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Arts and Humanities
metaphysics test 2
Terms in this set (47)
the ordering of events in terms of those events being past (or more past), present, or future (or more future).
An ordering of events in terms of their dates and times and permanent relations of being earlier than, later than and simultaneous with each other.
the B-facts ground the A-facts
it is not the case that the B-facts ground the A-facts tensed facts aren't grounded into tenseless facts
facts that attribute a location in the A-series to objects or events
facts that attribute a location in the b-series to objects or events
The truth maker objection to presentism and the A-Theory
1. Washington is the capital of the US now
2. We will go to the shore next summer
3. Washington is the capital of the US in 2015
4. We will go to the shore in the summer of the year after 2015
- If you change it to Washington is the capital of the US on February 25, 2015 at 9:28 it becomes a B-fact
- The B-facts don't fix they don't change it's still there, 1 would change and be untrue (A-facts)
- 1 is true because of 3 or 1 is a fact and it's a fact that's grounded in 3
dinosaurs once roamed the earth
- if you endorse the block universe view. Not saying they exist now but the do exist because they did
- if you're a presentist you don't think there are 2 senses of existence you don't think they would exist. All true sentences have truth makers.
-can't appeal to the past for a truth maker so it would be untrue, but it is true.
An Argument that Time travel is incoherent
the protagonist of the Time Machine travels from nineteenth century victorian England to the year 802,791. In minutes he is millennia from where he began but it's impossible to be both minutes and millennia from the same point in time.
external vs. personal time
a response to the time machine problem: there's 2 different types of time, one we're seeing and one we're not. External (millennia) and personal (minutes)
one dimensional vs. two dimensional time
one dimensional: time corresponds to a single axis.
two dimensional: time has two dimensions an x-axis and a y-axis usually when people talk about time travel they're assuming eternalism because in eternalize past present future exist- so you can travel to all of them. If times two dimensional then Kelly says changing the past is impossible and doesn't change future if you warn. the past will have always happened.
endurantism and endurance
endurance: a material object o endures from time t, to a later time t2 just in case there is some material object o1 that wholly exists at t1, there is some object o2 that wholly exists at t2, o=o1=o2
Endurantism: material objects persist through time by enduring
perdurance and perdurantism
perdurance: a material object o perdures from a time t1, to a later time t2 just in case o has a temporal part that wholly exists at t1 and o has another temporal part that wholly exists at t2.
perdurantism: material objects persist through time by perduring. Perdurantism has theoretical applicability- main argument for this.
three dimensionalism vs. four dimensionalism
three dimensionalism: while material objects have spatial parts, they never have temporal parts
four dimensionalism: in addition to spatial parts, material objects have temporal parts. Would be a contradiction if you went back to prevent death. If Bob died at 3 p.m. yesterday and then you travel back and prevent it, it is both true that Bob did and did not die at 3 p.m. yesterday.
perdurantism and puzzles (ship of theseus and lump and goliath)
- solves ship of theseus- it does not have to be identical to either. There's a hole composed of s1 and s2 and a hole composed of s2 and s3. they both deserve to be called the ship of theseus. Lump and Goliath temporally overlap.
there are objects that extend through space as well as time, and familiar, ordinary objects like lewis are temporal parts or stages of those four-dimensional objects
a statement is nomologically possible just in case its compatible with the laws of nature.
a statement is logically possible just in case the statement isn't contradictory in nature
De dicto Modality
concerns the modal status of statements- whether they're possible, necessary, or contingent
de re modality
concerns the modal status of features of individuals-whether an individual has a property necessarily or contingently
david lewis is a modal realist-says that the actual world is a maximally connected space-time regions, the possible world is just like the actual world, so they're equally real.
the possible worlds analysis of modality
1. It is possible that a is true just in case there is a possible world in which a is true.
2. it is necessary that a is true just in case a is true in all possible worlds
3. it is possible that a is true just n case (Ew)(a is true at w)
4. it is necessary a is true just in case (Aw)(a is true at w)
5. Had a not occurred, b wouldn't have occurred
6. the nearest possible worlds to the actual world in which a doesn't occur are worlds in which b doesn't occur.
possible worlds are literal universes (concrete objects). A possible world is a concrete object, a maximally connected space-time region. These objects represent maximal possibilities-maximal ways the world could be.
the multiverse hypothesis
you can't interact with them casually. At each moment there are multiple world splintering off. If you sit in the actual world, this alternate world splinters off where you're standing and another where you're lying down.
different types of nominalism
bad nominalism: properties are classes of their instances
better nominalism: properties are classes of their actual and possible instances
crazy pants nominalism: properties are their extensions across possible and impossible worlds
actualism vs. possibilism
actualism: everything that exists actually exists-there are no merely possible objects.
possibilism: at least some entities are non-actual- they're merely possible.
the possible worlds analysis: possibility and necessity are to be understood in terms of what is true (and false) at various worlds (including the actual world)
while there are possible worlds, they aren't regions of space time. Instead, they're constructions-they're constructed out of other things we're already committed to.
possible worlds are constructed out of other sentences or other linguistic entities.
1. possible worlds understood as linguistic items can do ll of the theoretical work that possible worlds understood as maximally connected regions of space-time that are spatiotemporally disconnected from us.
2. We have independent reasons to think that there are linguistic entities like sentences
3. we don't have independent reasons to think that there are maximally connected regions of space-time that are spatiotemporally disconnected from us.
4. Hence, all other things being equal, we should prefer linguistic ersatzism to modal realism.
if possible worlds are constructed out of linguistic items:
step 1. Pick a world- making language- call it 'L'
a lagadonial language is a language in which the objects described name themselves
- a book names itself
- then everything is named
step 2: construct maximally consistent sentences out of basic or atomic sentences
the simple regularity theory
an event a of type A causes an event b of type B just in case both a and b occur and A-type events are regularly followed by B-Type events
the nomic regularity theory
an event a of type A causes an event b of type B just in case a occurs and the laws of nature require that if an A-type event occurs then a B-type event occurs as well
the simple counterfactual theory
c causes e just in case c and e occur and c counterfactually determines e
just in case c not occurred e couldn't have occurred either
the revised counterfactual theory
c causes e just in case c and e occur and there is a chain of counterfactual determination connected c to e
the process running from the preempted cause is cut short after the main process has gone to completion and brought about the effect.
case 1: Billy throws a rock (A) later, Suzy throws a rock (B) Suzy's rock remains on course (c) the window breaks (D).
is supposed to fix case 1
the process running from the preempted alternative is cut short before the main process running from the preempting cause has gone to completion
case 2: suzy throws a rock (A) then, Billy throws a rock (B), Suzy's rock arrives first. The window shatters (C)
- there is no chain of counterfactual determination connecting A and C we would need A cd A
late vs. early preemption
even if suzy's rock didn't hit the window, Billy's rock still would've hitter it. That's why late preemption causes a problem that early does not. There is no counterfactual determination, so preemption shows the theory can't be right.
case 2 poses a problem for both simple and revived. Case 1 poses problem for simple not revised
being able to act in such a way that your desires are satisfied
having the ability not only to satisfy your desires but be the ultimate source of your desires as well.
incompatibilism and determinism
compatibilism and free will are compatible
determinism and free will are compatible
determinism and free will are incompatibilism
the laws of nature are such that, given any complete state of the universe at a time and facts about what the laws are like, it is possible in principle to deduce what the complete state of the universe will be like at a later time.
incompatibilism and free will
the consequence argument
1. There is nothing we can do now to change the past
2. There is nothing we can do now to change the laws of nature.
3. By (1) and (2), there is nothing we can do now to change the past or the laws of nature
4. If determinism is true then the past and the laws of nature determine our present actions
5. By (3) and (4), if determinism is true then there is nothing we can do now to change that which determines our actions.
6. By (5), if determinism is true the there is nothing we can do to change our present actions
7. By (6), if determinism is true then no one has the power to do otherwise than one actually does
8. free will requires the ability to do otherwise.
Lewis response to the consequence argument
Lewis says 6 is false, so it must be 6 doesn't follow from 5. Says 6 is true just in case there is no possible world in which you have something different for breakfast and everything before breakfast stays the same.
the future doesn't exist
the past doesn't exist
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