When two or more tortious acts combine to proximately cause an indivisible injury to a plaintiff, each tortious actor will be jointly and severally liable for that injury.
Contribution allows a defendant required to pay more than his share of damages to recover from the other jointly liable parties for the excess. In other words, contribution apportions responsibility among those who are at fault.
Here, there is no evidence of a contractual right to indemnity between the construction company and the equipment company, there is no relationship between them that causes the construction company to be held vicariously liable for the equipment company's negligence, and this is not a strict products liability case. Also, there is no indication of a considerable difference in degree of fault between the two companies. Therefore, none of the circumstances in which indemnity is available is present. (C) is incorrect As to the homeowner, it is doubtful that he would be liable because he did not know (and had no reason to know) that the safety locking device on the equipment was missing. Even if a jury were to find him, as the property owner, at fault to some degree, indemnity would not be applicable to this situation, as discussed above. (D) is incorrect because, as explained above, the construction company can recover from the equipment company based on contribution rules.
With regard to the duties of a lessor of realty, liability for conditions on the leased premises hinges on who occupies and controls the premises.
A lessor owes no duty to a lessee as to unreasonably dangerous conditions of which the lessee is or should be aware. The lessor's duty applies only to concealed conditions of which the lessor knows or has reason to know, and of which he knows the lessee is not likely to discover on reasonable inspection
Generally, when the owner leases the entire premises, the lessee, coming into occupation and control, becomes burdened with the duty to maintain the premises in such a way as to avoid unreasonable risk of harm to others.
A lessor's duty to members of the public as to unreasonably dangerous conditions does not end when the premises is transferred to the lessee. The lessor's responsibility continues until the lessee should have, in the exercise of reasonable care in inspection and maintenance, discovered and remedied the defect. If a lessor, though under no obligation to do so, voluntarily makes repairs, he is liable if he does so negligently, failing to cure the defect; it is not necessary that his negligent repairs make the condition worse.
A lessor's duty to repair dangerous conditions on the premises does not relieve the tenant, as occupier of the land, of liability for injuries to third persons from the dangerous conditions within the tenant's control
The spousal immunity privilege lasts only during the marriage and terminates upon divorce or annulment.
If a marriage exists, the privilege can be asserted even as to matters that took place before the marriage.
Spousal immunity is not held by both spouses jointly. Held by witness-spouse.
In federal courts, only the witness-spouse may invoke the privilege against adverse spousal testimony. Thus, one spouse may testify against the other in criminal cases, with or without the consent of the party-spouse, but the witness-spouse may not be compelled to testify, nor may she be foreclosed from testifying (except as to confidential communications).
Some states (e.g., California) follow the federal view. In some state courts, the privilege belongs to the party-spouse.
Thus the witness-spouse may not be compelled to testify, and she may be foreclosed from testifying if the party-spouse asserts the privilege.
When the privilege of spousal immunity is invoked, a married person whose spouse is the defendant in a criminal case may not be called as a witness by the prosecution, and a married person may not be compelled to testify against his spouse in any criminal proceeding.
In contracts for the sale of goods, compensatory damages may also include incidental damages.
Either a nonbreaching buyer or a nonbreaching seller may recover INCIDENTAL damages for a breach of a contract for the sale of goods. Incidental damages include expenses reasonably incurred by the buyer in inspection, receipt, transportation, care, and custody of goods rightfully rejected and other expenses reasonably incident to the seller's breach, and by the seller in storing, shipping, returning, and reselling the goods as a result of the buyer's breach.
Consequential damages are special damages over and above standard expectation damages. These damages result from the nonbreaching party's particular circumstances and are recoverable only if a reasonable person would have foreseen them as a probable result of breach.
Note that in contracts for the sale of GOODS, ONLY A BUYER may recover CONSEQUENTIAL damages
The parol evidence rule prohibits admissibility of extrinsic evidence that seeks to vary, contradict, or add to an integration. Other forms of extrinsic evidence may be admitted when they will not bring about this result, i.e., they will fall outside the scope of the parol evidence rule.
When a party asserts that there was an oral agreement that the written contract would not become effective until a condition occurred, all evidence of the understanding may be offered and received. This would be a condition precedent to effectiveness. The rationale is that one is not altering a written agreement by means of parol evidence if the written agreement never came into being.
It should be borne in mind that parol evidence of such a condition precedent will not be admitted IF IT CONTRADICTS the EXPRESS language of the WRITTEN contract.
Parol evidence is inadmissible as to conditions subsequent to the formation of the contract, i.e., an oral agreement that the party would not be obliged to perform upon the happening of an event. This latter type of condition limits or modifies a duty under an existing or formed contract.
Under the parol evidence rule, when the parties to a contract express their agreement in a writing with the intent that it embody the final expression of their bargain (i.e., the writing is an integration), any other expressions, written or oral, made PRIOR to the writing, as well as any oral expressions CONTEMPORANEOUS with the writing, are INADMISSIBLE to VARY the terms of the writing.