a. If the police conduct does constitute a seizure, the remaining constitutional issue is whether the seizure was reasonable. With property, the police must often have a search warrant, based on probable cause, or justification for not securing a warrant. In seizing a person, the police must have adequate cause to seize the person. In the case of an arrest, the police must have probable cause to make the arrest, and if the arrest occurs in the home, an arrest warrant is usually required. With personal seizures less intrusive than arrests, a lesser standard- reasonable suspicion is satisfactory, in and relatively few circumstances, the police may briefly seize a person without any suspicion at all. In general, the Fourth Amendment does not require that police obtain a warrant to search an automobile when they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity. If police have probable cause to search an entire vehicle, they may search all compartments, containers, and packages within the vehicle, including those belonging to the passenger. In Acevedo, (see case description below), the Court held, that when placed in a vehicle, a container may be searched on probable cause alone. In addition, the part of the vehicle in which there is probable cause to believe the container will be found may be searched, but a search of the entire vehicle is unlawful absent the existence of probable cause as to the entire vehicle, consent, or exigent circumstances. Legal challenges can only be brought by the owner of the vehicle or by an operator with legitimate possession of the vehicle (Rakas). A warrantless nonconsensual search of an automobile can be justified in various circumstances: as incident to arrest; police inventory after it has been seized from public roads. Police stopped a vehicle containing the respondent, Robert Bustamonte, and they asked to search the vehicle. Another passenger in the car gave permission, and the search produced stolen checks that were entered into evidence against the Respondent. The challenge was to the voluntariness of the consent. As long as consent is given voluntarily, and not to the result of duress, coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined totality of circumstances, and while the subjects knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing voluntary consent. The State has the burden to show consent was not coerced, or under duress and was voluntarily given. Here, consent was given Police went to search house, Matlock was not there, but Matlock's co-tenant consented and the police found evidence to arrest Matlock. Case remanded to see if cotenant had common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises sought to be inspected. Common authority, look at the mutual use of the property of the person, did the person have joint access or control for most purposes of the habitat. Look at time person has been there, name on lease, paying rent, have a key, bulk of materials there, spends nights there, relationship to people there. If she had common authority, her consent was legally sufficient to search and gather evidence against her party. No REP to stuff shared. Δ had been arrested for drunk driving while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital. During his treatment, a police officer ordered a doctor to take a blood sample which indicated that Δ had been drunk while driving. The blood test was introduced as evidence in court and Δ was convicted. Did the blood test violate the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination? No. The protection against self-incrimination applied specifically to compelled communications or testimony. Since the results of the blood test were neither "testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds." Here, the evidence was physical evidence (blood), and even though it was incriminating, it was neither communicative, nor testimonial.
Keep in mind, this case brings in the idea of the "cruel trilemma"(lie- then its perjury, talk- and its an admission of guilt, or be silent- and an admission of guilt.) Also, dissent mentions how this could be a Due Process claim because forcefully took blood (but court would likely allow this unless it was against religion, or crazy fear of needles- which would lead to confession meaning it would be coercive. Also, the 4th Amendment challenge (search w/o warrant) shot down because of an exigent circumstance (liquor in blood).
In Miranda, the Court held that custodial interrogations have the potential to undermine the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by possibly exposing a suspect to physical or psychological coercion. To guard against such coercion, the Court established a prophylactic procedural mechanism that requires a suspect to receive a warning before custodial interrogation begins. The Court held that unless the suspect is warned of his Fifth Amendment rights, any pretrial statements elicited from the suspect are inadmissible at trial.
Under Miranda, before questioning suspects in custody, law enforcement officials must inform them that: 1) they have a right to remain silent; 2) their statements may be used against them at trial; 3) they have the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning; and 4) if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for them. No additional warnings are required. Miranda warnings must be given only when a suspect is both in custody and about to be subject to government interrogation. To introduce at trail a defendants statement made in response to custodial interrogation, the prosecution must demonstrate either that the statements were obtained in compliance with Miranda, or, if Miranda's requirements were not satisfied, that an exception applies.
Δ was pulled over for drunk driving, twice made statements about it, one in the car, once after the arrest. Charged with a misdemeanor DUI. Rules, 1) Miranda governs statements made during custodial interrogations, regardless of the nature of the severity of crome for which he is suspected or for which he was arrested. 2) A traffic stop is not a custodial interrogation, most traffic stops are short in duration, although slightly curtailing freedom, traffic stop is differenct from custody. It is a case by case analysis though. Initial stop and statements then were not mad while Δ was in custody so those are admissible, but the statements made after he was arrested without being Mirandized are inadmissible.
a. Factors that would bump up the traffic stop to custody. # of officers, handcuffed, getting out of car.
A defendant may invoke Miranda rights either prior to or during the interrogation. The police must then cease all questioning. If the right to remain silent is clearly invoked, further questioning is permissible only if law enforcement officials "scrupulously honor" the defendant's assertion of that right to cut off questioning and to remain silent. (Mosley). However, if the invocation of the right is ambiguous or equivocal, further questioning may be permissible. (Berghuis). Unlike the Sixth Amendment, which attached automatically upon initiation of formal judicial proceedings, the Miranda Fifth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when a suspect invokes the right by making a clear and unequivocal request for counsel. After the suspect invokes the right to counsel, law enforcement official must cease interrogation until counsel is present, actually present not just a communication with counsel. Further interrogation without counsel present is barred "unless the accused himself initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police" and subsequent events indicate that the defendant waived his right of counsel. (Edwards) Additionally, a police may further interrogate a suspect who has requested counsel if there has been a break in Miranda custody that lasts at least 14 days. (Shatzer). The ban on further interrogation also applies to interrogations about unrelated crimes for which the suspect stands accused. In 2003, a detective from the Hagerstown, MD Police Department interviewed Δ regarding allegations that he had sexually abused his three-year old child. At the time, Δ was incarcerated on an unrelated offense involving sexual abuse of another child. After Δ invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, the interview was terminated. The investigation was subsequently closed, only to be reopened in 2006 when specific allegations about Δ alleged sexual abuse. Thereafter in March 2006, another detective was aware that Δ had been under investigation, but was not aware that Δ had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, interviewed him. At this interview, Δ was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, which he waived, and then confessed to specific instances of sexual abuse involving his child. Δ moved to suppress the confessions he made in the March 2006 interview arguing that his 2003 invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights was still applicable. Under Edwards v. Arizona rendered the confession inadmissible. Does Edwards apply? No. The Court set a 14 day window that states police cannot re commence questioning. After that 14 days, police must go through he process again. The 14 days does not count if the suspect is in custody the whole time, here Δ went back to general population. The break in custody must be longer than 14 days.
Would be different if in custody for the 14 days, held in solitary, etc.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." The holding in Massiah brought the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel out of just the courtroom and into new places. The Court held for the first time that the Constitution is violated when government agents, in the absence of defense counsel, deliberately elicit incriminating information from a person against whom adversary judicial criminal proceedings have commenced, or when the Δ is at the "critical stage", counsel needs to be present. When the government fails to abide by this ruling, they, in effect, undermine the trial itself. To be in violation, the government must "deliberately elicit" incriminating statements from the accused, not just have basic contact with the defendant. Once the right attached, the government can not question without a waiver from the Δ. The exclusionary rule clearly applies to evidence that is the direct result of a violation of Δ's rights (evidence seized from Δ's premises during an illegal search). But the exclusionary rule also applies to some derivative evidence, that is, evidence that is only indirectly obtained by a violation of Δ's rights. In general, if police wrongdoing leads in a relatively short, unbroken, chain to evidence, that evidence will be barred by the exclusionary rule, even though the evidence was not the direct and immediate fruit of the illegality. The concept is frequently referred to as the poisonous tree doctrine, once the original evidence is shown to have been unlawfully obtained; all evidence stemming from it is equally unusable.
Example: Agents, acting without probable cause, break into Toy's apartment and handcuff him. Toy makes statements accusing Yee of selling narcotics. The agents go to Yee, from whom they seize heroin. The drugs seized from Yee are "fruits of the poisonous tree", since they were seized as the direct result of that gents illegal entry into Toy's apartment. Therefor, the drugs from Yee cannot be introduced against Toy, under the exclusionary rule.
If the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is no rational basis keep that evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the trial proceedings. Inevitable Discovery.
Wong Sun voluntarily went to the police department and voluntarily gave statements. Too attenuated from the poisonous tree to not be evidence.