United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. U.S. (1941)

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DECICDED BY
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Terms in this set (15)
DECICDED BY
- HUGHES COURT

-UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR US
FACTS OF THE CASE
- FLSA PASSED IN 1938

- DARBY WAS IN VIOLATION AND WAS SHIPPING LUMBER OUT OF STATE

- HE WAS ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH VIOLTING FLSA

- FEDERAL DISCTRICT COURT FOUND THAT FLSA WAS UNCONSTIUTIONAL AND DISMISSED CASE
LEGAL QUESTION
Was the FLSA a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce?
The Court held that the purpose of the FLSA was to prevent states from using substandard labor practices to their own economic advantage by interstate commerce
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Congress acted with proper authority in outlawing substandard labor conditions since they have a significant impact on interstate commerce.
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The two principal questions raised by the record in this case are, first, whether Congress has constitutional power to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber manufactured by employees whose wages are less than a prescribed minimum or whose weekly hours of labor at that wage are greater than a prescribed maximum, and, second, whether it has power to prohibit the employment of workmen in the production of goods 'for interstate commerce' at other than prescribed wages and hours.
(Page 1).
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The appeals statute limits our jurisdiction on this appeal to a review of the determination of the district court so far only as it is based on the validity or construction of the statute.
(Page 3).
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The motive and purpose of the present regulation are plainly to make effective the Congressional conception of public policy that interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows.
(Page 4).
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Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause. Subject only to that limitation, presently to be considered, we conclude that the prohibition of the shipment interstate of goods produced under the forbidden substandard labor conditions is within the constitutional authority of Congress.
(Page 4).
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The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart, was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretation of the commerce clause both before and since the decision and that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had has long since been exhausted. It should be and now is overruled.
(Page 5).
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The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. (Page 6).-But long before the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act, this Court had many times held that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce extends to the regulation through legislative action of activities inPage 120 trastate which have a substantial effect on the commerce or the exercise of the Congressional power over it.3-The Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations Act are familiar examples of the exertion of the commerce power to prohibit or control activities wholly intrastate because of their effect on interstate commerce. (Page 8).-The requirement for records even of the intrastate transaction is an appropriate means to the legitimate end. (Page 9).-the fixing of a minimum wage is within the legislative power and that the bare fact of its exercise is not a denial of due process under the Fifth more than under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Page 9).-