Service of Process. Dr. Kevin Bardwell owns Northfield Urgent Care, LLC, a Minnesota medical clinic. Northfield ordered flu vaccine from Clint Pharmaceuticals, a licensed distributer of flu vaccine located in Tennessee. The parties signed a credit agreement that specified that any disputes would be litigated in the Tennessee state courts. When Northfield failed to pay what it owed for the vaccine, Clint Pharmaceuticals filed a lawsuit in Tennessee and served process on the clinic via registered mail to Dr. Bardwell, the registered agent of Northfield.

Bardwell's wife, who worked as a receptionist at the clinic and handled inquiries on the clinic's Facebook site, signed for the letter. Bardwell did not appear on the trial date, however, and the Tennessee court entered a default judgment against Northfield. When Clint Pharmaceuticals attempted to collect on the judgment in Minnesota, Bardwell claimed that the judgment was unenforceable. He asserted that he had not been properly served because his wife was not a registered agent. Should the Minnesota court invalidate the Tennessee judgment? Was service of process proper, given that the notice was mailed to the defendant medical clinic and the wife of the physician who owned the clinic opened the letter? Explain. [Clint Pharmaceuticals v. Northfield Urgent Care, LLC, $2012$ WL $3792546$ (Minn.App. $2012$).] (See Pretrial Procedures.)

.Appellate, or Reviewing, Courts. Angelica Westbrook was employed as a collector for Franklin Collection Service, Inc. During a collection call, Westbrook told a debtor that a $\$15$ processing fee was an "interest" charge. This violated company policy. Westbrook was fired. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which the Mississippi Department of Employment Security (MDES) approved. Franklin objected. At an MDES hearing, a Franklin supervisor testified that she had heard Westbrook make the false statement, although she admitted that there had been no similar incidents with Westbrook. Westbrook denied making the statement, but added that if she had said it, she did not remember it. The agency found that Franklin's reason for terminating Westbrook did not amount to the misconduct required to disqualify her for benefits and upheld the approval. Franklin appealed to a state intermediate appellate court. Is the court likely to uphold the agency's findings of fact? Explain. [Franklin Collection Service, Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Employment Security, $184$ So.$3$d $330$ (Miss.App. $2016$)] (See The State and Federal Court Systems.)

Angelica Westbrook was employed as a collector for Franklin Collection Service, Inc. During a collection call, Westbrook told a debtor that a $15 processing fee was an “interest” charge. This violated company policy. Westbrook was fired. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which the Mississippi Department of Employment Security (MDES) approved. Franklin objected. At an MDES hearing, a Franklin supervisor testi- fied that she had heard Westbrook make the false statement, although she admitted that there had been no similar incidents with Westbrook. Westbrook denied making the statement, but added that if she had said it, she did not remember it. The agency found that Franklin’s reason for terminating Westbrook did not amount to the misconduct required to disqualify her for benefits and upheld the approval. Franklin appealed to a state intermediate appellate court. Is the court likely to uphold the agency’s findings of fact? Explain. [Franklin Collection Service, Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Employment Security, 184 So.3d 330 (Miss.App. 2016)] (

Arbitration. PRM Energy Systems owned patents licensed to Primenergy to use in the United States. Their contract stated that "all disputes" would be settled by arbitration. Kobe Steel of Japan was interested in using the technology represented by PRM's patents. Primenergy agreed to let Kobe use the technology in Japan without telling PRM. When PRM learned about the secret deal, the firm filed a suit against Primenergy for fraud and theft. Does this dispute go to arbitration or to trial? Why? [PRM Energy Systems v. Primenergy, $592$ F.$3$d $830$ ($8$th Cir. $2010$)] (See Alternative Dispute Resolution.)

Mark Ramun worked as a manager for Allied Erecting and Dismantling Co., where he had a tense relationship with his father, who was Allied’s president. After more than ten years, Mark left Allied, taking 15,000 pages of Allied’s documents on DVDs and CDs, which constituted trade secrets. Later, he joined Genesis Equipment & Manufacturing, Inc., a competitor. Genesis soon developed a piece of equipment that incorporated elements of Allied equipment. How might business ethics have been violated in these circumstances? Discuss. [Allied Erecting and Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Equipment & Manufacturing, Inc., 511 Fed.Appx. 398 (6th Cir. 2013)] (See Business Ethics.)

A Question of Ethics-The IDDR Approach and Arbitration. John McAdams is a tenured professor of political science at Marquette University. McAdams posted a comment on his blog criticizing Cheryl Abbate, a philosophy instructor, for ber interchange with a student in her Theory of Ethics class. Lynn Turner, also a member of the faculty, expressed a negative opinion of McAdams's comment in a letter to the Marquette Tribune. Meanwhile, on Abbate's complaint, the university convened the Faculty Hearing Committee (FHC)_which consists entirely of faculty members, including Turner-to consider the case. Acting on the FHC's recommendation, Marquette suspended McAdams for a semester without pay and ordered him to apologize to Abbate. He refused, and filed a suit in a Wisconsin state court against Marquette. [McAdams v. Marquette University, $383$ Wis.$2$d $358$, $914$ N. W.$2$d $708$ $(2018$)] (See Alternative Dispute Resolution.)

• Apply the IDDR approach to consider the ethics of Marquette's convening of the FHC in McAdams's case.
• From a legal perspective, was the university's disciplinary procedure the functional equivalent of arbitration, limiting McAdams's right to litigate his claim in court? Explain.

Spotlight on AOL-Common Law. AOL, LLC, mistakenly made public the personal information of $650,000$ of its members. The members filed a suit, alleging violations of California law. AOL asked the court to dismiss the suit on the basis of a "forum-selection clause" in its member agreement that designates Virginia courts as the place where member disputes will be tried. Under a decision of the United States Supreme Court, a forum-selection clause is unenforceable "if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought." California courts have declared in other cases that the AOL clause contravenes a strong public policy. If the court applies the doctrine of stare decisis, will it dismiss the suit? Explain. [Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2009)] (See The Common Law Tradition.)

PRM Energy Systems owned patents licensed to Primenergy to use in the United States. Their contract stated that “all disputes” would be settled by arbitration. Kobe Steel of Japan was interested in using the technology represented by PRM’s patents. Primenergy agreed to let Kobe use the technology in Japan without telling PRM. When PRM learned about the secret deal, the firm filed a suit against Primenergy for fraud and theft. Does this dispute go to arbitration or to trial? Why? [PRM Energy Systems v. Primenergy, 592 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 2010)]

Best Buy, a national electronics retailer, offered a credit card that allowed users to earn “reward points” that could be redeemed for discounts on Best Buy goods. After reading a newspaper advertisement for the card, Gary Davis applied for, and was given, a credit card. As part of the application process, he visited a Web page containing Frequently Asked Questions as well as terms and conditions for the card. He clicked on a button affrming that he understood the terms and conditions. When Davis received his card, it came with seven brochures about the card and the reward point program. As he read the brochures, he discovered that a $59 annual fee would be charged for the card. Davis went back to the Web pages he had visited and found a statement that the card “may” have an annual fee. Davis sued, claiming that the company did not adequately disclose the fee. [Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2012)] (See Business Ethics.)

(b) The Truth-in-Lending Act requires that credit terms be clearly and conspicuously disclosed in application materials. Assuming that the Best Buy credit-card materials had sufficient legal disclosures, discuss the ethical aspects of businesses strictly following the language of the law as opposed to following the intent of the law.

Ronald Metzgar placed his fifteen-month-old son, Matthew, awake and healthy, in his playpen. Ronald left the room for five minutes and on his return found Matthew lifeless. A toy block had lodged in the boy's throat, causing him to choke to death. Ronald called $911$, but efforts to revive Matthew were to no avail. There was no warning of a choking hazard on the box containing the block. Matthew's parents hired an attorney and sued Playskool, Inc., the manufacturer of the block, alleging that the manufacturer had been negligent in failing to warn of the block's hazard. Playskool filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the danger of a young child's choking on a small block was obvious. Using the information presented in the chapter, answer the question.

Suppose that the judge denied Playskool's motion and the case proceeded to trial. After hearing all the evidence, the jury found in favor of the defendant. What options do the plaintiffs have at this point if they are not satisfied with the verdict?

Stephen Glass made himself infamous as a dishonest journalist by fabricating material for more than forty articles for The New Republic magazine and other publications. He also fabricated supporting materials to delude The New Republic’s fact checkers. At the time, he was a law student at Georgetown University. Once suspicions were aroused, Glass tried to avoid detection. Later, Glass applied for admission to the California bar. The California Supreme Court denied his application, citing “numerous instances of dishonesty and disingenuousness” during his “rehabilitation” following the exposure of his misdeeds. How do these circumstances underscore the importance of ethics? Discuss. [In re Glass, 58 Cal.4th 500, 316 P.3d 1199 (2014)] (See Business Ethics.)

The Commerce Clause. Regency Transportation, Inc., operates a freight business throughout the eastern United States. Regency maintains its corporate headquarters, four warehouses, and a maintenance facility and terminal location for repairing and storing vehicles in Massachusetts. All of the vehicles in Regency's fleet were bought in other states. Massachusetts imposes a use tax on all taxpayers subject to its jurisdiction, including those that do business in interstate commerce, as Regency does. When Massachusetts imposed the tax on the purchase price of each tractor and trailer in Regency's fleet, the trucking firm challenged the assessment as discriminatory under the commerce clause. What is the chief consideration under the commerce clause when a state law affects interstate Commerce? Is Massachusetts's use tax valid? [Regency Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, $473$ Mass. $59$, $42$ N.E.$3$d $1133$ ($2016$)] (See The Constitutional Powers of Government.)

Discovery. Advance Technology Consultants, Inc. (ATC), contracted with RoadTrac, LLC, to provide software and client software systems for the products of global positioning satellite (GPS) technology being developed by RoadTrac. RoadTrac agreed to provide ATC with hardware with which ATC's software would interface. Problems soon arose, however. ATC claimed that RoadTrac's hardware was defective, making it difficult to develop the software. RoadTrac contended that its hardware was fully functional and that ATC had simply failed to provide supporting software.

ATC told RoadTrac that it considered their contract terminated. RoadTrac filed a suit in a Georgia state court against ATC alleging breach of contract. During discovery, RoadTrac requested ATC's customer lists and marketing procedures. ATC objected to providing this information because RoadTrac and ATC had become competitors in the GPS industry. Should a party to a lawsuit have to hand over its confidential business secrets as part of a discovery request? Why or why not? What limitations might a court consider imposing before requiring ATC to produce this material? (See Pretrial Procedures.)

** Equal Protection**. Abbott Laboratories licensed SmithKline Beecham Corp. to market an Abbott human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) drug in conjunction with one of SmithKline's drugs. Abbott then increased the price of its drug fourfold, forcing SmithKline to increase its prices and thereby driving business to Abbott's own combination drug. SmithKline filed a suit in a federal district court against Abbott. During jury selection, Abbott struck the only self-identified gay person among the potential jurors. (The pricing of HIV drugs is of considerable concern in the gay community.) Could the equal protection clause be applied to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in juryActi selection? Discuss. [SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, $740$ F.$3$d $471$ ($9$th Cir. $2014$)] (See Due Process and Equal Protection.)