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Globalisation Readings/Key Terms

Terms in this set (104)

Policies for economic development are based on developed economic theories. However, these economic theories do not consider the local institutional environment of the economy. At the same time, "local conditions matter not because economic principles change from place to place, but because those principles come institution-free and filling them out requires local knowledge" (p 55). Thus, economic policies do not successfully translate into economic reality.

He draws his arguments from the economic growth rates of different types of economies around the world to show that the ideal economic policies, as derived from the Original Washington Concensus, do not acheive their economic goals. At the same time, the logic of the Washington Concensus holds up in solving the economic issues of Beijing, resulting in the failure of economic policies derived from these logically-sound ideal goals.

He also distinguishes the difference between igniting economic growth and sustaining economic growth. This distinction is important because policies needed for deeper and more extensive institutional reforms are long term and does not promote short term growth accelerations (igniting economic growth). At the same time, it is easier to implement such reforms needed for sustaining economic growth with short term growth accelerations. Thus, a two-pronged approach is needed, where "the two views differ in the importance they attach to prevailing, irremovable market imperfections and their optimism with regard to governments' ability to design and implement appropriate policy interventions." (p 44)
Globalization makes institutions necessary for efficiency and legitimacy of markets, contributing in large part to 20th-century economic growth. However, it also makes it harder to implement regulatory or redistributive institutions. This impacts developing nations, as their institutions are insufficient in a time where institutions are so needed. (p195)

Grider (1996) and Friedman (1999) imagine a seamless world market where nation-states have almost no power. The reality is that country borders and jurisdiction still matter, contributing to informal barriers and transaction costs. (p196-197)
Ideally, we would have a global "federal" politics, like in the US: the important debates happen at the federal level, not the state level. In the short run, however, we can have international standardization with opt-out clauses, allowing integration while leaving room for different national practices. (p196)

There is a political trilemma: out of being a nation-state (having sovereignty over a demarcated territory), having responsive mobilized political institutions ("global federalism"), and having integrated national economies, only a maximum of two can be pursued simultaneously. (p200, Fig7.1)

What he suggests is a recreation of the Bretton Woods compromise. Firstly, this compromise should accept the centrality of the nation-state in the short-term, with the long-term goal of global federalism. Secondly, it should have incentives for nation-states to voluntarily come together under the compromise and work towards convergence of national policies, rather than to abandon the compromise and "go alone". Thirdly, it should have an opt-out system in place, rather than try to implement rules that are flouted and ignored. (p204-205)
He writes, "technology is generating global convergence" (pp. 8-9) Technology increases the speed and access of trans boundary communication and movement. This transports not only people but also goods and ideas.

Technology improves quality of life. For example, solar paneled battery technology brings electricity to communities in remote African and Indian villages, enabling them to connect through mobile phones, small computers and the Internet. For example, the spread of knowledge, in particular to previously more isolated areas can directly mitigate disease spread, by spreading awareness of vaccinations and preventative practices.

The world is not only interconnected but also interdependent. "We live in one economic world" (pp. 8-9) because global trade in products and finance means that changes in one sector will affect others in the web. The issue of interdependence also touches on subjects like climate change where global cooperation is imperative because all nations hold a stake.

Technology can sensitize because it makes us aware and gives us a potential outlet for effecting change, for example Kony 2012 or disaster relief. In understanding that our actions affect others and vice versa technology can facilitate a shift from seeing within an organizational unit of nationality to acting in a way that upholds a "global ethic" (pp. 8-9), a shared global citizenship.

This relates back to this week's theme of international economic interdependence as it is because of technology that we can create complex webs of communication, cooperation and organization. Examples of such would be intergovernmental organizations and global agreements.
As the title suggests, they observe how Malaysia and Singapore take a bilateral approach to conflict resolution between the two states, despite the existence and encouragement of multilateral approaches through ASEAN, where both states are committed to its membership and development (pg. 277). The authors attribute the unusual relationship to the influence of realism in Southeast Asia, especially for Singapore. As they quote Michael Leifer (pg. 255): "The rhetoric of government [in Singapore] registers a belief in the premises of the realist paradigm in International Relations, whereby states are obliged to fend for themselves as best as they can in an ungoverned and hostile world." This certainly holds true given the state's limited resources, geopolitical size and surroundings, but from the perspective of Malaysia, "political realism dictates that... economic interdependency and broader regional/global interests are of greater concern... that bilateral relations and issues be downplayed and managed to mutual benefit" (pg. 256).

The political economy of the states' relationship tends towards both competition and complementarity, as shown in key bilateral conflict issues like the demand and supply of water, the Malaysian Railway land in Singapore, and sovereignty disputes over maritime territory like Pedra Branca. Competition and complementarity will continue to govern the relationship between the two states in a changing international political economy, though in an increasingly interconnected world, the need for a deepening of institutions and a redefinition of national sovereignty (pg. 281) may affect the present bilateral approach of these two states.
In this chapter, he defends globalization against claims that international economic integration has increased global inequality. He argues that the globalization may be associated with increased global inequality only because countries participating in global economy have experienced immense growth while those which did not participate have been left behind, which is not in principle a bad thing. He uses the examples of China (p.144), India and Bangladesh (p.145) to show how growth followed the liberalization of their economies, and explains a number of factors which limited other countries' abilities to partake in globalization (p.146) Wolf thus seems to agree with Rodrik in how success comes only to countries poised to take advantage of globalization.

he then proceeds to argue that while some statistics used by critics of globalization seem to imply that globalization has increased global inequality, it is only because the starting points of the different countries were already so drastically unequal. While inequality in absolute terms might be increasing, inequality between countries relative to the past is declining. (p. 156)

he then turns to measures of poverty (p.158) and indicators of human welfare (p.164) to show that globalization has positively impacted human welfare globally. He notes, however, that countries which withheld their participation in globalization benefitted far less.
Lastly, he argues that within developing countries, globalization has benefitted the poor (p.168). It is in developed countries that globalization has resulted in increased inequality (p.170); he argues, however, that this is no reason to dismiss it.
What exactly do we mean by globalization and anti-globalization? In this reading, they highlight the subjectivity of such terms by acknowledging that there is some truth in the statement, "globalization is what is made of it"(p.161).

They suggest that the globalization scholarship comes in four successive waves, namely "the theoretical, the historical, the institutional and the deconstructive" (p.162), which fundamentally demonstrate the non-linearity in its knowledge progress. These four waves are then further divided into two "dimensions of contention" (p.163), which are either "normative (cosmopolitan or communication)" (p.163) or "explanatory (globalist or sceptic)" (p.163).

As such, there are generally "four distinct modes of analysis" (p.163) that have overlapping similarities and interesting differences. As supporters of globalisation, the transformationalists define globalisation as a real existing cultural and political phenomenon that transcends economics; and although the critical globalists take globalization seriously, they see it to be another cosmopolitan phenomenon, which should be resisted. On the other hand, the statists, who are essentially sceptics of the idea of globalization, focus on the "centrality of state power to the improvement of human condition" (p.163). Intersecting the cosmopolitan and sceptics' views, the glocalists venture beyond the global and local distinctions to highlight their mutual imbrication, with a specific focus on "rooted cosmopolitan" (p.163).

The reading concludes that critical globalism provides an account regarding "coexisting alternative globalizations" (p.173). Ultimately, all such explanatory theories of globalization are fundamentally normative disagreements about its essential ethical nature.
In this chapter, he questions why globalization has not resulted in the alleviation of global poverty. The first counterargument is that the two largest developing economies, China and India, house half the world's poor, and they have experienced spectacular economic growth, which has resulted in poverty alleviation for them. The second counterargument is that those countries that did not benefit from globalization were those who did not follow the "rules" of globalization - integration with the world economy.

Thus, he clearly rejects Wolf's argument that globalization has benefitted the global poor. he then explains why - because of "inconvenient facts". He rejects a blanket rule for globalization, as those who accrue the most benefits from globalization are thus those who develop on their own terms, while taking advantage of world markets, like China and India.

He argues that the labour market, a resource that developing nations have in abundance of, continues to experience high barriers to trade, resulting in systemic barriers to entry for poorer nations to benefit from globalization. He posits that the reason for this is because beneficiaries from trade and economic liberalization such as MNCs have become more politically effective than those from international labour mobility.

He concludes that globalization is a system with rules, which are friendly to all stakeholders - particularly poorer nations. Because powerful countries set the rules, the interests of poorer nations are marginalized. Domestic politics is one obstacle to convincing the electorates of powerful countries to make room for the needs of poorer countries.
In this article he argues that advanced economies like the U.S. must restructure their own economies to accommodate the threat globalization on their economic power. Globalization is described as the "new technologies and management expertise [that] have reduced transportation and transaction costs and [lowered] tariffs and other man-made barriers to international trade" (28).

In the tradable sector employment becomes more assured the more educated the individual, while the non-tradable sector's opportunities decrease. he mentions that "employment opportunities available in the tradable sector is declining, which is limiting choices for U.S. workers in the middle-income bracket" (31). This increasing lack of diversification in the tradable sector coupled with an inability to compete with the convenience and lower price of developing countries could lead the U.S. towards more economic crises.

In general the tradable sector has become more stagnant in producing jobs, aside from the fields of "finance, computer design and engineering, and top management at multinational enterprises" (30). At the same a lack of aggregate demand and increased savings means that the non-tradable sector further suffers (37).

He concludes that the economy and unemployment issue will not be naturally solved as some believe. Rather the U.S. should begin making changes to facilitate a restructure of its economy. His beginning suggestions are: finding ways to stimulate competitiveness and inclusiveness in the economy, multistakeholders, improvement of the education system, "creating attractive employment opportunities conditional on educational success", investing in infrastructure, and tax structure reformation (38-41).
they critique the positive interpretations of financial globalization that have gained prominence in their time. By 'financial globalization', they mean countries loosening restrictions on foreign capital inflows and allowing others to hold a country's currency, which is different from foreign direct investment.

The authors argue that these claims are generalizations, and that financial globalization can in fact be harmful to some countries, by pushing up the exchange rate and reducing exports. A careful study of the evidence available shows that letting more money in does not clearly boost investment and economic growth, or strengthen institutions. The solution lies not in even more drastic reforms with long lists of pre-conditions, as Mishkin argues, but rather a more nuanced approach that takes the needs of the individual country into account.

they argue that "Poor countries are poor because there are many things wrong with them". They offer up an alternative explanation for low investment and growth; not lack of capital but lack of investment demand. This means that entrepreneurs don't want to invest because they don't think they will make a decent return. In these economies, allowing foreign money in will not boost growth, but will simply increase domestic consumption and push up exchange rates. At best, this will have no effect on economic growth and at worst it will harm the economy.

They conclude by saying that less is more, and that the role of policymakers should sometimes be to restrict, not encourage, capital inflows.
In this issue of the World Economic Outlook, the IMF looks at the impact of globalisation on inequality within countries. The main argument put forth by the report is that technological progress has had a greater impact on exacerbating inequalities within countries than globalisation has had on inequality within countries.

The argument for technology increasing inequalities is quite intuitive. Essentially, it reduces economies' dependence upon labour factors of production and thus capital/technology is increasingly valued higher than labour. This increases inequality as returns to capital and the scales achieved by technology increase and labour wage increases are kept low. The report is explicit in distinguishing between trade globalisation and financial globalisation, which helps us understand why (at least in the long-run) globalisation might not be impacting inequality as much as we think. The report sees trade globalisation as having a positive impact on inequality, with this set-off by increasing inequality caused by financial globalisation. This demonstrates how important it is not to see globalisation as one singular monolithic phenomenon. The report alludes further to the importance of this when arguing for the need to understand regional and sectoral dimensions of inequality and its relationship with globalisation', and for policies to be 'calibrated to specific countries' (p. 56).

Key Quotes:
- 'Technological progress has made the biggest contribution to rising income inequality over the past two decades' (p. 55)
- 'Globalisation has had a much smaller disequalizing impact overall, reflecting the offsetting positive impact from trade globalisation and a negative impact from FDI' (p. 55)

The main conclusion is that policies are needed to: (1) reduce barriers to trade as trade globalisation reduces inequality; (2) broaden access to credit; and (3) broaden access to education. These will allow benefits of globalisation to be shared more equally. Although technology and FDI might increase inequality, do not suppress them as they fuel growth and their negative impacts dissipate over time.
In this article, he argues against the critiques that skeptics have against globalisation and international capitalism. The first misunderstanding critiques have is that "stricter regulation of international business is not going to reduce profits: the costs will be passed along to consumers. And it is not going to diminish any company's interest in making profits."
This leads to the second misunderstanding on the effect of government intervention. Hebelieves that the liberal market does it job because it limits the forces of corruption. Thus, "especially in developing countries with weak legal systems, taming capitalism by regulation or trade protection often proves such a hazardous endeavour." As such, he does not think that intervening with the international economy against global integration is the solution to the ill-effects of globalisation. Instead, he believes that "Far from being the greatest cause of poverty, globalisation is the only feasible cure."

His critiques of globalisation skeptics is worth considering because he acknowledges that these skeptics draw their motivation and arguements against globalisation from the widespread poverty and resulting terrorism. His arguments show how intervention aimed at alleviating poverty would not solve the problem but rather, diminish the benefits of the free market and lead to political consequences. Overall, his arguments serves as a warning for NGOs hoping to diable markets, because of the fundamental profit-seeking nature of businesses that cannot be changed, and that over-regulation of the liberal market economy will hinder is ability to civilise the quest for profit "into an engine of social progress."
He argues that China is not the economic powerhouse we believe it to be. He makes his point by looking at four aspects of China's global economic footprint (1) global trade profile; (2) position in global energy markets; (3) overseas direct investment and MNCs and lastly; (4) aid programs. He believes that China is behind in every factor in comparison to the West.

Firstly, the global trade profile. China is known as the "workshop of the world." Most of its exports are manufactured goods as opposed to tertiary services. One key points is that China's microchips technology is still far behind Western giants. Next, China is very dependent on foreign energy sources, especially crude oil. China built several oil reserves to protect themselves from price fluctuations. Two interesting takeaways are Chinese refineries are also not very technologically advanced, and they tend to form partnerships with countries that are international political pariahs. Next, regarding overseas direct investment and MNCs, China is in an increasing amount of bilateral investment treaties (about 127). Chinese MNCs are not so great ( criticism from 187-193) and do not fill out this list ( page 185). He also talks about the backlash that Chinese companies face. A good number of Chinese people have been killed, kidnapped or terrorized in some fashion. This may be a result of (1) domestic unemployment and; (2) reigniting memories of colonialism and exploitation Lastly, because China is not part of the OECD, she does not have to comply with their rules of foreign aid. Most of China's foreign aid can be seen as foreign investment. Chinese foreign aid is not transparent to the public for fear of backlash from her citizens for not fixing their domestic problems first. China has a "no (political) strings attached policy" to its foreign aid, something he finds problematic because it undercuts goals and conditions of good governance and best practices—while rewarding some of the worlds most corrupt and repressive regimes
In this short and succinct piece, he shares his analysis on Singapore's intricate relationship with globalization, highlighting both the benefits and consequences of the link.

He makes note of the fact that while Singapore is home to the world's second-busiest seaport and sits at the top of a variety of world-rankings, the country was perhaps forced to make sacrifices in other arenas. In the beginning the complaints that Singapore lacks the "grittier authenticity" of other nearby Asian cities likely came from "the legions of foreigners who avail themselves of [Singapore]'s First World amenities"(2). However, more recently, local Singaporeans are beginning to join "in the second guessing about the price of development"(2).

Near the end of his piece, he seems to be pointing to the idea that this trade-off that Singapore may have made is not entirely unique. He writes that the sense of regret for culture sacrificed to the gods of progress is in fact a part of the "tensions inherent in globalization"(2). In order to succeed on the global economic stage, countries are often forced to conform to the already established patterns, leaving them with feelings of unease at having their "distinctive sense of place eroded"(2).

Interestingly enough, in the final words of his piece, he leaves the ponderings of his earlier remarks behind, neatly sidestepping the dilemma of 'progress towards the future or protection of the past'. He instead concludes that Singapore, "and its paternalistic, technocratic cosmopolitanism"(2), are perfect for the new age of global interdependence.
He claims that China is "a player in the global system of aid and development finance" (104) and that its "going global" strategy, especially focused in Africa, started as early as the 1980s and goes beyond a mere interest in natural resources.
China is interested in Africa because:
- Its fast growth and consequent use of natural resources makes Africa's natural resources "a growing attraction." (78)
- Its need "to convince other developing countries that China's rise would be peaceful and not zero-sum" (86)
- Its expanding economy needs new markets. (78)
In the 1980s, Western aid to Africa shifts from manufacturing and infrastructure to social development projects, leaving a vacuum that China filled (77). In 1995 China reforms its aid policy, shifting from direct aid to combining "aid to Africa, mutual cooperation, and trade together" and encouraging "join-venture investments in manufacturing and agriculture (80). He hence shows China as a country that is successfully, although unconventionally, going global through its mix of business and aid.

This contrasts Shambaugh's opinion that China's role in the economy and in the aid sector is not as remarkable and that the extent of its globalization is questionable. However, he notices, "the Chinese embrace of globalization, and the role aid would play in that embrace, would not look much like globalization viewed from the West" (75). What standards are we using when assessing China's globalization?

In the context of the imminent debate, is China's "going global" strategy and its impact on Africa a case in favour of globalization?
This chapter argues that forces of globalization have led to overall significant increases in agency and access to job opportunities for women. Changing economic demands have also led to a feminization of employment. Increasing trends in ICT (Information and communication technologies) coupled with computerization of new economic work has increased gender equality by removing emphasis on physical work (brawn), which levels the playing field for women.

The report argues that there is a positive relationship between trade and gendered labour force participation. Greater economic costs for gender inequality in an integrated world have created incentives for firms and states to move towards gender equality. Forces of globalization, which create demands for feminized employment, propels and strengthens internal and external pressure on gender norms within countries.

An integrated world creates global accountability that has real implications and costs for countries that ignore gender inequality. International treaties and economic agreements are the primary international system of checks and balances against gender discrimination, creating global conditions, which promote a shift to equal gender roles and norms.

The report thus highlights the role of globalization in creating conditions for gender equality, but emphasizes the need for public action to capitalize on these conditions to achieve gender equality. Public action is required to absolve existing differences that may hamper gender equality. Such arguments are similar to Rodrik and Wolf's, that it is the onus of countries to direct the impacts of globalization to achieve an objective, in this case, gender equality
This press release is concerned more with trends in globalization across the globe than the globalization of Singapore. It highlights first that Singapore's main strength in the global economy is its business-friendly environment with low and predictable tax rates, which leads to high levels of foreign direct investments.

The rest of the article moves on to describe general trends in globalization worldwide. It claims that increasing globalization among the majority of the world's leading economies, driven by technology and cross-border flow of ideas, creates new emerging players which compete with the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC, grouped together because they were at similar stages of newly advanced economic development). As non-BRIC rapid-growth markets emerge as hot spots for global business, leading companies are investing in both BRIC and non-BRIC economies using nuanced and customized strategies for different markets, areas, regions, sectors and countries.

The last section of the article concerns mature markets. A number of factors, such as high energy costs, have made near-sourcing a more favourable option than outsourcing for some global organization. The Innovation and exchange of technology and ideas also give developed markets an edge over emerging competing markets. A shift between import and export countries is thus expected, with rapid-growth markets emerging as stronger consumer markets and developed markets regaining strength as producers and exporters of goods and services.
This article suggests
1. Globalization is not a new feature. Rather, it is an old capitalist feature that has been repackaged and sold to the world.
2. In the last 500 years, globalization has followed a specific pathway which can be defined as "systemic cycles of accumulation." We're currently in an era that is an anomaly.

"The idea of globalization was from the start intertwined with the idea of intense interstate competition for increasingly volatile capital, and a consequent tighter subordination of most states to the dictates of capitalist agencies."

Globalization is characterized by its four systemic cycles of accumulation (1) rapid stable expansion of world trade and production, (2) crisis of over accumulation, (3) heightened competition, financial expansion, (4) eventual breakdown of the organizational structure on which the preceding expansion of trade and production had been based.

"In all past financial expansions, the declining power of the old organizing centers of world capitalism was matched by the rising power of new organizing centers capable of surpassing the power of their predecessors not just financially but militarily as well." However, during Cold War years in East Asia, USA maintained military dominance in Japan, Korea, Philippines and Taiwan, which allowed the nations to focus on expanding their economy.

"East Asia's geohistorical heritage of comparatively low reproduction and protection costs gave the region's governmental and business agencies a decisive competitive advantage in a global economy more closely integrated than ever before... for the time being the East Asian expansion has proceeded along a developmental path far more economical and sustainable than the US path."

Structural difference of power, US in control of guns, Japan and overseas Chinese in control of money, PRC in control of labor, suggests it is unlikely any single state will gain the ability to become a single global hegemon
East Asian countries like Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, China and Singapore during the period of the economic 'East Asian Miracle", integrated into the global economy by positioning themselves in a strategic way to take advantage of the requirements of a globalised market - easy exchange of capital, stability in the form of strong(sometimes draconian) rule of law, 'exchange rate policies to underpin export competitiveness', efficiency optimisation across sectors and minimal government intervention in the form or price distortions.

In achieving the growth they did, they needed to also catch up to the technologies and systems of established economies in the More Economically Developed Countries(MEDCs). To do this they had to rapidly quicken the pace of industrialisation and GDP growth so as to force domestic industries to upgrade and away from obsolesce and into adoption modern economic technologies and systems that were being developed and implemented in the MEDCs.

However, there was a downside to this massive growth. The use of exchange rate and fiscal policies coordinated to chase ever and ever larger growth targets was the primary cause for severity of the crisis, also contrary to popular rhetoric, total factor productivity(TFP) actually dropped as a result of this rapid industrialisation. Finally these East Asian countries, in 'direct(ing) credit and subsidies to build new subsectors' they perceived to be the most worthy of growth often were guilty of 'getting the prices wrong and subsidising industry for lengthy periods (that) have entailed high costs'
This essay by someone presents a case study of Iranian women who migrate to Dubai, UAE for work, opportunity, and the sex industry. Based on interviews and research with constituents from 2000 to 2007, she seeks to clarify that the two pronged view of the Iranian women, as either glamorous husband hunters or victimized products of human trafficking, is "international discourse based on hearsay"(540) (referring to UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons and the US 2006 Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP)) that is inaccurate and further endangers the women by:

Perpetuating informal migration via potentially abusive intermediaries and labor recruiters when tightening borders;
Rendering them vulnerable to corrupt police brutality and lack of social or health care, because of the UAE's lack of protection for non-citizens;
Limiting the scope of help available to untrained human rights police units who will "provide protection only if women are willing to testify against their "traffickers" (who often do not exist or with whom women have lost touch)" (545);
Perpetuating cultural imperialism a belief that these non-Western women are uneducated, lack agency and in desperate need of "saving".

She proposes investigation into the "socioeconomic and political structures that are leading women to migrate as well as the ways that we can improve migrant women's living and working conditions by addressing restrictive immigration policies and decriminalizing sex work" (545-546). This illustrates globalization as a perpetuator of inequality, where global governance agendas get in the way of aiding individuals and assessing local realities.
Greater economic integration and trade openness, technological advancements and diffusion in communications and greater access to information have been the forces of globalisation working through markets and institutions to alleviate the problem of gender inequality in many parts of the world.

Firstly, greater trade openness and the diffusion of new information and communication technologies (ICT) have both led to more jobs and stronger connections to markets for many women, as well as greater access to economic opportunities for women. Women are moving out of agriculture and into manufacturing and services.

Secondly, gender inequality has more costs in an integrated world, because gender inequality in a country would hinder the country's ability to compete internationally. This is particularly so for countries with export potential in goods and services with high female employment.

A greater access to information has also meant greater exposure to other cultures of the world and their different gender dynamics and norms, including those pertaining to women. With greater awareness of the fact that the gender inequality against women is definitely not a global norm and is not a default hierarchy of gender, there is a greater shift towards more egalitarian gender roles and norms. This has been further reinforced and facilitated by women's increasing economic empowerment.

However, it must be noted that in the absence of public policy, globalisation alone cannot and will not lead to decreased gender inequality in the long run, especially in societies where the entrenched barriers denying gender equality to women are greatest.
She presents a balanced account of the growing influences of both intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as agitators, architects and entrepreneurs in regard to global environmental governance as well as the corresponding problems that accompany such growth. Neil is fundamentally concern with the dynamic power matrix underpinning global environmental governance, specifically in regard to the influences of IGOS and NGOs in shifting the traditional roles of nation states.

As the dominant example of an IGO, the United Nations has created many instances of multilateral corporations between nation states since 1972 through environment-focused summits. The growing interconnectedness of networking has also enhanced critical information sharing between the secretariats (e.g. UNEP), leading scientists and environmentalists in creating pragmatic resolutions in tackling issues such as climate change amongst others.

On the other hand, through collective actions, NGOs serve as significant moral forces of environmental advocacy and whistle-blowers from the ground in ensuring the effectives of the respective implementations. On this note, they contribute to the efficacy and comprehensiveness of policies made by the states and IGOs. NGOs have also challenged the "business as usual" (46) framework by moving beyond operating within international treaties to" designing and constructing governance regimes" (46) in regard to environmental issues. This clearly highlights how globalization has facilitated the fluidity of governance as NGOs are stepping in to fill in governmental vacuums.

IGOs and NGOs are nevertheless challenged in terms of their limited capacities, abilities to maintain their legitimacy to a wider audience and novel interorganizational conflicts.
In his article, analyses the idea of international environmental justice against the backdrop of the North-South divide, particularly in the effectiveness and fairness of policies. He starts off by explaining how the differing problems that plague developed (North) and developing (South) countries make crafting international environmental policies especially difficult, which thus sparks the debate on how to go about doing so fairly. These policies, he highlights, are not independent of other considerations, such as the contrasting demographics of both camps (with developing countries having low income per capita, low literacy rates whilst the reverse is true of developed etc.), differing priorities and different standpoints.

The South argues that "the North should take the lead role in addressing global environmental problems" mainly because it arose due to their rapid industrialisation, and that they should lend assistance to the South so that the South would not have to "divert their limited resources from development to environmental issues". Anand points out that it is an economic myth on GDP growth which "coerces governments ... to support continued economic growth at any cost -- even the environment".

The article then shifts to the idea of environmental justice on both the national level, which is the idea that "low-income persons and communities of color have to bear disproportionate environmental burdens", and the international level, which focuses on distributive justice. Anand argues for applying the ideas of environmental justice more on an international level, which he says "may serve as a powerful tool for international environmental agenda-setting and decision-making, coalition building and mobilization amongst countries of the South".
Topic: They assess the potential for major emerging powers to exercise effective leadership in sustainable development diplomacy, marking a departure from the traditional focus on the economic significance of emerging economies.

Central argument: emerging powers exhibit significant potential to exercise effective leadership in global governance of sustainable development. They have demonstrated the political ambition to lead. However, although they are developing the capacity for joint action, emerging powers still lack policy cohesion. They argue that 'exerting actual global leadership would require building a stronger policy agenda' by emerging powers.

Summary of paper: They underscore the significance of emerging powers by arguing that the emergence of the BRICS and BASIC emerging powers challenges the traditional North/South divide in the area of global policy-making. The paper's introduction offers a summative review of the literature on the debate as to whether emerging nations are exerting influence in sustainable development policy-making or not and also gives an overview of the importance of emerging powers by elucidating their importance in terms of population, land area, energy consumption, trade and GDP. The paper then identifies the following three key elements of leadership: 1) policy-based; 2) structural; and (3) instrumental. The paper then assesses whether newly emergent nations exhibit these leadership qualities, analysing the countries' progress in increasing their abilities in each aspect and identifying their shortcomings and the factors which continue to inhibit their abilities to assert themselves successfully in these various ways. A common hindrance inhibiting the three elements of leadership is the incoherence between the different nations. Papa and Gleason argue that whilst Russia and India hold back the success of policy-based leadership, power politics within emergent nations weakens structural leadership, and that civil society is yet to ensure that sustainable development is at the top of the political agenda in emergent nations. As well as providing a practically beneficial analysis of the leadership potential of emerging powers, the paper claims to have implications for the theoretical debate on the rise of emerging powers in IR scholarship by arguing that 'a conceptual prerequisite for understanding [emerging powers'] long-term impact requires examining their ability to act jointly in complex multiparty settings and use their coalitions to exert leadership'. They note that emerging powers are doing particularly well in building their capacity for instrumental leadership through improved collaboration and preparation in ensuring joint positions.

This paper sophisticates the debate surrounding emerging economies and their significance, and adds nuance to the idea that emerging economies will gain more power as their economic significance increases; it's not as simple as that. Emerging economies' cannot rely solely on economic growth to secure greater power in policy-making. Strategic partnerships and coalitions, and their ability to cooperate will be equally important to this endeavour.
The problem posed in adapting to climate change, as apposed to preventing it

Based on the current research, they both believe that substantial changes in the earth's climate are likely; thus, they deem it necessary to work on climate change adaption policies that address the potential "climate refugees" that global warming may create.

In Depth:
The first challenge they cite is coming up with an agreed definition of a "climate refugee" that locates it in the current literature and discourse on migration, saying that current definitions of environmental refugees are too broad for this. The definition they offer is as follows: "people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate change: sea-level, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity."

They propose an estimate of the problem's scale and how well equipped global governance is to deal with it. They break down the migrants based on causes, specifically rising sea-levels (162mn), draughts (50mn) and floods (302mn without defence, but only 34mn with defences). They also state that draughts could leave 800mn suffering from water shortage and 100mn from food shortage; although they acknowledge that predictions of exact numbers are fraught with difficulties because of inconsistent definitions, unreasonable assumptions on human behaviour and a lack of clarity around motivations for migration. As for the systems dealing with these refugees, the authors note that all major conventions either do not cover climate refugees or cover them as part of a really broad definition, thus providing only marginal protection.

As for creating systems to protect climate refugees, the authors offer up their own blueprint. This blueprint advocates for permanent resettlement of climate refugees, tailored to the individual countries, with a reimbursement scheme for the locations of the resettlements and international assistance in offering domestic support. They say that these could be offered by many different institutions. As such, the authors advocate for a change to the legal regime and the creation of a number of international agencies to deal with climate refugee relocation. In particular, they finger the UN Development Program and the World Bank as two institutions that could serve as implementing agencies. As for funding, they suggest that all funds be provided on a grant basis from a new funding Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement Fund that reimburses all costs that developing countries are burdened with as a result of accepting these climate refugees, this would be determined by the UNFCCC Protocol on Recognition, Protection and Resettlement of Climate Refugees. They acknowledge that putting this process in place would inevitably have to overcome many hurdles.​
In this article, the authors argue that the issue of aggregate food production and the issue of food-distribution failure should be jointly studied. The link between the two issues is shown in the interactions between ecological and economic systems operating at localized levels. Policies hence need to target this link.

While world population has increased drastically since 1950, cereal production has more than kept pace and increased significantly. Human well-being and gross national product (GNP) per head has increased as a result. However, increases in agriculture production could be through exploiting the environment and impairing other ecosystem services. Such impairments can be unnoticed because there is no effective price system. By focusing on current welfare measures such as GNP, market prices of agricultural produce and life expectancy, the links that exist between population growth, increase material output and the state of the natural resource base could be ignored.

Obstacles exist in meeting the increase in food requirements with increase in food production. Many genetic resources needed to develop new crops are being destroyed. Ecosystems are under increasing threat. Fertilizers and pesticides harm the environmental and human health. Extreme climatic events could threaten food security. These obstacles vary in different regions. Measures to tackle food scarcity need to be tailored to local circumstances. Local environmental pressures exerted by growing populations will increase more than agricultural growth.

The authors suggest a host of new policies. These include "increased public investment in agriculture and in people in poor countries" which is directed at technologies and health and education institutions. Technical knowledge needs to be distributed to local populations. "Foresight institutions" could also be established to analyze important local trends in food production to inform policymaking. Honing local capabilities to collect and distribute information is also crucial to sustainable development measures.
They embark on a comprehensive review and analysis of the state of global food security today, listing many major challenges and detailing possible solutions to them. While the analysis is somewhat grim - as the authors say, "It is not far-fetched to describe the world's current state of [food security] as a collective crisis"- this reading should be taken as a timely and relevant reminder of the necessity for a radically different approach to food security in the twenty-first century.

The paper starts off with a definition of food security, which exists "when all people at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life." This is often summarized as the 3 A's - accessibility, affordability and availability. They then problematize and broaden this definition by introducing dimensions of sustainability and food sovereignty (the right for people to secure their own livelihoods in a sustainable manner). These are ''livelihood approaches" to food security, which "place food security in a wider web of human development, justice and environmental issues".

The authors describe three main challenges in the coming century: population growth, economic growth and climate change. They describe many specific trends within those challenges such as the following: the rise of biofuels, intensive agriculture, economic growth, shifts to meat-based diets, oligopolic markets and unfair trade regimes. All of these trends can negatively impact food security and increase the vulnerability of undernourished/poor people across the globe.

In response, the authors offer an equally broad array of solutions, from increasing the power of local farmers and associations, enshrining food security as a legal right, reforming corrupt bureaucracy, improving efficiency and implementation of farming methods, empowering women, to including civil society in policy-making. The authors wrap all of this up by calling for "climate resilient food systems that are integrated, diverse and efficient in terms of resource use, productivity and environmental impact."
The chapter illustrates a growing sentiment that Chinese businesses must conform to international standards of business operations or risk long-term losses. China aims to cultivate better CSR practices in overseas investments to deal with increased international scrutiny.

There are three main approaches: top-down, outside in and bottom-up. For top-down approaches, Beijing has passed several laws, utilized its banking systems, and ensured Chinese companies are well versed with laws of host countries invested in to cultivate better CSR practices. However, weak political will and structural flaws of the Chinese political system have resulted in a lack of strong institutional mechanisms to ensure actual compliance.

For outside in approaches, China is generally open to learning from and working with international actors. However, transforming Chinese business culture will require time because: 1) deep-rooted suspicions of efforts to promote CSR, 2) fears that increased transparency will discourage Chinese investments overseas, and 3) unwarranted scrutiny by Western media who sensationalize every blunder.

For bottom-up efforts, devastating social, health and environmental ramifications caused by Chinese enterprises have galvanized the Chinese public to pressurize the government through Internet activism and public protests. Also, worker safety (e.g. Sinohydro kidnapping) and corporate reputational damage overseas have caused public outcry for more government intervention, though government responses remains lukewarm.

The paper concludes that efforts to transform Chinese businesses remain incomplete primarily due to weak governance in China and host countries where China invests, which hinders actual compliance. Compliance may increase however, in developed nations where host governance is stronger.
In this chapter, he looks at how how geopolitics has evolved in the contemporary world. He argues that there are now two streams of geopolitics -- one stream pushing nation-states to cooperate, while the other stream pushing nation-states to compete. This is seen most saliently in Sino-US relations, which has been on the forefront of world geopolitics because of America's dominant position and China's rising one. Kissinger argued that a cooperative Sino-US relation is "essential to global stability and peace" and that it cannot be a zero-sum game. This is true, because as the world becomes increasingly globalised, states are becoming more interdependent. However, he attributes growing tensions between the US and China to the US' inability to accept the very possible reality that they will soon be overtaken by China. Politically, he argues, China is becoming more open-minded than America. He points out that "although China is still a somewhat politically closed society, [...] it is a closed society with an open mind. American my be an open society, but it is an open society with a closed mind." In fact, China has been far more successful in engaging the international community, signing and ratifying international agreements that the US has refused to sign, like the Kyoto Protocol. In that vein, he argues that in the globalised world, there is a real need to share national interests, instead of seeking only to protect one's own. He cites ASEAN as a success story -- from a troubled region with conflicting cultures, languages and interests to a regional powerhouse.
In this article they look to pose an alternative argument to the common 'multilateralism is undemocratic vs. multilateralism is practical' debate, i.e. that there is always a trade-off between democracy and pragmatism when it comes to multilateral institutions. Rather, they argue that multilateralism in some instances can "enhance the quality of national democratic processes." The authors begin by examining the current state of democracy in the world today and recognize that many are flawed, for example by being subject to dominance of special interests. Furthermore they acknowledge that they are committed to constitutional democracy rather than democracy identified by strict majority rule, with the motivation: "We adopt a constitutional conception of democracy because well-designed constitutional constrains enhance democracy."

They then identify three areas in which multilateralism is democracy enhancing. First, in combating special interests for example in trade (the WTO) and within the EU; second, by protecting individuals and minority rights through international courts and human right treaties; third, by fostering collective deliberation by providing transnational information, e.g. the IPCC. The authors, however, do recognize that multilateralism does not always promote democracy, and instead find that "In areas of the highest priority to the public, where relevant publics are very highly organized and attentive, multilateralism will tend to be subject to more direct participatory democracy, whereas where publics are less organized and attentive, nonparticipatory mechanisms will be used", e.g. social welfare and education vs. central banking and trade liberalization. Nevertheless, they conclude that "the net positive impacts, taking account of the pragmatic arguments for [multilateralism], may be significant."

This reading naturally ties into the course by debating the democratic, functional, and valuable aspects of global governance. I can also draw links between this reading and other areas, such as the debate in International Relations whether or not multilateral institutions are significant in the international arena.
In this chapter of Who Governs the Globe, they explore the idea of non-state actors influencing the governing of the world. They provide a variety of examples of non-state actors who have strong impacts on the world, such as the United Nations and the IMF, as well as organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

As a whole, they argue that the key to understanding the motivations and goals of these different agents can be found in a set of relationships. The first is the relationship between the governor and the governed. "Why the governed defer tells us a lot about how the governor will behave and when she will gain or lose authority"(Avant et al., 3). The other part of the set is the relationship between different governing actors, such as between the UN and Amnesty International. This second relationship is critically important because these non-state governors rarely act alone; they aim to harness each other and leverage each other in order to accomplish their own goals.
One reason that these governors can establish their authority and power is because of the spread of Globalization, an idea which affects much more than just the global economy.

"Environmental issues, particularly problems such as global warming, join the fates of people across the globe.5 Ideas about human rights became platforms for social connections with people across the globe as well as military intervention to protect them.6 Even security became identified with humanity as analysts, activists and states developed and implemented conceptions of 'human security'" (5)

He also identify five methods that governors use to establish their authority in the international sphere: institutional, delegated, expert, moral, and efficacious. They also relate to other non-state actors in four particular ways: through the establishment of hierarchies, contracts, networks and systems of delegation.

Hierarchies help to organize the power dynamic in the international scene by establishing clear authority of certain groups over others. "Explicit hierarchies of law inside the European Union, for example, create hierarchical relations between various courts and judges" (27). Contracts, on the other hand, are much more fluid because they allow corporations or NGOs to respond more specifically to new challenges that are "often harder to generate with existing relationships of delegation", due to bureaucracy or tradition. However, this flexibility also comes at a price of legitimacy and accountability. Thus, networks provide a similar but less structured and less hierarchical example of contracts, in that they concentrate like-minded actors in order to work together to devise solutions to potential problems. Lastly, systems of delegation are in fact found throughout all of these other 3 categories, as they are structures that pave the way for progress. Without systems of delegation, hierarchies would lose their structure, contractors would lose efficiency, and networks would lose coherency and clarity amongst their members.

This reading provided a clear portrayal of how globalization has changed the stage of international politics, by altering the definition of governors. Now non-state actors can have nearly as much influence as, and sometimes more than, certain nations, as they can derive their power from more than one population. Like in the case of Amnesty International, human rights activists exist all over the world, forming a network of motivated agents of change who influence their respective countries from the inside out. In the future, perhaps these new actors will surpass the traditional governors in terms of power and influence around the globe.