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Philosophy Exam 1

Terms in this set (48)

-Socrates said there are parts to the individual soul as there are three parts to the city (rulers, soldier, craftsmen).
-An important principle for his argument: One and the same thing cannot do or undergo opposites in the same part of itself (in relation to the same thing, at the same time) (436c). So if we find this, we'll know that there are PARTS to the individual soul.
-Desires can be contraries: wanting something and also rejecting it. So in the case of thirst, we want to drink, but sometimes we don't want to drink when we're thirsty. This is an experience of contraries in desires. This suggests that there are at least TWO parts of the soul, the rational (telling you not to drink) and the appetitive (which wants the drink).
-Then Socrates argues for a third part of the soul, the spirited part of the soul, which is distinct from appetites and reason.
-The example of Leontius shows us that sometimes the spirited part of the soul goes against the appetitive part. Leontius gets angry (spirited part) at himself (his appetitive part) (440a).
-The spirited part usually allies itself with the rational part (this is why we get angry when we know we've been falsely punished) (440b-c).
-Nonetheless, the spirited part is still distinct from the rational because children and animals have spirit, but do not have reason (441b).
Socrates' answer to Glaucon?
-A persons with justice in his soul (in the new sense of notion) has internal harmony. Thus, he won't commit crimes and do the sorts of thing Glaucon mentions in Book II (external actions of outdoing others, taking from others and harming others).
Mental States | Objects
Intelligible world
1. Mental- Understanding (nouns)
Objects- The forms universal- (piety, Justice-the good) unchnaging, independent, material, free of opposite
2. Mental- Thinking-Natural Sciences
Objects- Hypothesis (math)- assumed or stipulated
Visible World
3. Mental- Beliefs/Opinion
Objects- Objects-particular changing, dependent material composed of opposites
4. (lowest level) Mental- Imaginary-
Objects- Shadows, Reflections (not clicked into reality)

Plato's Divided Line:

Mental States Objects of Thought___________________

__________INTELLIGIBLE WORLD________________________

Understanding The Forms (& their relation to the Good)
-free from opposites
-exist independently from material objects
-Not known through the senses

Thought Hypotheses (mathematical)
-hypothetical truth

(somewhat abstract from visibles, but still deal with visibles, eg., geometry)
________________________________________________________xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxVISIBLE WORLD (can't be object of knowledge)___________

Belief material objects
-composed of opposites
-depend on forms for their existence
-accessible through the senses
(e.g, think of Euthyphro's attempt to define piety by appealing to examples of pious actions; might include someone with true belief, but no understanding of why a belief is true)

Imagination reflections, shadows

(prisoners inside the cave, believe the shadows are real)
1. Objective introspection: Introspection reveals states and properties radically different from any neurophysiological states and properties. So how could they be the same thing?
Answer to objection: Easily. It is just as discriminating between hot and cold and red and blue is really discriminating differences in intricate electromagnetic stereochemical, and micromechanical properties of physical objects. Our sense are not sufficiently penetrating to reveal the detailed nature of those properties so we need theoretical research to do this.
2. Category errors: the identification of mental states to brain states would involve an unintelligible category error. Based on Leibniz's Law of Identity: two items are numerically identical just in case any property had by either one of them is also had to be the other. So, find a property that is true of brain states, but not of mental states (or vice versa) and identity theory fails. (317-318). If mental states are identical with brain states, then they would have to have the very same spatial location (e.g., to say that my feeling of pain is located in my ventral thalamus, etc.), which is literally meaningless.
Going in the other direction gives you the same problem. Thoughts and beliefs have propositional content, which have properties like being true or false and have relations such as consistency and entailment with other beliefs. But it is senseless to say that, for example, some resonance in my association cortex is true or logical entails some other resonance.
Answer: The "abuse" of accepted modes of speech is often an essential feature of real scientific progress (318)! There is no problem in assuming that one's brain is the seat of a complex inferential economy in which types of brain states are the role-playing elements (in this case, inferential roles).
3. You can skip
4. Introspectible qualities of our sensations: If a neuroscientist knew everything about physical structure and activities of the brain, but has never had a sensation of red because she's color blind or whatever, will there remain something she does not know about sensations, namely, what it is like to have a sensation of red. A complete knowledge of the physical facts leaves something out.

Answer: The identity theorist can reply that this argument exploits the unwitting equivocation of the term "know." The identity theorist can admit a duality or even plurality of different types of knowledge without thereby committing himself to a duality in types of things known.
He can admit that one can have "knowledge" of one's sensations in a way that is independent of the neuroscience one may have learned. Animals have a prelinguistic mode of sensory representation, but this does not mean that sensations are beyond the reach of physical science. This just means that the brain uses more modes and media of representation than the mere storage of sentences
1. Sensory qualia: functionalism ignores the inner or qualitative nature of our mental states. The "inverted spectrum thought-experiment" where I have a different, inverted spectrum of sensations than you when I see color. I see green when I see tomato, for example. And yet, we may remain functionally isomorphic, so that my viewing a tomato is functionally identical (322).

Answer: Our functional states do have an intrinsic nature on which our introspective identification of those states depends. But also, such intrinsic natures are nevertheless not essential to the type-identify of a given mental state and may indeed vary from instance to instance of the same type of mental states. So my sensation of red might be different from the qualitative character of your sensation of red, but so long as both states are both caused by red objects and cause us to believe that something is red, then they are both sensations of red, regardless of their intrinsic qualitative character (323).

2. "Absent qualia problem" - The functional organization characteristic of conscious intelligence can be instantiated (realized) in a considerable variety of physical systems, some of the radically different from a normal human. Consider the example of all the people of China organized into mutual interactions such that they constitute a giant brain, and instantiate the functional organization without having qualia.

Answer: If materialism is true, then there must be some internal physical feature or other to which your discrimination of sensations of red is keyed: that is the quale of your sensations of red.

So long as the physical system at issue is functionally isomorphic with us, to the last detail, then it will be equally capable of subtle introspective discriminations among its sensations.