The intentions of a state can never be known because of incentives to misrepresent, private information, and unreliability of direct information. Ex: State A gets 100 cannons for defensive purposes. State B can't know for sure it's only for defense, so it gets 150 cannons. Then, there is an arms race. If this were true and unavoidable, offensive realists would be correct. There are ways, however, to lessen this, such as reputation, institutions, balancing, identity, or absolute gains. State-society relations can be restated in terms of assumptions made about actors, states, and the international system, namely that fundamental actors in intl politics are private groups and invidiauls who are rational, risk-averse, and are able to organize collective action to achieve goals, and that states represent some subset of domestic society which then affects how states act in the world, and that configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behaviors based on the strategic situation at the time. These are the three variants of liberalism - ideational liberalism (focusing on impact on state behavior of collective opinion of public goods (borders, political processes, etc)), commercial liberalism (focuses on impact on state behavior of economic interdependene), and republican liberalism (impact of domestic institutions,) Analysts think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of implicit conceptual models. There are a few models.
Rational Policy Model - nations quit when costs outweigh benefits.
Organizational Process Model - identifies relevant organization and displays patterns of organizational behavior, to have lost is not sufficient and surrender likely to create inefficiencies in early stages.
Bureaucratic Models - focuses on international politics of government, perceptions, motivatoins, positions, model, principal players, etc. Suggests that surrender will not come when costs outweigh benefits and will not wait until leadership group concludes war is lost but instead says advocates of war dont think costs outweigh benefits, memebers of govt are convinced that war effort is futile, surrender is result of political shift, and course of war can influence advantages and disadvantages of loser's governments.
A hierarchical and unified Communist bloc existed under the leadership of the Soviet Union that was accurately perceived by Western decision makers.
Soviet expansion into Asia was not in response to Western threats due to security dilemmas, but because of the lack of a unified Western containment policy.
"Traditionalists portray the Soviet Union as an expansionist, ideologically driven power and the West as primarily reactive; revisionists argue that the Soviets were reactive, and the United States expansionist; post-revisionists, while assigning some responsibility for the Cold War to Soviet expansionist pressures, often place equal or greater blame on the United States; realists portray the Soviets as highly reactive because of the security dilemma, and therefore generally defensive and cautious."
On balance, the circumstantial evidence suggests that Western officials' perceptions of the Soviet bloc and traditional analyses of the Soviet threat were more correct than those of many subsequent critics. A relatively high degree of Soviet control over bloc members' policies, especially relations with other bloc nations and other international policies, but also often a Stalinist-inspired orthodoxy internally, was a consistent reality for most members in the early years of the Cold War.
Refutes realism and identifies a traditionalist explanation for the cold war, that the Soviets were driven by ideological needs and expanding to other nations in various ways, even supporting other Communist nations like China, and the West was in part reacting to this ideological drive. This article critiques other schools of thought for their explanations, particularly realism for focusing too heavily on power and ignoring ideological factors.
Statehood is defined in one of two ways, empirically (Weber, a corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organization, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population, including all the action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. Definition of means not an ends. pplying the definition to African states:
Not stable communities
Governments exercise control in 3 ways:
domestic authority - frequent military coups indicates institutional weakness and disaffection of elites
apparatus of power - underdeveloped resources and resource deployment mechanisms, bureaucratic corruption
economic circumstances - small size of skilled workforce, dependent on few primary exports.) or judicially (Brownlie, a legal person, recognized by international law, with the following attributes: 1) a defined territory, 2) a permanent population, 3) an effective government, and 4) independence, or the right to enter into relations with other states, Applying the definition to African states:
During the process of decolonizing Africa, many states with weak empirical qualifications for statehood became formally recognized states internationally
States could not reorganize the broders they inherited from colonialism or redetermine them after receiving international recognition). Juridical statehood is more important than empirical statehood in accounting for the persistence of states in "Black Africa"
International organizations have served as "post-imperial ordering devices" for new African states by recognizing them, but also freezing them within their arbitrarily defined colonial borders and blocking any post-independence movements towards self-determination
International support of empirical state building is limited in its ability to foster state growth and prone to supporting corrupt states.
Typically, support takes the form of the transfer of goods, services, technology, or skills to another state, but since the international system cannot tell a state how to precisely use these resources without violating that state's sovereignty, this form of support can support states with weak bureaucratic systems and corrupt governments.
End point of mankind's ideological evolution is universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
Root causes of economic inequality do not have to do with the underlying legal and social structure of our society, which remain fundamentally egalitarian and moderately redistributionist, so much as with the cultural and social characteristics of the groups that make it up, which are in turn the historical legal of premodern conditions. Ex. black poverty is legacy of slavery and racism
Socio-political organization hasn't advanced terribly far since 1806
Ethnic and nationalist violence, terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue to be on international agenda, but large-scale conflict involving large states no longer pretinent
w/ end of history, struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, consumer demands
Post-historical period will be neither art nor philosophy, just perpetual caretaking of museum of human history
Centuries of boredom at the end of history will get history started once again