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Navy Expeditionary Warfare (EXW) Common Core

Terms in this set (176)

a. Concept- Integration & employment of various types of ships, craft, aircraft, weapons & forces in a concerted effort to achieve and/or maintain control of riverine, coastal, or delta areas under command of a single Mobile Riverine Force Commander.

b.Definition of Characteristics- Riverine is an inland, coastal or delta area composed of both land and water. Riverine Operations exploit the advantages of waterways for movement, capitalizing on mobility to find, fix & destroy hostile forces while also maintaining control of the water lines of communication (LOC) and providing transportation & combat support to our forces.

c. Purpose- Riverine operations are conducted to (1) establish & maintain control of riverine waterways & lines of communications
(2) deny, by interdiction, barrier, or surveillance operations, the use of riverine LOCs by hostile forces and
(3) locate and destroy hostile forces, bases, and supplies contained within the riverine area.

d. Scope- Because of the inherent waterborne mobility of a riverine force and the continuing need for its capabilities throughout the conduct of the riverine operation, it is appropriate to use these forces in their primary role. However they can contribute to a wider territorial area of control in support of other forces.

e. Types- (1) Assault - (a) to establish control of the water lines in a geographical area including the water LOCs,
(b) to establish control of land areas and/or population & resources,
(c) to locate and destroy hostile forces, installations and supplies
(d) to establish and secure the area for a combat support base as needed.
(2) Surveillance, Interdiction & Security -
(a) protection of friendly LOCs,
(b) denying the use of the waterways by the hostile forces
(c) collection of intelligence
(d) performing security missions
(e) enforcing population and resource control.

f. Supporting Operations-At request of Riverine Force Commander and directed by higher authority to support operations outside the MRF area to include:
(1) deception operations
(2) Isolation of area operations
(3) air, ground or naval supremacy
(4) Securing of information
(5) Psychological or unconventional operations.
(1) Standard embarkation boxes, crates, pallets, and containers will be used to the maximum extent possible. Where practical, use embarkation boxes and containers to store T/E assets in the workspace. Twenty-foot International Organization for Standardization (ISO) containers measuring 240 X 96 X 96 inches are maintained in the MEF container pools.

(2) Tactical Markings- All units will ensure that vehicles, containers, and equipment are marked IAW Marine Corps Forces Tactical Marking Procedures for Equipment and Embarkation Containers. This standardized marking system for vehicles, equipment, pallets, and containers identifies the owning organization, general contents, stowage location, size, weight, and, when required, source and destination of the equipment and cargo.

(3) Administrative markings provide amplifying information such as source, content, and destination of the cargo and equipment. Common forms include placarding and labeling. Types of markings include Placards, Bar Code Labels, AIT labels and Symbolic Markings.

(4) Follow packing and crating guidelines such as maintaining uniformity, packing like items in the same container, using waterproofing and corrosion control techniques and materials.

(5) Follow palletization techniques and guidelines. Each pallet must be able to withstand inclement weather and rough handling.

(6) Ensure Hazmat is identified properly and prepared accordingly to prevent damage or injury to personnel and/or shipment.

(7) Follow vehicle preparation guidelines & instructions in preparation for transportation of the equipment or cargo. This primarily includes vehicle inspection and securing the load for transportation.
a. Trouble desk- The trouble desk, and its attendant receive all customer trouble calls, enters information into the trouble desk log, and fills out emergency service authorization (ESA) forms. The attendant makes sure that ESA forms are properly routed and that outstanding ESAs are completed within the required deadlines. All facility history jackets are maintained at the trouble desk.

b. Four Priority Work Classifications- Priority assignment of jobs is essential in deciding the importance of each job in relation to the other requirements. Manpower and funding limitations may not allow the PWD to do all the necessary and desired work at the time of identification. With a priority classification system you can get the most use from your resources. Assigning a priority designator provides you with an adequate definition of the importance of each job. The matrix shown below contains the work classifications of:
Safety- Work required primarily for safety concerns
Function- Work primarily identified with the mission of the activity.
Preventative- Work required to prevent significant deterioration of the plant property or equipment caused by continued use or from natural forces.
Appearance- Work done for preserving or upgrading the appearance of a facility.

c. Operator inspection- These inspections consist of examining, lubricating, and making minor adjustments. This is another form of PM for constantly attended equipment, but they are performed by the operator assigned to the equipment as part of the day-to-day responsibilities.
Special equipment is needed by an individual under field conditions whether in combat or in training. This special equipment is commonly called 782 gear, the number of the custody card originated in the Marine Corps Supply System years ago. This gear is also known as field or bivouac equipment.
The standard issue of 782 gear is divided into 3 categories:
(1) fighting load-carrying equipment,
(2) bivouac equipment &
(3) protective equipment.

The standard issue of 782 gear items includes (*These items may or may not be issued):
1. Pistol belt
2. Pack combat medium
3. Suspenders
4. Two ammo pouches
5. Canteen cover, canteen, and canteen cup
6. First-aid packet*
7. Entrenching tool and cover
8. Poncho
9. Shelter half with one tent pole, five tent pins, and guy line
10. Mess kit with knife, fork and spoon
11. Bayonet or K-Bar*
12. Kevlar helmet
13. Camouflage cover
14. Hat and mosquito net

Fighting / Load-Carrying equipment has been designed to make the job of carrying the equipment you need easier and more comfortable. There are certain rules, however, that must be followed when the equipment is to do the job for which it is intended. This equipment consists of the following:
Pistol Belt, 2 ammunition cases, suspenders w/belt, entrenching tool, canteen cover, first-aid case.

Existence/bivouac equipment is designed to provide you with the minimum necessities while living in the field. It is carried in or on the load-carrying equipment as explained below. Take care of your equipment and it will take care of you. This equipment consists of the following items: Poncho and liner, Shelter half, Entrenching tool, Canteen and cup, Mess kit.

Protective equipment includes items designed primarily to protect you from injury, either from the enemy or from nature, and consists of the following: Kevlar helmet, Camouflage cover, Hat and mosquito net.
a. Hasty/skirmisher's Position- This shallow pit type of emplacement provides a temporary, open, prone firing position for the individual rifleman. With his entrenching tool, he scrapes and piles the soil in a low parapet between him and the enemy. Thus a shallow, body-length pit can be formed quickly in all but the hardest ground. In a skirmisher's trench, a man presents a low silhouette to the enemy and is afforded some protection from small-arms fire.

b. Improved One-man Fighting Position- It is made as small as possible to present the smallest target to the enemy, but wide enough to accommodate a man's shoulders, and deep enough to use entrenching tools at the bottom. A sump should be built below the firing step, at one end, to catch rainwater. The firing step should be deep enough to protect most of a man's body while firing. A circular grenade sump, large enough to accept the largest known enemy grenade, is sloped downward at an angle of 30 degrees and is excavated under the fire step. Hand grenades thrown into the fighting hole are exploded in this sump, and their fragmentation is restricted to the unoccupied end of the fighting hole. The soil from the hole is used to build a parapet. The edge of the hole is used for an elbow rest while firing. Be sure to camouflage the soil used for your parapet to avoid detection.

c. Improved Two-man Fighting Position- It is essentially two 1-man fighting holes. The two-man fighting hole provides some advantages over the one-man fighting hole. By being in such close proximity, each man gains a feeling of more security, and it allows one man to rest while the other man is observing the area. One disadvantage is since it is longer than a one-man hole, it provides less protection from tanks, bombing, strafing, and shelling.
To read the "writing on the ground," you can organize the analysis of weather and terrain primarily around the following set of military considerations (KOCOA): Key Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, Concealment and Cover, Obstacles to Movement, Avenues of Approach.

Key terrain features must be considered in formulating defensive tactics. Their selection is based on the mission of the command. Tactical use of terrain often is directed at increasing the ability to apply combat power. The selection of key terrain varies with the following: Level of command, Type of Unit, and Mission of the Unit.

Observation and fields of fire are so closely related that they are considered together. Fields are based on observation because a target must be seen to bring effective fire upon it. Observation considerations are: Weather conditions, Time of day, Vegetation, Surrounding terrain.

Cover and concealment is used together to provide protection from the effects of fire and observation.
Cover ideas are: Rocks, Shell craters, Ditches, Buildings, Caves, Sunken roads, River banks, Walls, Folds in the ground, and Highway fills. Concealment is protection from observation or surveillance on both air and ground. Concealment ideas are : Woods, Underbrush, Snowdrifts, Tall grass, and Cultivated Vegetation.

Obstacles are anything, including a natural or artificial terrain feature, that stops, impedes, or diverts military movement. Entanglements are set up as obstacles along the FEBA or the defensive perimeter to channel the enemy into the beaten zone of various weapons held by the defending unit.

Avenues of approach are routes the enemy is likely to travel to reach its objective. When setting up the defense positions, the platoon commander visualizes all possible enemy avenues of approach into the area.
Compasses are used to describe direction. The most common military method of describing direction is through azimuths. An azimuth is a horizontal angle, measured in a clockwise manner from a north base line. Azimuths are described in terms of degrees or mils. One circle has 360 degrees or 6400 mils.

Center Hold Method: Open the cover of the compass so it forms a straight edge with the compass base. Pull the eyepiece as far to the rear as possible, perpendicular to the compass base. Align the slot in the eyepiece with the hairline sighting wire in the cover and with the target. Read the azimuth by glancing down at the dial through the lens.

Compass to Cheek Method: Extend your other index finger along the other straight side. Pull your elbows firmly into your side, place the compass between your chin and belt. Turn your whole body until the compass is pointing at the object of which you are taking the reading. Look down to read the azimuth.

Night Method: Compass features for night use include Luminous markings and Bezel ring- three degrees or 53 1/3 mils per click. Using the bezel ring: Set the azimuth before it gets dark. Turning the ring to the left increases the azimuth. Left decreases the azimuth. Rotate the bezel until the luminous line is over the black index line. Since each bezel click is three degrees, divide the desired azimuth by three to get the number of clicks needed. For an azimuth of 60 degrees, divide by 3 to get 20 bezel ring clicks (60º/3=20 clicks). Turn the ring that many clicks. Continuing this example, turn the ring 20 clicks left. Using the center hold method, turn your body and the compass until the north arrow is directly under the luminous line on the bezel ring. You are facing the direction of the desired azimuth.

To bypass enemy positions or obstacles and still stay oriented, detour around the obstacle by moving at right angles for equal distances. This is called the "box" method.
A succinct way of stating concept of operations and orders to subordinates. Remember the acronym SMEAC: Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, Command and Signal

*Situation: divided into three sections: (1) Enemy Forces - Size, location, capabilities, and recent activity (2) Friendly Forces - Mission of higher, supporting and adjacent units. Identify who is providing security. (3) Attachments - Types and size of attachments. Time they attach.

*Mission - States mission in clear and concise statements.

*Mission is unit specific - what we are to accomplish

*Execution - Assigns definite tasks to each element of the command, organic or attached, that contributes to carrying out the whole mission.
No restrictions are set on the number of paragraphs, although information is typically divided into three areas: (1) Concept of operations - brief summary of the tactical plan the unit is to execute (2) Tasks, or missions, for each unit. For a Squad Leader's SMEAC, each fire team would be tasked in this section. (3) Coordinating instructions - actions upon contact, MOPP level, route, etc.

*Administration and Logistics - Addresses all administrative, supply, or transportation concerns (i.e. the four B's) : Beans - distribution of food. Bullets - quantity of ammo and resupply info. Band-aids - location of corpsmen, med-evac plan. Bad guys - POW handling instructions.

*Command and Signal - Chain of command and communications information given in two parts: (1) Communications instructions- typically an annex of standard reports, but also includes passwords and countersigns, radio call signals, frequencies, etc. (2) Chain of command- gives precedence of command and location of command posts.
In the defense, the defender takes every opportunity to seize the initiative and to destroy the enemy. The defender seizes the initiative by forcing the enemy to react in conformity with the defensive plan of the battalion and exploiting the enemy weaknesses. In general, priorities follow the acronym SAFE: S - Security, A - Place automatic and crew-served weapons,
F - Clear fields of fire, E - Emplacements, dig fighting positions. Effective defensive actions are achieved by a blend of the principles discussed below. The degree to which each principle applies will vary with the mission and the situation.

Proper use of terrain - Read the "writing on the ground" ; analysis of weather & terrain following set of military considerations (KOCOA).

Security - Measures that prevent surprise, avoid annoyance, preserve freedom of action, and deny to the enemy information about our forces.

Mutual Support - A well-developed defense plan includes mutual support from adjacent units & is critical when conducting a convoy.

Defense in Depth - This applies to the squad level by engaging the enemy at maximum small-arms range as it advances and continuing this fire until the enemy has been stopped.

All-Around Defense - The platoon must be prepared to defend against an attack from any direction. It is best achieved by early warning and the rapid shifting of platoons into supplementary fighting positions to counter a developing attack.

Coordinated Fire Plan - Coordination of all fire from weapons organic and supporting the battalion is considered. Coordination between the companies is also critical. The fire of the squad forces the enemy to slowdown and deploy, thus creating a target for the mortar crew of the battalion, adjacent companies, or supporting weapons. This makes the squads a key element in a coordinated fire plan.

Use of Barriers - Using barriers, either natural or man-made, can channel, direct, restrict, or stop enemy movement.

Flexibility - A platoon commander must continually develop various courses of action to meet the enemy threat. Being flexible is to ask yourself, What should I do if the enemy does this?

Maximum use of Offensive Action - Since the defender can examine the terrain in detail and plan its best use, every effort is made to prepare the defense in advance. The effectiveness of the defense depends not only on the time available for its planning and preparation but also on its advantageous use during the preparation phase.

Dispersion - Firing positions are assigned and should be close enough to provide interlocking fire. They should not be close enough so an enemy machine gun or mortar can wipe out an entire fire team or an entire squad.
The purpose of SROE is to provide implementation guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. In the absence of superseding guidance, the SROE establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by US force commanders in the event of military attack against the United States and during all military operations, contingencies, terrorist attacks, or prolonged conflicts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

The intent of SROE is to: (1) Implement the right of self-defense, which is applicable worldwide to all echelons of command.
(2) Provide guidance governing the use of force consistent with mission accomplishment.
(3) Be used in peacetime operations other than war, during transition from peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict in the absence of superseding guidance.

US forces assigned to the operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of a multinational force will follow the ROE of the multinational force for mission accomplishment if authorized by the NCA. US forces always retain the right to use necessary and proportional force for unit and individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

When US forces, under US OPCON or TACON, operate in conjunction with a multinational force, reasonable efforts will be made to effect common ROE. If such ROE cannot be established, US forces will operate under these SROE.

Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by varying national obligations derived from international agreements. US forces remain bound by US international agreements even if the other coalition members are not parties to these agreements and need not adhere to the terms.

Commanders of US forces subject to international agreements governing their presence in foreign countries (e.g., Status of Forces Agreements) retain the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and take all appropriate actions for unit self-defense.

US forces will comply with the Law of War during military operations involving armed conflict, no matter how the conflict may be characterized under international law, and will comply with its principles and spirit during all other operations.

All of these rules do not limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-defense of the commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity.
1. Barbed-wire entanglements are artificial obstacles designed to slow the movement of foot troops and, in some cases, tracked and wheeled vehicles.

a. Triple-standard Concertina Fence - This fence consists of two lines of concertinas serving as a base, with a third line resting on top.
All lines are installed with staggered joints. Each line is completed before the next is started, so a partially completed concertina entanglement presents some obstruction. It is erected quickly and is difficult to cross, cut, or crawl through. As an obstacle, inmost situations, the triple standard concertina fence is better than the double-apron fence. The material for it weighs about 50 percent more, but it is erected with about one half of the man-hours.
Every concertina fence is secured firmly to the ground by driving staples at intervals of not more than 6.6 feet.

b. Double-apron Fence - There are two types of double-apron fence: the 4- and 2-pace fence and the 6- and 3-pace fence. The 4- and 2-pace fence is the better obstacle of the two and is the type more commonly used because it is more difficult to raise the lower wires and crawl over or under them. In this fence, the center pickets are 4 paces apart and the anchor pickets are 2 paces from the line of the center pickets and opposite the midpoint of the space between center pickets.

c. Low wire Entanglement - This is a 4- and 2-pace double-apron fence in which medium pickets replace long pickets in the fence center line. This results in omission of wire Nos. 6, 7, and 8, and in bringing all the apron and diagonal wires much closer to the ground, so passage underneath this
fence is difficult. This fence may be used advantageously on one or both sides of the double-apron fence. The low-wire entanglement is used where concealment is essential. In tall grass or shallow water, this entanglement is almost invisible and is particularly effective as a surprise obstacle. However, a man can pick his way through this low-wire fence without much difficulty; therefore, for best results, it must be used in depth.

d. Tangle Foot - Used where concealment is essential and to prevent the enemy from crawling between fences and in front of emplacements. Site tanglefoot in scrub, if possible, using bushes as supports for part of the wire. In open ground, use short pickets. Control the growth of grass to help prevent the enemy from secretly cutting lanes in, or tunneling under, the entanglement.
A helicopter Landing Zone (LZ) is a specified ground for landing helicopters to embark or disembark troops or cargo. Depending upon the terrain and the size of the unit, you can divide the LZ into several landing sites. A landing site is a specific location within a landing zone in which a single flight of helicopters may land to embark or disembark troops or cargo. Landing sites are designated by color, such as landing site red. A landing site contains one or more landing points.

Preparation of an LZ should take several factors into consideration.
First, you should know what type of helicopters will be using the landing zone.
Second, you must consider the unit's position in relation to the enemy. Security troops must establish a 360-degree perimeter around the landing zone to defend the LZ.
A third factor is the time it will take to prepare the LZ and the final factor considered is the equipment needed to prepare the LZ.

Obstacles: The ground approaches to the LZ and exits from the LZ must be free of major obstacles that might obstruct landing or takeoffs, such as tall trees, telephone poles, or power lines. Approaches and exits should also be clear of obstructions that are 10 meters or higher, extending at least 50 meters in the direction of approach and exit paths. The rule of thumb for determining the distance required between the landing point and a high obstruction is a 10:1 ratio. This means that the distance a landing point is located from a tree is ten times the height of the tree. (Example: A helicopter landing or taking off near a 30-foot tree needs at least 300 feet of horizontal clearance.) Obstacles on the ground, such as stumps or rocks, should not exceed 1 foot in height on level ground and should be less on sloping ground.

Gradient (slopes): Ground slope has a considerable effect on selecting a landing site or landing point within the LZ. A helicopter cannot land safely in locations where the ground slopes more than 14 degrees. Pilots prefer to land uphill on a slope because of the tail down attitude of the helicopter.

Mud, excessive dust, and loose debris are considered undesirable surface conditions for helicopters.

Landing site dimensions vary, depending on the number of landing points required. For each landing point, a fuselage safe circle is cleared of all obstacles, such as stumps, rocks, or bushes. Clear a rotor safe circle of all obstacles that could obstruct the rotor blades. For daylight landing, select a
level area at least 100 feet larger than the diameter of the rotor blades. For night landing, this distance should be at least 150 feet larger.

Marking the LZ: Once you have established the LZ, the landing sites, and the landing points, you need to direct the helicopter to the location of the LZ. The proper marking of the LZ will aid the pilot in locating it.

• Daylight landing: The landing zone is equipped with a means of showing wind direction and velocity. This is usually accomplished by the use of smoke or by verbal radio message. Methods include
(1) Grass Drop method and
(2) Angle of Smoke method. Use smoke and landing zone panels to mark a daytime landing zone. Both should be the same color as the designation of the landing zone. This will aid the pilot in locating the landing zone. If smoke is used to mark the landing zone, use only as needed and do not tell the pilot the color of smoke; ask the pilot to acknowledge the color after the smoke grenade is set off.

• Night landing: The organization and use of an LZ at night or during periods of low visibility is more complex compared to daytime operations. Special lighting equipment or field expedients as required. You must indicate outlines of landing zones by low-intensity markers. You must show obstacles near the landing zone by low-intensity markers or voice radio instructions. Another method of guiding the aircraft to the zone is vector instructions. This is simply relaying instructions to the pilot by radio.
a. SORTS - Status Of Resources & Training System; principle report in the U.S. Navy for identification and general status to higher authorities and is the foundation for assessing unit readiness. It indicates the status of personnel; equipment and supplies on hand; equipment condition; and training, as reported by each unit. In their reports, each unit commander also assesses the unit's ability to execute its wartime mission, indicated by one of five "C" levels. Units are required to submit their SORTS reports on a regular basis or when there is a change in their C level or location.

b. CASREP - Casualty Report; the primary means used to report the status of a unit with reduced combat readiness caused by a casualty. It is also used to report accidents and disasters that include a loss of capability, material damage, personnel injury caused by collisions, strandings, fires at sea, missing or sunken submarines, and damage from natural causes such as hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes, and tidal waves.

c. LOGREQ - Logistial Requirements, report used by ships entering ports to pass information to and request services from the port. It describes power and general berthing requirements, will normally be received from the arriving ship prior to entering port. This information, in conjunction with the berthing assignment received from Waterfront Operations, will allow the Shore-to-Ship Group to prepare the berth prior to the ship's arrival.

d. SITREP - Situation Report, provides report of the situation, disposition and status of forces including overview, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, personnel, commanders assessment. A unit SITREP is a message transmitted by any unit CO, officer in charge, or other commander to notify appropriate operational commanders and seniors in the chain of command of a significant event or incident. Generally, the unit SITREP is used when an incident does not meet the criteria of the Operational Report (OPREP) 3 reporting system. An OPREP 3 is a higher level reporting system used to inform senior authority that an incident of national or high U.S. Navy interest has occurred.
The ATFP plan should provide an integrated, comprehensive approach to deter, detect, defend against and mitigate terrorist threats. The classification of an ATFP plan is dependent upon its content, current policy and the specifics of a unit's situation. An effective ATFP plan will address:

1. Concept of operations
2. Preplanned responses
3. Tactics
4. Crisis management procedures
5. Consequence management procedures
6. Baseline security posture
7. Measures to increase security posture
8. Reporting procedures
9. Command and control procedures.

Every ATFP plan includes the identification of intelligence gaps in available threat holdings, factoring in time to develop requests for information from higher echelons to include the national agencies. Threat information is typically acquired from higher echelons, host-nation authorities, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, American embassies, civilian authorities and the advance party.

U.S. Navy ships and forces on the high seas should use appropriate anti-terrorism measures consistent with the known threat level in the AOR. Under customary international law, military ships and aircraft are sovereign platforms. Ships and aircraft require specific and advance entry permission (usually referred to as diplomatic clearance) for entry into internal waters or airspace of a foreign country, unless other bilateral or multilateral arrangements have been made. When U.S. forces are operating within internal waters or territory of a foreign nation, the foreign nation has primary responsibility for antiterrorism and law enforcement. Notwithstanding the foreign nation's primary responsibility, the U.S. commander remains ultimately responsible for unit self-defense.
**Small Boat Threat: As the bombing of the USS COLE in October 2000 clearly demonstrated, a small boat can be a lethal weapon. In a matter of minutes, a small boat carrying approximately 500 pounds of explosives approached the port side of the COLE, exploded and left a gaping hole in the ship, causing the death of 17 sailors and many injuries. The purpose for developing PPRs to counter small boat attacks is to prevent threats from gaining close proximity to protected assets or areas.

The following principles will guide the development of PPRs to counter a small boat threat:
1. Detect and assess all vessels entering a predetermined assessment zone.
2. Establish positive ID and determine hostile intent of all vessels in the warning zone.
3. Prevent unauthorized vessels from entering the threat zone.

**Deep Draft Threat : The potential for deep draft ships to inflict devastating damage is due to their large capacity to hold explosives, and to the difficulty friendly forces will face trying to stop an underway vessel. Security forces and boats can stop hostile small craft by shouldering, ramming or shooting them; while the same measures could be employed against an approaching hostile ship, the likelihood of stopping it is minimal.

The following principles will guide commanders in forming PPRs to counter a deep draft threat:
1. Liaison with HN or USCG authorities to ensure all deep draft vessels in the area are tracked.
2. Detect, assess, and determine hostile intent as far away from the protected asset or area as possible so security forces have time to react.

**Sub-surface Threat: The third waterborne threat occurs at the subsurface level, carried out by either swimmers or mines, or a combination of the two. Both threats were used successfully during the Vietnam War and remain attractive options for terrorists because of their relatively low cost and simplicity. The most difficult aspect when planning to defend against subsurface threats is employment of capability to detect them. Small boats and deep draft vessels are clearly visible and thus provide at least some time to determine hostile intent; security forces may not see a swimmer or mine until it is in the threat zone, if at all. While a mine is clearly a threat and should be acted upon immediately, a swimmer or bubbles in the water are not necessarily indicative of a hostile threat.

The following principles will guide the development of PPRs to detect and deter subsurface threats:
1. Develop specific guidance for reacting to a surfaced swimmer or bubbles sighting. Such directives are critical because of the likelihood that defenders will get only one look at the swimmer at the water surface. Is any swimmer in the water within a certain distance from the protected asset or area assumed to be hostile? Can concussion grenades automatically be used if a swimmer submerges or bubbles are seen? PPRs to these questions will ensure security forces are armed with sufficient authority to counter this elusive threat.
2. Install barriers at a distance from the protected asset or area if there is a likely threat of mines.
3. Use anti-swimmer devices when possible. A variety of commercial anti-swimmer products that either put sound into the water to deter a swimmer, or detect a swimmer with a variant of sonar are increasingly available to U.S. Navy assets.
-Assessment Zone: The outermost defense zone is not typically patrolled, thus allowing security boats to remain close to the HVA in case of an incident. Security forces first detect and identify contacts, notify craft that they are nearing a restricted area (if they approach the warning zone), and create a visible deterrent presence in the assessment zone. Unlike the warning zone, access to the assessment zone is not challenged.

-Warning zone: In this zone, security boats actively interact with and challenge unknown craft for classification as either a threat or non-threat, to determine hostile intent and to ensure unauthorized vessels do not approach closer to the HVA. The size of a warning zone is determined after consultation with local civilian, military, or HN authorities since it involves interaction with local craft.

-Threat zone: The innermost layer around the HVA. No hostile craft should be permitted to enter this zone. Hostile intent should have been determined in the warning zone after repeated attempts to deter the unknown craft from approaching the protected asset or area. Predetermined ROE/RUF guidelines will specify what lethal actions can be taken by security forces once hostile intent is determined.

Zone sizes and locations are dependent upon several factors:
1. HN restrictions. Political sensitivities, availability of HN security forces, and HN laws all restrict U.S. actions when OCONUS. A HN, for example, might restrict a U.S. ship security boat to patrol only 200 meters around the anchored ship so as not to interfere with commercial vessel traffic lanes. Or a HN may not even allow U.S. boats in the water, insisting that HN boats will provide security.

2. Geography. Channel width, port size, and pier dimensions are just several restrictions that can limit sizes of defense zones. The ideal of establishing zones 500 yards in width to deter standoff RPG attacks is not possible for a pierside ship in a 100-yard-wide river.

3. TAs. Location-specific TAs can shape the size of zones. For example, if there is a high threat of vehiclecarried IEDs, security forces should establish ECPs far from the protected asset, post additional vehicle inspectors, and employ a variety of detection equipment. Zones that protect against a swimmer threat would extend upstream of the current that flows past an HVA, while zones against a small boat threat might extend in the other direction toward local marinas, which could serve as boat launch points.

4. Capabilities of U.S. security forces. The number and skills of AT/FP forces will affect zone size and location. If four, vice two, security boats are available per watch, zone sizes could be extended so identification and classification of unknown vessels occurs farther from the HVA, providing more time and distance to neutralize threats. Conversely, using nonorganic security forces, such as FAST or NCW, would result in more robust coverage of ECPs, which could then be constructed closer to the HVA.

5. Proximity of targets. In a crowded port or urban installation, security forces may be limited in choice of weapons employment. In such environments, zones could be extended, if permissible, to ascertain intent further from the protected asset, better ensuring an ability to neutralize the threat with allowable weapons.
a. Selection of Landing Areas/Sites.
-A river landing area includes a segment of river bank or similar features along a waterway over which troops, supplies, or equipment can be landed by watercraft. A river landing area contains one or more river landing sites, within which are contained one or more points at which individual craft land and disembark troop units. Whenever possible, river landing areas are selected to avoid opposition and facilitate the rapid and orderly debarkation of ground combat units. Primary considerations in the selection of river landing areas are: Scheme of maneuver, Enemy situation, Hydrography, Obstacles, and Terrain/river bank.

The primary considerations in selection of helicopter landing zones are:
1. The concept of operations.
2. Enemy capabilities and dispositions, and known counter-helicopter tactics.
3. Friendly capabilities to suppress enemy air defense and to provide air, artillery, and naval gunfire support for ground operations.
4. Ease of identification from the air.
5. Firm dry ground suitable for landing helicopters. This frequently may not be available. Accurate data on the depth of water in inundated landing zones and the location of minor waterways within the landing zones are essential to prevent unnecessary loss of life and inordinate delay in troop reorganization upon landing when it becomes necessary to land by jumping from hovering helicopters.
6. Adequate obstacle clearance for approach and departure routes.
7. Helicopter landing zones shall be approved by the commander on scene through liaison with supporting helicopter unit as appropriate.
8. Potential for deployment of combat service support area.

b. Selection of waterway routes - The primary consideration in selection of waterway routes between the mobile riverine base and the selected landing areas are: Hydrography, Enemy capabilities, Capabilities to support primary & alternate plans and Terrain/bank characteristics. If not prescribed by the mobile riverine force commander, waterway routes are selected by the Navy component commander, in coordination with the Marine Corps component commander.

c. Selection of Base Site
Riverine base sites must contribute to accomplishment of the mission and meet the following criteria:
(1) Be within an area which can be defended by available forces without jeopardizing offensive capabilities of the MRF.
(2) Provide for mooring assigned ships and craft and, when necessary, sufficient area and facilities to accommodate forces ashore.
(3) Be within operational and communication range of deployed elements of the MRF and facilitate their logistic support.
(4) Potential for deployment of combat service support area.

Other considerations :
(1) If the Navy mobile riverine base element does not include a helicopter landing capability, it may be desirable to locate the afloat base adjoining a land area suitable for staging and loading helicopters.
(2) Defense plans should permit rapid establishment of defense on land and along the waterways.
(3) Mine countermeasures and swimmer 7. Most effective employment of supporting defense must be provided for. arms.
(4) The area should be thoroughly reconnoitered.
(5) The location of the afloat base of operations should permit safe passage of other waterway traffic.
a. Assault - A riverine assault operation commences when troops begin tactical assault loading to depart the riverine base for an operation and terminates when all forces involved have returned to the base. In any assault landing against a hostile or potentially hostile point, several options rest with the assaulting force. In all options the assault must support and contribute to the attainment of the mission. The phases of the mobile riverine force assault operations are tactical loading (i.e. troop personnel), movement (i.e. to the objective), landing attack (preparation of the landing area, landing, initial ground and waterborne maneuver, and special support operations), subsequent operations (such as coordinated employment of artillery, assault
craft fire, naval gunfire, and close air support), and planned withdrawal.

b. Waterway interdiction, surveillance, barrier and security - These operations are conducted by specially configured craft and aircraft in the waters of the riverine area and may be used to gain control of waterways preparatory to subsequent riverine assault operations or they may be conducted by Navy forces alone, with Marine Corps elements provided only as a reaction or security element. An individual waterway interdiction and surveillance and security operation may be called a patrol and consists of two or more craft in execution of a specific operation.

Waterway interdiction and surveillance and security operations serve five basic purposes:
(1) Protect friendly lines of communication
(2) Deny hostile forces the use of waterways (i.e. modes of transportation)
(3) Collect intelligence information
(4) Perform security missions
(5) Enforce population and resources control (i.e. deny the enemy the means to wage war. Isolate the enemy from his support to take away his operational initiative and make his primary task that of supply).

Air and surface operations are mutually supporting and may be conducted independently or concurrently. However, close coordination is required between airborne and waterborne patrols in the employment of mutually supporting fires.

c. Special - Riverine special operations are ancillary or supporting operations conducted by the MRF as adjuncts to a riverine assault operation
or a waterway interdiction and surveillance and security operations. Special operations are normally characterized by employment of procedures and techniques which require special training and equipment. The capability to conduct these operations is generally limited to specific units which have been assigned primary mission responsibility within the service organization.

Types of operations include :
(1) Reconaissance and Waterway Clearance
(2) Riverine Base Security
(3) Mine Warfare Operations to include mining and mine countermeasures
(4) Salvage Operations
(5) Cover and Deception Operations
(6) Unconventional warfare operations
(7) Physchological Operations
(8) Civil Affairs
Historically, MIO is a peacetime measure designed to enforce embargoes sanctioned by the UNSC, national authority, or other regional organization. MIO characteristics vary depending on the purpose and authority.
The provisions of the embargo are usually promulgated in the form of a UNSCR that establishes the parameters, objectives, prohibited items, and geographic area of MIO. It may also designate the C2 structure and amount of force authorized. The enforcing nations ensure that MIO responses
are proportional to the violation of international norms by the target state. Proportional response means taking the minimum measures necessary to enforce compliance and ensure the security of the MIO force. MIO is generally tailored to create the least impact on freedom of navigation for
nations not targeted by MIO.

The following are common characteristics for traditional MIO that enforces an embargo:
(a) Interception terms are publicly announced, usually in a Notice to Mariners/Notice to Airmen. These notices specify start date, location, prohibited items, and cargo access inspection requirements.
(b) Use of minimum force required for mission accomplishment.
(c) An embargo may encompass virtually all imports and exports even though specified items are prohibited.
(d) Ships and aircraft not carrying prohibited items are permitted to pass.
(e) Ships carrying prohibited items are turned back, diverted to a neutral port requested by the detainee, or diverted to a port selected by the cognizant commander. They are not seized as a prize. However, MIO may permit the seizure and sale of ships (and their cargo) that refuse to comply.
Type of operations include:
(1) Littoral surveillance support operations (LSSO) - LSSO refers to the synergy developed between the capabilities of an MIUWU and those of the LSS operated and manned by the Naval Space Reserve Program. The combined capabilities of the MIUWU and LSS resources provide a naval tactical commander with timely receipt of all weather, day/night maritime and littoral intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data from selected national, theater, and tactical systems. The MIUWU's role in this operation is one of support only; providing security, equipment and communications support. MIUWU personnel do not man or operate the equipment of the LSS. That task falls to personnel assigned to a LSS/NFN unit which provides the cleared and trained equipment operators.

(2) Harbor approach defense (HAD) operations - HAD ensures the unimpeded use of designated offshore coastal areas by friendly forces and denies the use of these areas to enemy forces. HAD operations are an extension of HD/PS operations into the littoral area. This area is also referred to as a defensive sea area (DSA). HAD operations are performed by NCW forces, freeing up theater forces for employment elsewhere. HAD is a focused NCW operation that complements broader naval operations designed to maintain SLOCs.

(3) Harbor defense/port security (HD/PS) operations - There are two distinctly different applications of HD/PS operations, depending on whether the tasks being conducted are expeditionary or for homeland defense. The primary goal of expeditionary HD/PS operations is maintaining unimpeded access and security within ports and harbors. In homeland defense, terrorism and sabotage are the primary threats within the port or harbor.
Harbor defense (HD) — "the defense of a harbor or anchorage and its water approaches against external threats such as: (a) submarine, submarine-borne, or small surface craft attack (b) enemy minelaying operations and (c) sabotage." HD operations involve conducting surveillance, employing defensive measures, and monitoring ship movement within the harbor and port.
Port security (PS) — "the safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo from internal threats such as destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts; accidents; thefts; or other causes of similar nature." These operations are not law enforcement operations in that security forces are not charged with maintaining order within a port area.

(4) Antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) - The goal of AT/FP is to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack, and effect mitigation if one occurs. Preventative measures in AT/FP must include awareness of the threat, physical security enhancements, and the deployment of forces in a layered defense. AT/FP plans identify and, when implemented, reduce the risk of loss or damage to people, equipment, and facilities. Plans provide procedures to detect or deter planned terrorist actions before they take place. The plan addresses the reactive or tactical stage of a terrorist incident, including direct contact with terrorists to end the incident with minimum loss of friendly life and property. The layered defense concept employed by NCW forces is an effective means of deterrence against terrorism. Layered defense is additive to the point defense employed by individual ships within the NCW AO. Random antiterrorism measures, when activated by NCW forces, serve to disguise the security measures, in effect thereby denying terrorist surveillance the opportunity to accurately predict security actions, further enhancing the deterrence created by force deployment.

(5) Point defense operations - In the case of a ship or aircraft using a port or airfield where security is a concern and the Host Nation security infrastructure (in the case of expeditionary operations) or CONUS port security measures (in the case of homeland defense operations) are inadequate, the employment of various components of the NCW force for point defense may be appropriate. Point defense is generally conducted in confined and traffic-congested harbors and ports and air space occupied by friends, adversaries, and/or neutrals. This environment complicates threat identification, stresses C2 capabilities, and makes reaction times critical. NCW forces assigned point defense normally operate in a Level I or II threat environment to protect ships (in transit, at anchor, or in port), aircraft on flight lines, and very important persons (VIPs). Threats may come from agents, saboteurs, enemy sympathizers, terrorist groups, small tactical units, unconventional warfare forces and guerilla groups involved in surface, subsurface, or air attacks. Some of the specific means used by these adversarial forces include: High-speed attack craft, Innocent appearing civilian boats, Swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs), Mini-submersibles, Divers, Mines, Small aircraft or Vehicle based improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (i.e., car bombs).
Host Nation Support: To a great degree, effective expeditionary NCW operations depend on active and effective liaison with the HN that supports unity of effort, and are further enhanced with coordinated support from other US military commands and government agencies. A capable and friendly HN can provide invaluable civil and military assistance to US forces. HNS is normally based on agreements (standing, interim, or exigent) that commit the HN to provide specific support under prescribed conditions. The intrinsic littoral and rear area nature of NCW operations makes close and effective HNS and cooperation particularly critical.

In general, HNS is highly situational and heavily dependent on the operational capabilities of the HN and its political acceptance of US policies.
The type and amount of support to be provided by the HN is specified in signed agreements and detailed in the plans of all the nations concerned. Maximum use of HN capabilities is especially critical in crisis response situations when US forces may not be in place or have outpaced their logistics support lines of communications. The amount of civil or military support provided by an HN will depend on its national laws, industrial capability, and willingness to give such support.

Some of the planning factors taken into consideration when planning for HNS are:
1. HN international agreements and treaties that specify US involvement in the AO
2. Capability, dependability, and willingness of the HN to provide and sustain resources
3. Shortfalls in NCW forces supplemented by HNS
4. Implications of HNS on the political structure both within the host nation and the region
5. Effects on security, to include operations security (OPSEC)
6. Availability of HNS in the type and quantity agreed upon and its applicability across the range of NCW operations
7. Availability of US liaison (DOS, attaché, etc.) amd language interpretation support, if necessary.

Examples of HNS include:
1. Government agencies - Police, Fire, Translators/liaison personnel, Customs/immigration.
2. Civilian Contractors - Support services.
3. HN civilians - Labor pool.
4. HN military units - Coast guard/navy, Maritime police, Border guard, Army and marine corps.
5. HN facilities - Harbor entrance control towers, Boathouses, Checkpoints/hardened guard mounted posts.
6. Selected functions - Rail operations, Air traffic control, Harbor pilot services.
7. Logistics support - Supplies, Equipment, Laydown and material staging areas.
8. Community security materiel system (CMS) and other classified material stowage and handling.
9. Intelligence support - Devices, Facilities, Intelligence products.

United States Interagency Support: NCW operations generally involve a close relationship with and support from US governmental agencies. For example, when expeditionary NCW forces are deployed, interagency support is arranged through the embassy. The ambassador speaks and acts with the full authority of the US government and can bring other governmental agency capabilities to bear in support of NCW missions. Homeland defense operations provide another example of NCW and US governmental interagency support and interaction. Both NCW forces and other governmental agencies are assigned as supporting forces under USNORTHCOM. Effective accomplishment of the overall mission requires that all supporting commands and agencies coordinate efforts.

The US Embassy has at its disposal representatives from various US aid, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies. NCW forces can request and gain support from the agencies represented by liaison with the defense or naval attaché assigned. These representatives have an intimate knowledge of the culture and capabilities of the HN and the advice of these individuals should be relied upon when issues arise that require interaction with the HN.
a. MCU-2/P- Protects face, eyes, nose, throat and lungs from CBR agents or contamination. It offers no protection against carbon monoxide or ammonia. It filters the air removing particles of dust that may be radioactive or otherwise contaminated. It purifies the air of many poisonous gases.
The latest variant in the MCU-2/P mask series is the MCU-2A/P mask. It contains the same features as the MCU-2/P mask and, with modifications, may be integrated into the ship's Interior Voice Communications System (IVCS) and the Flight Deck Communications System.

b. Chemical Protective Overgarment- Two piece suit that protects against all known chemical and biological agents.
It is NOT to be used for radiological contamination.

c. Wet-weather clothing- Provides complete protection against alpha/beta radiological contamination when worn with battle dress and antiflash gear. It also provides an extra layer of protection for the chemical protective overgarment.

d. Atropine/Pralidoxime Chloride (Oxime)- Used to counteract the effects of and relieve the symptoms of nerve agents only.
If you are told that your pupils are getting very small or if you are having trouble breathing and your chest feels tight, use the atropine nerve agent antidote kit (NAAK), Mark I. The injectors contain medications to treat the initial symptoms of nerve agent poisoning. But, most importantly, it will check the more serious effects of nerve agent sickness. The injectors are antidotes, not a preventive device; therefore, only use the injectors when you actually experience symptoms of nerve agent poisoning.

e. Pocket dosimeter- Size and shape of a fountain pen. Used to measure exposure to radiation over a period of time.
Casualty Agents include nerve, blister, choking and blood agents. Harrassing Agents include Tear and Vomiting agents.

1) Nerve Agents- Types include G Agents and V Agents. Used as a quick-action casualty agents. Symptoms include: Runny Nose, Tightness of chest with difficulty in breathing, contraction of pupils, nausea, cramps, headache, coma and convulsions. Symptoms can take place in 30 seconds when the dose is sufficiently heavy.

2) Blister Agents- Types include Mustards, Phosgeneoximedichloroforoxime and Lewisite. Used as a delayed-action casualty agent. Symptoms include the following :
For the eyes - Watery eyes, Redness and inflammation.
For the skin - Skin starts to turn red after several hours, Blisters appear on the skin, throbbing pain and swelling may be observed.

3) Blood Agents- Types include Hydrogen Cyanide and Cyanogen Chloride. Used as a quick-action casualty agent. Symptoms range from convulsions to coma. These agents interfere with the ability of oxygen-carrying cells to transfer oxygen to other body tissues and also cause an irritating effect on nasal passages.

4) Choking Agents- Types include : Phosgene CG, Diphosgene DP and Chlorine CL. Used as a delayed-action casualty agent. Symptoms involve the inability to breathe.

5) Vomiting Agents- Types include Diphenylchlorarsine (DA), Diphenylchanoarsine (DC), and Adamsite (DM). These agents are dispersed as aerosols and produce their effects by inhalation.
Symptoms include minor eye irritation and a feeling of pain and sense of fullness in the nose and sinuses. This is accompanied by a severe headache, intense burning in the throat, tightness and pain in the chest, and irritation of the eyes, producing excessive tear formation. Coughing is uncontrollable and sneezing is violent and persistent. Nausea and vomiting are prominent. Mild symptoms, caused by exposure to very low concentrations, resemble those of a severe cold. Effects will continue after donning a mask. Victim will become sick to the point of vomiting. The victim will be exposed to even more hazardous agent when the mask is removed for vomiting.

6) Tear Agents- Types include CN, CNC, CNB, BBC, CS. Of these agents, CS is the newest and most effective. Tear agents are essentially local irritants, which, in very low concentrations, act primarily on the eyes, causing intense pain and a considerable flow of tears; stinging of warm, moist skin; and irritation of the nose. High concentrations produce irritation of the upper respiratory tract and lungs and cause nausea and vomiting. The agents may be either solids or liquids and may be dispersed in the air as vapors or smokes. The physiological effects of tear agents include: Extreme burning of the eyes (accompanied by a heavy flow of tears), Coughing, difficulty in breathing, and chest tightness, Involuntary closing of the eyes, Stinging sensation of moist skin.

7) Incapacitating Agents- are used to wage and win a war without resorting to the massive killing, enormous destruction of property, and immense monetary cost, as in past wars, which undeniably will characterize any future conflict in which nuclear weapons are used. Incapacitating agents are the latest discovery. Many are still in the research, development, and testing stage; and much remains to be learned about them. An agent of this type is BZ, a slow-acting aerosol. It enters the body by inhalation and interferes with mental processes that control bodily functions. Advantages to the commander is that they are flexible, economical, not destructive, less injurous, simpler to store and utilize, and are difficult to detect.
a. Blast- Primary blast injuries result from the direct action of the air shock wave on the human body. Secondary blast injuries are caused mainly by collapsing buildings and by timber and other debris flung about by the blast.

b. Burns- Primary burns are a direct result of the thermal radiation from the bomb. Secondary burns are the result of fires caused by the explosion. Flash blindness also occurs.

c. Nuclear radiation- The effects of nuclear radiation include the following:
- Alpha particles: Must be taken into the body through ingestion or cuts to be injurious.
- Beta particles: Enter through the skin or ingestion, carried in contaminated dust, dirt, or bomb residue
- Gamma Rays: Pure energy and not easily stopped, can penetrate every region of the body. Gamma rays strike atoms in the body cause ionization of these atoms, which may result in any number of possible chemical reactions that damage the cells of the body.
- Neutrons: Have the greatest penetrating power of the nuclear radiation hazards, create hazards to personnel when the neutron is captured in atoms of various elements in the body, atmosphere, water, or soil. The captured elements become radioactive and release gamma rays and beta particles.

d. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) phenomenon- An EMP is an intense burst of radio-frequency radiation generated by a nuclear explosion. The strong, quick-rising surges of electric current induced by EMP in power transmission lines and long antennas could burn out most unprotected electrical and electronic equipment.
CPO Inspection- Check the Packaging, Expiration date and look for "tears" or "rips" in the materials.
CPO Maintenance- Keep dry, Store in bag when not worn, Avoid POLs
Gloves and Boots- Inspect for wear and tears

MCU-2/P Mask Inspection: Pre-fit mask prior to storing in mask carrier. Test the drinking tube. Conduct a negative pressure test.
Maintenance/Cleaning and Care- Clean with warm soapy water. Air dry before storing in carrier. Keep filter dry. Replace damaged or worn parts.

Donning the Chemical Protective Overgarment (CPO) :
1. Don the trousers and tighten the waist by using the hook and pile fasteners.
2. Bring the straps over your shoulders and cross them across your chest. Insert straps into the belt loops and secure them snugly.
3. Don the smock.
4. Secure bottom of smock with hook and pile fasteners.

Donning the overboots :
1. Attach the laces to the toe loop, making sure that the laces are centered.
2. Put a lace through each of the holes on the sides of the boot and pull them up snug.
3. Cross the laces over the instep.
4. Put one lace through each of the holes at the heal, inserting them from inside to outside and pulling the laces snug.
5. Again cross the laces over the instep.
6. Thread the laces through the holes on the side again from inside to outside.
7. Cross the laces over the instep one more time and pull them snug
8. Wrap the laces behind the ankle and back to the front. Tie the laces securely.

Notes: Trousers are worn over the boots. White cotton undergloves and black, butyl rubber chemical protective outer gloves are worn under the sleeves. The use of masking tape at the wrists and ankles is a common procedure to protect against loosening of hook and pile seals and to provide additional sealant protection.

Donning the Mask :
1. Open mask carrier with left hand.
2. Hold bottom of mask carrier with your left hand
while removing the mask with your right hand.
3. Slide your thumbs inside the facepiece under all of the head harness straps.
Grasp the top of the facepiece and thrust your chin forward.
4. Hold our head still while you raise the mask to your out-thrust chin and bring the harness over the back of your head.
5. Center the head pad.
6. Grasp the tab ends of the lower straps and tighten them.
7. Close the outlet valve with the heal of your hand. Breath out forcibly to clear the mask.
8. Test the mask for fit and for possible leakage by placing your palms over the canisters.
--When you inhale normally, no air will enter mask.
a. Symptoms - Mild to moderate symptoms include : Unexplained runny nose, Unexplained sudden headache, Drooling, Difficulty with vision (dimness), Tightness in chest/difficulty in breathing, Localized sweating/muscle twitching in contaminated area of the skin, Stomach cramps, Nausea.

*Casualties with severe symptoms can experience most or all of the mild symptoms and most or all of the following:
*Strange or confused behavior
*Wheezing, severe difficulty in breathing, and coughing.
*Red eyes with possible tearing
*Vomiting
*Severely pinpointed pupils
*Severe muscular twitching and general weakness
*Involuntary urination and defecation
*Convulsions
*Unconsciousness
*Respiratory failure

b. Contents of Nerve Agent Antidote kit (NAAK) MK 1 - Auto-injectors: Atropine (x1) 2PAM Chloride (x1).

c. Treatment (self and buddy aid)
--Treatment (Self) : Don protective mask, Remove a NAAK from the protective mask carrier, Inject the thigh with first injector from the kit (atropine) and hold against thigh for at least 10 seconds. Follow immediately with second injector of 2-pam chloride and hold for at least 10 seconds. Bend needle to form a hook and place on the protective outergarment. Massage injection site if time permits. Wait 10-15 minutes before administering second series of injections (no more than three). Administer the back pressure arm-lift method of artificial ventilation if breathing is difficult or has ceased.
--Treatment (Buddy Aid) : Mask the casualty. Using the NAAK belonging to the victim, administer three sets of injections immediately and in rapid succession in the thigh muscle of the log. Hook the expended auto injectors to the overgarment pocket flap of the victim. Administer the back pressure arm-lift method of artificial ventilation if breathing is difficult or has ceased. Seek medical attention NOW
a. DT-60/PD - The DT-60/PD is a gamma radiation dosimeter with a usable range of 10 to 600 R. It is a solid-state package in the form of a locket designed to be worn on a chain around the neck. Inside the black plastic casing is a phosphate glass. When the phosphate glass is exposed to ultraviolet light, it emits an orange light. The intensity of the orange light is proportional to the amount of radiation the glass has received. The DT-60/PD stores the dose information indefinitely and is a permanent record of the amount of exposure to radiation.

b. IM 143/PD - The IM-9/PD is a self-reading pocket dosimeter of the quartz-fiber type. This unit indicates the gamma radiation dose in the range of 0 to 200 mR. By holding the dosimeter up to the light and looking through the lens, you can read the radiation dose received. It is primarily a health-physics device that is particularly useful in areas of low dose rates. The IM-143/PD is identical to the IM-9/PD except in range. The IM-143/PD indicates gamma radiation dose in the range of 0 to 600 R. It is used by repair locker personnel that are involved with the survey, monitoring, and decontamination details during CBR evolutions. It keeps track of the dose they have received up to the time they read the dosimeter.

c. CP-95A/PD - A radiac computer-indicator that is used to read the amount of radiation a DT-60/PD has been exposed to. The cover must first be removed before the DT-60/PD is inserted. Each radiac computer-indicator has two scales: 0 to 200 R and 0 to 600 R. However, 10 R is the minimum detectable exposure. These units have an accuracy rate of ±20 percent.
Purpose/Importance: The COSAL is a technical and supply management document designed to enable ships to achieve maximum self-supporting operating capability for extended periods of time, independent of external logistics support. How: It establishes equipage allowances for the ship and the storeroom allowance of repair parts for installed equipment. It covers all electronic, ordnance, electrical, and mechanical equipment on board your ship.

The COSAL is a technical document because it provides the nomenclature, operating characteristics, technical manuals, specifications, parts lists, technical data for installed equipment / machinery, and equipage & tools required to operate and maintain the ship and its equipment. It tells the supply officer how much and what type of material to stock and also tells the quantity of each item of equipage that must be carried aboard ship.

The key word in COSAL is "Consolidated". Computers assemble a list of the allowed parts from the hundreds of APL/AELs into lists of repair parts to be stocked by the ship. These lists are prepared by the activities and cover the equipment supported by them. The preparation of these lists takes into account the installed equipment on board, the quantity of each item of that equipment, the failure rate of parts, and the relative importance of these parts to the operation of the equipment. Thus, the COSAL, aided by experience and advice from technical ratings, enables the supply officer to stock the items that should be carried to meet the requirements for repair parts.
a. ARP- Automotive Repair Parts receives, stores and issues repair parts for CESE and material handling equipment. ARP validates and updates CESE COSAL. Typically located in Alpha Company spaces. Financial records, reports, and requisition files are normally maintained in Supply.

b. CTR- The Central Tool Room manages all hand tools, power tools, tradesman's tool kits, and other special tools. Assets are kept under strict security because items are highly pilferable and can be easily converted to personal use. Inventory management measures include maintenance of separate records for individual items, scheduled physical inventories, and scheduled preventive maintenance.

c. CSR- The Central StoreRoom is the central shipping and receiving outlet in the battalion. The CSR receives all shipments that are not project related (ARP, consumables, etc.). The CSR manages and issues administrative and consumable items in the TOA. Typically located in Supply spaces.

d. MLO- The Material Liaison Office manages all project funds and materials in accordance with NAVSUP P-48. The MLO receives, issues, and inventories project materials. The MLO maintains records and accounting and submits reports of expenditures for project materials at the main body site. Details manage their own materials. The Supply Officer is overall responsible for project materials at all sites, including main body.

e. CUU- The Camouflage Utility Uniform (CUU) is responsible for individual combat equipment (782 Gear), CUUs and other organization and foul-weather clothing.
a. NSN - The National Stock Number is a 13 digit stock number used to identify an item of material in the Federal Supply System. It is assigned by the Defense Logistics Service Center, Battle Creek, Michigan.

b. COG - The Cognizance Symbol is a two position alpha-numeric code that identifies to the Navy inventory manager, or cognizant authority, of the specific category of material that item falls under. Example: The COG for all CESE is 2C. All CESE falls into the same category of material, which means all CESE has the same cognizant inventory manager.

c. APL - The Allowance Parts List is a list of all the repair parts installed in the equipment or component to which it applies. The APL also lists the equipment or component's operating parameters and capabilities. Each piece of equipment or component has a separate APL. APLs are filed in Part II of the COSAL.

d. AEL - The Allowance Equipage List is a list of all the equipment that a specific unit or platform is supposed to have (Examples: A Camp Maintenance Builder Shop would have an AEL. A possible entry on a ship AEL would be life rings).

e. NC - Means an item is Not Carried (i.e. Material the supply department does not stock).

f. NIS - Means an item is Not in Stock (i.e. Material the supply department carries, but is out of when requested).

g.SIM - Refers to Selected Item Management which is used for Inventory control. If a part is requested two or more times in a six month period,
it is identified for SIM. All SIM items are inventoried quarterly. Non-SIM items are inventoried semi-annually.
a. Turn-in available- When a DLR item is issued from stock and the departmental turn-in of the unserviceable item is received at the same time that the replacement item is issued.
Procedure: The issuing storekeeper will enter the notation "TURN-IN REC'D" and his signature in block 29 of the DD Form 1250-1. After the required entries (see par. 6207-3) have been made, the issuing storekeeper will give the "receipt" yellow copy of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 to the requester and the remaining copies of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 will be forwarded to the DLR storekeeper for the DLR suspense file. If a procurement action tickler file is maintained (see par. 6188-8) and stock replenishment is required, the stock records storekeeper must prepare an additional yellow copy of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 for the procurement action tickler file.

b. Remain in Place (RIP)- These items are repairable components that cannot be removed until receipt of a replacement item (i.e. a DLR item is issued from stock and the unserviceable item cannot be removed from an equipment or system until the replacement item is available for installation) The items in this category are identified in the Consolidated Remain-in-Place List (CRIPL). Items identified in the CRIPL are the only authorized exceptions to the one-for-one exchange rule.

Procedure: The issuing storekeeper will enter the notation "RIP ITEM" "TURN-IN NOT REC'D" in data block 29 of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1. After the required entries (see par. 6207-3) have been made, the issuing storekeeper will give the yellow copy of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 to the requester, with instructions to return it with the departmental turn-in of the unserviceable repairable when it has been replaced. The remaining copies of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 will be forwarded to the DLR storekeeper for the DLR suspense file. When the unserviceable repairable is received, the
recipient storekeeper will enter his signature in data block 29, and delete the word "NOT" from the previously entered notation "TURN-IN NOT REC'D" on the accompanying yellow copy of the NAVSUP Form 1250-1 which was used to issue the replacement item. The "receipt" copy will
then be returned to the person who made the turn-in. The No. 6 copy of the skeletonized DD Form 1348-1A will be annotated "TURN-IN REC'D", signed, dated (in data blocks FF-GG), then returned to the DLR storekeeper for further processing and shipment.

When the RFI item is received, it will be turned over to the ordering department to allow replacement of the NRFI carcass which will be turned in to AIMD or IMA. The carcass will be turned in to shore regardless of the condition (RFI or NRFI) when returned to supply from AIMD or IMA.
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