountered?
The intent of the course is not to show a linear progression in the theory and practice of operational art, but rather to look at a wide variety of circumstances that required thinking about and practicing operational art. Several lessons are paired to demonstrate trends, successes and failures, and other aspects.
SCOA course statement
Strategic Context of Operational Art provides AMSP students with a deeper understanding of the broader political context in which military force plays a role and, specifically, U.S. military force is employed. While Clausewitz often referred to the different concerns of officers at different ranks, implying that strategic context existed at a level above the operational artist, the current generation of soldier understands that politics with strategic consequence can happen at any rank.
The purpose of this course is to develop in the student a sophisticated approach to understanding politics in an abstract, objective manner. It centers on an understanding of politics as the strategic interaction of political actors at various levels of aggregation, and the way that this interaction results in a complex adaptive system. This course, then, is not about the strategic context of a particular war or operation, but rather aims to generate within the students the habits of mind and patterns of inquiry that will enable them to evaluate the complex political context of a conflict and evaluate the relationship between that context and the use of force.
M&W course statement
Upon graduation from the School of Advanced Military Studies, AMSP students are prepared to evaluate the moral constraints and the moral implications of operational actions in war. To this end, in the Morality and War course, students draw on theory and history to evaluate the moral dilemmas in war. Three theoretical ideas areas are introduced in this course: justice of war; justice in war; and justice after war. Students use secondary readings, class discussions, and guest speakers to evaluate these ideas and the resulting moral dilemmas caused by war.
DOA course statement
The design course teaches the application of conceptual planning in environments that pose unfamiliar, complex military and socio-political problems. The course provides officers with reasoning and critical thinking methods that produce effective and adaptable operational concepts and plans. Using the Army Design Methodology found in ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0, the course fosters the small-group leadership and communication skills that are essential to approaching complex problems in highly fluid environments.
FOA Course statement
Upon graduation from the School of Advanced Military Studies, AMSP students will "[understand] the complexities of past and future operational environments." To this end, in Future Operational Art (FOA) students draw on previous courses to synthesize elements of future operational art. Since no one commands a monopoly of knowledge on what the future holds, instead of preparing students for a specific future, this course exposes students to a wide range of thought on future warfare, thus teaching them how to think about the future instead of what to think. Student groups will also use readings, class discussion, and group work to generate scenarios that would influence future military campaigns
The institutions established at the end of conflict will determine how lasting the peace is.
Scientific way of warfare
Thesis: dominant scientific ideas are reflected in the contemporary practices of warfare in the western world
1. Mechanism- Force, Linear, matter in motion (Close order drill)
2. Thermodynamic-energy, entropy, probability (mass mobilisation, motorisation, industrialisation)
3. Cybernetics-inormation, negentropy, negative feedback, homeostasis (C2, automation)
4. Chaoplexity-information, non-linear, positive feedback, self organisation, emergence (decentralisation, swarming)
the construction of metaphors. language is all metaphors and the creation of metaphors is the process of which concepts are formed and displaced from old to new domains.
Difference between War and Warfare
War is the event. Warfare is how you conduct it. Think Clause and Theucydides as theory of war, Jomini and everyone else as warfare.
Gray says: war is a relationship between belligerents warfare is the activity.
National military behavior is in a real sense learned behavior
International behavior caused by one of three types of explanations
Accidental - bad leadership, misinformation, lack of understanding
Structural - military industrial complex - implies a conflict within the system
Cultural - racism, endemic violence, aggressive and materialistic ethnocentrism
Brevity, intensity, and relative infrequence of war drastically reduce the chance for military memory to become more empirical, to learn from the feedback of trial and error. 207
Assumption that the current significance of an event decreases directly with its distance in time from the present. p.209 monocue (episodic engagement will have lessened effect as the gap between episodes widens)
Shy uses a construct of society as an individual (in a psychological sense)
17th and 18th Centuries - Military age of survival
19th Century - Age of free security
20th Century - Age of power and insecurity (no clear definition of danger)
Colonies acquired a high military potential, but only had a low capacity for self defense. 213
Mahan's Sea Power stated that by offensive action a concentrated battle fleet could effectively deny the use of the sea to infeior naval forces and could pierce the coastal defense of any hostile power. p 223 monocue
p. 224 - Each doctrine can also be associated with an epoch of American foreign policy: sea power with imperialism and active intervention (Caribbean and Far East); Strategic Air Attach with isolationism interwar and post war with massive retaliation; Flexible Response with global containment of Communist revolution
System Principles (G-Man)
a. openness(30): the behavior of living open systems can be understood only in the context of their environement. The world is a complex whole in interaction.
b. purposefulness (33): o influence the actors in our transactional environment we have to understand why they do what they do. Understanding is both different from information and knowledge.
-Hierarchy of influence: Information, Knowledge, Understanding
-Purposefulness and dimensions of decisions: Rational, Emotional, Cultural
-Behavioral classification of systems: passive, reactive, responsive, active
c. multidimensionality: one of most potetnt principles. Ability to see complementary relationships in opposing tendencies and create feasible wholes with unfeasible parts
-Complementary and parrallel to it is idea of plurality. Plurality of function, structure and process. Systems have multiple structures and multiple processes. denies classical single structure in system with single purpose.
d. emergent property: poperties are the property of the whole. not the property of the parts. they are a product of interactions, not a sum of actions or parts. Emegent property by their nature cannot be analyzed. Instead of a process of being, it is a process of becoming. Emergent properties are the spontaneous outcome of ongoing processes.
e. counterintuitiveness: actions intended to produce a desired outcome may in fact generate opposite results.