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As Epicurus describes death as the absence of pain, and most humans, with bronze-souls, will avoid bodily pain, it follows logically that we should not worry about death, it should not only mean nothing to us, but it is nothing to us because we will lose the only bad sensation and feel nothing.
I struggle with his claim is in the two ways you can interpret nothingness. "Nothing" can be interpreted through the lack of sensation. I agree here as death is literally nothing to us, where we will feel nothing and experience nothing posthumously. This interpretation is incredibly straightforward, and I believe most people would agree that our bodies become nothing after death. I disagree with Epicurus in the interpretation death should mean "nothing" to us. In his four-part cure, one of his points is not to worry about death. He believes death is an irrational fear which should not impact our lives. However, Epicurus states, "Pleasure is our first and kindred good," and since when we die we no longer feel sensation, yes we no longer feel pain, but we can also no longer feel pleasure because we cannot feel. And while Epicurus believes "certain pleasures entail annoyances... greater than the pleasures themselves," which means the fear of death is ultimately worse than actually experiencing death, it is extremely difficult for humans to combat this when pleasure is our number one priority. We think of what sounds tasty today and what professor will be friendly and an easy-grader. We are generally not thinking what might reduce pain in the future by eating foods that are healthier and taking from professors we can learn more and challenge ourselves from.
Acedia is one of the 8 sins as well as fundamental passions, it is a state of restlessness and inability either to work or to pray. There is also the noonday demon called acedia which "is the most burdensome of all the demons." It is explained as such on page 18 that it "First it makes the sun appear to slow down or stop , so the day seems to be fifty hours long.
[2] Then it forces the monk to keep looking out the window and rush from his cell to observe the sun in order to see how much longer it is to the ninth [hour, i.e. 3 pm], and to look about in every directions in case any of the brothers are there.
[3] Then it assails him with hatred of his place, his way of life and the work of his hands; that love has departed from the brethren and there is no one to console him
[4] If anyone has recently caused the monk grief the demon adds this as well to amplify his hatred [of these things]
[5] It makes him desire other places where he can easily find all that he needs and practice an easier, more convenient craft After all, pleasing the Lord is not dependent on geography, the demon adds; God is to be worshipped everywhere.
[6] It combines this with remembrance of his relatives and his former way of life, and depicts to him a long life, placing before his eyes a vision of the burdens of the ascetic life. So, it employs, as they say, every [possible] means to move the monk to leave his cell and flee the racecourse.
No other demon comes immediately after this one; rather, after the struggle the soul receives in turn a peaceful state and unspeakable joy."
He insists that such disciplines as ethnology and psychoanalysis, even in their Structuralist forms, remain captive of the linguistic protocols in which their interpretations of their characteristic objects of study are cast. The Structuralist movement in general he takes as evidence of the human sciences' coming to consciousness of their own imprisonment within their characteristic modes of discourse. The two principal Structuralist disciplines, ethnology and psychoanalysis, not only comprehend the other human sciences, in the sense of transcending and explaining them; they point as well to the dissolution of belief in the "positivity" of such concepts as "man," "society," and "culture." Structuralism signals, in Foucault's judgment, the discovery by Western thought of the linguistic bases of such concepts as "man," "society," and "culture," the discovery that these concepts refer, not to things, but to linguistic formulae that have no specific referents in reality. This implies, for him, that the human sciences as they have developed in the modern period are little more than games played with the languages in which their basic concepts have been formulated. In reality, Foucault suggests, the human sciences have remained captive of the figurative modes of discourse in which they constituted (rather than simply signified) the objects with which they pretend to deal. And the purpose of Foucault's various studies of the evolution of the human sciences is to disclose the figurative (and ultimately mythic) strategies that sanction the conceptualizing rituals in which these sciences characteristically indulge themselves.
Certain forms of knowledge become popularized, and are dividing factors. They provide course frameworks or standards of knowledge. However, he does not necessarily believe they are right or wrong. Biopower shapes people to see themselves in a certain manner.