Juicy Oranges, Inc. received an e-mail from Alison Adams providing her credit card number and ordering five crates of oranges, worth $272. When the shipment was delivered, Alison claimed she never sent the e-mail and refused to pay. If you were the judge in this case, would you rule in favor of Alison or Juicy Oranges, Inc.?

See, Inc. is an American corporation that sells eyewear over the Internet on its Web site, seeeyewear.com, which it registered as a domain name in 1998. See, Inc. owns federal trademarks on SEE and SEE SELECTIVE EYEWEAR ELEMENTS. See, Inc. has also filed for a trademark on SEE EYEWEAR. The Defendant, Imago Eyewear Party, Ltd., is an Australian company that also sells eyewear over the Internet. Imago uses the Web site “seeyewear.com” to sell its products. This Web site domain name was registered in 2002. Image has filed for a United States trademark on SEEYEWEAR. See, Inc. sued Imago Eyewear in Michigan Federal Court. See, Inc. claimed that Imago, by using the Web site seeyewear.com, had violated Federal trademark law and Michigan’s unfair trade practices statutes. Imago argued that there is no jurisdiction for See, Inc. to sue in Michigan. Imago argued that See, Inc. is an Australian corporation and that, although Michigan residents can access its Web site on the Internet, no Michigan resident has every contacted See, Inc. via its Web site. Therefore, a U.S. Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case. Source: See, Inc. v. Imago Eyewear Party, Ltd., 167 Fed.Appx. 518 (6th Cir. 2006)

Can See, Inc. sue Imago Eyewear in Michigan?

se the graph to determine which country has a comparative advantage in producing each good.

Comparative advantage Comparative advantage in wheat production in textile production

a. Country A Country B

b. Country A Country A

c. Country B Country A

d. Country B Country B

e. Country A Neither Country

A computer hacker, Raoul, broke into computer systems at several businesses for fun. He did not do any damage, but he was caught and put on probation. After a year, he was hired to work at a computer security firm helping to stop hackers.

Does it send the wrong message to computer hackers that they can get good jobs after committing crimes?

Cyrus is an executive assistant at GenCom. His boss asks him to type a press release announcing that Gencom will soon merge with Billcom. That night, he discusses the merger with his aunt, who is a business journalist. She then buys 1,000 shares of GenCom, and, after the news is released, makes $20,000 in stock price gains.

Did Cyrus engage in insider trading by discussing the merger?

Luca filed to incorporate his company. He was told that the charter was in the mail. He began his business. Later, when he was sued for an accident, he learned that thestate had never mailed the incorporation charter and he was not protected. If you were the lawyer for Luca, would you defend him by saying that he was told that his business was incorporated?

Mark registered the business name Crazy Cookies, but did not open his bakery right away. When Ruth later opened Crazy Cool Cookies, Mark sued her for infringing on his registered business name. Should Ruth be allowed to use the business name? Why or why not?

Dorothy Bearley worked 22 hours a week as a bookkeeper for Friendly Ice Cream Corporation (Friendly’s) in Dunmore, PA, and 18 hours a week for the Friendly’s district that covered Dunmore. This amounted to full-time employment. She also worked a few hours a week as a hostess in the Dunmore restaurant. On July 5, 2000, Ms. Bearley informed her boss that she needed to undergo toe surgery. Her boss granted her medical leave, but informed her that while she was gone, Friendly’s bookkeeping functions were going to be automated. Upon returning to work in August, Ms. Bearley discovered that much of her job had been automated and her bookkeeping hours reduced. Friendly’s offered Ms. Bearley 22 hours bookkeeping, 13 hours food preparation, and three hours hostessing. Ms. Bearley rejected the offer and sued Friendly’s, claiming it had violated the Family Medical Leave Act by not reinstating her to a position equal to her previous one Source: Bearley v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 322 F.Supp.2d 563 (M.D. Pa. 2004)

Was Friendly’s offer acceptable under the law?

What Is Implied Agency? On April 25, 1997, Julius Prioleau applied for auto insurance with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company for himself and his wife, Paula. Ms. Prioleau was not with Mr. Prioleau at the time. While at the insurance agent’s office, Mr. Prioleau declined to purchase additional uninsured and underinsured automobile coverage and signed a form stating his decision. On February 3, 1998, Ms. Prioleau was involved in an automobile accident. She suffered bodily injuries in the accident and made a claim against the other driver. The other insurance company paid Ms. Prioleau the amount allowed under that driver’s policy, but it did not cover all of her medical expenses. Ms. Prioleau then made a claim with Nationwide for underinsured motorist insurance. Nationwide claimed that she did not have underinsured coverage because her husband, acting as her agent, had declined it. Ms. Prioleau argued that she did not decline the coverage, and her husband could not make that decision for her. Source: National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Prioleau, 597 S.E.2d 165 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004)

Was Julius Prioleau the agent of Paula Prioleau?

During the early 1980s, Craig Allen and his wife formed Amedas, Inc. to sell medical goods manufactured by Designs for Vision, Inc. (DVI). Mr. Allen contacted a former coworker, Edward Brown, about selling DVI goods for Amedas. Mr. Brown entered into a sales representative agreement with Amedas.The agreement provided that Mr. Brown was to devote full time and to promote the best interests of Amedas. The agreement also stated that Mr. Brown was not allowed to represent any other company during the life of the agreement and that Mr. Brown would receive a ten percent commission for his sales. In 1985, DVI told Mr. Allen that Amedas would no longer be able to sell DVI products. Mr. Brown had secretly been meeting with DVI about selling DVI on his own, and DVI decided to give him the exclusive sales contract. Amedas then sued Mr. Brown, claiming he violated his sales agreement. At issue before the court was whether Mr. Brown was an independent contractor or agent of Amedas. Source: Amedas, Inc. v. Brown, 505 So.2d 1091 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987)

Was Mr. Brown an agent of Amedas?

Men’s Fitness Center

Archer & Bower Architects received a contract to design two fitness centers—a men’s and a women’s—in a new housing tract. The company insists that it must hire a male architect to work on the men’s center and a female to work on the women’s center.

You Debate Can the company make a case for bona fide job qualifications?

Can Student Loans Be Discharged in Bankruptcy? In July 1991 Robert Ardis consolidated his student loans into one loan totaling $23,756. He made 14 payments totaling approximately$2,700 until August, 1994, when he stopped paying the loan. In April of 1995, his account went into default. Ten years later, in 2005, the amount, with interest, had increased to $70,600. In 2005, Mr. Ardis sought to have his student loan debt discharged in bankruptcy. He had previously filed for bankruptcy in 1995 and 2003. Both times, the bankruptcy court declined to discharge his student loans. Mr. Ardis, a single father, worked as a teacher at an annual salary of$40,000 and did not anticipate any salary increases in the near future. His offer to pay a lump sum of $8,000 was rejected. Student loan debt is not normally dischargeable in bankruptcy, but can be if the debtor demonstrates three things: 1) that the debtor could not maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay the loans; 2) that the debtor’s financial situation is likely to persist into the future; and 3) the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loan.

Source: Ardis v. Educational Management Corp., 2006 WL 931563(D.S.C. 2006)

Should Mr. Ardis’s student loan debt be discharged?

Mariann Patzka was enrolled at Viterbo College in Wisconsin. She incurred debt in the amount of $3,530.16 during her first semester. At that time, Ms. Patzka was not informed of any fees she could be charged if she did not pay in full by the first day of classes. Interest charges came to$2,253.55, making the total amount due $5,783.71. Ms. Patzka paid$1,509.55 to Viterbo College, but still owed $4,274.16.College assigned the debt to a collection agency, Security Credit. Prior to doing so, the College assessed Ms. Patzka a collection fee of 33% ($1,410.47), making the total amount due $5,684.63. Ms. Patzka made payments to Security Credit in the amount of$4,284.63. Ms. Patzka now argues that she does not owe the remaining $1,400 because her account was an open-end credit account and she was never informed of the potential charges and fees when credit was extended as required under the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Source: Patzka v. Viterbo College, 917 F.Supp.654 (W.D. Wis. 1996)

Does Ms. Patzka need to pay the remaining$1,400?

(In 1984, John and Evelyn Leavings contracted with Solar Marketing to have a heating system installed in their home. The Leavings signed a note with Solar Marketing to make 120 monthly payments in the amount of $146.82 each. Solar Marketing then placed a lien on the Leavings's property. Solar Marketing assigned the note and lien to Briercroft Service Corporation (BSC). BSC, in turn, assigned the note and lien to Briercroft Savings Association (BSA). After numerous problems with the system, the Leavings stopped making payments. BSC sent a letter in 1989 advising the Leavings that their note was in default. The Leavings's attorney responded to BSC. BSC did not pursue demands for payment any further.In 1997, after Mr. Leavings had died, Mrs. Leavings received a letter from a Mr. James Mills. The letter stated that Mrs. Leavings's installment contract had fully matured and she must pay$21,196 immediately or Mr. Mills would foreclose on her property. Mrs. Leavings argued that Mr. Mills could not foreclose on the property because the contract was not payable "to bearer" or "to order" and thus was not a negotiable instrument. Source: Leavings v. Mills, 175 S.W.3d 301 (Tx. Ct. App. 2004)

Is the retail installment contract a negotiable instrument?